Hansen v Archdall and Smith - [1930] HCA 16

ARCHDALL AND SMITH

RESPONDENTS.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

QUEENSLAND. Tagrancy--Fortune-telling-Imposing upon charitable institution or private individual

- False or fraudulent representation-With a view to obtain money or some other benefit - Interpretation - Imposition not limited to cases of charity - Vagrant Act of 1851 (Q.) (15 Vict. No. 4), sec. 3.

A person was convicted, under sec. 3 of the Vagrant Act of 1851, of endeavour- ing to impose upon a private individual by a false verbal representation that she had power and ability to foretell events which would thereafter happen in the life of that individual with a view to obtain money.

Held, by Isaacs C.J., Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ. (Rich J. dissenting), that fortune-telling, if dishonestly made, is an offence under sec. 3 of the Vagrant Act of 1851, and that the statute is not limited to cases of imposition by way of charity.

Per Isaacs C.J. and Gavan Duffy J. :-It is only when a person sets out to cheat either any charitable institution or any private individual by means of a false or fraudulent representation in order to obtain from the institution or individual, as the direct or proximate result of the representation, money or some other benefit or advantage, that the section is contravened. It does not extend to any case when the representation is honestly made, even though it * The Vagrant Act of 1851 (Q.), by

private individual by any false or sec. 3, provides (inter alia) that " All

fraudulent representation either ver- persons going about as gatherers of alms

bally or in writing with a view to under false pretence of loss by fire or

obtain money or some other benefit or by other casualty or as collectors under any false pretence and all persons

rogue and vagabond within the true imposing or endeavouring to impose

intent and meaning of this Act." upon any charitable institution or

44 CLR 266

is false nor does it extend to the case of a person by misrepresentation inducing an institution or individual to make a contract under which money is obtained: the statute contemplates the representation as the direct actuating cause of the offender obtaining the money.

Decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Full Court): Smith v. Hansen: Ex parte Hansen, (1930) S.R. (Q.) 124, affirmed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The appellant, Margaret Hansen, was charged at the Court of Petty Sessions at Brisbane upon complaint that on 18th October 1929, at Brisbane, she "endeavoured to impose upon a private individual, namely, one Ruby Kingsley, by verbally falsely repre- senting to the said Ruby Kingsley that she, the said Margaret Hansen, otherwise Madame Margaret, had power and ability to foretell future events which would thereafter happen in the life of the said Ruby Kingsley, with a view to obtain money. from the said Ruby Kingsley." The evidence adduced before the Police Magistrate who heard the complaint showed that Ruby Kingsley, a paid…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hansen v Archdall and Smith

Details

AGLC: Hansen v Archdall [1930] HCA 16
Case: [1930] HCA 16
Decision Date: 11 August 1930

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland concerning a conviction under section 3 of the Vagrant Act 1851 (Qld). The appellant, Margaret Hansen, was convicted of endeavouring to impose upon a private individual by falsely representing she had the ability to foretell future events, with the aim of obtaining money. The Supreme Court of Queensland had previously upheld this conviction.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether fortune-telling, when dishonestly practiced, constituted an offence under section 3 of the Vagrant Act 1851, and whether the scope of this section was limited solely to impositions related to charity. The appellant argued that the Act, as originally intended and as interpreted in some jurisdictions, did not extend to fortune-telling or impositions on private individuals unless they were charitable in nature.

By a majority decision (Isaacs C.J., Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ., with Rich J. dissenting), the High Court held that fortune-telling, if dishonestly undertaken, is indeed an offence under section 3 of the Vagrant Act 1851. The Court reasoned that the phrase "any charitable institution or private individual" should be interpreted as distinct categories, meaning the word "charitable" did not qualify "private individual." Therefore, the section was not confined to cases of charitable imposition. The majority found that the statute contemplated a false or fraudulent representation as the direct cause of obtaining money or other benefit, and that fortune-telling, when dishonest, fit this description. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders