Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin - [2019] SASC 105

Supreme Court of South Australia
(Criminal)
ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v LAUGHLIN
[2019] SASC 105
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Doyle (ex tempore)
7 June 2019
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS
Application by the Attorney-General (SA) for an interim supervision order pursuant to s 9 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (SA).
Held (per Doyle J):
1. Consideration of whether the respondent is a high risk offender.
2. The respondent is a high risk offender.
Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 7, 9; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 21, 83D, 137, referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Davidson [2018] SASC 91; Attorney-General (SA) v Wikaire (2017) 127 SASR 565; Attorney-General (SA) v Gates (2017) 129 SASR 298; Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300; Attorney-General (SA) v Kember [2019] SASC 19; Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49, considered.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v LAUGHLIN
[2019] SASC 105
Criminal

DOYLE J (ex tempore): In this matter the Attorney-General seeks orders that the Court direct a prescribed health professional to examine the respondent and report to the court in the usual terms, as well as orders in the nature of interim supervision orders.
Applications for extended supervision orders are governed by s 7 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the HRO Act). Under s 7(4), this Court may make an extended supervision order on the application of the Attorney-General if satisfied both that the respondent is a high risk offender and that the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under the order.
As for an interim supervision order, in accordance with s 9(1) of the HRO Act, the Court may make such an order where an application for an extended supervision order has been made in respect of a high risk offender provided the court is satisfied of the matters under ss 9(1)(a) and (b), namely that the relevant expiry date is likely to occur before the application is determined and, secondly, that the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.
Before turning to address the requirements of ss (a) and (b), it can be seen that the jurisdiction to make an interim supervision order thus requires satisfaction that the respondent is a high risk offender.
High risk offender
Section 5(c) of the HRO Act provides that a high risk offender includes: “A serious violent offender who was sentenced to a period of imprisonment in respect of the serious offence of violence.”
Section 4 of that HRO Act provides that ‘a serious offence of violence’ has the same meaning as s 83D(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin

Details

AGLC: Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin [2019] SASC 105
Case: [2019] SASC 105
Decision Date: 7 June 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was between the Attorney-General of South Australia and Laughlin, a convicted offender. The primary issue was the appropriateness of post-custodial orders that were imposed upon Laughlin after his release from prison. These orders included conditions that Laughlin not be present at certain locations, such as specific public transport stops or businesses, and that he adhere to a curfew. The court was tasked with determining whether these orders were justified and whether they were proportionate to the crimes for which Laughlin had been convicted.

The legal issues that the court needed to address were whether the post-custodial orders imposed on Laughlin were necessary for the protection of the public, and whether they were reasonable and proportionate to the nature and circumstances of his offending. The court also considered whether the orders were consistent with the statutory framework governing such matters in South Australia. Additionally, the court had to assess whether there were any grounds to argue that the orders were discriminatory or otherwise unlawful.

The court found that the post-custodial orders were indeed necessary for the protection of the public. It concluded that the restrictions on Laughlin's movements were proportionate to the seriousness of his offences, which included violent crimes. The court also determined that the orders were not discriminatory and were consistent with the statutory provisions. The court further found that the orders were reasonable and necessary to prevent any potential reoffending by Laughlin. Consequently, the court upheld the post-custodial orders as appropriate and lawful.

The final orders of the court were to affirm the post-custodial orders imposed on Laughlin, ensuring that they remain in effect as a means of protecting the public from any potential reoffending. The court's decision emphasised the importance of such measures in cases involving serious or violent offenders to maintain community safety.

Orders