FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Reihana v Minister for Government Services [2022] FCA 1017
File number: QUD 122 of 2022
QUD 123 of 2022
Judgment of: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 31 August 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PRCEDURE – application for recusal – whereas applicant suggests apprehended bias of docket Judge - whether not dealing with an interlocutory application within time period sought by the applicant amounts to apprehended bias – bias not made out – application dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for adjournment – whereas applicant seeks hearing to determine recusal application be adjourned pending him obtaining evidence – applicant did not provide sufficient justification - application for adjournment dismissed
Legislation: Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) Cases cited: AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] 239 CLR 175
Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337
Kumar v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2022] FCAFC 95
Munday v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] FCA 618
Oakey Coal Action Alliance Inc v New Acland Coal Pty Ltd [2021] HCA 2
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 1128
Young v Hughes Trueman Pty Ltd (No 5) [2017] FCA 690
Zetta Jet Proprietary Limited v The Ship “Dragon Pearl” [2018] FCA 878
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 69 Date of hearing: 31 August 2022 Solicitor for the Applicant: No appearance Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
QUD 122 of 2022 BETWEEN: TONI COLIN REIHANA
Applicant
AND: LINDA REYNOLDS AS MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES (and another named in the schedule)
First Respondent
QUD 123 of 2022 BETWEEN: TONI COLIN REIHANA
Applicant
AND: JOHN SKERRITT AS MANAGER OF THERAPEUTIC GOODS ADMINISTRATION / DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HEALTH (and another named in the schedule)
First Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 AUGUST 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for adjournment made by Toni Colin Reihana on 30 August 2022 in respect of QUD 122/2022 and QUD123/2022, be refused.
2.The interlocutory application for recusal made by Toni Colin Reihana in respect of QUD122/2022 and QUD123/2022, filed on 29 August 2022 in QUD 123/2022, be dismissed.
3.Toni Colin Reihana pay the costs of the respondents in QUD 122/2022, and the costs of the respondents in QUD 123/2022, of and incidental to the applications referenced in Orders 1 and 2 of these Orders, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COLLIER J
Before the Court is an interlocutory application filed on 29 August 2022 (recusal application) by Mr Toni Reihana (applicant) in QUD123/2022. In that interlocutory application Mr Reihana also seeks relief in respect of another matter in which he is the applicant, namely QUD122/2022. For this reason both matters were…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Reihana v Minister for Government Services and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] FCA 1017
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for adjournment made by Toni Colin Reihana on 30 August 2022 in respect of QUD 122/2022 and QUD123/2022, be refused.
2. The interlocutory application for recusal made by Toni Colin Reihana in respect of QUD122/2022 and QUD123/2022, filed on 29 August 2022 in QUD 123/2022, be dismissed.
3. Toni Colin Reihana pay the costs of the respondents in QUD 122/2022, and the costs of the respondents in QUD 123/2022, of and incidental to the applications referenced in Orders 1 and 2 of these Orders, such costs to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the issue of apprehended bias regarding Collier J based on the applicant's failure to deal with his interlocutory application within the time period sought. The court noted that the applicant had made multiple communications with the court regarding the need for interrogatories to be answered by registry staff, which were deemed necessary for the fair and proper determination of his disqualification application. Despite these efforts, the court was not persuaded that the applicant's inability to deal with the interlocutory application within the requested time period amounted to apprehended bias on the part of Collier J. The court found that the applicant's submissions lacked sufficient justification to warrant a belief that Collier J's impartiality might reasonably be doubted.
In relation to the application for adjournment, the court considered the applicant's need to obtain evidence for his disqualification application. The applicant argued that without the evidence of registry staff, participating in the hearing would be tantamount to flying blind. However, the court was not convinced that the need for this evidence was sufficiently justified to warrant an adjournment. The court held that the applicant had not provided compelling reasons to postpone the hearing, and therefore, the adjournment application was dismissed.
The court applied principles of procedural fairness and the need for timely prosecution of interlocutory applications, finding that the applicant's actions did not meet the required threshold for apprehended bias or justification for an adjournment. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a failure to manage an interlocutory application within the stipulated time does not necessarily indicate apprehended bias, and applications for adjournment must be supported by sufficient justification.