FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 141
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2448 File number(s): NSD 1829 of 2017 Judge(s): PERRY J Date of judgment: 19 February 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for leave to appeal – where judicial review application was dismissed at a show cause hearing pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – whether an appeal would have any reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165
Date of hearing: 19 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the First Applicant: The First Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Second Applicant: The Second Applicant did not appear Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms C Saunders of DLA Piper ORDERS
NSD 1829 of 2017 BETWEEN: BSW17
First Applicant
BSX17
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicants are to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
3.While a final calculation has not yet been undertaken, the legal representative for the Minister estimated that his legal costs would likely be in the order of $2,500.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
The applicants are married. They are both citizens of Malaysia and are of Chinese ethnicity. They seek leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court (the Court below) dismissing their application on a show cause hearing under rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules) on the ground that it did not raise an arguable claim for relief. The application sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision by the delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 141
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were open to it based on the evidence and materials before it. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not tainted by any failure to afford procedural fairness, nor was it unreasonable. The Court also noted that the Tribunal was not required to accept uncritically all claims made by an applicant or to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had considered the applicants' evidence and had prudently considered their risk of discrimination or financial hardship. Consequently, the Court found that the applicants had not demonstrated any appellable error in the Tribunal's decision and that the application for leave to appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success. Therefore, the application was dismissed.
The Court made an order that the applicants were to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed, with the legal representative for the Minister estimating that the costs would likely be in the order of $2,500. The entry of orders was to be dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicants are to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
3. While a final calculation has not yet been undertaken, the legal representative for the Minister estimated that his legal costs would likely be in the order of $2,500.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Before the Federal Circuit Court, the first applicant stated that the Tribunal did not believe that he and his wife had faced discrimination in Malaysia, that the Tribunal had failed to give his case prudent consideration, and that he wished that the Tribunal had believed him (FCC reasons at [30]). The primary judge found that the applicant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. In particular, the primary judge found that: 45. The Tribunal’s findings would appear to be open to it on the evidence and materials before it and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Those findings would not appear to have been tainted by any failure to afford procedural fairness, reaching a finding without a logical or probative bases or unreasonableness (see ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 at [83] per Griffiths, Perry, Bromwich JJ).46. A credit finding is sound if it was “open to [the Tribunal] on the material, was based on rational grounds and was arrived at on consideration of matters that were logically probative of the issue of credibility.” (see Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547).47. It is also well-established that the Tribunal is not required to accept, uncritically, any and all claims made by an applicant (see Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451 per Beaumont J; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo & Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 per Kirby J; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70 per Wilcox J). Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out (see Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347 at 348 per Heerey J).48. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s decision record to suggest that the Tribunal had not considered the Applicant’s evidence or that it had failed prudently to consider the Applicant’s risk of discrimination or financial hardship.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles The applicants require leave to appeal to this Court because the decision below was interlocutory in nature: see r 44.12(2) of the FCC Rules and s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). A decision on whether to grant leave to appeal is discretionary. Relevant factors include: whether in all of the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal; and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, assuming the decision at first instance to be wrong (Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (the Court)). The question of whether an appeal would enjoy sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave is approached at a reasonably impressionistic level: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 (MZABP (FCA)) at [62]-[63] (Mortimer J) (by analogy). (I note that the approach of Mortimer J in MZABP (FCA) in this regard was endorsed on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138 at [38] (the Court)).