Beljajev v Director of Public Prosecutions

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brennan J.

BELJAJEV v. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS AND ANOTHER

(1991) 173 CLR 28

6 May 1991

High Court—Practice—Bail—Person charged with crime in State court—Grant of bail pending trial—Appeal by Crown to Supreme Court—Recommittal to prison—Application for special leave to appeal to High Court—Application for stay—Bail pending application—Jurisdiction—Exceptional circumstances.

Decision


BRENNAN J. An indictment was presented before the County Court in Victoria on 13 July 1990 charging the applicant with conspiracy to import prohibited imports contrary to s. 233B(1)(cb) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) on five counts; conspiracy to traffic in a drug of dependence contrary to s. 79 of the Drugs Poison and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vict.) on one count; and trafficking in a drug of dependence contrary to s. 71(1) of that Act on seven counts. No plea was then, or has since, been taken to this indictment.

2. The trial judge, Judge Kelly, has entertained a number of applications with respect to the preparation for and conduct of the trial, including two applications for bail. On 20 September 1990 his Honour refused the first application for bail but, after an eight day hearing of the second application, his Honour granted bail on 11 April 1991.

3. His Honour was satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed which justified the grant of bail. That is the condition governing the power of the court to grant bail, when an accused is charged with offences of the kind appearing in the present indictment: see s. 4(2)(aa) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vict.).

4. Pursuant to s. 18A of the Bail Act the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Commonwealth and the Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria then appealed to the Supreme Court. Marks J. allowed the appeal and ordered that the applicant, who had been released on bail pursuant to Judge Kelly's order, should again be committed to prison to await his trial.

5. The applicant filed an application for special leave to appeal to this Court on 2 May 1991 and the present application seeks an order that the order of Marks J. be stayed pending the hearing by this Court of the application for special leave to appeal. Alternatively, bail is sought pending a hearing of the application for special leave.

6. The jurisdiction of this Court to make an order either preserving the status quo pending the hearing of an application for special leave to appeal or to grant bail pending the hearing of such an application has been considered in several cases. In Chamberlain v. The Queen (No. 1) (1983) 153 CLR 514 at p 518, I expressed the opinion that: "the power of this Court to grant bail rests upon the inherent
power to preserve from futility the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal and to allow an appeal thereafter."

7. In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Myer Emporium Ltd. (No. 1) (1986) 160 CLR 220 at pp 222-223, Dawson J. said, in reference to…
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Details
Case
[1991] HCA 16
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Beljajev v Director of Public Prosecutions*, Brennan J of the High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the interpretation of section 41(1) of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) (the Act). The appellant, Mr Beljajev, had been convicted of an offence under the Act, and the central dispute revolved around whether the Director of Public Prosecutions had the power to withdraw a charge after the commencement of the trial but before the verdict.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Director of Public Prosecutions possessed the authority, under section 41(1) of the Act, to withdraw a charge against an accused person after the trial had commenced but prior to a verdict being delivered. This required an examination of the scope and timing of the Director's power to withdraw charges as conferred by the legislation.

Brennan J reasoned that the power to withdraw a charge under section 41(1) of the Act was exercisable at any time before the verdict. His Honour interpreted the phrase "at any time" to include the period after the commencement of the trial. The Court's reasoning focused on the plain meaning of the statutory language and the absence of any express limitation within the section that would restrict the Director's power to withdraw a charge before the conclusion of the proceedings. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

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