BPI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BPI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2020] FCA 252

Appeal from: BPI17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2657
File number: VID 1016 of 2019
Judge:  O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 12 March 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Tribunal affirmed decision of Minister’s delegate refusing grant of protection visa under section 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where primary judge failed to consider written submissions of the appellant and thereby failed to afford the appellant a fair hearing – whether matter should be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for rehearing or should be determined by the Federal Court – where appellant’s submissions raised new grounds of appeal – whether Tribunal reasons gave rise to an apprehension of bias – whether Tribunal failed to address claims raised by appellant – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 28

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

ASIC v Reid (No 1) (2006) 151 FCR 540

BPI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 637

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

EDI16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 171

Elliott v ASIC (2004) 10 VR 369

Embertee Pty Ltd v Energy Efficient Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 347

Foster v ACCC [2012] FCA 953

Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224

NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264

NSW v Canellis (1994) 181 CLR 309

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347

Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 1

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141

SZKLO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 102 ALD 115

SZQFS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1244

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

SZULE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2136

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BPI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) involved the appellant, a male citizen of Sri Lanka, who sought a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue was whether the Tribunal's decision to refuse the visa was flawed due to procedural errors and whether the Tribunal's findings were affected by jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider his written submissions, thereby denying him a fair hearing, and that the Tribunal's reasons raised an apprehension of bias. Additionally, the appellant contended that the Tribunal had not properly addressed his claims.

The Federal Court examined the appellant's arguments and found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the appellant's claims and evidence. The Court held that the appellant's contention that the Tribunal formed a mindset and failed to properly address his claims was not supported by the Tribunal's reasons. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's conduct did not give rise to an apprehension of bias, as the Tribunal had engaged in robust and appropriate questioning of the appellant's claims. Furthermore, the Court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The appellant's new grounds of appeal, raised during the appeal process, were also considered and dismissed.

The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs. The Court refused leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal raised in the submissions provided on 13 February and 3 March 2020. The orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

3. Leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal raised in the submissions provided to the Court on 13 February and 3 March 2020 be refused.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Accordingly, the remainder of these reasons address the appellant’s contentions as originally advanced before the Federal Circuit Court and as supplemented on this appeal. For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant’s submissions dated 15 July 2019, if considered by the Tribunal, would not have made a difference to the outcome and that the appellant has not otherwise established that the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error. I accordingly dismiss the appeal.Background The appellant is a male citizen of Sri Lanka. In making his application for a protection visa, the appellant has been required to articulate his claims on a number of occasions. It is relevant to set out the various claims made by the appellant on each of those occasions, as they bear upon the Tribunal’s adverse credibility findings. The appellant’s visa application sent to the Department on 14 February 2014 records that the appellant is of Sinhalese ethnicity and Buddhist religion. He was born in 1971 in Colombo, received 14 years of education and has been continuously employed throughout his adult life in Sri Lanka. He has travelled to Australia on 3 occasions, in 1998, 2008 and 2013. On the third occasion, he remained in Australia for 3 months from 25 July 2013 to 25 October 2013. He then travelled to Singapore for 3 weeks and returned to Australia on 14 November 2013. The visa application states that he travelled from Australia to Singapore in order to get an extension on his Australian visa. Although the appellant then returned to Australia on 14 November 2013, he did not lodge an application for a protection visa until 14 February 2014. In the visa application, the appellant stated that he left Sri Lanka in July 2013 because of death threats received from his ex-wife’s family and “underworld people”. The appellant provided the following background:(a)He married his first wife in June 2005. At that time, the appellant was conducting a successful business selling motor vehicles. His first wife was 17 years younger than the appellant. His then father-in-law is well connected in politics.(b)The appellant conducted his business through a company called Katsuki Auto Traders Pty Ltd, importing vehicles from Japan and Singapore. His wife became a director of the company.(c)The marriage was not happy and his first wife decided to leave and sought a divorce. His first wife and her family demanded money from the appellant as part of the divorce. Ultimately, the appellant agreed to pay a smaller amount than demanded, on the basis that his business was not going well. The family said that they would demand more if his business improved.(d)From 2009, the appellant conducted his business through a new company called Hiruni Motors Pty Ltd.(e)The appellant met his second wife and they married in January 2011 at St Thomas Church. A daughter was born at the end of 2011. (f)The appellant’s business improved. By the beginning of 2013, the appellant began building a new house. The news spread and his ex-wife’s family began to harass him for money. Unidentified persons visited his workplace, showed him weapons, warned him not to go to the police and threatened to kidnap his daughter.(g)In June 2013, the appellant was abducted by armed men, driven away in a van and held for 2 hours. The men demanded money and gave the appellant 2 months to obtain it. (h)The appellant travelled to Australia in July 2013 to escape the threats, travelling on a tourist visa that he had previously obtained.(i)Since travelling to Australia, the appellant’s second wife has received threats.(j)The appellant fears for his life and those of his family. He believes that he will not receive protection in Sri Lanka because his ex-father-in-law is well connected in politics and the police.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant’s written statement was accompanied by various documents. One of the documents recorded that the appellant’s ex-father-in-law had stood for elections between 2001 and 2010 on behalf of the UNP.Tribunal decision The Tribunal set out in some detail the claims that had been made by the appellant. In the course of its reasons, the Tribunal highlighted what it considered to be inconsistencies in the claims made by the appellant, as well as the making of new claims over time. Those matters were a significant reason for the Tribunal making adverse credibility findings in respect of the appellant’s claims. The Tribunal highlighted that, in the appellant’s statement to the Tribunal, the appellant had made a new claim of fearing harm because of his and his family’s political affiliation to the UNP. The Tribunal noted that that claim had not been made by the appellant in his visa application, his written statement titled “Applicant’s Additional Claims” (despite giving emphasis to his ex-father-in-law’s political connections), or in his interview with the Department (at [36] – [38]). The Tribunal recorded that, at the hearing, it had asked if the appellant was a member of the UNP and the appellant stated that he was. When the Tribunal asked the appellant whether he had a membership card, the appellant altered his evidence to state that he was only a supporter of the UNP, and not a member (at [39]). As to the appellant’s claim that he had told his previous migration agent about his UNP involvement, but was told not to go into detail, the Tribunal noted that the appellant’s visa application was detailed and included a considerable amount of information about his circumstances and difficulties he claimed to have with his ex-father-in-law. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant himself had written his application but had not mentioned any involvement with the UNP. Indeed, the application referred to the fact that his ex-father-in-law was politically connected, but made no reference to the appellant’s political activities on behalf of the UNP (at [40]). The Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s explanation for not referring to his UNP involvement in his visa application, and only raising it for the first time before the Tribunal, and concluded that the claim was not a true claim and that the appellant had contrived the claim in an attempt to strengthen his refugee convention claims (at [46] and [47]). The Tribunal also highlighted an inconsistency in the appellant’s claims concerning his ex-father-in-law’s political affiliation. The documentary evidence provided by the appellant showed that the appellant’s ex-father-in-law had previously stood for and been elected as a member of parliament for the UNP, the political party opposed to the PA. The information provided by the appellant demonstrated that his ex-father-in-law had been involved with the UNP for an extended period of time, including between 2001 and 2011 (at [49]). Given that evidence, the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that his ex-father-in-law had been angry at the appellant for supporting the UNP (at [50]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In respect of ground (c), the primary judge rejected the contention that the Tribunal failed to appropriately engage with the appellant’s claims that he was deserving of complementary protection. The primary judge observed that the same findings underpinned the Tribunal’s conclusion with respect to the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) and the complementary protection criteria.Consideration of appeal groundsAppeal ground (a) – apprehended bias The central contention in appeal ground (a) is that the Tribunal “formed a mindset” that the appellant’s claim was contrived and then failed to properly address his fear of UNP political opponents and did not take into account the profile of his ex-father-in-law. In respect of this ground, the appellant’s written submissions dated 15 July 2019 were largely directed to the contention that the Tribunal’s decision gave rise to apprehended bias. The appellant relied on many authorities concerning apprehended bias including Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 492-493 [11]-[12] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-294 per Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ; and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 344-345 [6]-[8] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. While the appellant correctly stated the legal principles concerning apprehended bias, he did not correctly apply them. The basis for the submission that the Tribunal’s decision gave rise to a risk of apprehended bias was the appellant’s disagreement with the Tribunal’s factual findings. The submissions criticised the Tribunal’s observations about the evidence and factual findings. The difficulty with the appellant’s submissions is that they do not demonstrate that any of the findings made by the Tribunal gave the appearance of bias. They merely join issue with the Tribunal’s findings as a matter of fact and criticise the Tribunal for not accepting the appellant’s explanations for apparent inconsistencies in his evidence. I accept the Minister’s submissions that the rule against bias does not require the absence of any predisposition or inclination for or against an argument or conclusion (see for example Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 (Jia Legeng) at [72] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J). The underlying principle is that the Tribunal ought to have (and be perceived to have) an open mind, not that it must have an empty mind (see for example Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223 at [38], citing R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 554; Jia Legeng at [72]). Put another way, “[t]he question is not whether a decision-maker’s mind is blank; it is whether it is open to persuasion”: Jia Legeng at [71]. Thus, the appellant must show that the bystander might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might have been so committed to a particular conclusion as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments the appellant might present: Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 1 (Sharma) at [23]. In making an evaluative judgment as to whether the Tribunal’s conduct gives rise to apprehended bias, the Court must recognise that the Tribunal is entitled to engage in a “robust and forthright testing” of an applicant’s claims and evidence (see for example SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [24]). In that context, it is apt to have regard to the inquisitorial role of the Tribunal, which the bystander is taken to be aware of: Sharma at [24]. In NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264, Allsop J (as his Honour then was) observed at [19] (Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreeing):The tribunal which has to reach a state of satisfaction may want to test and probe a recounted history. It may have particular matters troubling it for resolution, which require questioning and expressions of doubt which are entirely appropriate, but which if undertaken or said by a judge in open court in adversary litigation might give rise to an apprehension of a lack of impartiality.