Glendenning v Goodwin

Case [2018] QDC 15


DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: 

Glendenning v Goodwin & Anor [2018] QDC 15

PARTIES: 

AMY JANE GLENDENNING (Applicant)

v

ALYSSA GOODWIN (First Respondent)

AND

RACQ INSURANCE LIMITED (ABN 50 009 704 152) (Second Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

245/18

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT: 

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

22 February 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE: 

5 February 2018

JUDGE:

Porter QC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The originating application be dismissed.

2.   The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of

the application on a standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE — MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – PERSONAL INJURY OR FATAL ACCIDENT PROCEEDINGS – PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS – where proceedings brought pursuant to Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 — where act requires compulsory conference — whether time and date for compulsory conference should be fixed by the court.

Legislation
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) ss 37, 39, 41, 45, 47, 51A, 51B, 51D

Cases
Gitsham v Suncorp Metway Insurance Limited
[2002] QCA 310
Parker v Ford
[2011] QDC 163
Terence Choi v Collansi & Anor [2002] QCA 441
Verstappen v Fordyce [2004] QSC 149

COUNSEL:

A Harris for the applicant

SOLICITORS:

Law Qld Injury Claims Solicitors for the applicant

Jensen McConaghy Lawyers for the second respondent  

Summary

  1. The applicant, Mrs Glendenning, was injured in a car accident which occurred on 19 June 2017 involving a Ford Falcon, of which her husband was the driver and a Ford Fiesta, of which the first respondent was the driver.  Her husband was also injured in the accident.

  2. It is common ground that the Glendennings each delivered a proper Notice of Accident Claim Form under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) (the Act) to the Second Respondent (RACQ) by about 8 August 2017.  On 11 August 2017, RACQ admitted liability in respect of both claims.

  3. Prior to bringing proceedings for damages for personal injury arising out of the accident, section 51A of the Act requires a conference between the parties to occur with the view to settling the claim. By her originating application, Mrs Glendenning applies to the Court under section 51A(5)(a) of the Act to fix the time and place for the compulsory conference as 26 March 2018 in the applicant’s solicitors’ board room. Identical relief is sought by Mr Glendenning in proceedings 244/18. Mr Glendenning’s application is made on materially identical grounds.

  4. On 5 February 2018, I dismissed both applications with costs. I did so for the following reasons.

Statutory Scheme

  1. Section 51A is part of a broader statutory regime enacted by the Act which is relevant to the disposition of this application.

  2. The starting point is section 3 of the Act which, relevantly, includes as an object “to encourage the speedy resolution of personal injury claims resulting from motor vehicle accidents”. 

  3. That object is sought to be advanced, inter alia, by the pre-Court procedures outlined in Part 4, particularly Division 3, (Claim procedures), Division 4 (Co-operation between claimant and insurer); Division 5 (Enforcement of obligations) and Division 5A (Compulsory…

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Details
AGLC
Glendenning v Goodwin [2018] QDC 15
Case
[2018] QDC 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Glendenning v Goodwin involves proceedings initiated under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994. Glendenning, the applicant, sought a determination on the scheduling of a compulsory conference, a mandatory step required by the Act, which Goodwin, the second respondent, contested. The dispute was heard by the relevant court, which was tasked with resolving the procedural issue regarding the timing and date for the compulsory conference.

The legal issue before the court was whether the time and date for the compulsory conference should be determined by the court, as requested by the applicant, or left to the parties to agree upon. This question was pivotal in understanding the procedural framework of the Act and the respective roles of the court and parties in such proceedings.

In its reasoning, the court determined that the compulsory conference should be left to the parties to agree upon, rather than being fixed by the court. The court held that the statutory requirement for a compulsory conference did not mandate judicial intervention in setting its timing and date. Consequently, the applicant's originating application was dismissed, and the court ordered that the applicant pay the second respondent's costs of the application on a standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of

the application on a standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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