Spigelman CJ at 1; Wood CJ at CL at 19; Greg James J at 230
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Supreme Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) :
70037/97
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER :
Newman J
COUNSEL :
Crown: G. Smith Applicant: T. Game SC
SOLICITORS:
S.E. O'Connor David Giddy & Associates
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW - appeals - appeal against conviction - murder - fitness to be tried - whether an intellectually disabled offender (not suffering a mental illness) falls within scope of Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) - statutory interpretation - history of common law - whether issue of fitness had been raised in good faith - whether additional fitness hearing should have been ordered - miscarriage of justice - new trial
LEGISLATION CITED:
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 269H Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 (UK) s 2 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (UK) s 4 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (UK) Justices Act 1902 (NSW) ss 36, 41(1B)(a), 41(4) Lunacy Act 1878 (NSW) ss 58, 59 Mental Health Act 1958 (NSW) ss 4, 23, 24 Mental Health Act 1990 (NSW) ss 3, 8, 11 Mental Health Criminal Procedure Act 1990 (NSW) ss 3, 5, 7, 8, 10(1)(a), 10(1)(b), 11, 15, 18, 21, 32
DECISION:
(1) Appeal allowed.; (2) Conviction and sentence quashed and a new trial ordered.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
No. 60523/99
SPIGELMAN CJ
WOOD CJ at CL
GREG JAMES J
FRIDAY 19th OCTOBER 2001
Regina v Graham MAILES
The appellant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with a minimum fixed term of 18 years. Prior to appearing for trial, an inquiry was conducted into the appellant’s fitness to stand trial pursuant to the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW). The jury found that the appellant was fit to stand trial.
The question of the appellant’s possible unfitness was again raised by Counsel before the trial and on separate occasions during the trial, however, the trial Judge declined to order a further fitness hearing.
The appellant appeals against the conviction on the ground that the trial miscarried due to (1) the fact that a real question arose at trial as to the appellant’s fitness which should have led to a further fitness hearing and (2) the inability of the appellant’s counsel to obtain instructions from him.
Before determining the issue on appeal the Court was required to consider whether an accused who is intellectually disabled, but who does not suffer from a mental illness, can qualify for a fitness hearing under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990.
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
R v Mailes [2001] NSWCCA 155
Case
[2001] NSWCCA 155
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The appeal before the court was against the conviction of the respondent, Mr Mailes, who was found guilty of murder. The issue of Mr Mailes' fitness to stand trial was raised but ultimately dismissed by the trial judge. Mr Mailes, who is intellectually disabled but not suffering from a mental illness, argued that he should have been assessed under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW). The court was required to determine whether the statutory provisions applied to an intellectually disabled offender who does not have a mental illness and whether the trial judge erred in not ordering a further fitness hearing.
The court considered the relevant statutory provisions and their historical context, noting that the legislation was intended to address issues of mental illness rather than intellectual disability. The court examined whether the issue of fitness had been raised in good faith and whether a miscarriage of justice had occurred. The court held that the trial judge was not incorrect in finding that the issue of fitness was not raised in good faith, and therefore, there was no need for a further fitness hearing. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.
The court's decision hinged on the interpretation of the statutory provisions and the circumstances under which a fitness hearing should be ordered. The court found that the trial judge's decision not to order a further fitness hearing was not an error, and there was no miscarriage of justice. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that the issue of fitness is raised in good faith and that the statutory provisions are applied appropriately. The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge be upheld.