Austal Ships Pty Ltd v Incat Australia Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Austal Ships Pty Ltd (ACN 079 160 679) v Incat Australia Pty Ltd

(ACN 051 556 855) [2009] FCA 368

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for further particular discovery – principles governing discovery – whether burden of discovery outweighs benefit – whether discovery relevant to pleaded issues – whether sufficient evidence to support order for further discovery – whether application constitutes ‘fishing expedition’ – whether respondents should be directed to respond to applicant’s notice to admit facts – whether leave should be granted to applicant to administer interrogatories – application for summary dismissal by respondents – whether reasonable prospect of success

EQUITY – applicant claims two reports on sea keeping of its vessels confidential – alleged misuse of confidential information – springboard doctrine  

Held:  The applicant’s applications for further particular discovery; an order to direct the respondents to respond to its notice to admit facts; and for leave to serve notices to produce is refused.  The respondents’ application for judgment is dismissed.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52

Federal Court Rules O 1 r 4, O 15 r 2(3), O 15 r 8, O 15A r 3 and r 6

Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 72 WN(NSW) 250
Austal Ships Pty Ltd (ACN 079 160 679) v Thurlow (No 2) [2007] FCA 202
Austal Ships Pty Ltd (ACN 079 160 679) v Thurlow [2006] FCA 1219
Betts Group Pty Ltd v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1983
Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v The Amalgamated Metal Workers Union [1990] FCA 721
Carr v Baker (1936) 26 SR(NSW) 301
Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41
Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1964] 3 All ER 289
Fieldturf Inc v Balsam Pacific Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 809
Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Jones (No 2) [2006] FCA 1401
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1955) 75 WN(NSW) 261
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298
KGL Health Pty Ltd v Mechtler [2008] FCA 273
LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989) 16 IPR 27
Mediterranean Bakery Pty Ltd v Vardakis (1976) ACLD 649
Melbourne Home of Ford Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 36 FLR 450
Molnlycke AB v Proctor & Gamble Limited (No 3) [1990] RPC 498
Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341
Polygram Records Inc v Raben Footwear Pty Limited (1996) 140 ALR 617
Printers and Finishers Ltd v Holloway [1964] 3 All ER 731
Slick v Westpac Banking Corporation [2006] FCA 1712
Trade Practices Commission v CC (New South Wales) Pty Limited (1995) 58 FCR 426
WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 41 FLR 175

AUSTAL SHIPS PTY LTD (ACN079 160 679) v INCAT AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 051 556 855), INCAT TASMANIA PTY LTD (ACN 054 616 410), INCAT MARKETING PTY…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 368
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Austal Ships Pty Ltd v Incat Australia Pty Ltd, Austal sought additional discovery and other interlocutory relief against Incat, while Incat applied for summary judgment against Austal. The dispute involved allegations of breach of confidence, copyright infringement, and contravention of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The court was required to decide on the admissibility of evidence, the availability of further discovery, and the likelihood of success for Austal’s claims. The court found that Austal had already received extensive preliminary discovery and that the additional evidence sought was largely hearsay and speculative. The court declined to order Incat to respond to a notice to admit facts, as it lacked the authority to do so. It also dismissed Incat’s application for summary judgment, finding that Austal had a reasonable prospect of success with its claims.

The court examined the evidence presented by both parties, noting that Austal had already had access to substantial information through preliminary discovery, compulsory examinations, and witness statements. Given this extensive discovery, the court gave little weight to hearsay and speculative evidence. The court highlighted that Austal’s claim for breach of confidence and copyright infringement was based on information known only to Incat, making further discovery essential for Austal to prove its case. However, the court found that the additional evidence sought by Austal was not necessary for the interlocutory application. In regard to the summary judgment application, the court concluded that Austal had a reasonable prospect of success with its claims, and thus dismissed Incat’s application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Each of the respondents is to file and serve an affidavit of discovery which conforms to the Rules of the Court within 21 days.

2. Each of the applicant’s applications for:

(a) further particular discovery;

(b) an order to direct the respondents to respond to its notice to admit facts; and

(c) for leave to serve notices to produce

is refused.

3. The respondents’ application for judgment is dismissed.

4. Any written submissions on costs are not to exceed five pages and are to be filed and served within 21 days, failing which there will be no order as to costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Incat strenuously resists further relief of any nature being granted to Austal and by its own amended notice of motion seeks summary judgment against Austal pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in respect of the claim insofar as it refers to entities described below as Higashinihon, Spanish Acciona and PATT . BACKGROUND Austal was incorporated and commenced business in 1988. It manufactures a range of lightweight, high speed vessels including monohulls, catamarans and trimarans. Those vessels range in size from 20 to 130 metres and are used for commercial, military and naval applications. Austal employs 1700 people at its ship building facilities located on the waterfront at Henderson, immediately south of Fremantle in Western Australia and at Mobile in Alabama in the United States. It has designed and secured orders for the manufacture and delivery of over 160 vessels since it was formed. A number of those vessels are fast passenger and vehicle passenger ferries. In June 2003, Austal contracted for the design and construction of a 126 metre trimaran, vehicle passenger ferry for a European ferry operator Fred Olsen SA. As was observed in Austal Ships v Thurlow [2006] FCA 1219, at that time the high speed vehicle passenger ferry market had been dominated by catamarans and the use of trimarans was a relatively new concept in that market. Austal’s internal research was contained in a report entitled ‘Analysis of the Ship Motion Performance of an Austal 101 metre Catamaran and a Comparison with a 126 metre Trimaran in the Irish Sea’ (the first Report). As indicated above, the first Report reached the conclusion that the trimaran was significantly inferior to the catamaran on the routes and conditions to which it referred. The first Report and the follow up reports were stored in a computer archive within Austal. The document was strictly an internal and confidential document of Austal. In fact it transpired, according to Austal, that both the conclusion and the basis for it in the first Report were quite erroneous. In a subsequent report, the error was explained and the conclusion in the first Report was corrected. It is now common ground that Mr Merrigan had access to the first Report while he was employed with Austal. He made that Report available to Mr Thurlow of Incat when Mr Merrigan was subsequently employed by Incat. The text of the offending email attaching the first Report and sent by Mr Thurlow is set out in Austal Ships v Thurlow [2006] FCA 1219. In particular, it observed that it was well known in the market that the Austal 101 is ‘far inferior to the Incat 98 metre in terms of sea keeping, yet in this Austal report the Austal 101 comes out significantly better than the trimaran which is around 26 metres longer on the waterline …’. (emphasis added) The email also observed that a ‘move into the 98 metre’ (being the Incat vessel) is a timely, sound and logical step forward in order to be able to carry freight and to get good all round weather reliability. It observed that the Incat vessel ‘costs a little over half the capital cost of a trimaran’, was proven in service and was available quickly.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the unusual circumstances arising in this litigation, the interlocutory relief sought by each party is supported by quite extensive evidence. The evidence therefore needs to be considered in these reasons, not with a view to drawing any conclusions as to the ultimate issues at trial but in order to evaluate the strength of the current interlocutory arguments. EVIDENCE I have not referred to all of the evidence. Some of the evidence is clearly more relevant to a trial than an interlocutory application. That observation is no way intended to be deprecating because the witness statements were in fact intended to be those that would be relied upon at trial. I have also not referred to much of the evidence as notwithstanding the fact that the application is interlocutory, a great deal of it is hearsay, speculation, argument and generally inadmissible. Nevertheless, I have endeavoured to reflect the substance of the relevant issues for the purposes of the current applications. As discussed, Austal has had the benefit of preliminary discovery, compulsory examination on oath of Incat officers and the provision of Incat witness statements and affidavits. It has had all of these sources of information before seeking further discovery. While there may have been some misunderstanding as to the topics that Austal was to cover in its witness statements, the statements collectively advert to all the pleaded transactions. Austal has not pointed to any additional evidence it would have adduced to supplement that so far supplied. Austal’s affidavits and witness statements were subject to extensive objections raised by Incat. I do not propose to deal with the objections in detail for reasons which will become evident in due course. Nevertheless, while to some extent on an interlocutory application hearsay material may be admissible, in light of the extensive benefit which Austal has had already in having access to Incat’s information, I would be giving little weight to material which is no more than hearsay. The witness statements and affidavits relied upon include the following: an affidavit of Mr Darren Frederick Thomas Edwards, sworn on 14 October 2006; witness statement of Mr James Bennett of 2 May 2008; witness statement of Mr Richard Regan of 2 May 2008; witness statement of Mr Kobayashi Toyohiko, undated but apparently signed on 16 May 2008; witness statement of Mr Christopher Gerrard dated 20 May 2008; witness statement of Mr Darren Edwards of 7 July 2008; witness statement of Mr Richard Regan dated 9 July 2008; witness statement of Mr James Bennett dated 9 July 2008; witness statement of Mr Christopher Gerrard dated 9 July 2008; witness statement of Mr Christopher Pemberton filed 20 October 2008; witness statement of Mr Richard Regan dated 24 October 2008; and a witness statement of Mr Michael Wake signed 27 October 2008. Mr Nicholas Timoney Mr Timoney is a solicitor acting for Austal. In Mr Timoney’s affidavit sworn on 27 August 2008, he recounts the history of the matter and the history of communications between the parties and records his belief that further discovery is critical in relation to Austal’s ability to advance and prove its case against Incat. As, by its very nature, Austal’s claim is for breach of confidence, infringement of copyright and contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), it raises matters solely within the knowledge of the respondents. In that regard, Mr Timoney observes that the discovery given by Incat through solicitors so far effectively simply mirrors that which had been given in the preliminary discovery proceedings with some minor exceptions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MCKERRACHER J
As to the notice to admit facts, I indicated during the course of argument that I do not propose making any order directing Incat to answer a notice to admit facts. There is no power in the Court to make such an order. The notice issued by Austal contains 391 questions with a bundle of documents referred to in the notice running to several hundred pages. Austal sought answers within 14 days of the notice being administered which was, in my view, quite unrealistic. A failure to answer a notice to admit facts goes only to costs, albeit on an indemnity basis in a suitable case: Polygram Records Inc v Raben Footwear Pty Limited (1996) 140 ALR 617. I note in the correspondence exchanged, however, that Incat have indicated that the notice will be answered in due course. Therefore, I decline to make any order to that effect.Judgment under s 31A I turn now to Incat’s argument in support of a notice of motion for dismissal of that portion of usage of Austal’s confidential information that was not admitted by Incat. Incat relies on s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The material relied upon in opposition to the further discovery is relevant to the same argument. In my view, however, the considerations are different. Pursuant to s 31A, the Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if it is satisfied that the party prosecuting the claim has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it. It is expressly emphasised that for the purposes of s 31A, a proceeding need not be hopeless or be bound to fail for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. The section has been discussed in numerous cases including Fortron Automotive Treatments Pty Ltd v Jones (No 2) [2006] FCA 1401. It is clear that it is open to the Court to consider evidence in the context of such an application and it is clear that the language of the section imposes a different and less stringent test to the former test described in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130. Austal has stressed that its case depends upon drawing inferences. It is true that the existence of a fact may be inferred from other facts when those facts make it reasonably probable that it exists. However, as Incat submits, if they go no further than to show that its possible that it may exist, then its existence does not go beyond mere conjecture and an inference is not open to be drawn: Carr v Baker (1936) 26 SR(NSW) 301 at 306-307. In Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 305-306, Kitto J said that:One does not pass from the realm of conjecture into the realm of inference until some fact is found which positively suggests, that is to say provides a reason, special to the particular case under consideration, for thinking it likely that in that actual case a specific event happened or a specific state of affairs existed. Street CJ observed in Gurnett v Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1955) 75 WN(NSW) 261 at 264:… The plaintiff must prove his case; and although he may establish a state of facts which leads one to think that his version is quite a possible version of what took place, he must do something more than show a state of facts which is consistent with one view or with another view … [a] guess is a mere opinion or a judgment formed at random and based on slight or uncertain grounds. In contradistinction to such a conjectural opinion, an inference is a reasonable conclusion drawn as a matter of strict logical deduction from known or assumed facts. It must be something which follows from given premises as certainly or probably true, and the mere possibility of truth is not sufficient to justify an inference to that effect.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MCKERRACHER J

In addressing the application for a notice to admit facts, the court observed that it could not compel Incat to respond to the extensive notice served by Austal within the short timeframe specified. The court noted that while failure to answer a notice to admit facts may result in costs on an indemnity basis, there was no basis for making a specific order compelling Incat to respond. The court also noted that Incat had indicated it would answer the notice in due course.

Regarding the application for further particular discovery, the court considered the extensive evidence already available to Austal, including preliminary discovery, compulsory examinations, and witness statements. The court concluded that Austal had already been afforded a significant opportunity to obtain information and that the application for further particular discovery was not warranted.

For the application to serve notices to produce, the court similarly noted the extensive evidence already available to Austal and found no basis for granting leave to serve further notices to produce.

In dismissing Incat's application for judgment under s 31A, the court examined the evidence and Austal's ability to draw inferences from it. The court noted that while Austal's case depended on inferences, it was open to the court to consider the evidence and determine whether Austal had a reasonable prospect of success. The court found that Austal's case was not hopeless or bound to fail and therefore did not meet the threshold for judgment under s 31A.

The court applied the principle that a proceeding under s 31A requires the court to determine whether the party prosecuting the claim has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it, a test that is less stringent than previous tests applied in Australian case law. The court referenced several authorities to clarify the application of this principle and ultimately concluded that Austal's claim had a reasonable prospect of success.