FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| TRAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 2859 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION –Application for remedies under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in relation to a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision not to grant a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (class TO) visa – whether Tribunal applied arbitrary standards of conduct when determining whether the parties had a genuine intention to marry and to live together – whether the Tribunal’s findings the parties had no such genuine intention were otherwise legally unreasonable. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), Schedule 1, Part 3 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15A; Schedule 2, cll.300.111, 300.211, 300.215, 300.216, 300.221, 300.511 |
| Applicant: | TRUNG NINH TRAN |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1919 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 2 October 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 2 October 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 11 October 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr O Jones |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Vietaust Lawyers |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms K Hooper |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Minter Ellison |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7,206.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1919 of 2017
| TRUNG NINH TRAN |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This application for remedies under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) raises two questions. The first is whether the second respondent (Tribunal) applied arbitrary standards of behaviour when affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant to Ms Nguyen, a citizen of Vietnam, a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (class TO) visa (PM visa). The second question is whether the Tribunal made findings that were otherwise legally unreasonable.
To be in a position to consider these questions, it will be necessary to identify some of the criteria an applicant for a PM visa must satisfy before he or she can be granted such visa, and then to set out the evidence that was before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision.
Relevant criteria
Ms Nguyen and her son applied for a PM visa on 24 June 2015. To have been…
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- Case
- [2019] FCCA 2859
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine two primary questions. First, did the Tribunal rely on unstated, assumed generalisations or standards of conduct when making its findings regarding the genuineness of the parties' intentions? Second, if it did, was there an evidential, rational, or reasonable foundation for those assumed facts or standards? Mr Tran argued that such reliance, if implied from the Tribunal's inferences, could constitute jurisdictional error, drawing an analogy to cases where the Tribunal had imposed arbitrary standards of knowledge regarding religion or political activity.
The court considered Mr Tran's submission that the Tribunal applied arbitrary standards of conduct, including expectations that couples planning a wedding would discuss celebrants, ceremonies, and honeymoons; that parties intending to live together would discuss plans for a child's education; that couples planning a child, where the female partner is nearing the end of her childbearing age, would discuss this in the context of her age; and that an Australian citizen engaged to a person overseas would visit more than once over two years if financially able. Mr Tran contended these standards were arbitrary as they were not necessarily indicative of a genuine intention to marry or live together, and that parties might reasonably defer such discussions or travel arrangements. The court also considered the alternative claim that the Tribunal's findings were, in any event, legally unreasonable.
The application was dismissed, and Mr Tran was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $7,206.
Orders
Orders of the court
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7,206.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Tran relies on the one ground contained in the amended application, which is as follows:The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error of legal unreasonableness in making findings of fact as to genuineness for the purposes of cl 300.215, 300.216 and 300.221 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).a.It is settled that the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error where it makes material findings of fact which are legally unreasonable, in the sense that they lack an evident and intelligible justification (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [10] and [82]).b.As part of the law of legal unreasonableness, the Tribunal has been held to make a jurisdictional error where it imposes an arbitrary standard of knowledge upon a person with respect to religion or political activity (BWC16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1375 at [51], [55], [59]).c.The Tribunal must likewise not impose an arbitrary standard of behaviour in relation to the conduct of a relationship which is intended to be marital.d.The Tribunal made legally unreasonable findings of fact or imposed arbitrary standards of behaviour at paragraphs 21-22 and 29-30 of its decision. Mr Tran makes two claims, both contained in paragraph (d) of the particulars to the ground of application. The first is that the Tribunal imposed or applied arbitrary standards of behaviour in finding it was not satisfied that Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran had a genuine intention to marry,[25] or a genuine intention to live together as spouses.[26] The second claim is that, even if the Tribunal did not impose arbitrary standards of behaviour in finding it was not satisfied Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran had a genuine intention to marry or to live together as spouses, those findings were legally unreasonable. Mr Tran’s counsel’s written and oral submissions were directed almost exclusively to the first of these two claims.[25] CB343, [22][26] CB345, [35] Mr Tran’s submissions in relation to the first claim may be summarised as follows:a)The Federal Court and the Full Federal Court have held the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error if it assesses an applicant’s knowledge about a system of religion by reference to an “arbitrary standard of knowledge”.[27]b)The principle referred to in (a) has been applied when assessing a person’s knowledge about subjects other than religion. In particular it has been applied to a person’s knowledge of the principles and history of a political party,[28] and to a person’s political opinions.[29]c)The principle referred to in (a) applies by analogy to the assessment of a person’s conduct. That is, the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error if it assesses an applicant’s conduct by reference to an arbitrary standard of conduct.d)The Tribunal assessed Ms Nguyen’s and Mr Tran’s conduct by reference to arbitrary standards of conduct. In particular, the Tribunal applied the following arbitrary standards:i)Persons who are planning a wedding should or would discuss plans for a marriage celebrant, a wedding ceremony, and a honeymoon.[30] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran not having approached a marriage celebrant, and their not having discussed any details of their marriage, or about whether they will have a honeymoon.[31] The standard the Tribunal applied is arbitrary because it is consistent with parties having a genuine intention to marry to leave the discussion and arrangement of such matters to a later date.[32] ii)Parties who genuinely intend to live together would discuss or consider plans in relation the education of the child of one of the parties.[33] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this arbitrary standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on evidence Mr Tran had given about his knowledge or understanding of the education that would be arranged for Ms Nguyen’s son, and the Tribunal’s being troubled by Mr Tran’s having apparently given little thought to Ms Nguyen’s son’s education. The standard the Tribunal applied is arbitrary because it was not necessary for the parties to have discussed or considered the education of the child of one of the parties.[34] iii)Parties who genuinely intend to live together and plan to have a child in circumstances where the female partner is nearing the end of the average childbearing age, would discuss that plan in the context of the female being near the end of her childbearing age.[35] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on its finding that Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran did not discuss their intention of having a child together in the context of Ms Nguyen’s age (she was then 42 years old).[36] The standard the Tribunal applied is arbitrary because it was not necessary, or inconsistent with the desire to have further children, for the parties not to have discussed the question of the advanced age of the prospective mother.[37]iv)An Australian citizen who genuinely intends to live in Australia with a person who lives in another country would travel to the foreign country to see the other person more than on one occasion over two years, if the Australian citizen has the means to do so.[38] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on its finding that it would have expected Mr Tran to have spent more time with Ms Nguyen in Vietnam, given they have been engaged for more than two years, and that, although his income is modest, Mr Tran has some capacity to travel to Vietnam.[39] The standard the Tribunal applied was arbitrary because it was not necessary that Mr Tran visit Ms Nguyen more than he did.[40][27] See, for example, SZLSP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 451; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159[28] BWC16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] 1375, at [55];[29] MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80[30] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [5][31] CB343, [21][32] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [5][33] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [6][34] CB344-345, [29][35] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [6][36] CB344-345, [29][37] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [6][38] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [7][39] CB345, [30][40] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [7]