FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Munday v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 618
Citation: Munday v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 618 Parties: MICHEAL JOHN MUNDAY and CATHERINE ANNE DAY v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA File number: ACD 12 of 2013 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 12 June 2014 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application seeking contact details of decision-makers so as to allow subpoenas to be issued for them to give evidence – whether a legitimate forensic purpose or a mere “fishing expedition” Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46PH(1)(c), 46PO
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth)
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 29
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39BSuperannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.19A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 20.11, 20.35, 21.01, 24.01, 24.12Cases cited: Austal Ships Pty Ltd v Incat Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2010) 272 ALR 177; [2010] FCA 795
Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Wong [2002] FCAFC 327
WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 30 ALR 559
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 1128Date of hearing: 2 June 2014 Place: Sydney (via video link to Canberra) (heard in Canberra) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 34 Counsel for the Applicants: The First Applicant appeared in person and by leave for the Second Applicant Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D O’Donovan Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 12 of 2013
BETWEEN: MICHEAL JOHN MUNDAY
First ApplicantCATHERINE ANNE DAY
Second ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 JUNE 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed on 1 April 2014 be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 12 of 2013
BETWEEN: MICHEAL JOHN MUNDAY
First ApplicantCATHERINE ANNE DAY
Second ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE:
12 JUNE 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA) (HEARD IN CANBERRA)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Catherine Anne Day apparently has a genetic chromosome disorder which prevents her from producing ova. More than once she has been denied early access to her superannuation in order to finance in vitro fertilisation (“IVF”) treatment in the United States where ova may lawfully be purchased. Micheal John Munday is her de facto husband. On 28 March 2012 Mr Munday complained to the Australian Human Rights Commission (“AHRC”) that the Commonwealth of Australia (more specifically, the Department of Human Services (“the Department”)) had unlawfully discriminated against Ms Day because of “the medical condition that she…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 618
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the information sought by the applicants was not relevant to the issues in the proceeding. The six individuals named by the applicants were acting on behalf of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) at the relevant times, and there was no evidence that they were employed by the Commonwealth at any point. Furthermore, the refusals of Ms Day's applications were signed by delegates of APRA, and APRA was not a party to the proceeding. The court held that the motivations and "directions" of the named individuals were irrelevant to the applicants' claim that the decision-makers should not have taken into account the illegality of the proposed fertility treatment in Australia.
The court dismissed the interlocutory application, holding that the information sought did not serve a legitimate forensic purpose. The court concluded that the applicants' case turned on the proposition that the reason given for the decision was unlawful and that the motivations of the decision-makers were irrelevant to this issue. The court also noted that the applicants had not provided sufficient evidence to support their claim that the true reason for the refusal of Ms Day's applications was her infertility.
The court dismissed the interlocutory application and made no orders in favour of the applicants.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Should the Commonwealth be ordered to supply the applicants with sufficient information to allow them to serve subpoenas on six individuals involved in their applications to APRA?
2. Does the interlocutory application serve any legitimate forensic purpose in the context of the main proceeding?
Held
1. The court concluded that the Commonwealth should not be ordered to supply the applicants with sufficient information to allow them to serve subpoenas on six individuals involved in their applications to APRA. The interlocutory application was dismissed.
2. The court held that the interlocutory application did not serve any legitimate forensic purpose in the context of the main proceeding. The interlocutory application was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth opposes the making of an order in the present case on the ground that none of the six individuals could give evidence relevant to the issues in the proceeding. For the reasons given below, the Commonwealth is correct and the interlocutory application must be dismissed.Consideration Whatever the foundation for the Court’s power may be, whether the proposed order should be made depends on whether the purpose for which it is sought is a legitimate forensic purpose. What little evidence there is suggests that the six individuals were acting on behalf of APRA at all relevant times. There is no evidence that they were employed at any such time by the Commonwealth. The letters refusing Ms Day’s applications, which are annexed to her affidavit, were signed by delegates of APRA. There is no evidence to implicate them in the Department’s refusal to interfere with APRA’s decisions. APRA is not a Commonwealth Department; it is an independent statutory authority established as a body corporate under the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth). The complaint to the AHRC was made against the Department, not against APRA, and APRA is not a party to this proceeding. Accordingly, it is the conduct of the Commonwealth, more particularly the Department, with which this proceeding is concerned, not the antecedent processes. In the circumstances, the application is misconceived. Even if the Commonwealth is somehow liable for the decisions of APRA made before responsibility for early release of superannuation on compassionate grounds was transferred to the Department, I am not satisfied that the order sought serves any legitimate forensic purpose. First, there is no satisfactory evidence that Adaem, Chloe, Yumi or Maureen played a part in any decision to deny Ms Day access to her superannuation. For this reason alone I would not make any order that their contact details be supplied to the applicants. More fundamentally, the amended originating application does not take issue with the proposition that the reason given for the decision was that Ms Day’s fertility treatment would be unlawful in Australia. Indeed, the grounds upon which relief is sought turn on that reason. To the extent that the substantive proceeding involves a claim of unlawful discrimination, the complaint appears to be that Ms Day’s application for early release of her superannuation was refused on the basis that the fertility treatment she was seeking was unlawful in Australia. It appears that the applicants’ case is that the decision-makers should not have taken into account the illegality of the proposed treatment in Australia (it being a factor not mentioned in the relevant legislation) or Ms Day’s infertility and the fact that they did amounted to unlawful discrimination. The motivations and “directions” of the named individuals are irrelevant to this issue. During the interlocutory hearing, however, Mr Munday said that he would be arguing that the reasons given by the decision makers were not the true reasons Ms Day’s applications were refused. The true reason, he submitted, was his wife’s infertility.