FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ramsay v Menso [2019] FCA 1273
Appeal from: Ramsay v Menso(No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808 File number(s): QUD 508 of 2018 Judge(s): COLLIER J Date of judgment: 15 August 2019 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – pecuniary penalties for contravention of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where applicants held right of entry permits – where primary Judge ordered bulk of penalties to be paid to Consolidated Revenue – nature of discretion under s 546(3) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – usual order that successful applicant is entitled to be paid any pecuniary penalty imposed – whether primary Judge took into account irrelevant consideration Legislation: Fair Work Act2009 (Cth) ss 501, 546(3)
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld)
Cases cited: Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Assessment [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482
Gibbs v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of City of Altona (1992) 37 FCR 216
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Ramsay v Menso (2018) FCAFC 55
Ramsay v Menso (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808
Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4; (2016) 239 FCR 336
Milardovic v Vemco Services Proprietary Limited [2016] FCA 244; (2016) 242 FCR 492
Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union [2008] FCAFC 170, (2008) 171 FCR 357
Date of hearing: 13 August 2019 Registry: Queensland Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr W Friend QC with Mr C Massy Solicitor for the Appellants: Hall Payne Lawyers Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: The First and Second Respondents did not appear. Counsel for the Third Respondent: Ms A Coulthard Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Australian Building and Construction Commission ORDERS
QUD 508 of 2018 BETWEEN: ANDREW RAMSAY
First Appellant
ANTHONY STOTT
Second Appellant
AND: SUSAN MENSO
First Respondent
Z GROUP PTY LTD
Second Respondent
AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Appeal be allowed.
2.Orders 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Order of the Federal Circuit Court given on 28 June 2018 at Brisbane in Ramsay v Menso (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808 be varied as follows:
(a)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 2 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;
(b)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 3 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;
(c)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 5 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”; and
(d)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 6 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COLLIER J:
BACKGROUND
This is an appeal in relation to Orders 2, 3, 5 and 6 of…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1273
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were centered around the nature of the discretion under section 546(3) of the Fair Work Act and whether the primary Judge had taken into account irrelevant considerations in directing that the penalties be paid to the Commonwealth instead of the applicants. The Commissioner submitted that the correct principles to be applied in respect of the discretion were those set out in Sayed, and the "ordinary rule" or "usual order" is that the successful applicant is entitled to be paid any pecuniary penalty imposed. However, the court retains a discretion to order that penalties be paid to someone other than the applicant if the circumstances of the case warrant it.
The court found that the primary Judge did not take into account irrelevant considerations in directing that the penalties be paid to the Commonwealth. The Full Court observed that the power conveyed by section 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant, but there may be cases where the penalty, or a part of the penalty, should be paid to another person depending on the factual circumstances of the case. The Full Court held that this matter did not stand outside the ordinary or usual case, and the outcome of the appeal should be accepted.
The orders of the court were to allow the appeal and vary the orders of the primary Judge to direct that the penalties be paid to the applicants, Mr Williamson and Sergeant Greenwood, rather than to the Commonwealth. The court emphasized that the ordinary rule to which the power conferred by section 546(3) is directed is that pecuniary penalties awarded by the Court are paid to the successful applicant, and this case did not fall outside the ordinary or usual case.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Appeal be allowed.
2. Orders 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Order of the Federal Circuit Court given on 28 June 2018 at Brisbane in Ramsay v Menso (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808 be varied as follows:
(a) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 2 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;
(b) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 3 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;
(c) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 5 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”; and
(d) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 6 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Commissioner submitted, in summary:·The correct principles to be applied in respect of the discretion conferred by s 546(3) are those set out in Sayed;·The “ordinary rule” in Sayed or the “usual order” is just that, and is the order which would be made in the ordinary or usual case, which is a different thing from suggesting that the Court is bound to follow that course except in the particular cases which were outlined in authorities referred to by the Full Court in Sayed;·The Court retains a discretion in the awarding of penalties under s 546 to order that penalties be paid to someone other than the applicant;·To the extent that it be suggested that the primary Judge was bound by the decision in Sayed and other authorities to pay the pecuniary penalty to the applicants only, that contention is not to be accepted, save and except if to do so would be the ordinary or usual circumstance which applied having regard to the facts of that particular case;·This matter is not one which stands outside the ordinary or usual case, having regard to the facts found by the primary Judge;·As a general proposition, the outcome of the appeal sought by the appellants should be accepted.CONSIDERATION It is apparent that there is consensus between the appellants and the Commissioner that the appeal should be allowed in the terms sought by the appellants. From her written submissions, Ms Menso does not appear to take a position in respect of the issues the subject of this appeal, but rather seeks to re-agitate issues in respect of contravention already determined earlier by the Full Court in Ramsay v Menso (2018) FCAFC 55. No notice of contention was filed by Ms Menso referable to the primary Judge’s decision. As the appellants and the Commissioner properly identified, the ordinary rule to which the power conferred by s 546(3) is directed is that pecuniary penalties awarded by the Court are paid to the successful applicant. In this case his Honour directed that the bulk of penalties awarded should be paid to the Commonwealth, primarily because of the recalcitrance of Ms Menso in listening to Mr Williamson and Sergeant Greenwood, and because the “real” persons offended against by the first and second respondents in relation to the second and third contraventions were the Australian community. In Sayed the Full Court observed:101.Given the legislative history of ss 539(2) and 546(3) of the FW Act, since the enactment of ss 44 and 45 in the pioneering 1904 Act, and the manner in which the “usual order” was articulated in such early cases as the Vehicle Builders’ Employees’ Federation case and Seymour, which is reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum, we consider that the power conveyed by s 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant. We accept that there may be cases (of which this is not one) where the penalty, or a part of the penalty, should be paid to another person in the circumstances described by Gray J in Plancor at [44] (as set out at [96] above).102.The examples given in the Explanatory Memorandum and by Gray J in Gibbs as to when a payment (or a part payment) might be made to a particular person support the view that, depending on the factual circumstances of a particular case, a particular person for whose benefit, in effect, the contravention proceeding was brought may be the beneficiary of a s 546(3) order in the types of cases there referred to.(Emphasis added.)