Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson; Uhr v Nicholson

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd v Nicholson; Uhr v Nicholson [2023] QCA 119

PARTIES:

In Appeal No 414 of 2023:

CARBOROUGH DOWNS COAL MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(appellant)
v
SIMON NICHOLSON (WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTOR)
(first respondent)
ACTING MAGISTRATE ATHOL KENNEDY
(second respondent/not a party to the appeal)

In Appeal No 425 of 2023:

RUSSELL CLIVE UHR
(appellant)
v
SIMON NICHOLSON (WORK HEALTH AND SAFETY PROSECUTOR)
(first respondent)
ACTING MAGISTRATE ATHOL KENNEDY
(second respondent/not a party to the appeal)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 414 of 2023
Appeal No 425 of 2023
ICQ No 17 of 2022
ICQ No 18 of 2022

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Industrial Court of Queensland – [2022] ICQ 34 (Davis J)

DELIVERED ON:

2 June 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 May 2023

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Flanagan and Boddice JJA

ORDERS:

In Appeal No 414 of 2023:

1.   The appeal be dismissed.

2.   The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.

In Appeal No 425 of 2023:

1.   The appeal be dismissed.

2.   The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE – EXTENSION OF TIME – GENERALLY – where the primary judge granted the first respondent an extension of time under s 46(1)(b) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) to commence applications for prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari – where the appeal is limited by s 554(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) to the ground of error of law or excess, or want, of jurisdiction – where the appellants submit that the primary judge made errors of law – where the primary judge did not misdirect himself as to the applicable principles – where the error of law must therefore be an error in the primary judge’s application of the applicable principles – where the primary judge considered whether there was an acceptable explanation for delay – where the primary judge considered whether it was fair and equitable in the circumstances to grant the extension – where the primary judge calculated the period of delay in seeking relief in the nature of certiorari – where the primary judge considered whether there was any evidence of prejudice that would impact the ability to achieve a fair trial – whether the primary judge, in exercising the discretion to extend time, made an error of law

Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld), s 34, s 255(1)
Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 424(1)(e), s 554(1), s 556
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 43, s 46

Batterham v QSR Ltd (2006) 225 CLR 237; [2006] HCA 23, cited
Chibanda v Chief Executive, Queensland Health & Anor [2018] QSC 128, cited
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441; [1993] FCA 498, cited
Gore v Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2022] ICQ…

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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd and Mr Russell Uhr, appealed against the primary judge's decision to grant the first respondent, Mr Nicholson, an extension of time to commence applications for prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari. The Queensland Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeals, held that the primary judge did not make any errors of law in exercising the discretion to extend time. The appeals were limited to the grounds of error of law or excess, or want, of jurisdiction under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). The appellants contended that the primary judge erred in finding that there was no evidence of prejudice impacting the ability to achieve a fair trial, but the court found that the primary judge's finding was factually accurate and appropriately considered all relevant prejudice and general unfairness to a respondent. The court dismissed the appeals and ordered the appellants to pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal in both Appeal Number 414 of 2023 and Appeal Number 425 of 2023.

Orders

Orders of the court

In Appeal No 414 of 2023:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.

In Appeal No 425 of 2023:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appellants have not demonstrated any error of law in the exercise of the discretion to extend time by the primary judge.Background The first respondent to both appeals, Mr Nicholson, presently holds the position of the WHSP.[4] The appellants, Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd (Carborough) and Mr Russell Uhr, are a coal mine operator and a Site Senior Executive, respectively.[4]During the relevant period, the office of the WHSP has been occupied, respectively, by Mr Guilfolye until 9 March 2022, Ms Wooldridge QC (as her Honour then was) effective from 10 March 2022 until 19 June 2022, Mr Gore effective from 20 June 2022 until 30 October 2022 and Mr Nicholson from 31 October 2022. In these reasons, all four are collectively referred to as either the first respondent or the WHSP. By complaints sworn 24 November 2020, the WHSP commenced criminal prosecutions against each of the appellants in respect of incidents that occurred at the Carborough Downs Coal Mine.[5][5]These incidents are referred to in the decision below as the Duxbury incident and Best incident, respectively. Those complaints, relating as they did to offences under s 34 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (CMSH Act),[6] invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court.[7] The summonses accompanying the complaints, however, commanded each of the appellants to appear “at the Magistrates Court”, not the Industrial Magistrates Court.[8] It is common ground that the Magistrates Court has no jurisdiction to hear the complaints.[9][6]An offence under s 34 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) is punishable by, inter alia, a term of imprisonment.[7]Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld), s 255(1).[8]Reasons, [15]. AB 16, 21.[9]Reasons, [18]. On that basis, the appellants each filed applications to strike out the complaints. On 19 August 2021, those applications came before Magistrate Morton for mention. Purporting to sit in the Magistrates Court, the learned magistrate made directions for the hearing of the strike-out applications. The following exchange then occurred between counsel for the WHSP and Magistrate Morton regarding whether the strike-out applications were to proceed in the Industrial Magistrates Court or the Magistrates Court:[10]“MS BROADBENT: Your Honour, just for clarity, have you determined the jurisdiction? Will it be to the industrial or to the Magistrates - the Industrial Magistrates or the Magistrates Court?HIS HONOUR: Well, at this stage … the summons is the Magistrates Court jurisdiction. If this matter is to be considered further, it will need to be done at the appropriate time.”[10]AB 218. On 9 December 2021, full argument of the strike-out applications was heard by Acting Magistrate Kennedy, the second respondent to each of these appeals. Sitting as an acting magistrate in the Magistrates Court, the second respondent decided to strike out each of the complaints (and also the summonses) on the basis that they failed to invoke the required jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court.[11] The learned acting magistrate gave three reasons for declining to exercise the jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court:[12](a)The complaints failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court because they did not state on their face the Magistrates Court district in which the offences occurred;(b)The complaints failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Magistrates Court because they did not make express reference on their face to s 255 of the CMSH Act and the “Industrial Magistrates Court”;(c)The summonses commanded appearances before “the Magistrates Court”, rather than the Industrial Magistrates Court, which, together with the reasoning in (a) above, meant the correct jurisdiction had not been invoked.[11]Reasons, [17]-[20]. AB 303.[12]AB 290 – 303.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It therefore cannot follow, as this ground contends, that the first respondent should have brought an application seeking prerogative relief in relation to a determination on jurisdiction prior to that determination having been made. No error of law arises.Ground 4 – Finding, and taking into account, that there was no evidence to suggest that a fair trial cannot be achieved for the appellants, when there was no basis upon which to make the finding The primary judge found at [117](10) of the Reasons that “There is no evidence to suggest that a fair trial cannot be achieved for each of the three respondents.” By Ground 4, the appellants contend that in circumstances where neither party adduced evidence as to the delay’s impact on the ability to achieve a fair trial, the finding at [117](10) was “premature and without foundation” and, therefore, constituted an error of law. In considering whether it was fair and equitable in the circumstances to grant the extension, the primary judge properly considered whether there was any evidence of prejudice that would impact the ability to achieve a fair trial. That was a relevant consideration in the circumstances. As his Honour correctly observed: “[42]Because these proceedings concern a criminal prosecution, there are additional considerations.…[45]There is also public interest in the fair and just conduct of prosecutions. It is not necessary to descend to an examination of the types or extent of prejudice which may result, for instance, in a prosecution being stayed. The discretion to extend time otherwise limited for the bringing of applications for prerogative relief encompasses, as relevant considerations, all prejudice and general unfairness to a respondent.”(footnotes omitted) Despite adducing evidence of other specific prejudice caused by the delay (which is described at [45]-[46] above), the appellants did not put on any evidence regarding the inability to achieve a fair trial. If such evidence existed, it should have been adduced when the opportunity arose. The appellants having chosen not to do so, it was open to, and appropriate for, the primary judge to express the impugned finding in the negative. So expressed, the finding was a factually accurate observation that went no further than to note that there was no evidence before his Honour to suggest anything to the contrary. On this basis, Ground 4 must fail.Disposition The appellants have failed to demonstrate any error of law in the primary judge’s exercise of the discretion to extend time. I propose the following orders:In Appeal Number 414 of 2023:1.The appeal be dismissed. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the appeal.In Appeal Number 425 of 2023: The appeal be dismissed. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, the appeal. BODDICE JA: I agree with Flanagan JA.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the primary judge made an error of law in granting the extension of time to the WHSP to commence applications for prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari.
2. Whether the primary judge misdirected himself as to the applicable principles when exercising the discretion to extend time.
3. Whether the primary judge considered all relevant factors, including prejudice and general unfairness, when deciding whether it was fair and equitable to grant the extension of time.

Held
1. The court held that the primary judge did not make an error of law in granting the extension of time to the WHSP to commence applications for prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari. The appeal was dismissed.
2. The court held that the primary judge did not misdirect himself as to the applicable principles when exercising the discretion to extend time. The appeal was dismissed.
3. The court held that the primary judge considered all relevant factors, including prejudice and general unfairness, when deciding whether it was fair and equitable to grant the extension of time. The appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the appeals brought by Carborough Downs Coal Management Pty Ltd and Mr Russell Uhr against the decision of the primary judge to grant an extension of time to the WHSP to commence applications for prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari. The appeals were limited by statute to the grounds of error of law or excess, or want, of jurisdiction. The primary judge's decision was scrutinized to determine whether any errors of law were made in the exercise of the discretion to extend time.

The court noted that the primary judge did not misdirect himself as to the applicable principles when exercising the discretion to extend time. The primary judge properly considered whether there was an acceptable explanation for the delay and whether it was fair and equitable in the circumstances to grant the extension. The court found that the primary judge's consideration of prejudice and general unfairness was relevant and appropriate in the context of a criminal prosecution.

Furthermore, the court observed that the primary judge found there was no evidence to suggest that a fair trial could not be achieved for the appellants, which was a factually accurate observation based on the evidence before him. The court held that the primary judge's finding was not premature or without foundation, as the appellants did not provide evidence to suggest otherwise.

The court concluded that the primary judge exercised the discretion to extend time correctly, applying the relevant legal principles and considering all pertinent factors. The appeals were dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the costs of the appeals. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that in exercising the discretion to extend time under s 46(1)(b) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), the primary judge must consider all relevant factors, including prejudice and general unfairness, to determine whether it is fair and equitable to grant the extension.