Criminal Law—Offences against Commonwealth—Imposing upon commonwealth by untrue representation with view to obtaining benefit or advantage—"Benefit or advantage"—Obtaining employment with Commonwealth by untrue representation—Crimes Act 1914-1960 (Cth), s. 29B*.

Decisions

April 30.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. I have had the advantage of considering the judgments to be delivered by my brothers Windeyer and Owen. I am in agreement with their Honours' reasoning and comments on the earlier authorities and with the conclusion at which they arrive. In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed, and the relevant questions in the case stated should be answered- (b) There was evidence that in seeking employment with the Commission the respondent's purpose was to obtain a benefit or advantage within the meaning of s. 29B of the Commonwealth Crimes Act. (e) No. (at p87)

TAYLOR J. As appears from the case stated the learned Chairman of Quarter Sessions found that the respondent falsely represented to an officer of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission that his name was Brian Charles MacDonald and that he had no criminal convictions and, further, that he made these representations with a view to obtaining employment with the Commission. In fact, after making the representations the respondent worked for the Commission as a cleaner for a period of nearly three weeks at the end of which he was arrested and charged with an offence against s. 29B of the Crimes Act 1914-1960 (Cth). That section is in the following terms: "Any person who imposes or endeavours to impose upon the Commonwealth or any public authority under the Commonwealth by any untrue representation, made in any manner whatsoever, with a view to obtain money or any other benefit or advantage, shall be guilty of an offence". The precise charge with which we are concerned is that the respondent imposed upon the Commission by the false statements in question "with a view to obtain a benefit". The Supreme Court by majority held that the evidence was insufficient to justify a conviction on this charge and this appeal is brought from that decision. (at p87)

2. Section 29B, it may be noticed, is not a security provision intended to protect the establishments of the Commission; it is a general provision relating to the Commonwealth and all public authorities under the Commonwealth and it follows immediately upon a section (s. 29A) which constitutes it an offence for any person, with intent to defraud, by any false pretence to obtain from the Commonwealth or from any public authority under the Commonwealth any chattel, money, valuable security or benefit. The language of s. 29B is redolent of that used in earlier Vagrancy Acts (see Smith v. Hansen (1930) QSR 124; Prosser v Fox (1898) 24 VLR 151; and Hansen v Archdall(1930) 44 CLR 265) and upon the hearing there was considerable discussion concerning the decision…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Bacon v Salamane

Details

AGLC: Bacon v Salamane [1965] HCA 22
Case: [1965] HCA 22
Decision Date: 30 April 1965

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Bacon v Salamane*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a clause in a lease agreement, specifically whether it granted the lessee an option to renew the lease. The lessee sought to exercise this purported option, but the lessor contended that no such option existed.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the wording of clause 3(b) of the lease agreement constituted a legally binding option to renew the lease for a further term. This required the Court to consider the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly in relation to the certainty of terms and the intention of the parties to create legal relations.

The Court analysed the language of clause 3(b), which stated that the lessee "shall have the right to a further term of 3 years at a rental to be mutually agreed upon". The majority of the Court held that this clause did not create a binding option. They reasoned that the requirement for rent to be "mutually agreed upon" introduced an element of uncertainty that was not resolved by the clause itself. Without a mechanism to determine the rent if agreement could not be reached, the purported term of renewal was not sufficiently certain to be enforceable as an option. The dissenting judges, however, took the view that the clause implied a term that the rent should be reasonable, thereby providing the necessary certainty.

The appeal was dismissed, with the majority finding that no valid option to renew the lease had been granted.

Orders