JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: AVWEST AIRCRAFT PTY LTD as trustee for AVWEST AIRCRAFT TRUST -v- CLAYTON UTZ (A FIRM) [2018] WASC 167
CORAM: VAUGHAN J
HEARD: 21 MAY 2018
DELIVERED : 6 JUNE 2018
FILE NO/S: CIV 2167 of 2016
BETWEEN: AVWEST AIRCRAFT PTY LTD as trustee for AVWEST AIRCRAFT TRUST
Plaintiff
AND
CLAYTON UTZ (A FIRM)
Defendant
Catchwords:
Evidence - Admissibility - Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C(3)(b) - Evidence of the injured person - Statutory construction
Legislation:
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5A, s 5C, s 5D
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 3(1)(b), s 5, s 18
Result:
Objection to evidence disallowed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | AS Bell SC & V Whittaker |
| Defendant | : | K Rees SC & KR Lendich |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Herbert Smith Freehills |
| Defendant | : | King & Wood Mallesons |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1
AI McLean Pty Ltd v Hayson [2008] NSWSC 927
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Archer v Howell (1992) 7 WAR 33
Attard v James Legal Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 311; (2010) 80 ACSR 585
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378
Chappel v Hart [1998] HCA 55; (1998) 195 CLR 232
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384
Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 40; (1981) 150 CLR 1
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos [1955] HCA 27; (1955) 92 CLR 390
Commissioner of Taxation v Unit Trend Services Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 16; (2013) 250 CLR 523
CSR Ltd v Eddy [2005] HCA 64; (2005) 226 CLR 1
ElecNet (Aust) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] HCA 51; (2016) 259 CLR 73
Falkingham v Hoffmans (a firm) [2014] WASCA 140; (2014) 46 WAR 510
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503
Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118
Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v The Duke Group Ltd (in Liq) (1993) 62 SASR 158
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May [2016] HCA 19; (2016) 257 CLR 468
Neal v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 346
Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 14; (2004) 218 CLR 273
New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [2016] HCA 50; (2016) 260 CLR 232
Novotny v Todd [2002] WASCA 79
Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt [1964] 1 QB 40
Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt [No 2] [1964] 2 QB 647
Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd [2018] HCA 4; (2018) 351…
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- Case
- [2018] WASC 167
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was the interpretation of the statutory provisions requiring attendance to give evidence. Specifically, the court needed to decide whether the statutory language, which referred to 'persons', could include corporations, and whether a company could be compelled to attend by its proper officer to give oral evidence. The case drew on precedents such as Penn-Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt and Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, which established that a corporation cannot give oral evidence or be required to attend to give evidence on oath. The court also considered the legislative history and purpose of the statutory provisions to ascertain the appropriate construction.
The court ruled that a company cannot be compelled to give oral evidence and that any requirement to attend for the purpose of giving evidence on oath must be directed to a natural person. The court held that statutory provisions requiring attendance to give evidence must be interpreted as applying only to natural persons. This interpretation was consistent with the principle that only a natural person may be examined on oath or affirmation. The court relied on precedents and legislative history to support this construction, rejecting the notion that a company could be required to attend to give oral evidence through its proper officer.
As a result, the court determined that the defendant law firm could be required to attend by its proper officer to give evidence in relation to the production of documents. However, the law firm could not be compelled to attend for the purpose of giving oral evidence. The court's decision affirmed the impossibility of a corporation giving oral evidence and clarified the proper construction of statutory provisions requiring attendance to give evidence. The orders of the court were consistent with these findings, allowing for the production of documents but not for the giving of oral evidence by the company through its proper officer.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A company may be required to attend, by its proper officer, to give evidence in relation to the production of documents.[55] But a limited company cannot give evidence at large in answer to a subpoena to give oral evidence.[56] A corporation cannot itself give evidence[57] and cannot itself be required to attend for the purpose of giving evidence on oath.[58] As was said in Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt:If evidence is to be taken by the 'English mode', I do not see how it is possible to take the evidence of a limited company, whether by its proper officer or otherwise. If the proper officer attends for examination, it is he who goes into the witness‑box; it is he who takes the oath; it is he who is liable to be prosecuted for perjury; it is he, in short, who is the witness. I do not think it helps to say that when interrogatories are answered by the proper officer of a company, his answers are the company's answers and bind the company. I do not think that touches the question whether an officer can go into the witness‑box and give oral evidence which can be said to be that of the company. The answers given by him would be his answers, based upon his own memory and knowledge; and though any admission by him would no doubt be binding on the company, the evidence would still be his evidence and not that of the company. [59][55] Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt [1964] 1 QB 40, 55 - 56; Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt [No 2] [1964] 2 QB 647, 662; Rochfort v Trade Practices Commission [1982] HCA 66; (1982) 153 CLR 134, 146.[56] Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt [No 2], 662.[57] Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1976] HCA 53; (1976) 134 CLR 475, 481.[58] Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt, 56, 67 - 69, 73 – 74. However, in Novotny v Todd [2002] WASCA 79, McLure J (as her Honour then was) assumed without deciding that a company can be compelled to attend – by its proper officer – to give oral evidence: at [38].[59] Penn‑Texas Corporation v Murat Anstalt , 56. Only a natural person may be examined on oath or affirmation. A company cannot itself give oral evidence. That impossibility has had consequences for the proper construction of various statutory provisions requiring that persons attend before an examiner for the purpose of giving evidence. So, for example, where under the predecessor to the present day s 596A and s 596B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) the court was empowered to make an order for examination 'in relation to a person', it was accepted that the order must be directed to a natural person; such an order could not be directed to a company.[60][60] Rothwells Ltd (Provisional Liquidator Appointed) (1989) 15 ACLR 168, 187; Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v The Duke Group Ltd (in Liq) (1993) 62 SASR 158, 160–161. Other provisions enabling notice to be given to a 'person' to attend to give evidence have been construed as being limited to require only a natural person to attend to give evidence. That was the case in Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. There the power arose under s 264(1)(b) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). Stephen J, noting that a corporation cannot itself give evidence, concluded that the provision was confined in its operation to natural persons. It could apply only to those persons capable of physical attendance and of actually giving evidence.[61][61] Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd, 481 – 485.