FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Milardovic v Vemco Services Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2016] FCA 244
File number: VID 42 of 2015 Judge: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 16 March 2016 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – penalties – contravention of National Employment Standards pursuant to s 44(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – failure to pay redundancy pay contrary to s 119(1) of the Fair Work Act – effect of first respondent being placed in administration – relevance of insolvency to imposition of penalty
CORPORATIONS – whether s 546(4) of the Fair Work Act has effect that penalties imposed under the Act are provable in winding up of company despite s 553B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
CORPORATIONS – where leave to proceed against a company in administration granted pursuant to s 440D(1)(b) of the Corporations Act – where leave granted on the basis that company would be indemnified by insurer – where no admissible evidence subsequently before the Court regarding position of insurer
COSTS – costs sought under s 570(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act – whether refusal of settlement offer was an unreasonable act
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 79A(1)(d)
Corporations Act 2001(Cth) ss 440D(1)(b), 553B, 553B(1), 1317G(2)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 44(1), 119(1), 361, 546(3), 546(4), 549, 570(1), 570(2), 570(2)(b)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 53(1)
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48
Spam Act 2003 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 48
Cases cited: Australian Communications and Media Authority v Clarity1 Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1399; 155 FCR 377
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2007] FCAFC 146; 161 FCR 513
Australian Competition and Consumer Commissionv Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1427; 236 ALR 665
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Fila Sport Oceania Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2004] FCA 376; ATPR 41-983
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 247; ATPR 42-091
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SIP Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 336; ATPR 41-937
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Vales Wine Company Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1798
Australian OphthalmicSupplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8; 165 FCR 560
Commonwealth v Leahy Petroleum - Retail Pty Ltd (subject to deed of company arrangement) [2005] FCA 1422; 55 ACSR 353
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25; 230 FCR 298
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Victoria (No 2) [2013] FCA 1034
Fencott v Muller [1983] HCA 12; 152 CLR 570
Gibbs v The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of City of Altona [1992] FCA 553; 37…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 244
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court reasoned that the terms of section 553B were not currently applicable to any penalty imposed by the court on Vemco, as the company had not yet been liquidated. The court noted that the primary purpose of imposing penalties was to serve general deterrence and that the fact that a company might be placed in liquidation should not dissuade the court from imposing penalties if they were otherwise appropriate. The court referred to several cases where it was held that the potential financial ruin of a company should not deter the imposition of penalties. The court concluded that the capacity of the company to satisfy a penalty order was not a permissible consideration in imposing the penalty, aligning with the view that the primary purpose of penalties was deterrence.
The court ordered that Vemco Services pay Milardovic the sum of $30,024.60 for unpaid redundancy pay, along with pre-judgment interest. Additionally, Vemco was required to pay a penalty of $10,000 for failing to pay redundancy pay, which was to be paid by a specific date. The court granted a 30-day stay on the payment of the redundancy pay to allow Vemco to make arrangements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $30,024.60, comprising:
(a) $26,250.00 for the applicant’s redundancy pay; and
(b) $3,774.60 for pre-judgment interest upon the applicant’s redundancy pay.
2. There be a stay of 30 days upon the order in paragraph 1.
3. In respect of the contravention of s 44(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) by failing to pay the applicant redundancy pay under s 119(1) of the Act, the first respondent pay a penalty of $10,000.
4. The penalty payable by reason of paragraph 3 be payable to the applicant on or before 15 April 2016.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In summary then, the terms of s 553B are not currently applicable to any penalty imposed by the Court on Vemco. If Vemco is placed in liquidation at some time in the future, then it may well be the case that s 553B will operate to preclude any penalty sum being provable. At the moment, given there is no liquidation, I do not consider this factor should preclude the imposition of a penalty if the Court considers it is otherwise appropriate.Whether capacity to satisfy any penalty order is a permissible consideration in imposing penalty There are conflicting authorities on this issue, none of which were drawn to the Court’s attention by Vemco. On the one hand, there is a series of cases in which it has been clearly said that the fact that a corporation is, or may be placed, in liquidation should not dissuade a court from imposing penalties if they are otherwise appropriate. Generally the authorities refer to the fact that the objects of general deterrence in particular are still served by the imposition of a penalty: see for example Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Vales Wine Company Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1798 at [6]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SIP Australia Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 336; ATPR 41-937 at [59]. There is a decision of the Full Court to the same effect in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 247; ATPR 42-091, which dealt with a contravention s 48 of the Trade Practices Act. The Full Court noted at [9] that the primary judge had indicated “he had no intention of ‘impos[ing] penalties that would ruin the respondents’ [and Mr Scott’s] family’”. The Full Court rejected that approach, stating at [10]-[11]:There are several observations that can be made about the judge’s approach. The first (which in the circumstances is probably the least significant) concerns his view that imposing an appropriate penalty would ruin the respondents. We have examined the financial statements that were before the judge. They do not indicate that High Adventure would be forced into liquidation even were a penalty of $40,000 or thereabouts imposed, provided the company was given time to pay.The second observation is that by focusing on the detriment to the respondents the judge ignored both the seriousness of the contravention as well as the need to fix upon an appropriate penalty by reference to the need to deter future contraventions. As the cases to which the judge was referred show, the principal, if not the sole, purpose for the imposition of penalties for a contravention of the antitrust provisions in Part IV is deterrence, both specific and general. This rule is so well entrenched that citation of authority is unnecessary. Moreover, as deterrence (especially general deterrence) is the primary purpose lying behind the penalty regime, there inevitably will be cases where the penalty that must be imposed will be higher, perhaps even considerably higher, than the penalty that would otherwise be imposed on a particular offender if one were to have regard only to the circumstances of that offender. In some cases the penalty may be so high that the offender will become insolvent. That possibility must not prevent the Court from doing its duty for otherwise the important object of general deterrence will be undermined.