AXV16 v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 1914
•20 July 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AXV16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 1914 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection visa – jurisdictional error – corroborating evidence – real risk of significant harm – Al Malha Charitable Society. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 |
| Cases cited: AMT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 366 ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164; 85 ALJR 306; 273 ALR 122; 119 ALD 446 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS & Anor [2010] HCA 16 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259; 70 ALHR 568; 136 ALR 481; 41 ALD 1 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 MZYUV v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 498; 138 ALD 281 NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1 NAHI, NAHJ and NAHK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 SZNSP v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1143 WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74; 80 ALD 568 |
| Applicant: | AXV16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File number: | MLG 808 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Mercuri |
| Hearing date: | 20 March 2018 |
| Date of last submission: | 27 March 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 20 July 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the applicant: | Mr Maxwell |
| Solicitors for the applicant: | Lander & Rogers Lawyers |
| Advocate for the respondents: | Mr Brown |
| Solicitors for the respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
The applicant’s application filed on 21 April 2016 as amended on
28 February 2018 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding in a sum to be fixed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 808 of 2016
| AXV16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 24 March 2016 (“the tribunal”).
In that decision, the tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the delegate”) not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Background
The applicant was born in Bethlehem, Palestine on 5 February 1964.[1]
In 1965, he moved to Jordan with his parents and obtained Jordanian citizenship in early 1967.[2] Later, in 1967 the applicant moved to Kuwait with his family.[3] The applicant studied in India from 1985 until 1989.[4] The applicant returned to Jordan in 1991[5] and lived in Amman from 1991 until May 2011 aside from one year where he lived in the United States of America in the 1990s.[6] During this period, the applicant had his own business buying clothes from importers. The applicant is married, with five daughters. His marriage continues and his wife and children live in Jordan.[7]
[1] Court book at page 27 and page 78.
[2] Court book at page 28 and page 30.
[3] Court book at page 30 and page 34.
[4] Court book at pages 30 to 31.
[5] Court book at page 30 and page 34.
[6] Court book at page 206 at paragraph [14].
[7] Court book at page 2016 at paragraph [16].
In 1992, the applicant joined the Al Malha Charitable Society
(“Al Malha”) which provides assistance for people and students of Palestinian descent in Jordan.[8] It runs a dental clinic, physical therapy centre and wedding hall.[9] The applicant claims that it also has a political agenda supporting the rights of Palestinians in Jordan and supporting Palestinians who had been denied entry to universities and some schools, as well as assisting former political activists who had been arrested by providing them with lawyers.[10]
[8] Court book at page 208 at paragraph [27].
[9] Court book at page 208 at paragraph [27].
[10] Court book at page 89 at paragraph [25] to page 90 at paragraph [25]; and supplementary court book at page 2.
In about 2008, the applicant claims that, with others, he founded a secret organisation called the Palestinian Jordanian Liberation Front
(“the PJLF”) of which he was the secretary.[11] The PJLF’s purpose was to advocate for the rights of Palestinians in Jordan[12] and to pursue the same secret political agenda in support of Palestinians in Jordan as the Al Malha.[13] The applicant also claims that the PJLF used the Al Malha as a “front” for its political activities.[14]
[11] Court book at page 34; and at page 208 at paragraph [26].
[12] Court book at page 34; and at page 208 at paragraph [25].
[13] Supplementary court book at page 2; court book at page 89 at paragraphs [23] to [25]; and at page 90 at paragraph [26].
[14] Court book at page 208 at paragraph [28].
The applicant claims to have been under surveillance by the Jordanian security forces from in about 2009 or 2010 and to have been arrested, threatened and mistreated twice by Jordanian plainclothes security officers: once in January 2010 and once on 10 March 2011. On the second occasion the applicant claims that he was detained for a month.[15]
[15] Court book at page 210 at paragraph [36].
The Applicant’s application for a protection visa
On 10 May 2011, the applicant arrived in Australia on a tourist visa[16] which was extended three times until 8 March 2012.[17] The applicant applied for a student visa on 23 March 2012 but this application was refused on 11 May 2012.[18]
[16] Court book at page 29.
[17] Court book at page 62 and at page 89 at paragraph [22].
[18] Paragraph [17] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 206 of the court book.
On 18 December 2012, the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa (“the visa”) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).[19] Relevantly, the applicant asserted that, he was likely to be persecuted if returned to Jordan due to his Palestinian ethnicity and his political views and activities[20] and that this persecution might include being deprived of his citizenship.
[19] Court book at pages 27 to 56.
[20] Court book at page 65.
The delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa on 8 March 2015.[21]
[21] Court book at page 57 to 77.
The Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) (as it then was) affirmed the delegate’s decision on 30 September 2013.[22]
[22] Court book at page 83 to 104.
On review to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the Court remitted the application for review made on 20 August 2014 to the RRT by order dated 1 July 2015.[23]
[23] Court book at page 105.
On 5 February 2016, the matter was heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (differently constituted). The applicant appeared at that hearing with the aid of an interpreter and was represented by his registered migration agent. In addition, the applicant filed submissions both before and after the hearing.[24]
[24] Court book at page 151 to 182; and at page 191 to 199.
The Tribunal’s reasons
On 24 March 2016, the tribunal, as then constituted, again affirmed the delegate’s decision.[25]
[25] Court book at page 204.
The tribunal accepted that the applicant was a citizen of Jordan of Palestinian descent.[26]
[26] Paragraph [13] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 206 of the court book.
At paragraph 11 of the decision record, the tribunal relevantly stated:
The issue in this case is whether the applicant will be harmed in Jordan because of his Palestinian ethnicity or his political opinion as a member of Palestinian advocacy groups.[27]
[27] Paragraph [11] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 206 of the court book.
Moreover, at paragraph 19 of the decision record, the tribunal identifies the applicant’s claims as follows:
The applicant claims to fear harm as a Palestinian in Jordan, as a member of pro-Palestinian groups in Jordan and Australia, as a returnee from the West and as a failed asylum seeker.[28]
[28] Paragraph [19] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 207 of the court book.
In paragraphs 20 to 24 of its reasons, the tribunal concluded that the applicant had not suffered discrimination in Jordan amounting to serious or significant harm or that he faced a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm in Jordan as a Jordanian citizen of Palestinian origin.[29] In coming to this conclusion, the tribunal had regard to country information.[30] The applicant does not challenge this part of the tribunal’s reasoning.[31]
[29] Paragraph [20] to [24] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 207 of the court book.
[30] Court book at page 206 to 208.
[31] Paragraph [22] of the applicant’s outline of submissions filed 28 February 2018.
The applicant claims that he and others formed the PJLF, a secret organisation that advocated for the rights of Palestinians in Jordan. The applicant claimed that the Al Malha, of which he was a member, was a registered trade charity used by the PJLF as a front to organise demonstrations or secretly write letters and make complaints on behalf of Palestinians in Jordan.[32]
[32] Paragraph [28] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 208 of the court book.
The tribunal considered the claims that the applicant made in relation to his involvement with the PJLF at paragraphs 25 to 33.[33]
[33] Paragraph [25] to [29] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 208; and paragraphs [30] to [33] at page 209 of the court book.
The tribunal also considered the applicant’s claims that he was placed under surveillance by the Jordanian security forces and was the subject of various arrests during 2010 and 2011 at paragraphs as a result of his involvement with the PJLF.[34]
[34] Paragraph [34] to [38] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 210 of the court book.
The tribunal had regard to the fact that the applicant was able to renew his passport in 2010 after the alleged first arrest and departed the country legally in May 2011 after the alleged second arrest. The tribunal did not accept that the applicant paid bribes to renew his passport or leave the country, on the basis that it did not accept that the applicant was of interest to the Jordanian authorities.[35]
[35] Paragraph [40] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 211 of the court book.
At paragraph 41 of the tribunal’s decision record, it noted that the applicant claimed[36] that people who advocate for Palestinian rights are perceived to be acting against the Jordanian government.[37] The tribunal considered and concluded that the evidence before it did not indicate that people, ‘who advocate for the rights of Palestinians in Jordan are treated as anti-government by the Jordanian regime’.[38]
[36] The reasons referred to the “tribunal” but a fair reading of paragraph [41] makes it clear that this is a reference to claims made by “the applicant” of the tribunal’s decision record at page 211 of the court book.
[37] Paragraph [41] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 211 of the court book.
[38] Paragraph [41] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 211 of the court book.
The tribunal considered the applicant’s claims regarding his activities in support of Palestinian people living in Jordan whilst in Australia at paragraphs 42 and 43.[39]
[39] Paragraphs [42] and [43] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 211 of the court book.
The tribunal then considered the claim made by the applicant that he would face cancellation of his Jordanian citizenship on the basis that he would be perceived to be a critic or opponent of the regime.[40]
[40] Paragraphs [44] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 211; and paragraphs [45] to [47] at page 212 of the court book.
The tribunal also considered the applicant’s further claims in relation to:
a)treatment on his return from the west as a failed asylum seeker at paragraphs 48 to 52;[41]
b)concerns obtaining a new passport from the Jordanian embassy at paragraphs 53 to 54;[42] and
c)issues arising from his various medical conditions and the impact on those conditions of a return to Jordan at paragraphs 55 to 57.[43]
[41] Paragraphs [48] to 51 of the tribunal’s decision record at page 212; and paragraphs [51] to [52] at page 213 of the court book.
[42] Paragraphs [53] to [54] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 213 of the court book.
[43] Paragraphs [55] to [57] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 213 of the court book.
The tribunal then set out its conclusions at paragraphs 58 to 62.[44]
In essence, the tribunal concluded that having regard to all of the evidence before it, it was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations. The tribunal therefore affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant’s application for the visa.[44] Paragraph [58] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 213; and paragraphs [59] to [62] at page 214 of the court book.
Ground One
The first ground of review in the application filed on 21 April 2016 and amended on 28 February 2018 is:
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (the Tribunal) decision is affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal’s decision to give no weight to, or dismiss, corroborating evidence put forward by the applicant to support his claim that he was of interest to the Jordanian security services due to his political activities was irrational.
Particulars
(a)In written submissions made on 29 January 2016, the applicant clearly articulated his claim that, if he returned to Jordan, he would suffer persecution and/or be at real risk of suffering significant harm on account of his “actual/imputed political opinion” and membership of the particular social groups “Members of the Palestinian Jordanian Front (PJF)/ Al Malha Charitable Society.”
(b)At around the time of the hearing before the Tribunal on
5 February 2016, the applicant provided what he claimed was an official report indicating two requests for his arrest by the Jordanian authorities and an email from his wife describing how the document was obtained and stating that security forces had come to the family home asking for the applicant.(c)The applicant put these documents forward as corroborating his claim to be of interest to the Jordanian security forces as a result of his political activities.
(d)When assessing the applicant’s claim to be at risk of persecution for his political views by the Jordanian authorities at paragraph 39 of its Reason the Tribunal gave “no weight” to those documents on the basis that it had found the applicant’s account of being of no interest to the Jordanian security forces implausible.
(e)The Tribunal’s decision to give no weight to, or dismiss, those documents was made in the context of the Tribunal having:
(i)not found that the applicant had lied, fabricated claims or was not a credible witness;
(ii)accepted the applicant’s claim to be a member of another organisation in Jordan, the Al Malha Charitable Society, and to have been involved with the Palestinian Community Association of Victoria since 2013; and
(iii)accepted that an email from the President of the Palestinian Community Association of Victoria corroborated the applicant’s claim to be a member of that organisation.
The bar is high for establishing whether a claim of jurisdictional error on the basis of irrationality or illogicality is made out. So much was conceded by the applicant.
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS & Anor [2010] HCA 16, Crennan and Bell JJ, whilst acknowledging that illogicality or irrationality may form the basis for a finding of jurisdictional error, said at paragraph 131:
… the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
Crennan and Bell JJ went on to say at paragraph 135:
…A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.[45]
[45] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS & Anor [2010] HCA 16 at paragraph [135].
After referring to these comments, the Full Court of the Federal Court in ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174, went on to say:
Subsequent authorities have established that, for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reason, “extreme” illogicality or irrationality must be shown “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions and against the framework of the inquiry being as to whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal…[46]
[46] ARG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174 at paragraph [47]
The applicant pointed to, WAIJv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs[47] and Ex parte Applicant S20/2002[48] as examples of a cases in which the tribunal had erred by failing to consider corroborating evidence[49] on the basis that it was concerned about the applicant’s credibility. On appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court in WAIJ, Lee and Moore JJ said:
[25]In the instant matter it was not in issue that if events had occurred as claimed by the appellant, the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution.
[26]The Tribunal determined the matter adversely to the appellant by disregarding the documents it had been directed to consider by the order made by consent in this court, stating that the documents “do not overcome the problems I have with the applicant’s evidence.”
[27]Such a circumstance may arise where an applicant’s claims have been discredited by comprehensive findings of dishonesty or untruthfulness. Necessarily, such findings are likely to negate allegedly corroborative material. (See S20/2002 per McHugh and Gummow JJ at [49]). Obviously to come within that exception there will need to be cogent material to support a conclusion that the appellant has lied. Alternatively, if the purportedly corroborative material itself is found, on probative grounds, to be worthless it will be excluded from consideration by the Tribunal in assessing the credibility of an applicant’s claims. However, it will not be open to the Tribunal to state that it is unnecessary for it to consider material corroborative of an applicant’s claims merely because it considers it unlikely that the events described by an applicant occurred. In such a circumstance the Tribunal would be bound to have regard to the corroborative material before attempting to reach a conclusion on the applicant’s credibility. Failure to do so would provide a determination not carried out according to law and the decision would be affected by jurisdictional error (emphasis added).[50]
[47] [2004] FCAFC 74; 80 ALD 568.
[48] (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59.
[49] The applicant also referred to the decision in SZNSP v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1143.
[50] See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 per McHugh, Gummow, Haybe JJ at paragraphs [82] to [85].
The applicant argued that the tribunal’s failure to have regard to the evidence submitted on his behalf to the tribunal, namely, a document from the Directorate of Public Security,[51] together with a Statutory Declaration from the applicant’s wife explaining the provenance of the said document,[52] which corroborated his claims to have been of interest to the Jordanian Security Services, was irrational or illogical and therefore constituted a jurisdictional error. The premise on which this argument was based was that the tribunal had:
a)not found that the applicant had lied, fabricated claims or was otherwise not a credible witness;
b)accepted other claims made by the applicant; and
c)accepted other corroborating evidence provided by the applicant in support of his claims.
[51] Court book at page 156.
[52] Court book at page 152 to 154.
The applicant’s arguments in support of this first ground essentially raise two questions for consideration:
a)Did the tribunal consider and weigh the corroborating material supplied by the applicant in support of his assertion that because of his activities, he was of interest to the Jordanian authorities?; and
b)If not, was it permissible in this case, for the tribunal to simply dismiss this corroborating evidence, without first making a positive finding that the applicant had lied or was otherwise not credible?
Weighing of corroborating evidence
The applicant argued that the tribunal did not consider the corroborating evidence. The first respondent argued that it did.
At paragraph 40 of the applicant’s written submissions, the applicant sets out its complaint that the tribunal, whilst describing the corroborating evidence, does not make any findings concerning its authenticity.[53]
[53] The applicant’s outline of submissions filed 28 February 2018 at paragraph [40].
The transcript of the proceedings before the tribunal were put before this court. It is evident from that transcript and I find that the tribunal member:
a)told the applicants that the member had read all of the material that has been had been submitted on his behalf including the materials and in the course of the previous tribunal hearing and that the member had listened to the recording of his evidence before the previous tribunal;
b)told the applicant that he did not propose going over all of his evidence and all of his claims; and
c)told the applicant that having read the decision of the previous tribunal he shared a number of the concerns that the previous tribunal had in relation to his claims.[54]
[54] Annexure JDB-1 to the affidavit of John David Brown filed 16 March 2018 at page 2 at lines 23 to 43.
The transcript of the tribunal proceedings also reflects the fact that the tribunal member discussed the relevant corroborating documents with the applicant.[55]
[55] Annexure JDB-1 to the affidavit of John David Brown filed 16 March 2018 at page 21 to 23.
It is evident from the transcript of the proceedings before it that, having had regard to the material before the RRT, the tribunal as presently constituted, shared a number of the concerns that the RRT had about the applicant’s claims. In particular, the tribunal noted that the RRT did not accept the applicant’s claims in relation to his work with the PJLF. At page 9 of the transcript of the proceedings before it, the tribunal noted in relation to the PLJF:
… I’ve read the material and listened to all of the evidence about that. I understand that what you said is that… the purpose of this organisation was to defend the political and social rights of Palestinians living in Jordan. … You operated secretly behind another organisation called the Al Malha Charitable Society.
Okay, so the previous Tribunal didn’t accept that claim, in part because it thought that your evidence in relation to the activities in this organisation were vague and also didn’t accept that an organisation like the Al Malha Charitable Society would allow … also, some of your evidence in relation to how your organisation worked behind the Al Malha Charitable Society was of concern.[56]
[56] Annexure JDB-1 to the affidavit of John David Brown filed 16 March 2018 at page 9 at lines 1 to 21.
In its decision record, the tribunal discussed the applicant’s evidence in relation to his claims that he had been under surveillance and arrested in January 2010 and March 2011 as a result of his involvement with the PJLF. This discussion is set out at paragraphs 34 to 36.[57] At paragraph 37 the tribunal sets out its conclusion and states:
The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was engaged in a secret organisation called the PJLF for the reasons set out above. It therefore does not accept that the applicant was placed under surveillance by the security 2008 or 2009 or that he was arrested in 2010 or 2011 because of his involvement or activities with the PJLF or that any other members of the PJLF were arrested. Further, the Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence in relation to the claimed arrests to be vague and implausible … Further the Tribunal considers that his evidence… lacks credibility (emphasis added).[58]
[57] Paragraphs [34] to [36] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 22 of the court book.
[58] Paragraph [37] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 22 of the court book.
The tribunal then goes on to discuss the corroborating documents to which the applicant refers in ground one, ‘which … is an official document showing that the security forces wanted him in 2010 and 2013’.[59]
[59] Paragraph [38] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 22 of the court book.
The tribunal concludes as follows:
For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal does not accept that the security forces have any interest in the applicant and places no weight on the purported Public Security document or the email from the applicant’s wife.[60]
[60] Paragraph [39] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 22 of the court book.
A fair reading of the tribunal’s reasons as a whole, lead to the conclusion which I have reached, that the tribunal did have regard to the corroborating evidence and did weigh that against the other evidence before it but concluded on balance that, the applicant was not of interest to the security forces.[61] The letters themselves go to the issue of the security forces’ interest in the husband. Paragraph 39 of the tribunal’s decision record when read together with paragraph 37 is evidence of that very weighing process.[62] This is a conclusion which was open to the tribunal on the evidence before it and therefore is not one which is affected by irrationality or illogicality in the sense necessary to find jurisdictional error.
[61] Paragraph [38] and [39] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 22 of the court book.
[62] Paragraphs [37] and [39] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 22 of the court book.
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48,[63] the court had to consider whether the then RRT had engaged in a jurisdictional error by choosing to give ‘no weight’ to letters produced by some of the claimants in support of their claims. In SZJSS, the tribunal relevantly stated:
Although the Tribunal accepts that these two letters originated from the relevant school, the Tribunal gives no weight to their content in view of evidence the [first respondent] has presented the Tribunal over time undermining his claims about his purported political and social activism.[64]
[63] 243 CLR 164; 85 ALJR 306; 273 ALR 122; 119 ALD 446.
[64] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164; 85 ALJR 306; 273 ALR 122; 119 ALD 446 at paragraph [17].
In SZJSS, the High Court agreed with the Minister that, ‘the weight to be accorded to the letters, and the factual matters to which they gave rise, were entirely matters for the Tribunal as they concerned the merits of the application’.[65]
[65] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164; 85 ALJR 306; 273 ALR 122; 119 ALD 446 at paragraph [32].
The applicant sought to distinguish SZJSS in the sense that in that case the tribunal did weigh the letters against the other evidence whereas in this case, the applicant submits that the tribunal did not weigh the corroborating evidence.
In coming to the views expressed at paragraph 42 above, I have had regard to the comments of the High Court in SZJSS, in which the Court stated:
[33] The Minister’s submissions on the letters issue must be accepted as on a fair reading of the whole of the Tribunal’s decision, when the Tribunal said that it gave the letters “no weight” it was referring to the fact that it did not accept the letters as evidencing that the first respondent was in some danger from the Maoists in Kathmandu. This was in large part because of social and political changes which had occurred since the letters were written. The evidence given by the first respondent, including his evidence about the effect of those changes, undermined his claim of political and social activism, thereby contradicting the support which the letters gave to his assertion that Maoists were continuing to pursue him in Kathmandu. The weighing of various pieces of evidence is a matter for the Tribunal.
[34] It has been recognised that to described reasoning as irrational or unreasonable may merely be an emphatic way of disagreeing with it.[66]
[66] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; 243 CLR 164; 85 ALJR 306; 273 ALR 122; 119 ALD 446 at paragraphs [33] and [34].
A similar reasoning applied in this case. Moreover, as was noted in the extract from SZJSS above, the weight to be given to any evidence provided by the applicant, was a matter for the tribunal as fact finder and that no jurisdictional error arises as a result of the tribunal giving no weight to that material.
Was the tribunal required to make a positive finding as to credit before dismissing the corroborating evidence?
A second aspect of the applicant’s first ground is that the tribunal could only properly have rejected the corroborating evidence, without first weighing it against the other evidence lead by the applicant, if it first made a finding that the applicant had lied or fabricated some or all of their claims. In support of this proposition, the applicant referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex Parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 in which:
…some members of the High Court stated obiter dicta that a decision-maker may disregard corroborating evidence where the decision-maker has found that the applicant is fabricated their claim, as “the well has been poisoned beyond redemption. [67]
[67] The applicant’s outline of submissions filed 28 February 2018 at paragraph [32].
For the reasons stated above, I have concluded that the tribunal in this case in fact did weigh the corroborating evidence against other evidence before it, including the evidence of the applicant himself. If I am wrong in this, I further find that that the applicant’s reliance on the obiter comments in S20/2002 is misplaced.
In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP and Anor [2010] FCAFC 50, the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the obiter comments of the McHugh and Gummow JJ in Applicant S20/2002, referred to above.
At paragraph 30 of its decision in SZNSP, North and Lander JJ relevantly said:
We do not agree with the contention that it is necessary to find expressly that a party has lied before concluding that a piece of evidence which might corroborate the party’s account should be rejected. We do not read McHugh and Gummow JJ as saying that a precondition to the exercise which is described at [49] of their reasons is a finding that the party who is tendering the corroborative evidence in support of the party’s evidence has lied.[68]
[68] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP andAnor [2010] FCAFC 50 at paragraph [30].
The applicant conceded that this is a correct statement of the law, however went on to say that at the very least the tribunal must make a ‘serious credibility finding’ before dismissing corroborating evidence submitted by an applicant.[69]
[69] Transcript at page 9 at lines 16 to 19.
North and Lander JJ in SZNSP went on to say at
paragraph 32:
But even if it is a precondition, a finding that the first respondent’s claims were not credible and that she had fabricated her claim is tantamount to a finding of lying. It is a finding that the party making the claims has made those claims up. To make up claims is to lie about the existence of those claims.[70]
[70] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP andAnor [2010] FCAFC 50 at paragraph [32].
At paragraph 36, North and Lander JJ concluded:
When a decision-maker has conducted a hearing of the kind which is conducted by the RRT and has heard the applicant, and has reached the tentative conclusion that the applicant’s claims have been fabricated, the decision-maker is entitled in our opinion to reject evidence which would, if accepted, have corroborated the applicant’s account.[71]
[71] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP andAnor [2010] FCAFC 50 at paragraph [36].
It was put on behalf of the applicant that the tribunal made no such credibility findings in this case.[72] The applicant seems to be making a distinction between a finding that the applicant lacked credibility and findings that, ‘crucial parts of his account were implausible and not credible.’[73]
[72] Transcript at page 9 at lines 43 to 44.
[73] Applicant’s outline of submissions filed 28 February 2018 at paragraph [41].
With respect, I find that this to be a distinction without a difference. Whilst it is the case that, the tribunal did accept some of the applicant’s evidence, it did not accept ‘crucial parts of his account’. For completeness, I also note that the applicant’s reference to the comments of Katzmann J in SNZSP that the tribunal had not accepted the applicant’s assertions does not assist the applicant in this case.
It is not inconsistent with the reasoning in SNZSP, for the tribunal in this case to have accepted some of the facts put forward by the applicant but to have not accepted the crucial aspects of his claims for protection.
I find that on a fair reading of the tribunal’s reasons, in the sense contemplated by the court in, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (“Wu Shan Liang”)[74] which is discussed in further detail below, the tribunal did not accept the crucial aspects of the applicant’s case. In effect, the tribunal made it clear that it did not believe a crucial element of the applicant’s case. It was not necessary for the tribunal to expressly say that it found the applicant had lied or was not credible. This is implicit in the findings that the tribunal actually made. It was therefore open to it to reject or pay minimal regard to the corroborating evidence submitted on the applicant’s behalf regarding the applicant’s claim that he was of interest to the Jordanian authorities.
[74] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259; 70 ALHR 568; 136 ALR 481; 41 ALD 1 at paragraph [272].
In any event, as stated and for the reasons set out above, I find that the tribunal did consider the corroborating evidence put forward on the applicant’s behalf and it was a matter for the tribunal as to the appropriate weight, if any, to be given to that evidence in coming to its conclusions.[75]
[75] MZYUV v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 498; 138 ALD 281 at paragraph [25] and the cases referred to therein.
Just prior to the conclusion of the hearing, the applicant’s representative brought to the court’s attention a decision of his Honour Justice Tracey, AMT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 366, which had been handed down that morning, and which the applicant suggested might have some relevance to the proceedings before this court.
The parties were granted leave to:
…file any written submissions upon which they seek to rely addressing the decision of AMT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection … by 4pm on or before 27 March 2018.[76]
[76] Orders made 20 March 2018.
Pursuant to this order, the Minister filed further submissions within that time frame. The applicant did not do so. The following day, namely on 28 March 2018, the applicant wrote to the court (copied to the first respondent) noting the following:
a)the applicant considers that the decision in AMT15 had, ‘raised no matters relevant to the grounds articulated by the applicant in his amended application that were not already canvassed by the parties in written and oral submissions’;[77]
b)
the Minister had therefore gone beyond the leave granted on
20 March 2018; and
c)the remaining paragraphs of the correspondence from the applicant’s representative is responsive to the submissions put by the Minister and is in the form of a reply.
[77] Letter from Lander & Rogers Lawyers to the Associate to her Honour Judge Mercuri dated 28 March 2018.
The Minister, by letter also dated 28 March 2018, argued that the applicant’s correspondence of 28 March 2018 was a, ‘barely disguised attempt to put reply submissions to the Court when the orders of
20 March made no provision for such a reply.[78]’[78]In the circumstances, and in the interests of justice, having regard to the fact that the applicant’s correspondence, such as it is, was provided one day after the date for submission and the absence of any claimed prejudice, I have had regard to both the Minister’s submissions and the applicant’s correspondence of 28 March 2018 on this occasion.
In AMT15, his Honour Justice Tracey found that the tribunal’s failure to make enquiries as to the authenticity of a document to which it gave no weight in light of its credit findings about the applicant, constituted a jurisdictional error. In that case, the finding was made in the context of a claim that the tribunal’s failure to make such inquiries amounted to a breach of section 424 of the Migration Act1958. Although this was not raised in the context of an illogicality or irrationality ground, the Minister quite rightly pointed to the distinction between the document under consideration in AMT15 and that in this case.
As noted at paragraph 11.8 of the Minister’s outline of submissions dated
27 March 2018:
The Police Report[79]appears to relate to requests for 2 documents made by the Amman Prosecutor General to the Police in 2011 and 2013. On its face that document does not provide any support for the claim made in the applicant’s wife’s email that the Police Report was how she “learnt of the security circular to arrest my husband should he be found or if he was to enter the country through a border crossing”.[80]
[79] Court book at page 156.
[80] Court book at page 188 and the respondent’s outline of submissions filed 27 March 2018 at page 4 at paragraph [11.8].
At paragraph 11.9, the Minister then outlines the inconsistent and changing explanation of the Police Report during the hearing.
I find that there is nothing in the reasoning in AMT15 which alters the conclusions reached above, namely that there is no irrationality or illogicality in the tribunal’s decision.
For these reasons, ground one is not made out.
Ground Two
The second ground of review in the application filed on 21 April 2016 and amended on 28 February 2018 is:
The Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal failed to understand, or deal with, the applicant’s claim that his support for and advocacy of rights of Palestinians living in Jordan meant that if he returned to Jordan he would suffer persecution and/or be at real risk of suffering significant harm.
Particulars
(a)In written submissions made on 29 January 2016, the applicant clearly articulated his claim that, if he returned to Jordan, he would suffer persecution and/or be at real risk of suffering significant harm on account of his “actual/imputed political opinion” and membership of the particular social groups “members of the Palestinian Jordanian Front (PJF)/Al Malha Charitable Society”.
(b)The applicant claimed that the PJF and the Al Malha Charitable Society carried out their activities in support of the rights of Palestinians concerning their treatment while residing in Jordan in secret for fear of government persecution.
(c)In paragraph 32 of its Reasons, the Tribunal stated that the applicant had claimed that organisations such as the Al Malha Charitable Society carried out activities in support of Palestinians in Jordan publicly.
(d)On that basis, in paragraph 33 of its Reasons the Tribunal found that, although the applicant may continue to promote Palestinians’ rights on return to Jordan, he would not be at risk of persecution from the Jordanian authorities for doing so.
(e)In paragraph 41 of its reasons, the Tribunal found that the Jordanian government advocates for a right of return for Palestinians to the West Bank.
(f)On that basis, in the same paragraph, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that “persons who advocate for the rights of Palestinians in Jordan are treated as anti-government by the Jordanian regime”.
(g)This did not, however, address the applicant’s claim that he would be subject to persecution for advocating for the rights of Palestinians concerning their treatment while residing in Jordan.
In his written submissions, the applicant stated that the tribunal had failed to understand two fundamental integers of the applicant’s claim, namely that:
a)the politically controversial activities of the Al Malha Charitable Society, were conducted in secrecy; and
b)the political views for which he claimed a fear of persecution was the treatment of Palestinians within Jordan not the rights of Palestinians more broadly, including their right of return to the West Bank.
As properly conceded by the Minister in his written submissions at paragraph 32:
A failure to consider a contention amounting to a failure by the Tribunal to exercise is jurisdiction will relevantly arise where there has been a failure to consider a “substantial, clearly articulated argument” that, if accepted, might establish a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.[81]
[81] The first respondent’s outline of submissions filed 16 March 2018 at page 7 at paragraph [32].
There are two aspects to this part of the applicant’s ground of review, namely:
a)the tribunal did not appreciate that the claim made by the applicant was that the politically controversial activities of the Al Malha Charitable Society were conducted in secrecy because of the fear of the authorities, and the failure to appreciate this lead the tribunal to conclude that those activities could be carried out publically; and
b)the tribunal did not understand and therefore did not consider the claim by the applicant that his fear of persecution was based on his political support for Palestinians living in Jordan not for Palestinians seeking to return to the West Bank.
The principles in, NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 144 FCR 1 (“NABE”) are applicable in this case; namely, that a failure by the tribunal to consider a claim raised on the material before it can constitute jurisdictional error.
It was further submitted that in considering the tribunal’s reasons, this court ought not to construe them minutely and finely with an, ‘eye keenly attuned to the perception of error’.[82] This is a reference to the comments of Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ in, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259.[83]
[82] The first respondent’s outline of submissions filed 16 March 2018 at page 6 at paragraph [33.2].
[83] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at paragraph [272].
In Wu Shan Liang, the majority considered the role of a reviewing court in a judicial review application. In this context, the majority, in considering the reasoning of the court below, said:
… the reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.
These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status, must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision (footnotes excluded).[84]
[84] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at paragraph [30].
In Wu Shan Liang, his Honour Justice Kirby set out a series of principles which should guide a judge conducting judicial review of an administrative decision maker’s reasons. In particular, he said:
The reasons under challenge must be read as a whole. They must be considered fairly. It is erroneous to adopt a narrow approach, combing through the words of the decision-maker with a fine appellate tooth-comb, against the prospect that a verbal slip will be found warranting the inference of an error of law.[85]
[85] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at paragraph [57].
Secret activities of Al Malha
In support of this ground, the applicant refers to the submissions made on his behalf in 2013 by BMA Lawyers[86], which relevantly stated:
The Applicant was also an active member of a political charity organisation called “Al Malha Community Front” which is a charitable group that has a secret political agenda. Both “PJF” and “Al Malha” groups support Palestinian rights in Jordan. The groups support Palestinian families, Palestinian students who were denied entry into Universities and some schools, the groups also assisted former political activists who had been arrested by providing them with lawyers. All these activities were done in secrecy because the applicant states it was too dangerous to publically advocate. Both groups held meetings regularly by which the Applicant attended (emphasis added).
[86] Supplementary court book at page 2.
It was submitted on behalf of the Minister that there is nothing in the material, or in the submissions or evidence of the applicant that could be said to amount to a claim by the applicant that the Al Malha (as opposed to the PJLF) was engaged in any secret political activities.[87]
[87] Transcript at page 14 at lines 41 to 47.
In the decision record of the RRT,[88] it appears that the applicant’s evidence at that time was that the PJLF operated as a secret organisation within the Al Malha, and without the Al Malha Charitable Society’s knowledge of their activities. The RRT made a number of comments in its decision about concerns about the applicant’s credibility.[89]
[88] Court book page 92 at paragraph [38].
[89] Court book at page 98 at paragraph [74]; page 99 at paragraph [76]; page 100 at paragraphs [83], [87] and [88]; and page 101 at paragraphs [89] to [90].
In advance of the further hearing before the tribunal which occurred
on 5 February 2016[90], further written submissions were filed on the applicant’s behalf together with a statutory declaration signed by the applicant on 28 January 2016.[91] The written submissions, among other things, sought to address some of the earlier credibility concerns raised by the RRT.
[90] Following the remittal by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
[91] Court book at pages 151 to 174.
In particular, those submissions relevantly contained the following:
In addition to this, we note that the credibility issues in [AXV16]’s case are compounded by information included in [AXV16]’s original application and submissions provided to the Tribunal on his behalf. We are instructed that both his initial application and subsequent submissions provided to the Tribunal contain incorrect information.
…
In addition to this, we note that the section titled “Applicant’s circumstances” outlined in the submission provided to the Tribunal in August 2013 is not signed by [AXV16] nor was he made aware of its contents prior to his hearing. Having regard for this (sic) we request that the factual information set out in this legal submission be given minimal weight as it has not been provided directly by [AXV16].[92]
[92] Court book at page 161.
In his statutory declaration dated 28 January 2016, the applicant also said, among other things:
4.I have recently read the submission provided to the Tribunal on my behalf by my previous lawyers. There are several mistakes in the information contained in this document and I am not sure why this information was provided on my behalf I am also aware that there were some mistakes in the initial application forms that were prepared for me.
5.I would like the opportunity to properly explain my story again, to clarify any mistakes that I have previously made and I would be grateful if the Tribunal would take my situation into consideration.[93]
[93] Court book at page 152.
After the hearing on 5 February 2016, the applicant’s representative provided a further written submission to the tribunal dated
19 February 2016, in which among other things, the applicant’s representative said:
… the above information is consistent with [the applicant’s] evidence as to his involvement with the Palestinian Jordanian Liberation Front which was unable to openly operate but rather, operated behind other organisations who were not perceived as political organisations.[94]
[94] Court book at page 194.
It is now said on behalf of the applicant that the tribunal did not properly understand the applicant’s claim in relation to the Al Malha Charitable Society’s functions. That is, that the Al Malha, ‘did not publicly advocate for the rights of the Palestinians living in Jordan, but did so secretly’.[95]
[95] Applicant’s outline of submissions filed 28 February 2018 at page 18 at paragraph [63].
A proper and fair reading of the material before the tribunal, and the tribunal’s reasoning does not support this proposition. The reference in the applicant’s original submission prepared by BMA Lawyers [96]was to the ‘Palestinian Jordanian Front’ and to the ‘Al Malha Community Front’.
[96] Supplementary court book at page 64.
The applicant’s 2013 outline of submissions, also state:
‘The Applicant’s situation is made worse by the fact that he is a known Secretary of the “PJF” as well as a member of the “Al Malha Front”. These groups are suspected of criticising the Jordanian dominated regime and being involved in pro Palestinian activities in the Jordan (sic). [97]
[97] Supplementary court book at pages 5 to 6.
This is the only evidence which could be said to support a claim now made that the applicant’s claims included a claim that the Al Malha secretly, not publicly, advocated for the rights of Palestinians living in Jordan, a claim which it is now alleged the tribunal did not understand and therefore did not consider.[98]
[98] Applicant’s outline of submissions filed 28 February 2018 at paragraph [63].
However, the applicant’s 2013 written submissions also attached a copy of a letter confirming his membership of the Al Malha which states that he:
…is an active member of the Society. He helps with the society’s activities and periodical meetings which discuss and follow up the affairs of the society’s members (Jordanians of Palestinian descent) to help them preserve their rights and solve their economical and social problems.[99]
[99] Supplementary court book at page 48.
A fair reading of the material before the tribunal, including all of the material previously submitted on behalf of the applicant is that the applicant was claiming protection on the basis of his involvement in a secret organisation which operated under cover of the Al Malha that is the PJLF and/or possibly the Al Malha Front. It is to be noted that, the only reference to the ‘Al Malha Front’ as opposed to the Al Malha Charitable Society, was in the 2013 submissions referred to above. Submissions which as noted above, the applicant through his subsequent representative argued had been submitted without his approval and that they should be given minimal weight. The applicant did not make any other reference to this as distinct from the PJLF which operated under cover of the Al Malha Charitable Society.
Having regard to the further submissions, bringing into question the accuracy of the 2013 submissions, I find that the tribunal did have regard to the claims made by the applicant and that there is no integer of his claim which was not considered by the tribunal as now alleged.
I further find that the characterisation of the applicant’s claims now put on his behalf are not consistent with the claims before the tribunal. Irrespective of whether the applicant maintained that he was a member of one or two secret organisations operating under cover of the Al Malha, what is clear from the material filed on the applicant’s behalf and the exchange between the applicant and the tribunal member as evidenced by the transcript of the tribunal proceeding, is that there was no claim that the Al Malha itself was engaged in secret activities advocating for the rights of Palestinians living in Jordan.
Indeed, the document provided by the applicant as evidence of his membership of the Al Malha, itself makes reference to the functions of that society with which the applicant had been involved as being to assist Jordanians of Palestinian descent.
The tribunal’s finding that the applicant did:
…not (form) or (participate) in or (act) as the secretary of a secret organisation called the PJLF which secretly promoted Palestinian rights in Jordan using the name or resources of registered organisations such as the Al Malha Charitable Society…[100]
was open to it on the evidence.
[100] Paragraph [31] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 209 of the court book.
At the heart of this part of ground two, is a desire for the court to undertake impermissible merits review.
Support for Palestinians in Jordan vs Palestinians more broadly
The second integer which it is said that the tribunal did not consider, is that the applicant’s claim was to fear persecution on the basis of his advocacy for Palestinians living in Jordan rather than for Palestinians more broadly, and particularly Palestinians seeking to return to the
West Bank.
The basis of this argument is the fact that the tribunal made reference in its decision to country information that, ‘does not indicate that persons expressing support for Palestinians or the Palestinian cause are perceived by the Jordanian government as anti-government or as posing a threat to Jordanian security’.[101] It is said that, this is evidence that the tribunal failed to correctly understand the applicant’s claim. That is that the tribunal did not understand that the applicant was advocating for Palestinians residing in Jordan, not for Palestinians seeking to return to the West Bank. I do not accept this submission.
[101] Court book at page 209 at paragraph [32].
It is clear from the tribunal’s reasons that it has engaged with and considered the applicant’s claim that his concerns arise from his support and advocacy for Palestinians living in Jordan and not to the support of Palestinians more generally or in particular Palestinians seeking to return to the West Bank. [102]
[102] See for example, court book at page 209 at paragraphs [25], [29], [30], [32] and [33].
It is also clear from the decision record, that the tribunal understood the nature of the applicant’s claim and that it related to his alleged concerns arising from the fact that he had provided, and was continuing to provide, support to Palestinians living in Jordan rather than Palestinians more broadly or Palestinians seeking to return to the West Bank. The tribunal dealt with that squarely and the conclusions reached by the tribunal were open to it on the evidence before it.
To the extent that the applicant raises concerns about the tribunal’s reliance on particular country information, it is well accepted that it is a matter for the tribunal to determine what country information to have regard to and what weight ought to be given to that country information.
As noted by the Full Court of the Federal Court (Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ) in NAHI, NAHJ and NAHK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10:
… By s 420(2)(a) of the Migration Act, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. By s 424(1), in conducting a review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. There can be no objection in principle to the Tribunal relying on ‘country information’. The weight that it gives to such information is a matter for the Tribunal itself, as part of its fact-finding function. Such information as the Tribunal obtains for itself is not restricted to ‘guidance’, as the appellants submitted. … The question of the accuracy of the ‘country information’ is one for the Tribunal, not for the Court. If the court were to make its own assessment of the truth of the ‘country information’, it would be engaging in merits review. The Court does not have power to do that.[103]
[103] NAHI, NAHJ and NAHK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at paragraph [11]
The Court went on to note:
Both the choice and the assessment of the weight of such material were matters for the Tribunal. The Court cannot substitute its own view of the material, even if it had a different view from that reached by the Tribunal.[104]
[104] NAHI, NAHJ and NAHK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at paragraph [13]
The conclusions which the tribunal reached in this case, were open to it on the basis of the information before it, including country information to which it referred.[105]
[105] See for example paragraphs [21] and [22] of the tribunal’s decision record at page 207 of the court book.
For each of these reasons, I find that ground two is not made out.
Conclusion
As neither of the applicant’s grounds have been made out, the application should be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and five (105) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Mercuri
Associate:
Date: 20 July 2018
Letter from Australian Government Solicitor to the Associate to her Honour Judge Mercuri dated
28 March 2018.
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