BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1683

Appeal from: BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2757
File number: NSD 2111 of 2017
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 8 November 2018
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – coincidence evidence – admissibility of coincidence evidence – where evidence adduced to establish actual bias – where evidence adduced to establish state of mind of primary Judge – evidence of other cases decided by the primary Judge – statistical evidence – whether evidence has significant probative value – evidence inadmissible

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – actual bias – test to establish actual bias – consideration of need for caution before raising allegation of actual bias – whether primary Judge actually biased

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – reasons for decision –requirement to give reasons – consideration of what constitutes adequate reasons – whether the primary Judge failed to give adequate reasons – whether there was a real engagement with the arguments and grounds being advanced

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – apprehended bias – whether the Tribunal exhibited apprehended bias against the Appellant – whether Tribunal Member hostile to the Appellant – whether the allegation of apprehension of bias appropriately made

HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – application for the Court to be reconstituted – where application made after the conclusion of the hearing – where Counsel expressly declined to make application during the hearing – application rejected

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – legal practitioners –where barrister affirmed affidavit in proceeding in which he appeared – where affidavits annexed documents sought to be relied on – where prospect that barrister appearing could be called upon to give evidence – a course to be shunned

Legislation:

Evidence Act1995 (Cth) s 98

Evidence Act1995 (NSW) s 98

Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) s 97

Cases cited:

A2 v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 174

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

AZU15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 74, (2016) 240 FCR 143

AZZI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 24, (2002) 120 FCR 48

BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2757

Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94

CDD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 65, (2017) 250 FCR 587

Chava v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 313, (2014) 141 ALD 433

Commissioner of Taxation v Glennan [1999] FCA 297, (1999) 90 FCR 538

CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 330

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146, (2016) 253 FCR 496

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2, (2018) 353 ALR 641

DSJ v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 9, (2012) 84 NSWLR 758

Fletcher Construction Australia Ltd v…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1683
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the primary issue before the court was whether the primary judge's decision should be set aside due to actual bias. This case involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, where the Appellant, BDS17, contested the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's decision to cancel their visa. The Appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal, including allegations of actual bias against the primary judge, and sought to adduce coincidence evidence under the Evidence Act.

The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge was actually biased, whether the primary judge failed to properly consider the submissions, whether the Tribunal failed to make reasonable inquiries, and whether the Tribunal exhibited apprehended bias. Additionally, the court had to decide on the admissibility of coincidence evidence and the application for the court to be reconstituted.

The court rejected the allegation of actual bias against the primary judge, finding the evidence insufficient to establish bias. The court found merit in the argument that the primary judge failed to adequately explain the basis of his decision and did not properly consider the submissions. As such, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for reconsideration by a differently constituted court. The application for the court to be reconstituted was also rejected.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the primary judge's decision was set aside. The case was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for reconsideration in accordance with law, with no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Order 2 of the Orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 13 November 2017 be set aside.

3. The proceeding be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted, for reconsideration in accordance with law.

4. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appeal against a decision made by the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant, BDS17, a non-citizen, is challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel their visa. The appellant contends that the primary Judge exhibited actual bias and that the Tribunal made various errors in its decision-making process. The case revolves around the admissibility of coincidence evidence, the test for actual bias, the requirement to give reasons, the apprehension of bias, and an application for the Court to be reconstituted.

A Notice of Appeal was initially filed on 29 November 2017, followed by an Amended Notice of Appeal on 20 December 2017. The appellant contended, amongst other things, that the primary Judge was actually biased and that the Tribunal made various jurisdictional errors. The appellant also filed a Notice of Intention to Adduce Coincidence Evidence under s 98(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Both parties filed written submissions, and after the close of the hearing, the appellant filed further submissions, including a request for the Court to be reconstituted. The appeal was heard by the Court, which rejected the allegation of actual bias against the primary Judge, as well as other grounds of appeal related to the Tribunal's decision-making process. The application for reconstitution of the Court was also rejected.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The test for actual bias is “stringent” and the onus cast on the Appellant of proving actual bias is a “heavy one”: Hocking v Medical Board of Australia [2014] ACTSC 48 at [174] to [175], (2014) 287 FLR 54 at 84 per Murrell CJ. Coincidence evidence – s 98 of the Evidence Act “Coincidence evidence” is not admissible unless such evidence falls within s 98 of the Evidence Act. Section 98 provides as follows: The coincidence rule (1)Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally unless: (a)the party seeking to adduce the evidence gave reasonable notice in writing to each other party of the party’s intention to adduce the evidence; and (b)the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value. (2) Paragraph (1)(a) does not apply if: (a)the evidence is adduced in accordance with any directions made by the court under section 100; or (b)the evidence is adduced to explain or contradict coincidence evidence adduced by another party. “Coincidence evidence” is defined in the Dictionary to the Evidence Act as “evidence of a kind referred to in subsection 98(1) that a party seeks to have adduced for the purpose referred to in that subsection”. “Coincidence evidence” invites a “particular form of probabilistic reasoning designed to establish a particular fact or state of mind”: R v MR [2013] NSWCCA 236 at [61] per Beech-Jones J, Hoeben CJ at CL agreeing. In explaining the comparable provision found in the Evidence Act1995 (NSW), Simpson J in R v Gale [2012] NSWCCA 174, (2012) 217 A Crim R 487 at 494 observed:[25] At its heart, s 98 is a provision concerning the drawing of inferences. The purpose sought to be achieved by the tender of coincidence evidence is to provide the foundation upon which the tribunal of fact could draw an inference. The inference is that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind. The process of reasoning from which that inference would be drawn is:Ÿtwo or more events occurred; andŸthere were similarities in those events; or there were similarities in the circumstances in which those events occurred; or there were similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred; andŸhaving regard to those similarities, it is improbable that the two events occurred coincidentally;Ÿtherefore the person in question did a particular act or had a particular state of mind.Her Honour continued (at 495 to 496): [30]The factual underpinnings of the s 98 decision to admit or reject coincidence evidence are:Ÿthat there is evidence capable of establishing the occurrence of two or more events; andŸthat there is evidence capable of establishing similarities in the two or more events; orŸthat there is evidence capable of establishing similarities in the circumstances in which two or more events occurred;Ÿ that there is evidence capable of establishing both similarities in the two or more events and similarities in the circumstances in which the two events occurred.[31]In a case in which it is found that there is such evidence, then, in my opinion, the correct process in the determination of the admission of evidence under s 98 involves a series of steps, as follows:Ÿthe first step is to identify the “particular act of a person” or the “particular state of mind of a person” that the party tendering the evidence seeks to prove;Ÿthe second step is to identify the “two or more events” from the occurrence of which the party tendering the evidence seeks to prove that the person in question did the “particular act” or had the “particular state of mind”;Ÿthe third step is to identify the “similarities in the events” and/or the “similarities in the circumstances in which the events occurred” by reason of which the party tendering the evidence asserts the improbability of coincidental occurrence of the events;Ÿthe fourth step is to determine whether “reasonable notice” has been given of the intention to adduce the evidence (or, if reasonable notice has not been given, whether a direction under s 100(2) ought to be given, dispensing with the requirement);Ÿthe fifth step is to make an evaluation whether the evidence will, either by itself or in conjunction with other evidence already given or anticipated, “have significant probative value”;McClellan CJ at CL and Fullerton J agreed with Simpson J.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A Notice of Appeal was filed in this Court on 29 November 2017 and an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on 20 December 2017. Omitting for present purposes the Particulars provided in respect to each Ground of Appeal, those Grounds as set forth in the Amended Notice of Appeal were expressed (without alteration) as follows:(1)His Honour the learned primary judge’s decision should be set aside for actual bias on the part of the Judge.Substantive Grounds(2)His Honour the learned primary Judge erred in failing to hold under Ground 1 that the Tribunal (a) failed to take a relevant consideration (b) failed to exercise jurisdiction (c) failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration(3)His Honour the learned primary Judge erred under Ground 2 by failing to find that the Tribunal failed to inquire with the Mannar Police and/or Mannar Magistrates Court Registry or the Document Examination Unit of the Department or with the applicant’s former lawyer about the genuineness of documents vital to the applicant’s case(4)His Honour erred under Ground 3 by failing to hold that the Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it was (a) not open for the Tribunal to impliedly find that the documents were fraudulent and/or (b) not open for it to give no weight(5)His Honour erred under Ground 5 by failing to find that the Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it made exaggerated adverse credibility findings which were not open(6)His Honour erred under Ground 6 by failing to find that The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal caused apprehension of bias by its hostility to the applicant(7)His Honour erred under Ground 8 by failing to find that The Tribunal made jurisdictional error in that it misapprehended the applicant’s evidence and made adverse credibility findings based on that misapprehensionThese Grounds of Appeal are, amongst other reasons, noticeable for contending that the primary Judge’s decisions should be set aside by reason of actual bias on the part of the primary Judge. Such an allegation is rare. In addition to filing the Amended Notice of Appeal, Counsel on behalf of BDS17 has filed a Notice of Intention to Adduce Coincidence Evidence. That notice was given under s 98(1) of the Evidence Act1995 (Cth). Written submissions have been filed by both parties. After the close of hearing, further submissions were filed by the Appellant – including a submission that the Court should be reconstituted. Ground 1, being the allegation of actual bias against the primary Judge, is rejected. A number of Grounds, namely Grounds 2, 4, 5 and 7, overlap and raise a common contention that the primary Judge failed to explain the basis upon which he proceeded and failed to properly consider the submissions then being advanced. That argument has prevailed. Ground 3, being the allegation that the Tribunal failed to make reasonable inquiries, is rejected. Ground 6, confined as it is to an allegation founded upon an alleged “hostility” on the part of the Tribunal is also rejected. Ground 7 was not pressed. The application for reconstitution of the Court is rejected.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court considered the appeal on a number of grounds, primarily focusing on the alleged actual bias of the primary Judge and various errors made by the Tribunal. In relation to the allegation of actual bias, the Court emphasised the stringent test required to establish actual bias. The Court held that the Appellant had not met the heavy burden of proving actual bias. The Court noted that the test requires the Appellant to show that there existed a real likelihood of bias on the part of the primary Judge. The Court held that the evidence presented did not meet this test.

Regarding the primary Judge's reasoning, the Court found that he did not sufficiently explain the basis of his decision or properly consider the submissions made. The Court held that this amounted to a failure to properly exercise jurisdiction. The Court also noted that the Tribunal failed to make reasonable inquiries regarding the genuineness of documents critical to the Appellant's case. This was found to be a jurisdictional error.

The allegations that the Tribunal made exaggerated adverse credibility findings and implied that the documents were fraudulent were rejected by the Court. The Court found that the Tribunal did not cause apprehension of bias by exhibiting hostility towards the Appellant. Furthermore, the Court held that the Tribunal did not misapprehend the Appellant's evidence or make adverse credibility findings based on this misapprehension.

Finally, the Court rejected the application for the Court to be reconstituted, noting that such an application should have been made before the hearing and was not pursued during the proceedings. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside certain orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the proceeding to the Federal Circuit Court, differently constituted, for reconsideration in accordance with law. There was no order as to costs.