SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v HUMES
[2020] SASC 123
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Livesey
3 July 2020
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDER
Pursuant to s 7(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (“the Act”) the Attorney-General made an application for the respondent to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months. On 24 December 2019 the respondent was released from prison after having served a sentence of imprisonment for aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. Since then he has been subject to an interim supervision order made pursuant to s 9 of the Act.
Section 7(4) of the Act provides:
(4) The Supreme Court may, on application under this section, order that the respondent is to be subject to an extended supervision order if satisfied that—
(a) the respondent is a high risk offender; and
(b) the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under the order.
The respondent concedes that he is a “high risk offender” within the meaning of the Act but contends that he does not pose an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under an extended supervision order.
Held, granting the application:
1. The respondent is to be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months commencing on 3 July 2020.
2. The parties will be heard on the conditions of the extended supervision order.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20, s 21, s 83D, s 137; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 3, s 7, s 9, s 13, s 18, referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107; Attorney-General (SA) [2016] SASC 49; R v Kimmins [2016] SASC 176, considered.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v HUMES
[2020] SASC 123Criminal: Application
LIVESEY J: This is an application by the Attorney-General for an extended supervision order to be made with respect to Brandon Williams Humes (the respondent) pursuant to s 7(4) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the Act or the High Risk Offenders Act).
On 24 December 2019 Mr Humes was released from prison after having served a sentence of imprisonment for four years and six months for aggravated assault and aggravated robbery. Since then he has been subject to an interim supervision order made pursuant to s 9 of the Act.
Mr Humes opposes the Attorney’s application. He submits that though he is a high risk offender within the meaning of the Act, the evidence adduced by the Attorney does not establish that he poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under an extended supervision order.
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- Attorney-General (SA) v Humes [2020] SASC 123
- Case
- [2020] SASC 123
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence presented, including a psychiatric report from Dr Megan Ferris, who assessed Mr Humes' likelihood of committing an offence of serious violence. Dr Ferris concluded that Mr Humes had a history of antisocial behaviour and substance abuse, but noted his compliance with parole conditions and his efforts to abstain from illicit substances and alcohol since his release from prison. The court also considered Mr Humes' expressed remorse for his past violent offending and his intention to remain abstinent and engage in positive activities. The court had to balance the need for community safety against Mr Humes' arguments that the curfew and electronic monitoring conditions were limiting his reintegration into society.
The court concluded that while Mr Humes was a high-risk offender and had committed a serious violent offence, the evidence suggested that he had made positive changes and was complying with parole conditions. The court decided to impose an extended supervision order for 12 months but deferred the final decision on the specific conditions until further submissions from counsel. The court emphasized that the paramount consideration in determining the order was the safety of the community and that Mr Humes' compliance with parole and his efforts to abstain from substance abuse were positive indicators. The court also noted that the curfew condition might not be necessary, as Mr Humes' risk factors could manifest at any time of the day.
The final order was that Mr Humes would be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 12 months, with further discussion on the specific conditions to be included in the order. This decision underscored the court's focus on balancing the need for public safety with the rehabilitation and reintegration of high-risk offenders.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Humes had told the doctor that this condition would limit his ability to make contact with people after 9 pm. Dr Ferris was of the opinion that associating with antisocial peers and using illicit substances could equally happen during the day as it could at night.Consideration The two jurisdictional facts that the Attorney-General must prove to enliven this Court’s discretion to make an extended supervision order are set out in s 7(4) of the High Risk Offenders Act. They provide that the Court must first be satisfied that the respondent is a “high risk offender”[4] and secondly that he or she “poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under the order”.[5] [4] Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), s 7(4)(a).[5] Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), s 7(4)(b). Section 7(5) makes clear that the paramount consideration of the Court in determining whether to make an extended supervision order is the safety of the community. Section 7(6) provides a non-exhaustive list of additional factors that the Court may take into account in determining whether to make an extended supervision order including the extent to which the respondent has complied with his or her parole conditions,[6] any treatment or rehabilitation programs he or she has undertaken,[7] and any relevant evidence or representations that the respondent puts before this Court.[8][6] Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), s 7(6)(g).[7] Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), s 7(6)(f).[8] Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), s 7(6)(e). A high risk offender is defined by s 5(c) to include a “serious violent offender” who was sentenced to a period of imprisonment with respect to a “serious offence of violence”. The various interlocking definitions contained in the High Risk Offenders Act and the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), which govern the question whether or not a respondent has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment for a “serious offence of violence” and is thus a “serious violent offender”,[9] have been discussed in many cases before this Court.[10] Those definitions need not be discussed or set out here. Before me, there was no dispute that Mr Humes satisfies the definition of high risk offender under s 5(c). The parties were at one in submitting that the aggravated robbery, for which Mr Humes was sentenced to a period of imprisonment, constituted a “serious offence of violence” which made him a “serious violent offender”.[9] See s 4 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) and ss 21(1) and 83D(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).[10] Attorney-General (SA) v Wikaire (2017) 127 SASR 565; Attorney-General (SA) v Wells [2017] SASC 149; Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300; Attorney-General (SA) v Davidson [2018] SASC 91; Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin [2019] SASC 105; Attorney-General (SA) v Kember [2019] SASC 19 and Attorney-General (SA) v Gates (2017) 129 SASR 298.