Parker v Taylor - [1994] HCATrans 293

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Perth No P38 of 1993
B e t w e e n -
DAVID CHARLES PARKER

Applicant

and
KEITH WALTER TAYLOR

Respondent

Application for special leave
to appeal

BRENNAN J GAUDRON J McHUGH J

Parker

22/4/94

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 22 APRIL 1994, AT 11.16 AM

MR M.J. McCUSKER, QC:

May it please the Court, I appear

with my learned friend, MR T. RITTER, for the
applicant. (instructed by Dwyer Durack)

MR A.N. HOPE:

May it please the Court, I appear with my

learned friend, MR N.J. TWEEDIE, for the
respondent. (instructed by the Director of Public
Prosecutions (Western Australia))

BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Mccusker.

MR McCUSKER:

May it please Your Honours, the applicant's

summary of argument I would not think needs
repetition.

BRENNAN J:

I would hope not.

You would not get through it

in your 20 minutes.

MR McCUSKER:

I am sure of that, Your Honour. Could I just

briefly state what we consider some of the
important and salient points? First, the appeal
provisions that are contained in the Justices' Act
of Western Australia in section 187 include
provision for appeals from a magistrate's decision

to commit. The importance of committal proceedings
has often been stated. For example, His Honour
Justice Dawson in Grassby, referred to the
importance of those proceedings as preventing cases
which ought not to go to trial from going to trial
and thereby avoiding both public waste of funds and
personal humiliation and cost to the defendant.
The Western Australian legislature has, in our submission, recognized that importance by giving a
statutory right to appeal in section 187, which
provides that leave to appeal shall be granted by
the supreme court unless it appears that the
application is frivolous, vexatious or there are no

arguable grounds for the appeal. Now that being

the state of the legislation, in our submission,
the appeal ought to be treated, once leave has been
granted as it was here, in the same way as any
other appeal.
Your Honours, it is submitted that the

Full Court's approach to the appeal was

fundamentally flawed. The question of the test to
be applied under section 186 of the Justices Act
that that is sufficient to put on trial is a matter
of some debate still, surprising though it may be.
There are two schools of thought as to the
sufficiency which is required: one school, which
we would cleave to, is that the sufficiency of
evidence falls to be tested by reference to the
requirement that a jury may be satisfied beyond

Parker

22/4/94

reasonable doubt. The authorities are referred to
in a summary in the affidavit in support of the
application for special leave, which appears at the
appeal book, page 133, Your Honours, where a number
of the authorities are set out, and it can be seen

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Parker v Taylor

Details

AGLC: Parker v Taylor [1994] HCATrans 293
Case: [1994] HCATrans 293
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Brennan, Gaudron, and McHugh JJ of the High Court of Australia on an application for special leave to appeal. The applicant, Mr Parker, sought to challenge a committal order made by a magistrate. The respondent was represented by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia).

The primary legal issue before the High Court was the test to be applied under section 186 of the Justices Act of Western Australia concerning the sufficiency of evidence required to commit an accused for trial. The applicant argued that the standard should be that a jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, contrasting this with a potentially lesser standard favoured in Western Australia, such as that there is evidence from which a jury could infer a relevant fact. A further issue arose regarding the significance of the applicant's right to appeal under section 187 of the Justices Act, which mandates the granting of leave to appeal unless the application is frivolous, vexatious, or lacks arguable grounds.

Brennan J raised significant obstacles to the grant of special leave, noting the Court's general reluctance to grant leave in matters concerning committal orders. His Honour also pointed out that even if the committal order were quashed, the Director of Public Prosecutions retained a discretionary power to proceed by ex officio indictment. The applicant contended that these potential procedural outcomes should not deter the Court from addressing the appeal, given the statutory right to appeal provided by Western Australian legislation.

Orders