FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BWC16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1375
Appeal from: BWC16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 890 File number: WAD 145 of 2018 Judge: THAWLEY J Date of judgment: 5 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – fast track reviewable decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where appellant claimed to fear harm due to his membership of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party – where Authority found as a fact that the appellant had stated that he was unaware of the TULF party’s history – where the appellant made no statement to this effect – whether Authority’s finding was a critical finding made without probative evidence giving rise to jurisdictional error
MIGRATION – whether Authority’s finding that the appellant had failed to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the TULF party’s history from 1976 to 2001 was arbitrary and formed on the basis of illogical reasoning – where appellant had not been fairly tested on the TULF party’s history – where Authority did not consider why a person in the appellant’s position would be expected to know the historical events identified, or why the appellant should have demonstrated knowledge of them without having been asked about them – where Authority’s finding of insufficient knowledge was based on the incorrect finding of fact that the appellant stated he was unaware of the TULF party’s history
MIGRATON – whether adverse credibility finding affected by jurisdictional error in circumstances where the Authority had: (1) erred in finding that the appellant had stated he was unaware of the party’s history; and (2) adopted illogical reasoning when considering whether the appellant had demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the TULF party’s history from 1976 to 2001
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 473CB; Pt 7AA Cases cited: CKC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 126
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2
Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 250 FCR 309
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577
MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 239 FCR 436
SZNKV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 118 ALD 232
SZSMR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 655
SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562
Date of hearing: 24 August 2018 Date of last submissions: 3 September 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M G S Crowley Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Ms S J Oliver Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
WAD 145 of 2018 BETWEEN: BWC16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1375
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue before the court was whether the IAA's finding that the appellant did not demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the TULF party’s history from 1976 to 2001 was a critical finding made without probative evidence, thereby resulting in a jurisdictional error. The court was also required to determine if the IAA’s reasoning was illogical and whether it had fairly tested the appellant on the TULF party’s history. Furthermore, the court examined if the adverse credibility finding was affected by the jurisdictional error in the IAA's consideration of the appellant's knowledge of the party’s history.
The court held that the IAA's finding was indeed a critical finding made without probative evidence, constituting a jurisdictional error. The IAA incorrectly found that the appellant had stated he was unaware of the TULF party’s history, a fact the appellant did not make. Additionally, the IAA’s reasoning was deemed illogical because it did not consider why the appellant should have demonstrated knowledge of the party’s history without being asked about it, nor did it consider the appellant’s position as a shopkeeper with a rudimentary education. The adverse credibility finding was also affected by the jurisdictional error in the IAA's assessment of the appellant's knowledge. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside.
The court ordered the decision of 1 July 2018 to be quashed and directed the Minister to exercise the power under s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs, including the costs of the appeal to be determined as a lump sum. The court directed the parties to file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum for the appellant's costs and set timelines for the filing of affidavits and responses if an agreement could not be reached.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside, and in lieu thereof:
(a) there issue absolute in the first instance:
(i) a writ of certiorari directed to the second respondent quashing the decision of 1 July 2018; and
(ii) a writ of mandamus directed to the second respondent to exercise the power under s 473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.
(b) order that the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs;
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
4. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the appellant’s costs.
5. In the absence of any agreement pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders, within 21 days the appellant file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
6. Within a further 14 days, the first respondent file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
7. In the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the appellant’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The notice of appeal advanced a single ground of appeal. It was in substantially the same form as the ground advanced before the Federal Circuit Court:The Federal Circuit Court erred in not finding that the Immigration Assessment Authority’s (IAA) decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error where the IAA, in reasoning that because the Appellant did not reflect the ‘history and milestones’ of the Tamil United Liberation Front (Tamil United Liberation Front) from 1976 to 2001 described in country information, the Appellant’s claim to membership of the TULF was not credible, and that a letter purporting to be from the TULF corroborating the Appellant’s membership could be given little or no weight, went about its task irrationally or illogically, or denied the Appellant procedural fairness.Particulars1.1 The axis of the Appellant’s claim was that he had been peripherally associated with the TULF from 2001, but an active member of the TULF from 2005.1.2 The Appellant was asked at interview a range of questions about the TULF, to which the Appellant gave an account of the TULF’s contemporaneous purpose, leadership, composition and activities, for the period in which he claimed to have been involved. To the question ‘when was [the TULF] formed?’, the Appellant answered he did not know.1.3 The IAA found the claim to be not credible because the Appellant did not demonstrate ‘knowledge of the party’s history or any of its milestones [from 1976 to 2001], to the extent that would be expected of someone who was involved’ in the TULF between 2001 and 2012, where the Appellant had simply been asked, and said he did not know, when the TULF was founded.1.4 The IAA reasoned that the Appellant’s claim to membership of the TULF was not credible, that therefore a letter purporting to be from the TULF corroborating the Appellant’s claim could be given little or no weight in light of general country information that document fraud is prevalent in Sri Lanka.1.5 Where there was an account of the contemporaneous leadership, composition and activities of the TULF satisfactory to the IAA, there was no logical connection between an absence of knowledge about the ‘history and milestones’ of the TULF almost three decades before the Appellant’s claimed involvement with the group and the finding that that the Appellant had therefore fabricated his claim to TULF membership.1.6 Nor was there any evidentiary foundation for the latent premise that a person involved with the TULF would have the knowledge implicitly attributed to them by the IAA. The Appellant, a shopkeeper with a rudimentary education, did not claim to be a political historian. On the hearing of the appeal, the appellant also accepted it was a part of his case that the last sentence of A[8] of the Authority’s reasons contained a finding which was unsupported by the “review material” before the Authority: the appellant had never stated he was “unaware of the party’s history”. This matter does not appear to have been pointed out to the primary judge.