Tran v Minister for Immigration & Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TRAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 2859
Catchwords:
MIGRATION –Application for remedies under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in relation to a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision not to grant a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (class TO) visa – whether Tribunal applied arbitrary standards of conduct when determining whether the parties had a genuine intention to marry and to live together – whether the Tribunal’s findings the parties had no such genuine intention were otherwise legally unreasonable.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), Schedule 1, Part 3

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15A; Schedule 2, cll.300.111, 300.211, 300.215, 300.216, 300.221, 300.511

Cases cited:

BWC16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1375

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Angkawijaya [2016] FCAFC 5

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2012] FCA 451

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159

MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80

SZLSP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 451

Applicant: TRUNG NINH TRAN
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 1919 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 2 October 2019
Date of Last Submission: 2 October 2019
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 11 October 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr O Jones
Solicitors for the Applicant: Vietaust Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms K Hooper
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7,206.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 1919 of 2017

TRUNG NINH TRAN

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This application for remedies under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) raises two questions. The first is whether the second respondent (Tribunal) applied arbitrary standards of behaviour when affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant to Ms Nguyen, a citizen of Vietnam, a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) (class TO) visa (PM visa). The second question is whether the Tribunal made findings that were otherwise legally unreasonable.

  2. To be in a position to consider these questions, it will be necessary to identify some of the criteria an applicant for a PM visa must satisfy before he or she can be granted such visa, and then to set out the evidence that was before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal’s reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision.

Relevant criteria

  1. Ms Nguyen and her son applied for a PM visa on 24 June 2015. To have been…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 2859
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Tran for remedies under s 476 of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) following a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision to refuse Mr Tran a Prospective Marriage (Temporary) visa. The core of Mr Tran's claim was that the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error by applying arbitrary standards of conduct when assessing whether he and Ms Nguyen had a genuine intention to marry and to live together as spouses. He also contended that, irrespective of whether arbitrary standards were applied, the Tribunal's findings were legally unreasonable.

The court was required to determine two primary questions. First, did the Tribunal rely on unstated, assumed generalisations or standards of conduct when making its findings regarding the genuineness of the parties' intentions? Second, if it did, was there an evidential, rational, or reasonable foundation for those assumed facts or standards? Mr Tran argued that such reliance, if implied from the Tribunal's inferences, could constitute jurisdictional error, drawing an analogy to cases where the Tribunal had imposed arbitrary standards of knowledge regarding religion or political activity.

The court considered Mr Tran's submission that the Tribunal applied arbitrary standards of conduct, including expectations that couples planning a wedding would discuss celebrants, ceremonies, and honeymoons; that parties intending to live together would discuss plans for a child's education; that couples planning a child, where the female partner is nearing the end of her childbearing age, would discuss this in the context of her age; and that an Australian citizen engaged to a person overseas would visit more than once over two years if financially able. Mr Tran contended these standards were arbitrary as they were not necessarily indicative of a genuine intention to marry or live together, and that parties might reasonably defer such discussions or travel arrangements. The court also considered the alternative claim that the Tribunal's findings were, in any event, legally unreasonable.

The application was dismissed, and Mr Tran was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs in the amount of $7,206.

Orders

Orders of the court

ORDERS

The application is dismissed.

The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7,206.

Background

Background to the litigation

The proper characterisation of the jurisdictional error Mr Tran claims the Tribunal made, therefore, is that, in finding Mr Tran and Ms Nguyen did not have a genuine intention to marry, or a genuine intention to live together, it relied on facts or assumptions for which there was no evidential, or rational, or reasonable foundation, those facts and assumptions being the standards I have set out in paragraph 16(d) of these reasons (assumed facts). Two questions, therefore, arise. Did the Tribunal rely on the assumed facts? If so, was there an evidential, or rational, or reasonable foundation for the assumed facts? Mr Tran does not submit the Tribunal expressly articulated or relied on the assumed facts. That means Mr Tran should be taken to submit that the Tribunal’s assuming the existence of, and its reliance on, the assumed facts are to be implied from the inferences the Tribunal drew on the basis of particular items of evidence it considered. The first question to consider is whether it is permissible to infer from the findings the Tribunal made on the basis of particular items of evidence that it assumed and relied on the assumed facts. It has been recognised by commentators that when drawing an inference from a particular item of evidence or from a particular finding of fact a fact-finder relies on at least one assumed generalisation. Because of the ubiquity of this practice, and the availability of a ground of jurisdictional error based on the absence of evidentiary, rational, or reasonable support, which might suggest that an administrative decision-maker’s reliance on unstated and unproven generalisations may ground a finding of jurisdictional error, it would be useful to refer to what some commentators have said about the practice. A useful starting point is Wigmore. In his treatise on evidence Wigmore considered the form of argument fact-finders employ when drawing an inference from a particular item of evidence or finding of fact. [47] Wigmore said that every inference drawn on evidence adduced in a litigious setting is “inductive” in form – by which he meant that a fact-finder expressly infers a fact directly from a particular piece of evidence or from a particular finding. He gives the example: “A planned to kill B; therefore, A probably did kill B”. Wigmore recognised, however, that the inductive form of argument “is implicitly based upon an understood law or generalization and is thus capable of being expressed in the deductive or syllogistic form”.[48] Thus, the inductive form of argument: “A planned to kill B; therefore, A probably did kill B” may be expressed in a deductive or syllogistic form: “Men’s fixed designs are probably carried out; A had a fixed design to kill B; therefore, A probably carried out his design and did kill B”.[49] [47] J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Peter Tillers rev,Little Brown & Company, Boston, 1983, Vol 1A §30, pages 982-988 [48] J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Peter Tillers rev,Little Brown & Company, Boston, 1983, Vol 1A §30, page 985[49] J H Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Peter Tillers rev,Little Brown & Company, Boston, 1983, Vol 1A §30, page 985

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Tran relies on the one ground contained in the amended application, which is as follows:The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error of legal unreasonableness in making findings of fact as to genuineness for the purposes of cl 300.215, 300.216 and 300.221 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).a.It is settled that the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error where it makes material findings of fact which are legally unreasonable, in the sense that they lack an evident and intelligible justification (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30 at [10] and [82]).b.As part of the law of legal unreasonableness, the Tribunal has been held to make a jurisdictional error where it imposes an arbitrary standard of knowledge upon a person with respect to religion or political activity (BWC16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1375 at [51], [55], [59]).c.The Tribunal must likewise not impose an arbitrary standard of behaviour in relation to the conduct of a relationship which is intended to be marital.d.The Tribunal made legally unreasonable findings of fact or imposed arbitrary standards of behaviour at paragraphs 21-22 and 29-30 of its decision. Mr Tran makes two claims, both contained in paragraph (d) of the particulars to the ground of application. The first is that the Tribunal imposed or applied arbitrary standards of behaviour in finding it was not satisfied that Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran had a genuine intention to marry,[25] or a genuine intention to live together as spouses.[26] The second claim is that, even if the Tribunal did not impose arbitrary standards of behaviour in finding it was not satisfied Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran had a genuine intention to marry or to live together as spouses, those findings were legally unreasonable. Mr Tran’s counsel’s written and oral submissions were directed almost exclusively to the first of these two claims.[25] CB343, [22][26] CB345, [35] Mr Tran’s submissions in relation to the first claim may be summarised as follows:a)The Federal Court and the Full Federal Court have held the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error if it assesses an applicant’s knowledge about a system of religion by reference to an “arbitrary standard of knowledge”.[27]b)The principle referred to in (a) has been applied when assessing a person’s knowledge about subjects other than religion. In particular it has been applied to a person’s knowledge of the principles and history of a political party,[28] and to a person’s political opinions.[29]c)The principle referred to in (a) applies by analogy to the assessment of a person’s conduct. That is, the Tribunal will make a jurisdictional error if it assesses an applicant’s conduct by reference to an arbitrary standard of conduct.d)The Tribunal assessed Ms Nguyen’s and Mr Tran’s conduct by reference to arbitrary standards of conduct. In particular, the Tribunal applied the following arbitrary standards:i)Persons who are planning a wedding should or would discuss plans for a marriage celebrant, a wedding ceremony, and a honeymoon.[30] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran not having approached a marriage celebrant, and their not having discussed any details of their marriage, or about whether they will have a honeymoon.[31] The standard the Tribunal applied is arbitrary because it is consistent with parties having a genuine intention to marry to leave the discussion and arrangement of such matters to a later date.[32] ii)Parties who genuinely intend to live together would discuss or consider plans in relation the education of the child of one of the parties.[33] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this arbitrary standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on evidence Mr Tran had given about his knowledge or understanding of the education that would be arranged for Ms Nguyen’s son, and the Tribunal’s being troubled by Mr Tran’s having apparently given little thought to Ms Nguyen’s son’s education. The standard the Tribunal applied is arbitrary because it was not necessary for the parties to have discussed or considered the education of the child of one of the parties.[34] iii)Parties who genuinely intend to live together and plan to have a child in circumstances where the female partner is nearing the end of the average childbearing age, would discuss that plan in the context of the female being near the end of her childbearing age.[35] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on its finding that Ms Nguyen and Mr Tran did not discuss their intention of having a child together in the context of Ms Nguyen’s age (she was then 42 years old).[36] The standard the Tribunal applied is arbitrary because it was not necessary, or inconsistent with the desire to have further children, for the parties not to have discussed the question of the advanced age of the prospective mother.[37]iv)An Australian citizen who genuinely intends to live in Australia with a person who lives in another country would travel to the foreign country to see the other person more than on one occasion over two years, if the Australian citizen has the means to do so.[38] The basis of Mr Tran’s submission the Tribunal applied this standard of conduct is the Tribunal’s relying on its finding that it would have expected Mr Tran to have spent more time with Ms Nguyen in Vietnam, given they have been engaged for more than two years, and that, although his income is modest, Mr Tran has some capacity to travel to Vietnam.[39] The standard the Tribunal applied was arbitrary because it was not necessary that Mr Tran visit Ms Nguyen more than he did.[40][27] See, for example, SZLSP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 451; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159[28] BWC16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] 1375, at [55];[29] MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80[30] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [5][31] CB343, [21][32] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [5][33] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [6][34] CB344-345, [29][35] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [6][36] CB344-345, [29][37] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [6][38] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [7][39] CB345, [30][40] Applicant’s Proposed Amended Submissions, [7]