FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bux Global Limited v Hooke [2018] FCA 882
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Hooke v Bux Global Limited [2018] FCA 740 File number: WAD 231 of 2018 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 7 June 2018 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – winding up application – whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek the winding up of the company – whether the plaintiffs are contributories under the definition in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where the plaintiffs are registered holders of shares – where the plaintiffs should be permitted to seek standing in the substantive winding up proceedings.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – application for stay of proceedings – where the primary judge dismissed an application for summary judgment – where the primary judge's decision is not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal – where no substantial justice would be wrought – held: leave to appeal refused.
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 231, 231(b), 461, 462
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1)(a), 24(1A), 24(1D)(b), 31A(2)(b)
Cases cited: Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1949) 78 CLR 353
Dalgety Downs Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1952) 86 CLR 335
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Enviroco Ltd v Farstad Supply A/S [2011] 1 WLR 921
Gold Peg International Pty Ltd v Kovan Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1794
Re Independent Quarries Pty Ltd (1993) 12 ACSR 188
Itex Graphix Pty Ltd v Elliott (2002) 54 NSWLR 207
Jones v Thompson [2017] FCA 125
Kessey v Golledge (1999) 30 MVR 95
Maddocks v DJE Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 148 CLR 104
Maertin v Klaus Maertin Pty Ltd (2006) 57 ACSR 714
Moskios v Splendid Developments Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 210
Neimann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431
Re Nine Entertainment Group Ltd (No 1) (2012) 211 FCR 439
Niord Pty Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1990) 54 SASR 87
QUYD Pty Ltd v Marvass Pty Ltd [2009] 1 Qd R 41
Reese River Silver Mining Co v Smith (1869) LR 4 HL 64
Ship “Sam Hawk” v Reiter Petroleum Inc (2016) 246 FCR 337
Tamworth Base Hospital v Durant [2000] NSWCA 209
Titlow v Intercapital Group (Australia) Pty Ltd (1996) 65 FCR 449
Date of hearing: 7 June 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr AP Young QC with Mr P Bevilacqua Solicitor for the Applicant: K&L Gates Counsel for the Respondents: Mr DJ Jackson SC with Mr SJ Penrose
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- AGLC
- Bux Global Limited v Hooke [2018] FCA 882
- Case
- [2018] FCA 882
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal the decision of the primary judge, made on 17 May 2018 in WAD644/2017, be dismissed.
2. The application for a stay of the proceedings in WAD644/2017 be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondents to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the primary judge’s reasons, delivered on 17 May 2018, his Honour noted that the respondents (being the plaintiffs in that proceeding, WAD644/2017) claimed they were added to the register of shareholders and issued with holding certificates. Despite that, the company claims that the respondents are not members of the company, and the respondents themselves admit that they did not have the opportunity to consent to their names being inserted on the shareholding. It would therefore appear that they could not satisfy the requirements of s 231(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for membership of the company. (But that may not be an end to the matter.) The primary judge noted that the respondents sought a winding up order pursuant to s 461 of the Corporations Act, and noted, of course, that only those persons specified under s 462 of the Corporations Act may be permitted to apply to wind up a company. The question was whether the (respondents), fell into that category of persons. A possibility was foreshadowed before by the primary judge that they may seek to apply as creditors of the company. I do not propose addressing that possible future development. It was not addressed by the primary judge, nor has it been addressed by the respondents in submissions today, but the company has dealt with that possibility in written submissions. As I say, it is unnecessary to consider that possibility. The question is whether the respondents can satisfy the definition in s 9 of the Corporations Act as contributories. The primary judge set out the relevant part of s 9, noting that reliance was placed in particular by the plaintiffs as being holders of fully paid shares in the company and therefore contributions. That section relevantly provides:contributory means:(a)in relation to a company (other than a no liability company): (i)a person liable as a member or past member to contribute to the property of the company if it is wound up; and(ii)for a company with share capital – a holder of fully paid shares in the company; and(iii)before the final determination of the persons who are contributors because of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) – a person alleged to be such a contributory; and… His Honour noted that the term ‘member’ is defined in the Corporations Act, as I have mentioned, but the term ‘holder’ is not. His Honour noted that the plaintiffs say that the share register of the company is, without evidence to the contrary, proof that the plaintiffs are the holders of fully paid shares in the company and, therefore, contributories. They have been issued and hold shares, and they submit that the company cannot be heard now to say that they are not contributories when it has previously issued holding certificates to them, entered their names on the register of members and otherwise treated them as members. The primary judge identified what he regarded as being the key issue before him in [9] of his Honour’s reasons as follows:In my view, the key issue in relation to the claim of standing based upon being a contributory lies in the meaning of the words 'a holder of fully paid shares' as used in para (a)(ii) of that definition, and, in particular, whether it is to be read as meaning a member who is a holder of fully paid shares. I should say that, in expressing the issue in those terms, I do not believe that the construction advanced for [the company] is one which requires a reading in of those words; it is merely a question of what is meant by the phrase 'a holder of fully paid shares'.