COD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 835

Appeal from: COD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2619
File number: NSD 1942 of 2017
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 5 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision because the application for review was lodged outside the prescribed period of 28 days after notification of the decision under s 412(1)(b), Migration Act – where delegate’s decision sent to last email address pursuant to s 494B(5) and taken to have been received at the end of the same day under s 494C(5) – where Federal Circuit Court dismissed application for judicial review on a show cause hearing under r 44.12(1)(a), Federal Circuit Court Rules – whether grounds of appeal lack sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave to appeal
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 141

Calimoso v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1335

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 22 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms J Strugnell of MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 1942 of 2017
BETWEEN:

COD17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant seeks leave pursuant to rule 35.12 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the FCR) to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (the FCC). The FCC dismissed on a show cause hearing under rule 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (the FCC Rules), the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision given on 19 May 2017 by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).  The Tribunal, in turn, found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 835
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a Malaysian national, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of her application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had dismissed her application for review of the delegate's decision to refuse her application for a protection visa on the basis that she had not lodged her application for review within the prescribed 28-day period. The applicant contended that the AAT had erred in its jurisdictional determination by failing to consider her claims of jurisdictional error, including that she had not been offered a hearing by the delegate and that she had not received the delegate's decision until after the 28-day period had expired. The Federal Circuit Court (FCC) dismissed the application for leave to appeal on the basis that the applicant had not identified any error on the part of the AAT that was capable of establishing jurisdictional error. The primary judge concluded that the AAT had correctly identified that the applicant had not lodged her application for review within the prescribed period and had referred to the relevant law in affirming the decision under review. The primary judge further held that the application did not raise an arguable case for the relief claimed.

The court considered the principles governing leave to appeal and held that the applicant requires leave to appeal because the decision below was interlocutory in nature. The court noted that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal, and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, assuming the decision at first instance to be wrong. However, the court held that the applicant had not identified any error on the part of the AAT that was capable of establishing jurisdictional error and none was apparent on the face of the decision record. The court held that the AAT had correctly identified that the applicant had not lodged her application for review within the prescribed period and had referred to the relevant law in affirming the decision under review. The court further held that the application did not raise an arguable case for the relief claimed.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed. The applicant is required to pay the costs of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, either as agreed upon by the parties or as assessed by the court. The entry of orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, any appeal would lack sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave to appeal. It follows that the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The application for a protection visa and delegate’s decision The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 27 May 2016 on a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (subclass 572) visa. The applicant applied for a protection visa on 15 September 2016, claiming to fear harm from loan sharks and her former husband. The primary judge found that, in answer to a question on Form C of that application, namely, “Do you agree to the Department communicating with you via fax, email or other electronic means”, the applicant ticked the box marked “yes” and provided an email address. On 21 March 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa. A copy of the delegate’s decision was emailed to her at the email address which she had provided. 2.2 The application for review and the Tribunal’s decision The applicant applied for review of the delegate’s decision by the Tribunal on 25 April 2017. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant by a letter dated 1 May 2017 and advised her of its preliminary view that her application was not valid because it was not lodged within the prescribed 28 day time limit. The letter invited her to provide submissions on the matter by 15 March 2017. The Tribunal recorded in its reasons that the applicant responded by email on 3 May 2017, sending an unsigned statement in which she claimed that she did not receive the Department’s decision to receive her application until 25 April 2017 because her “Internet did not work properly, so she seldom checked her emails.” She also claimed that she was not invited to an interview with the delegate and was expecting to receive the decision at a post office box which was “one of the reasons she seldom checked emails”. She said that she applied for review to the Tribunal as soon as she received the decision. The Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine her application for review for the following reasons:2. … The material before the Tribunal indicates that the applicant was notified of the decision by letter dated 21 March 2017 and dispatched by email. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.…5. The Tribunal has carefully considered the applicant submission; however, the information before the Tribunal indicates that the Department sent the notification letter and decision record refusing her application by email to the email account address that she provided to the Minister for the purpose of receiving documents, in accordance with s. 494B(5). In these circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was correctly notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements, and that the decision notification was effective.6. The Tribunal finds that in accordance with s. 494C of the Act, the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 21 March 2017. Therefore the prescribed period within which the review application could be made ended on 17 April 2017. As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 25 April 2017 it follows that the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter.2.3 The decision below

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine her application for review for the following reasons:2. … The material before the Tribunal indicates that the applicant was notified of the decision by letter dated 21 March 2017 and dispatched by email. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.…5. The Tribunal has carefully considered the applicant submission; however, the information before the Tribunal indicates that the Department sent the notification letter and decision record refusing her application by email to the email account address that she provided to the Minister for the purpose of receiving documents, in accordance with s. 494B(5). In these circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was correctly notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements, and that the decision notification was effective.6. The Tribunal finds that in accordance with s. 494C of the Act, the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 21 March 2017. Therefore the prescribed period within which the review application could be made ended on 17 April 2017. As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 25 April 2017 it follows that the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter.2.3 The decision below The applicant filed an application for judicial review in the FCC raising three grounds which may be summarised as follows: (1)the Tribunal unfairly ignored her well-founded fear of persecution in Malaysia, that the loan shark is looking for her, and the real risk that she will suffer significant harm if returned;(2)the Tribunal did not consider whether there was a real risk that she would suffer significant harm, taking issue with the country information relied upon by the Department and with the proposition that she could relocate safely within Malaysia;(3)the Tribunal should have given her the opportunity to “appeal”, reiterating that:(a)the Department did not invite her to attend a hearing making it more difficult for her to be notified of the refusal;(b)her Internet did not work properly so she seldom checked her emails and did not see the refusal letter from the Department until 25 April 2017; and(c)she thought that the Department would notify her by post because it was such an important letter and that she checked her post office mailing address regularly. The applicant appeared unrepresented in the FCC with the assistance of an interpreter in Mandarin and English. The applicant confirmed that she had attended a directions hearing before a registrar of the FCC on 14 September 2017 (FCC reasons at [3]). After considering the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions in her carefully reasoned judgment, the primary judge concluded that:32. While I make no final decision as to whether or not the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error, the applicant has not identified any error on the part of the Tribunal that is capable of establishing jurisdictional error and none is apparent on the face of the decision record. The Tribunal referred to the relevant law in affirming the decision under review. 33. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed. Accordingly, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion under r.44.12(1) of the Rules and on the basis that the application does not raise an arguable case, the proceeding before this Court, commenced by way of application filed on 13 June 2017, should be dismissed pursuant to r.44.12(1)(a) of the Rules with costs.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Principles governing leave to appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

After considering the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions in her carefully reasoned judgment, the primary judge concluded that:32. While I make no final decision as to whether or not the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error, the applicant has not identified any error on the part of the Tribunal that is capable of establishing jurisdictional error and none is apparent on the face of the decision record. The Tribunal referred to the relevant law in affirming the decision under review. 33. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed. Accordingly, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion under r.44.12(1) of the Rules and on the basis that the application does not raise an arguable case, the proceeding before this Court, commenced by way of application filed on 13 June 2017, should be dismissed pursuant to r.44.12(1)(a) of the Rules with costs.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Principles governing leave to appeal The applicant requires leave to appeal to this Court because the decision below was interlocutory in nature: see rule 44.12(2) of the FCC Rules and s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act); see also e.g. BSW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 141 at [12] (Perry J). The Court has a discretion to grant leave to appeal. Relevant factors to the exercise of that discretion include: whether in all of the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal; and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, assuming the decision at first instance to be wrong (Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 (the Court)). As Mortimer J held by analogy in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the question of whether an appeal would enjoy sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave is approached at a reasonably impressionistic level: [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 (MZABP (FCA)) at [62]-[63]. The approach of Mortimer J in MZABP (FCA) in this respect was endorsed on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138 at [38] (the Court)). 3.2 Should leave to appeal be granted? The draft notice of appeal accompanying the application for leave, sets out the following proposed grounds:1.The Department of Immigration and AAT did not offer me the opportunity of interview, which is required by the law. DIBP didn’t invite me to attend the hearing. They refused my application without hearing. DIBP should give me opportunity to attend the hearing.2.AAT refused my application since I didn’t lodged the application on time. But I believe that AAT should give me the opportunity to appeal to AAT. Firstly, I lodged the application to DIBP in 9/2016. I don’t know the time frame for processing my application. I have been waiting more than a half year. My Internet didn’t work properly, so I seldom check my emails. I didn’t see the refusal letter from DIBP until 25/4/2017. Secondly reading the letter, we can know that DIBP didn’t invite me to attend the hearing. They refused my application without hearing, which makes it more difficult for me to be notified for the refusal. Finally, I check my mailing address, PO Box [xxx], regularly, until now I haven’t received the refusal letter from DIBP by post. I thought they will notify me by post, since such an important letter shouldn’t be sent by email. That’s one of the reasons I seldom checked my emails.3.AAT has bias against me as I was deprived of the benefits of doubts.4.AAT has denied me procedural fairness but failing to provide adequate reasons for the finding of fact.(errors in the original)