FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd [2006]
FCA 1399MEDIA LAW – unsolicited commercial electronic messages (Spam) – use of harvested electronic addresses – contraventions established – pecuniary penalties – declarations – injunctions – costs
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1)
Spam Act 2003 (Cth) ss 4, 16(1), 16(9), 22(1), 22(3), 24, 24(2), 25, 25(1), 25(3), 25(4), 30, 33Federal Court Rules O 62
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd (2006) 150 FCR 494
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd (2003) 200 ALR 491
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Fila Sport Oceania Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) (2004) ATPR 41-983
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v GIO Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1298
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Limited (2006) ATPR 42-091
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum (No 2) (2005) 215 ALR 281
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McMahon Services Pty Ltd (ACN 008 274 020) (No 1) (2004) ATPR 42-022
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SIP Australia Pty Ltd(2003) ATPR
41-937Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Vales Wine Company Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-528
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Virgin Mobile (No 2) [2002] FCA 1548
CPSU v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2001) 108 IR 228
Trade Practices Commission v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (1991) 105 ALR 115
Trade Practices Commission v Stihl Chain Saws (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) ATPR 40-091
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 131 FCR 529AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY v CLARITY1 PTY LTD and WAYNE ROBERT MANSFIELD
WAD 155 of 2005NICHOLSON J
27 OCTOBER 2006
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 155 OF 2005
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA AUTHORITY
ApplicantAND:
CLARITY1 PTY LTD
(ABN 60 106 52 604)
First RespondentWAYNE ROBERT MANSFIELD
Second RespondentJUDGE:
NICHOLSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 OCTOBER 2006
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
Declaratory Relief:
1.A declaration that the first respondent by sending during the period from 10 April 2004 to 13 April 2006:
at least 213 443 382 commercial electronic messages (CEMs) (of which 41 796 754 were successfully sent) to 5 664 939 unique electronic addresses;
at least 56 862 092 CEMs (of which 33 199 806 were successfully sent) to 2 291 518 unique electronic addresses; and
by offering to supply/or promoting and/or advertising goods or services without obtaining the prior consent of the recipients thereby sent CEMs with an Australian link in contravention of section 16(1) of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) (the Spam Act).
2.A declaration that the second respondent by authorising the sending of the CEMs described in order 1 on behalf of himself and the first respondent aided and abetted, counselled and procured and was directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention of section 16(1) of the…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 1399
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the respondents' conduct in light of the novelty of the legislation and the lack of evidence that they intended to hinder ACMA's investigation. While ACMA argued for a penalty close to the maximum allowed by the Act, the court emphasised the need for commercial realism in penalty determination, balancing deterrence with the commercial environment. The court concluded that the respondents' conduct was flagrant but noted the absence of evidence of deliberate intent to contravene the Act.
The court granted ACMA's request for declaratory relief, confirming that Clarity1 and Mr Mansfield contravened various sections of the Spam Act. The court also imposed pecuniary penalties of $4.5 million on Clarity1 and $1 million on Mr Mansfield. Additionally, the court issued restraining injunctions to prevent future contraventions of the Act by both respondents. Lastly, the court ordered the respondents to pay ACMA's costs associated with the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Declaratory Relief:
1. A declaration that the first respondent by sending during the period from 10 April 2004 to 13 April 2006:
at least 213 443 382 commercial electronic messages (CEMs) (of which 41 796 754 were successfully sent) to 5 664 939 unique electronic addresses;
at least 56 862 092 CEMs (of which 33 199 806 were successfully sent) to 2 291 518 unique electronic addresses; and
by offering to supply/or promoting and/or advertising goods or services without obtaining the prior consent of the recipients thereby sent CEMs with an Australian link in contravention of section 16(1) of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) (the Spam Act).
2. A declaration that the second respondent by authorising the sending of the CEMs described in order 1 on behalf of himself and the first respondent aided and abetted, counselled and procured and was directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the contravention of section 16(1) of the Spam Act by the first respondent in contravention of section 16(9) of the Spam Act.
3. A declaration that the first respondent, by sending the CEMs described in order 1 to electronic addresses that had been obtained prior to the commencement of section 22 of the Spam Act by:
using address-harvesting software; and
obtaining harvested-address lists from external parties,
used harvested-address lists and thereby contravened section 22(1)(a) of the Spam Act.
4. A declaration that the second respondent, by authorising the sending of the CEMs described in order 1 on behalf of himself and the first respondent to electronic addresses that had been obtained, prior to the commencement of section 22 of the Spam Act, by:
using address-harvesting software; and
obtaining harvested-address lists from external parties,
aided and abetted, counselled or procured and was directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in or party to the use of address-harvesting software in contravention of section 22(1)(a) of the Spam Act by the first respondent in contravention of section 22(3) of the Spam Act.
Pecuniary Penalties
5. An order that the first respondent pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty pursuant to section 24(1) of the Spam Act in the amount of $4.5 million.
6. An order that the second respondent pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty pursuant to section 24(1) in the amount of $1 million.
Injunctive Relief
Restraining injunction
7. An injunction restraining the first respondent, whether by its directors, servants, agents or otherwise, from sending, or causing to be sent, CEMs as defined by section 6 of the Spam Act with an Australian link to any electronic address except in respect of the electronic addresses for which the first respondent has obtained the prior consent of the accountholder in accordance with the Spam Act or which is otherwise permitted by that Act.
8. An injunction restraining the second respondent, from sending, or causing to be sent, or authorising the sending of CEMs as defined by section 6 of the Spam Act, with an Australian link to any electronic address except in respect of the electronic addresses for which the first respondent has obtained the prior consent of the accountholder in accordance with the Spam Act or which is otherwise permitted by that Act.
9. An injunction restraining the first respondent, whether by its directors, servants, agents or otherwise, from sending, or causing to be sent, CEMs as defined by section 6 of the Spam Act with an Australian link to any electronic address that had been obtained at any time by:
using address-harvesting software; or
obtaining harvested-address lists from external parties,
except in respect of the electronic addresses for which the first respondent has obtained the prior consent of the accountholder in accordance with the Spam Act or which is otherwise permitted by that Act.
10. An injunction restraining the second respondent, from sending, or causing to be sent, or authorising the sending of CEMs as defined by section 6 of the Spam Act, with an Australian link to any electronic address that had been obtained at any time by
using address-harvesting software; or
obtaining harvested-address lists from external parties,
except in respect of the electronic addresses for which the first respondent has obtained the prior consent of the accountholder in accordance with the Spam Act or which is otherwise permitted by that Act.
Costs
11. The respondents pay the applicant’s costs of an incidental to these proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NICHOLSON J
The applicant acknowledges that there is no evidence that the respondents attempted to hinder or prevent it from conducting its investigation into the respondents’ conduct. The applicant states that cooperation flowed from the fact that at no time did the respondents entertain the possibility that their conduct might contravene the Spam Act. They vigorously opposed the position asserted by the applicant that they had not shown any cooperation in that relevant respect. However, the respondents were entitled to do that in the case of new legislation. CONSIDERATION AGAINST THE MAXIMUM PENALTY The applicant submits that having regard to the high volume of CEMs sent and the aggravating circumstances set out in its submissions, the respondents should be seen as liable to pay close to the maximum penalty amount set out in cl 25 of Sch 3 to the Spam Act for each day that the respondents committed a contravention. The applicant estimates, based on the evidence referred to in its submissions, that Clarity1 sent considerably in excess of two CEMs in contravention of the Spam Act on at least 300 days during the period between 10 April 2004 and 13 April 2006. This would give rise to a potential maximum penalty of:·against Clarity1 for contravening:section 16(1): 300 x 2000 = 600 000 ($66 000 000); and section 22(3): 300 x 1000 = 300 000 ($33 000 000); and·against Mr Mansfield for contravening:section 16(9): 300 x 400 = 120 000 ($13 200 000); and section 22(3): 300 x 200 = 60 000 ($6 600 000). The applicant further submits this estimate is a conservative one in view of a number of factors. First, the sending process adopted by the respondents involved sending many thousands of CEMs in ‘campaigns’ on a particular day. Second, as the evidence in the expert report discloses, between the period of 10 April 2004 and 7 April 2005 Clarity1 sent considerably in excess of two CEMs (usually thousands) on 252 separate days. It has admitted, by not responding to the notice to admit facts, that it continued to send CEMs at the same rate until at least 24 October 2005. Third, in order to achieve the high volume of total CEMs sent it would be necessary to send CEMs in bulk quantities over the course of many days. Fourth, on almost every occasion Clarity1 sent a CEM it contravened s 16(1) and s 22(1) of the Spam Act and Mr Mansfield contravened s 16(9) and s 22(3). Therefore the applicant submits that there is circumstances disclosing systematic, flagrant, deliberate and blatant conduct which warrants a very substantial penalty. In my view this fails to weigh the conduct in the context of the novelty of the legislation and the other circumstances referred to under ‘reasoning on pecuniary penalties’. COMMERCIAL REALISM However, there is also a need for commercial realism in fixing penalties. In Trade Practices Commission v Stihl Chain Saws (Aust) Pty Ltd (1978) ATPR 40-091, Smithers J said at 17,896:‘The penalty should constitute a real punishment proportionate to the deliberation with which the defendant contravened the provisions of the Act. It should be sufficiently high to have a deterrent quality, and it should be kept in mind that the Act operates in a commercial environment where deterrence of those minded to contravene its provisions is not likely to be achieved by penalties which are not realistic. It should reflect the will of Parliament that the commercial standards laid down in the Act must be observed, but not be so high as to be oppressive.’REASONING ON PECUNIARY PENALTIES