Ramsay v Menso

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ramsay v Menso [2019] FCA 1273

Appeal from: Ramsay v Menso(No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808
File number(s): QUD 508 of 2018
Judge(s): COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 15 August 2019
Catchwords:  INDUSTRIAL LAW – pecuniary penalties for contravention of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – where applicants held right of entry permits – where primary Judge ordered bulk of penalties to be paid to Consolidated Revenue – nature of discretion under s 546(3) Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – usual order that successful applicant is entitled to be paid any pecuniary penalty imposed – whether primary Judge took into account irrelevant consideration
Legislation:

Fair Work Act2009 (Cth) ss 501, 546(3)

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld)

Cases cited:

Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Assessment [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 258 CLR 482

Gibbs v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of City of Altona (1992) 37 FCR 216

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Ramsay v Menso (2018) FCAFC 55

Ramsay v Menso (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808

Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4; (2016) 239 FCR 336

Milardovic v Vemco Services Proprietary Limited [2016] FCA 244; (2016) 242 FCR 492

Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union [2008] FCAFC 170, (2008) 171 FCR 357

Date of hearing: 13 August 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr W Friend QC with Mr C Massy
Solicitor for the Appellants: Hall Payne Lawyers
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: The First and Second Respondents did not appear.
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Ms A Coulthard
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Australian Building and Construction Commission

ORDERS

QUD 508 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ANDREW RAMSAY

First Appellant

ANTHONY STOTT

Second Appellant

AND:

SUSAN MENSO

First Respondent

Z GROUP PTY LTD

Second Respondent

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Appeal be allowed.

2.Orders 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Order of the Federal Circuit Court given on 28 June 2018 at Brisbane in Ramsay v Menso (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808 be varied as follows:

(a)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 2 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;

(b)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 3 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;

(c)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 5 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”; and

(d)delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 6 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER J:

BACKGROUND

  1. This is an appeal in relation to Orders 2, 3, 5 and 6 of…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1273
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Ramsay v Menso, the applicants, Mr Williamson and Sergeant Greenwood, challenged the decision of the primary Judge to order that the majority of the pecuniary penalties imposed for contraventions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) be paid to the Consolidated Revenue rather than to them. The applicants held right of entry permits and were involved in proceedings against the respondents, Ms Menso and the company she managed, for various contraventions of the Fair Work Act. The primary Judge had ordered that the bulk of the penalties be paid to the Commonwealth due to the respondents' recalcitrance and because the Australian community was considered the "real" party offended against in relation to some of the contraventions.

The legal issues before the court were centered around the nature of the discretion under section 546(3) of the Fair Work Act and whether the primary Judge had taken into account irrelevant considerations in directing that the penalties be paid to the Commonwealth instead of the applicants. The Commissioner submitted that the correct principles to be applied in respect of the discretion were those set out in Sayed, and the "ordinary rule" or "usual order" is that the successful applicant is entitled to be paid any pecuniary penalty imposed. However, the court retains a discretion to order that penalties be paid to someone other than the applicant if the circumstances of the case warrant it.

The court found that the primary Judge did not take into account irrelevant considerations in directing that the penalties be paid to the Commonwealth. The Full Court observed that the power conveyed by section 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant, but there may be cases where the penalty, or a part of the penalty, should be paid to another person depending on the factual circumstances of the case. The Full Court held that this matter did not stand outside the ordinary or usual case, and the outcome of the appeal should be accepted.

The orders of the court were to allow the appeal and vary the orders of the primary Judge to direct that the penalties be paid to the applicants, Mr Williamson and Sergeant Greenwood, rather than to the Commonwealth. The court emphasized that the ordinary rule to which the power conferred by section 546(3) is directed is that pecuniary penalties awarded by the Court are paid to the successful applicant, and this case did not fall outside the ordinary or usual case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Order of the Federal Circuit Court given on 28 June 2018 at Brisbane in Ramsay v Menso (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1808 be varied as follows:

(a) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 2 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;

(b) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 3 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”;

(c) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 5 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”; and

(d) delete the word “Commonwealth” at the end of Order 6 and replace it with “First and Second Applicants”.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commissioner submitted, in summary:·The correct principles to be applied in respect of the discretion conferred by s 546(3) are those set out in Sayed;·The “ordinary rule” in Sayed or the “usual order” is just that, and is the order which would be made in the ordinary or usual case, which is a different thing from suggesting that the Court is bound to follow that course except in the particular cases which were outlined in authorities referred to by the Full Court in Sayed;·The Court retains a discretion in the awarding of penalties under s 546 to order that penalties be paid to someone other than the applicant;·To the extent that it be suggested that the primary Judge was bound by the decision in Sayed and other authorities to pay the pecuniary penalty to the applicants only, that contention is not to be accepted, save and except if to do so would be the ordinary or usual circumstance which applied having regard to the facts of that particular case;·This matter is not one which stands outside the ordinary or usual case, having regard to the facts found by the primary Judge;·As a general proposition, the outcome of the appeal sought by the appellants should be accepted.CONSIDERATION It is apparent that there is consensus between the appellants and the Commissioner that the appeal should be allowed in the terms sought by the appellants. From her written submissions, Ms Menso does not appear to take a position in respect of the issues the subject of this appeal, but rather seeks to re-agitate issues in respect of contravention already determined earlier by the Full Court in Ramsay v Menso (2018) FCAFC 55. No notice of contention was filed by Ms Menso referable to the primary Judge’s decision. As the appellants and the Commissioner properly identified, the ordinary rule to which the power conferred by s 546(3) is directed is that pecuniary penalties awarded by the Court are paid to the successful applicant. In this case his Honour directed that the bulk of penalties awarded should be paid to the Commonwealth, primarily because of the recalcitrance of Ms Menso in listening to Mr Williamson and Sergeant Greenwood, and because the “real” persons offended against by the first and second respondents in relation to the second and third contraventions were the Australian community. In Sayed the Full Court observed:101.Given the legislative history of ss 539(2) and 546(3) of the FW Act, since the enactment of ss 44 and 45 in the pioneering 1904 Act, and the manner in which the “usual order” was articulated in such early cases as the Vehicle Builders’ Employees’ Federation case and Seymour, which is reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum, we consider that the power conveyed by s 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant. We accept that there may be cases (of which this is not one) where the penalty, or a part of the penalty, should be paid to another person in the circumstances described by Gray J in Plancor at [44] (as set out at [96] above).102.The examples given in the Explanatory Memorandum and by Gray J in Gibbs as to when a payment (or a part payment) might be made to a particular person support the view that, depending on the factual circumstances of a particular case, a particular person for whose benefit, in effect, the contravention proceeding was brought may be the beneficiary of a s 546(3) order in the types of cases there referred to.(Emphasis added.)