FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BPI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2020] FCA 252
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 252
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court examined the appellant's arguments and found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the appellant's claims and evidence. The Court held that the appellant's contention that the Tribunal formed a mindset and failed to properly address his claims was not supported by the Tribunal's reasons. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's conduct did not give rise to an apprehension of bias, as the Tribunal had engaged in robust and appropriate questioning of the appellant's claims. Furthermore, the Court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The appellant's new grounds of appeal, raised during the appeal process, were also considered and dismissed.
The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the Minister's costs. The Court refused leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal raised in the submissions provided on 13 February and 3 March 2020. The orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
3. Leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal raised in the submissions provided to the Court on 13 February and 3 March 2020 be refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of ground (c), the primary judge rejected the contention that the Tribunal failed to appropriately engage with the appellant’s claims that he was deserving of complementary protection. The primary judge observed that the same findings underpinned the Tribunal’s conclusion with respect to the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) and the complementary protection criteria.Consideration of appeal groundsAppeal ground (a) – apprehended bias The central contention in appeal ground (a) is that the Tribunal “formed a mindset” that the appellant’s claim was contrived and then failed to properly address his fear of UNP political opponents and did not take into account the profile of his ex-father-in-law. In respect of this ground, the appellant’s written submissions dated 15 July 2019 were largely directed to the contention that the Tribunal’s decision gave rise to apprehended bias. The appellant relied on many authorities concerning apprehended bias including Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 492-493 [11]-[12] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-294 per Mason, Murphy, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ; and Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 344-345 [6]-[8] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ. While the appellant correctly stated the legal principles concerning apprehended bias, he did not correctly apply them. The basis for the submission that the Tribunal’s decision gave rise to a risk of apprehended bias was the appellant’s disagreement with the Tribunal’s factual findings. The submissions criticised the Tribunal’s observations about the evidence and factual findings. The difficulty with the appellant’s submissions is that they do not demonstrate that any of the findings made by the Tribunal gave the appearance of bias. They merely join issue with the Tribunal’s findings as a matter of fact and criticise the Tribunal for not accepting the appellant’s explanations for apparent inconsistencies in his evidence. I accept the Minister’s submissions that the rule against bias does not require the absence of any predisposition or inclination for or against an argument or conclusion (see for example Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 (Jia Legeng) at [72] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J). The underlying principle is that the Tribunal ought to have (and be perceived to have) an open mind, not that it must have an empty mind (see for example Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223 at [38], citing R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 at 554; Jia Legeng at [72]). Put another way, “[t]he question is not whether a decision-maker’s mind is blank; it is whether it is open to persuasion”: Jia Legeng at [71]. Thus, the appellant must show that the bystander might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might have been so committed to a particular conclusion as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments the appellant might present: Sharma v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 1 (Sharma) at [23]. In making an evaluative judgment as to whether the Tribunal’s conduct gives rise to apprehended bias, the Court must recognise that the Tribunal is entitled to engage in a “robust and forthright testing” of an applicant’s claims and evidence (see for example SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [24]). In that context, it is apt to have regard to the inquisitorial role of the Tribunal, which the bystander is taken to be aware of: Sharma at [24]. In NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; 214 ALR 264, Allsop J (as his Honour then was) observed at [19] (Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreeing):The tribunal which has to reach a state of satisfaction may want to test and probe a recounted history. It may have particular matters troubling it for resolution, which require questioning and expressions of doubt which are entirely appropriate, but which if undertaken or said by a judge in open court in adversary litigation might give rise to an apprehension of a lack of impartiality.