SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v FENNER
[2020] SASC 107
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Livesey
18 June 2020
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - GENERALLY
Pursuant to s 7(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (“the Act”) the Attorney-General made an application for the respondent to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months. In February 2010 the respondent was sentenced to a period of imprisonment after pleading guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a person of the age of 15 years contrary to s 49(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (“the CLCA”). That term of imprisonment was wholly suspended upon the respondent entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for three years.
The respondent breached the bond by committing further criminal offences which included violent offending. As a consequence, the suspended sentence was revoked and the respondent was required to serve its entire term cumulative upon the sentences of imprisonment that were imposed for the further offending. The respondent's head sentence expired on 14 March 2020.
Section 5(a) of the Act defines a “high risk offender” to include “a serious sexual offender who was sentenced to a period of imprisonment in respect of the serious sexual offence”. The respondent opposed the Attorney’s application for an extended supervision order on the basis that he does not satisfy the definition of “high risk offender” within the meaning of s 5(a). He conceded that by virtue of his offence contrary to s 49(3) of the CLCA he committed a serious sexual offence and is a serious sexual offender but submitted that because he received a suspended sentence he was not “sentenced to a period of imprisonment”. He also contended that the evidence adduced by the Attorney-General does not establish that he poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under an extended supervision order.
Held, granting the application:
1. The respondent is a “high risk offender” within the meaning of s 5(a) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA). A “sentence to a period of imprisonment” for the purposes of s 5(a) includes a sentence of imprisonment that has been suspended, either wholly or partially.
2. The respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under an extended supervision order.
3. The respondent is to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months commencing on 18 June 2020.
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) s 4A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 49; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 3, s 4, s 5, s 7, s 10, s 11, s 12, s 18, s 21;
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- Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107
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- [2020] SASC 107
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that Mr Fenner was a high-risk offender as he was a serious sexual offender who was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, notwithstanding that the sentence was suspended. The court held that a suspended sentence remains a sentence to a period of imprisonment. The court also held that certain conditions, including restrictions on the use of electronic devices, were not necessary for the protection of the community. The court made an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months with specified conditions.
The court ordered that Mr Fenner be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months with specified conditions, including restrictions on possession of firearms, ammunition, and offensive weapons, and requirements to submit to drug and alcohol testing and comply with a curfew. The order took effect on 18 June 2020.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A further issue agitated by the parties concerned material a prescribed health professional should be given access to under s 21 of the Act for the purposes of examining the respondent and preparing a report. The respondent’s position was that a prescribed health professional should not be given access to materials regarding criminal offences allegedly committed by the respondent but which ultimately did not proceed or were not otherwise proved in court. The Attorney’s response was that there is nothing in ss 7 or 21 which expressly, or by necessary implication, limits the materials that can be considered by a prescribed health professional. In any event, in this matter, Dr Raeside confined his assessment to the matters for which Mr Fenner had been convicted. This may be contrasted with the broader basis on which the SBC post-treatment assessment report had been prepared. Consideration I shall now consider s 7(4) of the High Risk Offenders Act.Is the respondent a high risk offender? As mentioned earlier in these reasons, the first of the two jurisdictional facts in s 7(4) which the Attorney-General must prove is that the respondent is a “high risk offender”. In this case that requires the Court to be satisfied that Mr Fenner is, for the purposes of s 5(a), “a serious sexual offender who was sentenced to a period of imprisonment in respect of the serious sexual offence”. I am satisfied that Mr Fenner committed a “serious sexual offence” and is a “serious sexual offender”. The question of construction is whether Mr Fenner was “sentenced to a period of imprisonment” with respect to the serious sexual offence within the meaning of s 5(a) where that sentence was suspended pursuant to s 96 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) or its predecessor, s 38 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). The general principles of statutory construction are well settled. In Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross the joint reasons of French CJ and Hayne J again articulated those principles, emphasising text, context and evident statutory purpose.[24] In Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said:[25]This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.(Footnotes omitted.)[24] (2012) 248 CLR 378, [23]-[25].[25] (2009) 239 CLR 27, [47]. Part of the relevant statutory context is the means by which sentences come to be suspended. By s 96 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) the power of a sentencing court to suspend a period of imprisonment is conditioned on a finding “that good reason exists for doing so”.[26] The same approach can be seen in the former s 38 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA). From s 96 and its progenitor it can be discerned that a suspension of imprisonment in South Australia is only available where, first, the sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment and, secondly, the court is satisfied that good reason exists to suspend it. Unless that first step is taken, the second cannot arise. When the bond that is entered into as part of the suspension is not complied with, and the suspension is revoked, it is the original sentence of imprisonment that confronts the offender. It follows then that a sentence that has been suspended, whether wholly or partially, stands as and remains a sentence to a period of imprisonment.[27][26] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), s 96(1).[27] Elliot v Harris (No 2) (1976) 13 SASR 516, 527 (Bray CJ); R v O’Keefe [1969] 2 QB 29, 32 (Lord Parker CJ); R v Gillan (1991) 100 ALR 66, 71 (the Court).