Berg v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Berg v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2015] QCA 196

PARTIES:

VINCENT VICTOR BERG
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (QUEENSLAND)
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 10371 of 2014
MHC No 79 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal from the Mental Health Court

ORIGINATING COURT:

Mental Health Court at Brisbane – [2014] QMHC 5

DELIVERED ON:

16 October 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 July 2015

JUDGES:

Fraser and Morrison JJA and Flanagan J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – FITNESS TO PLEAD OR BE TRIED – DETERMINATION OF ISSUES – where the appellant was charged with 37 offences – where the appellant referred himself to the Mental Health Court – where the appellant was found fit for trial both at first instance and on appeal – where the appellant’s legal aid was subsequently withdrawn – where the appellant referred himself back to the Mental Health Court on the basis that the previous assessments as to fitness for trial were irrelevant to his current circumstances on the basis that he had become self-represented – where “fit for trial” is defined in the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) as constituting fitness to plead, fitness to instruct counsel and fitness to endure the person’s trial with serious adverse consequences to the person’s mental condition unlikely – where the appellant submits that this definition necessarily implies that a defendant must be represented in order to be fit to instruct counsel – whether a defendant must be represented in order to be “fit for trial” – whether “fit for trial” in the context of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) incorporates and/or reflects the common law

MENTAL HEALTH – DECLARATION OR FINDING OF MENTAL ILLNESS OR INCAPACITY – where the appellant was charged with 37 offences – where the appellant referred himself to the Mental Health Court – where the appellant was found fit for trial both at first instance and on appeal – where the appellant’s legal aid was subsequently withdrawn – where the appellant referred himself back to the Mental Health Court on the basis that the previous assessments as to fitness for trial were irrelevant to his current circumstances on the basis that he had become self-represented – where the learned primary judge relied on evidence provided by two court appointed psychiatrists from the first reference – where the appellant tendered a bundle of letters from his treating psychiatrist to the effect that he was not fit for trial – where the learned primary judge and the two assisting psychiatrists found that the appellant’s treating psychiatrist was not an independent expert and lacked the necessary forensic rigour – where the learned primary judge took into account the bundle of documents from the treating psychiatrist, the earlier reference decision, the fact the appellant was now self-represented and the advice of assisting psychiatrists in determining…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 196
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Berg v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) concerns an appeal against a decision of the Mental Health Court that the appellant, Vincent Berg, was fit for trial. Berg was charged with 37 offences and had previously been found fit for trial both at first instance and on appeal. After his legal aid was withdrawn, Berg referred himself back to the Mental Health Court, asserting that the previous assessments of his fitness for trial were irrelevant due to his current self-represented status. The primary issues before the court were whether Berg must be legally represented to be considered "fit for trial" under the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld), and whether the definition of "fit for trial" encompasses common law principles. Additionally, the court had to determine if there was any bias or error in the primary judge's reliance on evidence from a previous reference and whether Berg's failure to object to the judge constituted a waiver of his right to challenge her impartiality.

The court reasoned that the definition of "fit for trial" in the Mental Health Act permits an assessment of a defendant's fitness to instruct counsel even when they are self-represented. This interpretation rejects Berg's argument that representation is a prerequisite for being fit to instruct counsel. Furthermore, the court held that the primary judge did not err in relying on evidence from the previous reference, as the change in circumstances did not render that evidence irrelevant. The court found that the primary judge's decision was supported by the evidence of three psychiatrists, who concluded that Berg was fit for trial. The court also dismissed Berg's allegations of bias, noting that he had not made any application for the primary judge to recuse herself and that there was no evidence to support the claims of apparent or actual bias.

In summary, the court found that Berg did not need to be legally represented to be considered fit for trial and that the definition of "fit for trial" under the Mental Health Act did not necessarily incorporate common law principles. The court further held that the primary judge's reliance on evidence from the previous reference was appropriate and that there was no bias on her part. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant also submitted, by reference to the Dietrich[76] principle, that as long as he remains legally unrepresented his charges should be permanently stayed. This submission must fail. First, as observed by her Honour, the Dietrich principle does not apply to committals.[77] Second, when properly construed, the definition of “fit for trial” permits a person’s fitness to be assessed including that person’s fitness to instruct counsel even where the person is self-represented.[76]Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292.[77]Re Berg [2014] QMHC 5, [28].Issue Two: Reliance on evidence from the previous reference The appellant submits the learned primary judge erred in relying on evidence from the previous reference to the Mental Health Court. Because of the change in circumstances since the previous reference, which includes the absence of legal representation and the opinions expressed by Dr Ziukelis in his letters, the appellant submits that the evidence of the previous reference was “entirely” based on the assumption that legal counsel was present.[78][78]Appellant’s amended outline dated 2 March 2015, [3]. The appellant has failed to establish this alleged error. The evidence from the previous reference remains relevant to the present reference. The change in circumstances does not detract from the relevance of this evidence. The reports of both Dr Kovacevic and Dr Beech conclude that the appellant had no psychotic illness and that he is fit for trial.[79] This is also the unanimous view of Dr Lawrence and Dr McVie who assisted the Mental Health Court in respect of the previous reference. The only psychiatrist who does not express that view is Dr Ziukelis.[79]Re Berg [2014] QMHC 5, [8]. The relevant psychiatric findings are referred to in detail by the learned primary judge in her Reasons:[80][80]Re Berg [2014] QMHC 5, [4]–[6], [8].“[4]As to the question of Mr Berg’s fitness for trial, the Court of Appeal judgment was as follows:‘[12]Three psychiatrists gave evidence before the Mental Health Court. One was Dr Ziukelis, who had been treating the appellant for some 16 months at the time of the hearing. In that time he had seen the appellant on nine occasions, the first for over an hour, and the subsequent consultations were in the order of half an hour each. As well, the Mental Health Court heard evidence from independent psychiatrists, Dr Kovacevic and Dr Beech. Dr Kovacevic had seen the appellant on 5 February 2010 for the purpose of examining him for the Court proceeding. The appointment lasted about 90 minutes and a written report was produced. Dr Beech saw the appellant on three occasions for the purpose of examining him for the Court proceeding. The consultations lasted about one hour each, and he produced a written report.[13]The Mental Health Court was assisted by Dr J M Lawrence and Dr E N McVie. Both Drs Kovacevic and Beech, as well as the two assisting psychiatrists, were of the view that the appellant was fit for trial. The only psychiatrist who did not express that view was Dr Ziukelis and, as will be seen, he did not distinctly express the view that the appellant was not fit for trial.’[5]Dr Jvozas (Joseph) Ziukelis apparently continues to treat Mr Berg. His lack of independence from Mr Berg meant his opinion was of little weight for Justice Lyons: his main report a standard form document; his own view that he should confine himself to clinical matters; his admission that Andreas Berg does most of the talking at appointments; his admission that he had not exhaustively reviewed the question of whether Mr Vincent Berg was fit for trial; the tentative nature of his opinions, final part of extracted evidence; his reliance on statements of Mr Vincent Berg, ‘I am led essentially by what the patient wishes to reveal to me rather than …’.[6]The position was the same in the Court of Appeal which proceeded on a rehearing on the evidence in the Mental Health Court – see for example paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The Court of Appeal judgment reads:‘[39]Dr Ziukelis at no point, either in his letters or in his evidence, makes clear what collateral information he had read before giving evidence. This Court cannot act on assertions made about that by the appellant. However, the relevant point is that Dr Ziukelis made it perfectly clear that the opinions he gave were based, not on a consideration of all the material, including the collateral material, but on his observations as a treating psychiatrist, in which capacity he accepted the veracity of the appellant’s reports of delusions. This is no doubt a valid basis to criticise his opinions in a forensic (as opposed to treatment) setting. Both assisting psychiatrists properly brought that to the attention of the Court below. It was quite proper for the Court to act on the basis of that advice.’[8]The other reporting psychiatrists before Justice Lyons, Dr Kovacevic and Dr Beech, were of the view that Mr Berg was fit for trial. They were of the view that he had no psychotic illness. The doctors went further than that: Dr Kovacevic’s view that, ‘… Mr Berg impressed me as deliberately and purposefully vague in his responses’; Dr Kovacevic’s evidence as to the lack of any objective evidence of dementia and his evidence of malingering or misreporting functional impairment; the reference to Dr Beech’s opinion that, ‘clinically it is difficult to make sense of the symptoms Vincent Berg reports’ and to Dr Beech’s sceptical view that Mr Berg’s delusional beliefs have evolved in such a way as to hinder Court proceedings and that he thought deliberate action to avoid trial was more likely than any mental illness; Dr Beech’s evidence that he disbelieved Mr Berg’s reports of hearing voices; Dr Kovacevic’s further views about neuropsychology results suggesting, but not being diagnostic of, malingering, and being suggestive of gross exaggeration; Dr Lawrence’s (assisting psychiatrist) conclusion that the evidence raised issues of deliberate misrepresentation at times; the evidence that the longitudinal pattern of illness was inconsistent with the natural course of any major illness; the evidence indicating no clear pattern of cognitive difficulties which would be consistent with any common memory disorder; further reference to neuropsychology tests showing gross exaggeration.” (citations omitted)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established