AYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 454

Appeal from: AYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2119
File number: NSD 1105 of 2018
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 4 April 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Protection visa – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal made adverse finding as to credit – whether adverse findings as to credit unreasonable – consideration of duty of a judge to provide reasons for decision 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – benefit of the doubt – no obligation on decision-maker to give benefit of the doubt

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

AYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2119

Ayoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 83, (2015) 231 FCR 513

BDS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1683

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146, (2016) 253 FCR 496

DQA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2086

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18, (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16, (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, (1999) 197 CLR 611

Plaintiff M64-2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50, (2015) 258 CLR 173

QLN146 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 42, (2018) 92 ALJR 877

SZHIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1641

SZHUF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1686

Date of hearing: 27 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 74
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1105 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AYG18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 APRIL 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FLICK J:

  1. The Appellant in the present proceeding, identified by the pseudonym AYG18, is a citizen of Sri Lanka.

  2. In May 2014, he applied for a Protection (class XA) visa.  A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused that application…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 454
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, AYG18, sought to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed his application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The primary issue in the appeal was whether the Tribunal's adverse findings about the appellant's credibility were unreasonable and if the primary Judge had erred in dismissing the appellant's arguments against these findings.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal's characterisation of his evidence as inconsistent and shifting was improper and that the primary Judge should not have accepted these findings without providing adequate reasons. He also contended that the primary Judge should have given him the benefit of the doubt, as there was no obligation on the decision-maker to do so. The court examined the evidence presented before the Tribunal and concluded that the Tribunal's task was to resolve issues of evidence and make findings of fact. The court found that the Tribunal's reasoning and findings were open to it based on the available materials and that the appellant's arguments did not expose any error on the part of the Tribunal.

The court further noted that the primary Judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's arguments were inadequate as they did not sufficiently engage with the arguments presented. However, the court did not find this to be a sufficient ground for appeal since no challenge was made on appeal to the adequacy of the primary Judge's reasoning. The court rejected all the grounds of appeal and dismissed the appeal. In accordance with the orders, the appellant was required to pay the costs of the first respondent, either as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Even had the transcript been admitted before this Court, it should be noted that it would have led to no different conclusion. An inconsistent account and shifting evidence Grounds of Appeal 10, 11 and 13 of the Notice of Appeal focus attention on the Tribunal’s reasons at paras [41] and [43]. It is argued that the primary Judge erred in not concluding that it was not open to the Tribunal to characterise the now-Appellant’s evidence as “inconsistent” and “shifting”. In expanding upon Grounds 10 and 11 and the reference to the Tribunal’s reasons at para [43], the Appellant’s written Outline of Submissions seek to further refer to the evidence the now-Appellant gave during the course of the hearing before the Tribunal. This evidence (in summary form) was said to confirm:·that the now-Appellant made a complaint to a human rights organisation about his vehicle; and ·that he did not make the complaint in Jaffna because the vehicle was not registered in Jaffna. The difficulty for the now-Appellant, both before the Federal Circuit Court and this Court on appeal, is that the task of resolving issues of evidence and that of making findings of fact was a task entrusted to the Tribunal. In circumstances where there is some evidence before the Tribunal upon which findings may be made, the fact that a different decision-maker (or even a Court conducting judicial review) may have made a different finding does not of itself expose error: cf. Eshetu [1999] HCA 21 at [147], (1999) 197 CLR at 657 per Gummow J; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [131], (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648 per Crennan and Bell JJ. Paragraph [43] of the Tribunal’s reasons:·identifies the evidence which it regarded as being “inconsistent”; ·identifies the difficulty it was having in assessing the evidence (e.g. it being “difficult to understand why he would travel from Jaffna to Vavuniya to complain”); and ·refers to the fact that there was no corroborative evidence of the claims being made.This process of reasoning, and the findings made by the Tribunal, were matters entrusted to the Tribunal to determine. The findings it made, and the reasoning it pursued, were findings open to it on the materials then available. In rejecting the Grounds of Review comparable to Grounds of Appeal 10 and 11, it should be noted that the reasons of the primary Judge do not expressly engage with the Tribunal’s reasons. A party to the proceeding, including (in particular) the Appellant, would have little assurance that these two Grounds were resolved by reference to the arguments sought to be advanced and not by reference to some general statement of legal principle divorced from the facts of the case under consideration. Reasons for rejecting Grounds of Review have to engage with the merits of the particular arguments sought to be advanced; a recital of general principles of law will generally not suffice. But no application was made by Counsel for the Appellant to amend the Notice of Appeal when the apparent deficiency in the reasons of the primary Judge was referred to during his submissions in reply and after the deficiency had been canvassed with Counsel for the Respondent Minister during her oral submissions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The focus on the individual paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons, which were the subject of scrutiny by the Federal Circuit Court and this Court, had the very real prospect of attempting to discern legal error in discrete aspects of the reasoning process and to divorce those discrete aspects from the entirety of the reasoning process. Such a course runs the risk of running counter to the caution advanced in Wu Shan Liang against reading reasons for decision with an eye attuned to the perception of error. Although individual aspects of the reasoning process of the Tribunal may potentially have been better expressed, when read in context, one simple message emerged – i.e., the Tribunal had real problems in accepting the truthfulness or the reliability of the account being advanced by the now-Appellant. CONCLUSIONS None of the Grounds of Appeal addressed in the written Outline of Submissions individually expose any error on the part of the Tribunal nor any reason to conclude that its decision was “unreasonable”. The final contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant, namely that the primary Judge erred in dismissing the same arguments, is also rejected. Notwithstanding the focus in submissions before this Court on the reasons of the Tribunal, it is not to be forgotten that that focus was itself fundamentally misplaced. The task of this Court is to consider whether there was any appellable error committed on the part of the primary Judge. When attention is directed to the decision of the primary Judge, considerable reservation is expressed as to the adequacy of the reasoning provided for rejecting the comparable Grounds of Review as are now relied upon before this Court. Some of those Grounds of Review have been more exposed to more scrutiny than others. Although there is some limited reference in the reasons of the primary Judge to the actual argument sought to be canvassed with respect to some of the Grounds of Review, such reference as is made to the arguments may have been insufficient to alert the now-Appellant to the fact that his arguments had been considered and resolved. Reservation is expressed as to whether it would be apparent to the now-Appellant that the primary Judge in fact actively engaged with the arguments presented to that Court for resolution. But no challenge was made on appeal to the adequacy of the reasoning of the primary Judge. The focus of oral submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellant remained more a challenge to the findings and reasons of the Tribunal than an attempt to identify appellable error on the part of the primary Judge. The substance of each of those challenges has been separately considered and each has been rejected. None of the Grounds of Review had any merit before the primary Judge and none of the Grounds of Appeal have been made out. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE: 1.The appeal is dismissed.2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as agreed or assessed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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