BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 141

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: BSW17  v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  [2017] FCCA 2448
File number(s): NSD 1829 of 2017
Judge(s): PERRY J
Date of judgment: 19 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for leave to appeal – where judicial review application was dismissed at a show cause hearing pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – whether an appeal would have any reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Date of hearing: 19 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the First Applicant: The First Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Second Applicant: The Second Applicant did not appear
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms C Saunders of DLA Piper

ORDERS

NSD 1829 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BSW17

First Applicant

BSX17

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicants are to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3.While a final calculation has not yet been undertaken, the legal representative for the Minister estimated that his legal costs would likely be in the order of $2,500.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)

PERRY J:

1.                 INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicants are married.  They are both citizens of Malaysia and are of Chinese ethnicity.  They seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court (the Court below) dismissing their application on a show cause hearing under rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) on the ground that it did not raise an arguable claim for relief.  The application sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision by the delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 141
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an application for leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed a judicial review application pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). The applicants, who did not have legal representation, sought to appeal the decision of the Tribunal which refused their second application for protection visas on the basis that they were not credible and were not owed protection. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider their claims prudently and had not believed them. The central legal issues for the Court were whether the Tribunal's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to justify reconsideration on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused. The Court had to consider the principles governing the grant of leave to appeal, including the threshold for establishing reasonable prospects of success and the potential for substantial injustice.

The Court found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were open to it based on the evidence and materials before it. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not tainted by any failure to afford procedural fairness, nor was it unreasonable. The Court also noted that the Tribunal was not required to accept uncritically all claims made by an applicant or to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had considered the applicants' evidence and had prudently considered their risk of discrimination or financial hardship. Consequently, the Court found that the applicants had not demonstrated any appellable error in the Tribunal's decision and that the application for leave to appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success. Therefore, the application was dismissed.

The Court made an order that the applicants were to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed, with the legal representative for the Minister estimating that the costs would likely be in the order of $2,500. The entry of orders was to be dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicants are to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3. While a final calculation has not yet been undertaken, the legal representative for the Minister estimated that his legal costs would likely be in the order of $2,500.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants did not have legal representation in this Court or in the Federal Circuit Court. The first applicant appeared at the hearing of the application for leave to appeal with the assistance of a NAATI accredited Level 3 Professional interpreter in Mandarin and English. The first applicant confirmed that he made submissions on his own behalf and on behalf of his wife. Written submissions were filed in advance of the hearing by the Minister, but not by the applicants. 2. BACKGROUND The primary judge sets out the somewhat complicated history of visa applications by the applicants which preceded their second application for protection visas under different names on 15 December 2014. This appeal relates to the second application. The first applicant claimed to fear harm if returned to Malaysia by reason of his Chinese ethnicity. The application for protection visas was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 14 April 2015, having found that the applicants were not credible witnesses and were not owed protection. On 29 March 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal identified with specificity the first applicant’s claims in his first and second applications for a protection visa. The Tribunal summarised the various exchanges it had with the applicants, putting to them concerns that the Tribunal had about their claims including, in accordance with s 424AA of the Act, putting to the first applicant differences in the information provided by the second applicant. The Tribunal also noted country information on Malaysia contained in a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report which it discussed with the first applicant indicating among other things that: ethnic Chinese make up 24.8% of Malaysia’s population; there are no laws or constitutional provisions which directly discriminate against Chinese Malaysians; and that, while Chinese Malaysians generally do not experience discrimination or violence on a day-to-day basis, they may face lower levels of discrimination when attempting to gain entry into the State’s tertiary system or the civil service. The Tribunal found that the first applicant was not a witness of truth and had fabricated his material claims for the purpose of obtaining a protection visa. The Tribunal found that the applicants had changed their names for the purposes of obtaining new passports and returning to Australia. While the Tribunal accepted that the first applicant may have suffered some discrimination in Malaysia because of his Chinese ethnicity, it was not satisfied that any such discrimination would have amounted to serious harm or significant harm. The Tribunal rejected the first applicant’s claims to have been detained and questioned by police for allegedly spreading anti-government pamphlets and did not accept that he had been detained for several days, beaten, and humiliated. Nor did the Tribunal accept that the first applicant was released with a monitoring device and that his daily operations were monitored by police. The first applicant’s claims about the circumstances in which he left Malaysia and the threats allegedly from police and authorities were also rejected by the Tribunal, as was his claim to be associated with a union or political party in Malaysia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

These statements express the first applicant’s disagreement with the decision of the Federal Circuit Court but they do not identify any appellable error in that decision for the reasons I have earlier given.4. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the application for leave to appeal enjoys no reasonable prospects of success and should be refused. As the Minister has been successful, an order should be made that the applicants are to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Before the Federal Circuit Court, the first applicant stated that the Tribunal did not believe that he and his wife had faced discrimination in Malaysia, that the Tribunal had failed to give his case prudent consideration, and that he wished that the Tribunal had believed him (FCC reasons at [30]). The primary judge found that the applicant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. In particular, the primary judge found that: 45. The Tribunal’s findings would appear to be open to it on the evidence and materials before it and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Those findings would not appear to have been tainted by any failure to afford procedural fairness, reaching a finding without a logical or probative bases or unreasonableness (see ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 at [83] per Griffiths, Perry, Bromwich JJ).46. A credit finding is sound if it was “open to [the Tribunal] on the material, was based on rational grounds and was arrived at on consideration of matters that were logically probative of the issue of credibility.” (see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547).47. It is also well-established that the Tribunal is not required to accept, uncritically, any and all claims made by an applicant (see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 per Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J). Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out (see Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J).48. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s decision record to suggest that the Tribunal had not considered the Applicant’s evidence or that it had failed prudently to consider the Applicant’s risk of discrimination or financial hardship.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles The applicants require leave to appeal to this Court because the decision below was interlocutory in nature: see r 44.12(2) of the FCC Rules and s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). A decision on whether to grant leave to appeal is discretionary. Relevant factors include: whether in all of the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal; and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, assuming the decision at first instance to be wrong (Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (the Court)). The question of whether an appeal would enjoy sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave is approached at a reasonably impressionistic level: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 (MZABP (FCA)) at [62]-[63] (Mortimer J) (by analogy). (I note that the approach of Mortimer J in MZABP (FCA) in this regard was endorsed on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138 at [38] (the Court)).