Attorney-General (SA) v Williams - [2025] SASC 164

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)

ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v WILLIAMS
[2025] SASC 164
Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice B Doyle
5 September 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER
The applicant seeks an interim supervision order in respect of the respondent, a high risk offender, pursuant to s 9(1) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’), pending the hearing and determination of an application for an extended supervision order. The respondent’s index offending involved procuring a child for sexual activity in May 2017. An extended supervision order was first made on 2 September 2020 and a second extended supervision order was made on 6 September 2023.
Held, making an interim supervision order:
1.the matters alleged in the materials supporting the allegation would, if proved, establish that the respondent poses an appreciable risk of sexual offending if not supervised, and would justify the making of an extended supervision order;

2. the Court should not decline to exercise its discretion to impose an interim supervision order.
Observations made as to the construction of ss 7 and 9 of the HRO Act.

Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) s 44; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 18 ; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 19AB(1)(a)(i), 63A, 63B ; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 26, 57, 58, 59, referred to.
Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107; Attorney-General (SA) v Gillard [2022] SASC 104; Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49; Attorney-General (SA) v Humes [2020] SASC 123; Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery [2018] SASC 1; Attorney-General (SA) v Karpany [2020] SASC 219; Attorney-General (SA) v McCann [2023] SASC 5; Attorney-General (SA) v Tipping [2019] SASC 7; Attorney-General (SA) v Wells [2017] SASC 149; Attorney-General (SA) v Williams [2023] SASC 64; Attorney-General (SA) v Williams (No 2) [2023] SASC 119; R v Humphrys [2018] SASCFC 69; R v Schuster (2016) 125 SASR 388; State of New South Wales v Elomar (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1034, discussed.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v WILLIAMS
[2025] SASC 164
Criminal: application

B DOYLE J: The respondent, a ‘high risk offender’ within the meaning of s 5 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’), opposes the imposition upon him of what would be a third interim supervision order and, ultimately, an extended supervision order.
Background and index offending
In September 2016, the respondent was sentenced to nine months imprisonment for the aggravated offence of possessing child exploitation material.[1] That sentence was suspended on the basis of a bond. The conviction led to the respondent having reporting obligations as a ‘registrable offender’ under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) (‘CSORA’).
[1] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 63A.
The ‘index offending’ for the purposes of the respondent’s original status as a ‘high risk offender’ involved procuring a child for sexual activity.[2] Between 7 May 2017 and 24 May 2017, the respondent contacted an undercover police officer who was posing as a 14 year-old girl named Hayley. The communication became sexualised and culminated in an agreement to meet up in person. The respondent was arrested at the meet up location.
[2] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 63B.
On 11 April 2019, the respondent was sentenced by a judge of the District Court for that offending as well as for failing to comply with reporting obligations[3] and a breach of a suspended sentence bond.[4] In respect of the offending, the judge imposed a term of imprisonment of two years, five months and 13 days. The suspended sentence was revoked, leading to a combined effective head sentence of three years, two months and 13 days, backdated to commence on 24 May 2017.
[3] Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA), s 44(1).
[4] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 19AB(1)(a)(i).
The sentencing judge referred to the submission that the offending happened in the aftermath of a relationship break-down. Noting the seriousness of the offending and the fact it was committed during the period of a suspended sentence bond, the judge considered that general and personal deterrence required a custodial sentence to be imposed. As for the respondent’s prospects of rehabilitation, the judge said that:
While I have little information before me to assess your likelihood of re-offending, clearly your offending history means that you are going to require assertive case-management and supervision upon your release.
Supervision orders and further offending
The respondent was eligible for parole on 23 May 2019, but was first released on parole on 13 May 2020.
On 29 July 2020, an interim supervision order was made and the respondent was subject to its conditions as well as parole conditions until 5 August 2020, when the latter expired.
On 2 September 2020, an extended supervision order was made for a period of two years (‘the first ESO’). In connection with that that application, a report was prepared by Dr Nambiar, Clinical Director and Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at Forensic Mental Health Service.
The report details that from an early age the respondent consumed alcohol in large quantities. The respondent’s own assessment was that his major difficulties in life had stemmed from alcohol use. His father died in 2012 and his relationship with his mother had been very difficult. In discussing the circumstances around the 2017 offending with Dr Nambiar, the respondent focused on the breakdown of his relationship with his then-partner prior to the offending.
Dr Nambiar considered that the 2017 offending appeared to be a significant escalation and that if he had not been arrested it was highly likely the respondent would have continued to escalate to the point of contact offending.
Dr Nambiar opined:
As already identified in my risk assessment, Mr Williams has a significant number of risk factors, all of which contribute to a relatively high risk of reoffending without any rehabilitation.
It would appear that Mr Williams is either in complete denial and/or has minimised his actions by externalising and considers himself a victim of various life circumstances. What is quite extraordinary is that Mr Williams seems to apportion a fair degree of blame on alcohol as being the facilitator of his most recent offences. In that context he tries to give the impression he has no memory of the actions that occurred in May of 2017, despite what would have been carefully constructed conversations and plans to eventually meet the intended victim.
I would agree with the assessment made by the clinicians of the Sentence Management Unit that Mr Williams poses a high risk of offending in a sexual manner, should he not receive treatment and rehabilitation.
I would suggest that if Mr Williams has an order placed on him that significant restriction should include a prohibition from accessing the internet through any form of electronic device, referral for ongoing sex offender registration programs, as well as alcohol rehabilitation in order for him to remain abstinent.
Mr Williams would also benefit from ongoing contact with a psychologist in order to develop strategies to cope with stress, including working through grief issues, anger issues and suicidal ideation.
The respondent breached the terms of the first ESO by failing to comply with reporting obligations under it. On 12 May 2022, the Parole Board issued a warrant that he be remanded in custody. He was released on 24 August 2022. In May 2022 he was also charged with failing to comply with reporting obligations associated with his ‘ANCOR registration’. Those charges did not proceed.
An application for a second extended supervision order was made on 29 August 2022. An interim supervision order was made on 31 August 2022 (‘the second ISO’), pending the determination of that application.
Before that application was determined, on 2 March 2023, the Parole Board issued a warrant for the respondent’s arrest under s 15 of the HRO Act. He was taken into custody shortly thereafter.
On 21 March 2023, the Parole Board was satisfied that by reason of his conduct on 2 March 2023 in failing to engage with his treatment program, making death threats to program facilitators and Department of Correctional Services (‘DCS’) staff and threatening to commit suicide, he had breached various conditions of the second ISO.
The Parole Board directed that the respondent was to remain in custody pending an application to the Court for a continuing detention order pursuant to s 18(3) of the HRO Act.
That application came before McIntyre J in April 2023. Her Honour was ultimately satisfied that two conditions of the second ISO had been breached and that the respondent had been ‘uncooperative, belligerent and aggressive towards program facilitators and DCS staff’.[5]
[5] Attorney-General (SA) v Williams [2023] SASC 64 at [9].
The key issue was whether he posed an appreciable risk to the community if he was not detained in custody. In considering that issue, McIntyre J had the benefit of a report by Dr Raeside, a forensic psychiatrist, dated 18 January 2023. As summarised by her Honour:[6]
Dr Raeside considered that as the respondent had not received any treatment, his risk remains unchanged; he is at a high risk of further sexual offending. Dr Raeside therefore supported the application for a further extended supervision order.
Dr Raeside was unable to clearly identify any psychiatric illness. He considered that the respondent had some depressive symptoms likely to amount to an adjustment disorder with depressed and anxious mood. He also appeared to have had an alcohol use disorder in the past but not currently. There was also a history of post-traumatic stress symptoms but no indication of a current post-traumatic stress disorder. The respondent’s history suggested antisocial personality traits if not an antisocial personality disorder. In relation to the question of treatment and rehabilitation, Dr Raeside commented as follows:
Nevertheless, the difficulty relates primarily to assisting Mr Williams to engage in appropriate treatment and rehabilitation that would effectively decrease his risk of further sexual offending. I would suggest a combination of ongoing individual psychological therapy from an appropriate qualified therapist with sexual offenders, as well as further attempts for the Owenia House. Psychological therapy might assist him in this regard.
Additionally, psychological therapy might assist him to look at more adaptive ways of dealing with stress to assist him in his interpersonal relationships that are clearly suffering at present and causing a barrier with Community Corrections.
[6] Attorney-General (SA) v Williams [2023] SASC 64 at [11]-[12].
Her Honour went on to consider the respondent’s submissions in relation to the context in which the breaching behaviour had occurred. Essentially, it was said to have arisen in the context of a breakdown in the relationship with the respondent’s community corrections officer in the context of untimely responses to requests for approval to travel interstate for work.
Having noted the limited rehabilitation options available to and suitable for the respondent in custody, her Honour concluded by observing:[7]
I am not satisfied that the risk posed by the respondent requires him to be detained. He has been resistant to supervision to put it mildly but, whilst he has breached the ISO and the ESO, he has not been convicted of any further offending since 2 September 2020. In particular, he has not committed any further acts of sexual offending. Whilst the threats by the respondent towards DCS and other rehabilitation providers are unacceptable and inappropriate, they have not resulted in charges. This suggests, consistent with the assessments referred to above, that the threats were viewed in the context of the respondent’s psychological condition to be “sounding off” rather than serious threats to kill or self-harm. There is no suggestion that the respondent’s conduct went beyond the making of threats. There is further no suggestion that he has been abusing alcohol which Dr Nambiar considered to be a factor in his offending.
The terms of the ISO enable the Community Corrections Officer to direct the respondent to attend, amongst other things, psychological and psychiatric treatment, counselling, and therapy programs. It is therefore open to the respondent’s Corrections Officers to direct him to attend psychological counselling of the type recommended and subsequently to direct him to attend a program such as the Owenia House program. If the respondent is so directed and does not participate, it is likely that he will find himself the subject of a further referral by the Parole Board. Having been in custody since 3 March 2023 for his failure to comply with the conditions of his ISO, the respondent can be under no illusion as to the consequences of non-compliance.
Accordingly, I decline to make an order for continuing detention. I will hear the parties as to whether it is appropriate to consider the variation of any of the terms of the ISO or the addition of other terms.
[7] Attorney-General (SA) v Williams [2023] SASC 64 at [28]-[30].
At a subsequent hearing before McIntyre J concerning whether a second extended supervision order should be made, Dr Raeside gave oral evidence. As her Honour’s reasons in relation to that issue record:[8]
He drew a distinction between static risk factors such as age, gender, past offending history, personal history and dynamic risk factors. Dr Raeside said that whilst it is not possible to alter the respondent’s static risk factors, participation in rehabilitation programs would aim to address dynamic risk factors such as the respondent’s mode of thinking and maladaptive behaviours. Dr Raeside conceded that, due to his static risk factors, the respondent was always going to remain a risk to the safety to the community given his history stating:
In practical terms, it’s very difficult for someone with Mr Williams’ history probably to ever satisfy that his risk is low.
[8] Attorney-General (SA) v Williams (No 2) [2023] SASC 119 at [8] (references omitted).
Her Honour heard evidence from the past DCS case manager (whose evidence tended to confirm that the difficulty in their relationship was in part driven by the respondent’s financial situation and his desire to travel interstate for work) and from the then-current DCS manager, with whom a positive relationship had been established. It was noted that the respondent had resumed psychology sessions which were preparatory to group sessions and potentially, the Owenia House Sexual Behaviour Clinic program (‘SBC’), as recommended by Dr Nambiar and Dr Raeside.
In reaching a conclusion that a further extended supervision order (‘second ESO’) should be made, her Honour said:[9]
[9] Attorney-General (SA) v Williams (No 2) [2023] SASC 119 at [20]-[28] (references omitted).
Dr Nambiar’s opinion is that without appropriate treatment and rehabilitation the respondent’s risk to the community is high. Dr Raeside concurs and says that the respondent’s risk remains unchanged from the time the original ESO was imposed on 2 September 2020.
I accept the respondent’s submission there are problems inherent in relying solely on a prescribed health professional’s determination of risk for the reasons set out in the respondent’s submission. The respondent refers to the decision in R v Wichens concerning the qualified medical practitioners’ determination of risk under s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 where Kourakis CJ stated that:
I doubt that there is any accepted area of expertise in predicting the likelihood that a particular offender in particular circumstances will reoffend. I accept of course that epidemiologically there are clearly identified risk factors and relatively well refined psychological tools for risk assessments generally.
Under s 7(6) of the HRO Act the Court is required to take the report of any prescribed health professional furnished to the Court into consideration when determining whether to make an ESO. I place considerable weight upon the opinions Dr Nambiar and Dr Raeside, but their opinions and concerns are but one factor that the Court must take into account. As Kourakis CJ said in Wichens:
… the ultimate decision rests with the judge hearing the application who must make an evaluative judgment based on the evidence and institutional and personal judicial experience.
The reports of the Parole Board and the material from DCS indicate that the respondent failed to comply with reporting obligations under his ESO and those associated with his ANCOR registration, he was belligerent and abusive towards program facilitators and DCS staff and has not engaged in recommended rehabilitation for the reasons outlined in my previous decision. DCS considers that the respondent remains “a large risk” to the community in the absence of treatment and rehabilitation.
I accept that the respondent has not offended in any significant way since the imposition of the first ESO. I also accept that the respondent did not breach either his parole conditions or his ESO from the date of his release, 13 May 2020, until 12 May 2022 when, due to the breakdown in his relationship with his DCS case manager, he failed to report for supervision. Further, the respondent’s commitment to self-employment is commendable as is the fact that he has abstained from alcohol since he was taken into custody in May 2017. These are very positive factors pointing towards a reduction in the respondent’s level of risk.
Whilst I accept the respondent’s submission that his risk of reoffending is never likely to be reduced to low given his static risk factors, I am concerned, due to a combination of factors, the respondent has received limited treatment and rehabilitation to address his dynamic risk factors. Dr Raeside says, and I accept, that addressing those factors will reduce the respondent’s relative risk.
SBC has been identified by DCS and the Parole Board as an appropriate form of rehabilitation and treatment to address the respondent’s risk of sexual reoffending. Dr Nambiar and Dr Raeside agree. The respondent has shown an unwillingness to undertake that program. I accept that his unwillingness is, at least in part, due to the effects of past trauma and the fact that the SBC includes a requirement to participate in group sessions. I do not accept that this precludes the respondent from meaningful participation in the SBC. Dr Raeside identified the need for the respondent to access professional assistance to deal with his anxiety in order participate in group therapy of the type included in the SBC. He is now attending private therapy sessions with Mr Fallo although the evidence is not clear as to the content of those sessions. The evidence suggests however that such therapy is capable of assisting and encouraging the respondent’s participation in the SBC. Further, once in the SBC, the respondent will receive one on one counselling in addition to group sessions
I do not accept the respondent’s submission that the benefits of participating in the SBC are general in nature and could be provided by other intervention programs. The SBC is directed to addressing sexual offending such as that perpetrated by the respondent; it is a long established and well-regarded program. Further, whilst I note the reference to “other intervention programs” none have been identified by the respondent. The respondent further submits that participation in the SBC is not helpful because it will not address static risk factors. Whilst this may be so, it is clear from the evidence of Dr Raeside that the program will address the respondent’s dynamic risk factors such as the minimisation of his offending behaviour, his maladaptive behaviours, and his mode of thinking. I am satisfied that SBC is an appropriate program for the respondent to undertake once he has received appropriate assistance to enable him to engage with the program. In my view, it is important that efforts be made to address any impediments to the respondent’s participation in the SBC as soon as possible noting that the SBC runs for 12 to 15 months.
I am satisfied that the respondent poses an appreciable risk to the community based upon his history, the reports of Dr Nambiar and Dr Raeside and, the material from the Parole Board and DCS. I am further satisfied that it is appropriate to order that the respondent be subject to a further ESO in particular given the lack of progress made under the first ESO towards providing treatment and rehabilitation to reduce his risk of reoffending.

The second ESO was ultimately made on 6 September 2023, but was varied on 24 July 2025. Shortly following the making of the order, the respondent on three occasions failed to comply with his reporting obligations after interactions with a child within two days of those interactions, thus contravening s 44(1a) of the CSORA.
The circumstances of the reportable contacts were that in November 2023, a woman contacted the respondent via ‘AirTasker’ to perform labouring work. On 17 November 2023, the respondent attended her home to deliver a television intended for one of her children. During that visit he had reportable contact with a 15 year old child which he failed to report. On 28 November 2023, he attended the woman’s home for dinner and had a reportable contact with the woman’s 13 year old child which he failed to report. Then, on 30 March 2024, he took that child with him in a motor vehicle whilst he ran an errand for about 15 minutes, but failed to report this.
The respondent was charged in respect of these offences and was in custody from 14 June 2024 until 15 November 2024, and was thereafter on home detention bail until he was sentenced on 19 March 2025.
Whilst awaiting sentencing, the Parole Board exercised its power under s 11 of the HRO Act to subject the respondent to an intensive supervision regime with electronic monitoring.
In sentencing the respondent, the magistrate did not find that these interactions involved any indecent or inappropriate intent on the respondent’s part. The magistrate emphasised, however, that the reporting obligations serve an important purpose and rely on trust and disclosure on the part of the individual.
The magistrate considered that it was necessary to fix a penalty that acted as a general and specific deterrent. The magistrate employed s 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) to impose a single penalty of six months and nine days (reduced from seven months by reason of the guilty plea), which he then reduced by a further month to account for the home detention bail conditions to which the respondent had recently been subject. The sentence was to operate from 14 June 2024, meaning it had been wholly served by the time of sentencing.
On 26 May 2025, the respondent made application to this Court to remove the electronic monitoring condition imposed by the Parole Board. The application was heard by Bampton J, who was provided with a Post-Treatment Report dated 28 May 2025. That report was prepared by Mr Norton, Acting Manager of Rehabilitation Programs at DCS.
On the present application, Mr Norton’s Pre-Treatment Report of 22 April 2024 was also in evidence. It provides context for the later report.
The Pre-Treatment Report detailed some of the difficulties previously encountered in assisting the respondent with treatment to develop distress tolerance skills so as to allow him to engage with the Owenia House SBC program. It explained that commencing in November 2023, the respondent had participated in seven individual treatment sessions with Mr Norton.
Mr Norton explained that he undertook a risk of re-offending assessment of the respondent in January 2024 and that having regard to the combined static and dynamic variables from the Violence Risk Scale – Sexual Offence version (‘VRS-SO’), the respondent’s risk of sexual re-offending was estimated to be well above the average range and to have a predicted recidivism of 31.2% over five years in comparison to a normative sample for the tool and offence type. In terms of DCS’s operational risk language, this was equivalent to a high risk of sexual re-offending should he not receive treatment.
Mr Norton’s working hypothesis at the time of the Pre-Treatment Report was that the respondent’s sexual offences were linked to his use of sex and alcohol to manage emotional states. Mr Norton wrote that:
His sexual preference appeared to be adult women but when he was living a lifestyle that was dominated by alcohol and isolation, Mr Williams appeared to engage in sexual behaviour indiscriminately and disregarded whether this behaviour was legal or consensual, including acting on a sexual attraction towards children. It was opined that if Mr Williams returned to using alcohol and sex to cope with uncomfortable emotional states, his risk of sexual offending would increase.
Mr Williams evidenced protective factors in the community which included his work ethic and reported motivation to abstain from alcohol and crime to avoid reimprisonment.
Following the assessment, Mr Williams was considered to have the following treatment needs and risk factors to be addressed through individual treatment: further investigation into the factors that led to the sexual offences including the presence of planning and of deviant sexual thoughts, the development of strategies to manage risk related thoughts and emotions, alcohol use, emotional management and the use of cognitive distortions.
The respondent engaged in individual sexual offence treatment on a continuing basis with Mr Norton until 5 May 2025, save for the period between June and mid-November 2024 when the respondent was incarcerated. The respondent attended 22 individual treatment sessions.
In the course of the Post-Treatment Report, Mr Norton detailed the respondent’s tendency to externalise blame for adversarial relationships he developed with corrections staff. Mr Norton revised his previous working hypothesis and expressed the following conclusions:
5.     Formulation
…
An updated formulation to further understand Mr Williams sexual offending was limited as he remained mostly unwilling or unable to explore the specific precipitants or maintaining factors related to his sexual offences.
Mr Williams reported that his parents separated when he was approximately five years old and that he primarily lived with his mother. He described an unhappy childhood, during which he did not feel loved or wanted and experienced physical and verbal abuse from his mother. Mr Williams recalled always feeling as though he was ‘walking on eggshells’ and began running away from home at the age of 12, leaving home permanently at 16. It was opined that those experiences eroded Mr Williams sense of safety and contributed to the development of attitudes that life is unpredictable and that trusting others ultimately led to disappointment.
Mr Williams reported sporadic contact with his father during childhood but noted that he developed a close relationship with him after he left home at age 16. He stated that following his father’s death in 2012, he attempted to manage his grief through heavy alcohol consumption. Mr Williams indicated that both of his sexual offences occurred while he was under the influence of alcohol.
It was opined that Mr Williams did not develop functional emotional regulation skills during childhood, instead adopting either an avoidant interpersonal style or, alternatively, an aggressive approach to interpersonal conflict. Those dysfunctional strategies were posited as attempts to protect himself from perceived threats such as rejection or disappointment by others. Mr Williams acknowledged that he often held a rigid black and white view of people and preferred to live in isolation as a means of avoiding others.
It was hypothesised that Mr Williams sexual offences were linked to his use of sex and alcohol as a coping mechanism for managing emotional states. It was apparent that he had historically had a sexual preference for adult women; however, his offences suggest that during periods when his lifestyle was dominated by alcohol use and social isolation, Mr Williams engaged in sexual behaviours indiscriminately, disregarding the legality of those actions, including acting on a sexual attraction towards children. It was opined that a return to using alcohol and sex to manage uncomfortable emotional states would increase Mr Williams risk of sexual offending.
Mr Williams evidenced protective factors in the community which included his motivation to abstain from alcohol and crime to avoid reimprisonment.
6.     Post-program assessment information
Following treatment, Mr Williams risk of sexual reoffending was re-assessed using the Violence Risk Scale – Sexual Offence Version (VRS-SO) (Wong, Olver, Nicholaichuk & Gordon, 2017), Mr Williams risk of sexual re-offending was estimated to be in the well above average range and to have a predicted sexual recidivism of 42% over five years in comparison to the normative sample for this tool and offence type. Under the Department’s operational risk language, this is equivalent to a high risk of sexual re-offending.
While Mr Williams did not appear to have moved on his dynamic risk factors, it was possible that he had made more changes than had been reported, but it was not possible to assess those changes due to his lack of transparency.
Mr Williams currently appears to have several lifestyle factors similar to those present at the time of his offending, including social isolation, victim mentality, and poor mental health. Specific thoughts, emotions, or other factors contributing to his offending remain unknown, as Mr Williams was unwilling or unable to recall details of the offences. Aside from the possibility of Mr Williams returning to his previous lifestyle involving frequent alcohol intoxication, no other clear risk factors have been identified.
7.     Recommendations
The following recommendations were made to enhance Mr Williams ability to maintain a pro-social offence-free lifestyle.
Community-based recommendations:
▪    Mr Williams CCO to encourage Mr Williams to apply for a Mental Health Care Plan via his General Practitioner.
▪    Mr Williams CCO assist him to identify and implement emotion regulation strategies to manage feelings of vulnerability, depression, or stress.
▪    Mr Williams continue to be supported in identifying, monitoring, challenging, and modifying unhelpful thinking patterns, to enhance his capacity to respond to high-risk situations in more pro-social ways and develop greater insight into his own risk factors.
▪    That Mr Williams’ CCO monitor his compliance of his ESO and ANCOR conditions. That recommendation could be achieved, in part, through regular communication between Mr Williams’ CCO and relevant ANCOR police officers.
▪    That his CCO engages in discussions regarding internet access and associated risks.
▪    That Mr Williams’ CCO engages in discussions regarding his sexual attraction and behaviour.
▪    That Mr Williams be encouraged to develop opportunities for making pro-social friendships and networks.
8.     Legislative considerations
In preparing this post-treatment report, consideration has been given to legislation under the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 Extended Supervision Order (ESO), and to legislation under Section 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017.
Mr Williams was currently subject to an Extended Supervision Order (ESO). Supervision should focus on the recommendations outlined above, with particular emphasis on developing a therapeutic alliance to facilitate Mr Williams’ willingness to discuss relevant risk factors.
Regarding S57 legislation, while Mr Williams often presented as a challenging individual to supervise and was largely unwilling or unable to discuss details of his sexual offending, there was no specific evidence to suggest that he was unwilling or incapable of controlling his sexual instincts. The writer does not recommend that the Serious Offender Committee pursue further investigation or application of the current legislation currently.
Shortly after this report was prepared, on 2 June 2025, an ESO Progress Report was authored by Jesse Liguoro (Community Corrections Officer) and Jeremy Rowlands (Area Manager, Port Adelaide Community Correctional Centre). The authors noted that whilst there were outstanding social re-integration treatment needs, the respondent had fulfilled his obligations in addressing his sexual offending through engagement with the Rehabilitation Programs Branch. They also noted that the respondent’s substance use needs appeared to have been addressed through consistent negative results through regular drug and alcohol testing procedures.
The authors went on to opine that:
Mr Williams cannot adequately address his mental and physical health sufficiently until he addresses his responsivity factors, namely finances, structured days and electronic monitoring.
They said that whilst the respondent was challenging to supervise and was largely unwilling and unable to discuss the details of his sexual offending, there was no evidence to suggest he was incapable of controlling his sexual instincts. The authors concluded by stating that a further extended supervision order was not supported.
In considering the application to remove the electronic monitoring condition, Bampton J was informed of the view of a specialist clinician within the Sentence Management Unit that the respondent had been compliant with electronic monitoring conditions and that his current conditions had contributed to his financial concerns and had an impact on his overall mental health. The clinician also noted that the respondent’s most successful period under DCS supervision occurred when he was not electronically monitored and was able to move more freely, although he did offend during that period. The clinician indicated that despite his ongoing angry and aggressive presentation and generally poor attitude, DCS would support the removal of electronic monitoring.
By letter dated 16 June 2025, the Presiding Member of the Parole Board expressed a contrary view. That is to say, the Parole Board supported the continuation of electronic monitoring.
Bampton J considered that the respondent’s completion of individual sexual offence treatment amounted to a material change in circumstances enlivening the Court’s powers to vary the second ESO. Her Honour noted that the removal of electronic monitoring would not leave him unsupervised. Having considered the materials before her, she was satisfied that condition should be removed, concluding:[10]
Noting the [Attorney-General] has foreshadowed a further ESO, it is my view that Mr Williams, in circumstances where those who supervise him support it, should be given an opportunity to demonstrate that he can continue to comply with progressively less stringent conditions and improve his attitude and response to those supervising him, with a view to him being reintegrated into the community without supervision.
[10] Reasons for the Orders of the Honourable Justice Bampton, 24 July 2025 at [15].
Third application for extended supervision order
In support of a third extended supervision order, the Attorney-General tendered three affidavits[11] which included the material I have summarised above, together with:
·an email from a DCS clinician which clarified that, notwithstanding the views expressed in the Post-Treatment Report and the ESO Progress Report, the Serious Offender Committee recommended to the Attorney-General that a further order be sought on the existing conditions on the basis that the respondent continues to have a treatment need in relation to his risk of sexual re-offending, and that he would need to obtain a mental health care plan in order to access subsidised psychology sessions to continue to address that need;
·a letter from the Presiding Member of the Parole Board dated 30 July 2025 which supports a further extended supervision order ‘for a period of at least three years’ and subject to electronic monitoring ‘until such time as he undertakes the necessary treatment to reduce his risk’.
[11] FDN2, FDN4 and FDN8.
The letter from the Presiding Member states, amongst other things:
Mr Williams is a convicted child sex offender with a serious substance abuse problem.
He also has a history of abusive and argumentative behaviour towards institutional staff and community corrections staff. He has breached his Australian National Child Offender Register (ANCOR) conditions on a number of occasions.
As recently as March 2023, he made extreme and violent threats towards his Offending Aid and Rehabilitation Service (OARS) worker and his Community Corrections Officer, which threats included death threats.
…
Given his struggle to comply with his current Extended Supervision Order, the Parole Board is concerned that the Court has [seen] fit to reduce his electronic monitoring condition, particularly, as he has not yet undertaken the necessary intervention due to his refusal.
In respect of the respondent’s substance abuse issues, it is appropriate to observe that the respondent has, since 2017, returned 70 negative urinalysis results and 11 negative breath tests with no positive results ever being recorded.
Before turning to the parties’ submissions, I briefly address the statutory framework within which the application for a third interim supervision order is to be considered.
Interim supervision orders
The object of the HRO Act is set out in s 3. It is to provide the means to protect the community from being exposed to an appreciable risk of harm posed by various serious offenders.
Section 9(1) of the HRO Act empowers the Supreme Court to make an interim supervision order in relation to a high risk offender if an application has been made for an extended supervision order and the Court is satisfied that the ‘relevant expiry date’ is likely to occur before the application is determined or has already occurred and that ‘the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order’.
The Court cannot determine the application for an extended supervision order unless it has directed that one or more prescribed health professionals examine the respondent and report to the Court on the results of the examination, including, in the case of a serious sexual offender, an assessment of the likelihood of the respondent committing a further serious sexual offence.[12] The report, once furnished, must be considered in determining whether to make an extended supervision order.[13]
[12] HRO Act, s 7(3).
[13] HRO Act, s 7(6)(b).
Reports of that kind take some time to be prepared. An interim supervision order is, as its name suggests, designed to operate on an interim basis until the application for an extended supervision order is able to be determined.[14] The interim order remains in effect until that occurs.[15]
[14] Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery [2018] SASC 1 at [3] (Hinton J).
[15] HRO Act, s 9(2).
Section 7(4) provides that the Court may make an extended supervision order if satisfied of two jurisdictional facts:[16] first, that the respondent is a ‘high risk offender’; and, secondly, that the respondent ‘poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under the order’.
[16] Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107 at [16] (Livesey J), Attorney-General (SA) v Gillard [2022] SASC 104 at [4] (Kimber J).
An ‘appreciable risk’ is one that is capable of being estimated, perceptible and sensible. It is anticipatory but not purely speculative. It is founded in some evidence that provides a substantive basis for an apprehension that the respondent might conduct himself in the future in a manner that poses a risk to the safety of the community.[17] The concept of an ‘appreciable risk’ is deployed later in the HRO Act as the touchstone for the imposition of a continuing detention order.[18]
[17] Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49 at [20] (Stanley J).
[18] HRO Act, s 18(2)(b). Where a person the subject of an order under s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) demonstrates that by reason of their advanced age or permanent infirmity, they no longer present an ‘appreciable risk to the safety of the community’, this enlivens a power in the Court to discharge the order or release the person on licence: ss 58 and 59 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA).
For the purposes of an extended supervision order, the appreciable risk is one that must be posed by the respondent ‘if they are not supervised by an extended supervision order’. Accordingly, if there are other protections applicable to the respondent which, on a stable and continuing basis,[19] sufficiently mitigate what might otherwise be an appreciable risk, the jurisdictional criterion may not be satisfied.[20]
[19] cf. Attorney-General (SA) v McCann [2023] SASC 5 at [53] (McDonald J).
[20] Attorney-General (SA) v Karpany [2020] SASC 219 at [19] (Livesey J).

If there is an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if the respondent is not supervised under an order, the Court must decide whether to make the order. Whilst satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements in s 7(4)(a) and (b) will often warrant the Court making the order and fashioning conditions intended to achieve the Act’s object as set out in s 3, there remains a discretion to be exercised.[21] The Attorney-General carries the onus in establishing both the jurisdictional requirements and the appropriateness of the exercise of the power.[22]
[21] Attorney-General (SA) v Wells [2017] SASC 149 at [8] (Hinton J), Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107 at [15]-[16] (Livesey J), Attorney-General (SA) v Humes [2020] SASC 123 at [51] (Livesey J).
[22] Attorney-General (SA) v Wells [2017] SASC 149 at [9] (Hinton J), Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107 at [16] (Livesey J).
In determining whether to make the order, the Court must have regard to the matters in s 7(6), but s 7(5) requires that ‘the paramount consideration in determining whether to make an extended supervision order must be the safety of the community’.[23] A paramount consideration is not, however, always a conclusive consideration.[24]
[23] In Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49 at [29], Stanley J said that the extent of the appreciable risk is informed by the consideration that in determining whether to make an extended supervision order the safety of the community is paramount. In my respectful view, it is unclear that the observation was intended to suggest that s 7(5) directly informs the content of ‘appreciable risk’ in s 7(4)(b), as distinct from whether the appreciable risk in a particular case warrants the making of an order: cf. Attorney-General (SA) v Fenner [2020] SASC 107 at [19] (Livesey J). The manner in which s 7(5) is expressed suggests to me that it is germane to the weighing of competing considerations in the exercise of a discretion, rather than to ascertaining the content of an objective (albeit imprecise) standard.
[24] Attorney-General (SA) v Tipping [2019] SASC 7 at [8] (Kourakis CJ). See, in the context of the former provisions concerning indefinite detention under the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), the observations in R v Schuster (2016) 125 SASR 388 at [80] (Kourakis CJ, Blue and Doyle JJ), R v Humphrys [2018] SASCFC 69 at [15] (Kourakis CJ, Vanstone and Nicholson JJ agreeing).
The matters identified in s 7(6) may inform both the jurisdictional requirements in s 7(4) and the exercise of the discretion conferred by that sub-section. They are:
(a)the likelihood of the respondent committing offences of a kind assessed under subsection (3)(a), (b), (c) or (d) (as the case may be) if not supervised under the order;
(b)the reports of any prescribed health professional (as directed under subsection (3)) furnished to the Court;
(c)any report prepared by the Parole Board under section 64(5) of the Correctional Services Act 1982;
(d)any report required by the Court under section 20 (including the results of any statistical or other assessment furnished to the Court as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the respondent committing a further relevant offence);
(e)any relevant evidence or representations that the respondent may desire to put to the Court;
(f)any treatment or rehabilitation program in which the respondent has had an opportunity to participate, including his or her willingness to so participate and the extent of such participation;
(g)in the case of a respondent released on parole—the extent to which he or she has complied with the conditions of his or her release on parole;
(h)in the case of a respondent subject to an existing extended supervision order—the extent to which he or she has complied with the terms of the order;
(i)in the case of a respondent who is a registrable offender (within the meaning of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006)—the extent to which he or she has complied with any obligations under that Act;
(j)the circumstances and seriousness of any offence in respect of which the respondent has been found guilty according to his or her criminal history, and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history;
(k)any remarks made by the sentencing court in passing sentence;
(l)any other matter that the Court thinks relevant.
Returning to the making of an interim order pursuant to s 9(1), the Court must consider whether the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.
There must be some limit upon the ‘matters alleged in the material supporting the application’ that are to be posited as proved,[25] but it is not necessary to explore or resolve that question in the present case.
[25] See, eg, State of New South Wales v Elomar (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1034 at [10] (Rothman J).
In my view, in assessing whether the relevant ‘matters alleged’ would, if proved, ‘justify the making of an extended supervision order’, it is appropriate to focus upon whether they would satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for the exercise of the power to make such an order.[26] As observed, ordinarily, demonstration of the jurisdictional requirements will go some distance towards demonstrating that it is appropriate to make an extended supervision order, but other considerations will also need to be brought to bear.
[26] cf. Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49 at [30] (Stanley J).
It would be surprising if the legislature expected a Court – in the circumstances in which an interim order will usually fall to be considered and without the benefit of the mandatory report of a prescribed health professional – to form a predictive conclusion as to the ultimate exercise of the discretion. Had such an approach been intended, s 9(1)(b) could have been framed in terms that empower the making of an interim order where the relevant matters would, if proved, require (or demand) the making of an extended supervision order.
In a case like the present, where there is no doubt that the respondent is a high risk offender, the power to grant an interim supervision order is enlivened where the relevant material, if proved, would demonstrate that the respondent poses an appreciable risk to community safety if they are not supervised. It is that conclusion which, if ultimately proved, would justify the Court in making an extended supervision order, albeit the Court will still need to consider whether, in the exercise of its discretion, it should do so.
Of course, s 9(1) itself confers a discretion upon the Court. The factors that weigh in the exercise of that discretion may be slightly different to those that attend the ultimate decision whether to impose an extended supervision order. The relatively shorter period over which the interim order will operate is such that where the Court is satisfied of the criteria in s 9(1)(a) and (b), it may only be in rare circumstances that the interim order would not be made.
That said, it is possible to imagine cases where the short period may militate in favour of providing the respondent with an opportunity, prior to the determination of the extended supervision order, to demonstrate pro-social and compliant behaviour. That may particularly be the case if there is some reason to doubt the cogency of the material which s 9(1) requires be taken to be proved for the purpose of assessing whether there is an appreciable risk.
The submissions
The applicant submitted that:
·whilst it was acknowledged that continued supervision is taxing upon the respondent, and that he has difficult and sympathetic personal circumstances, the Court should find that the s 9(1) criteria are established;
·the Parole Board supports a further extended supervision order;
·there is a clear need for the respondent to address his risk of sexual re-offending and mental health in order to mitigate the risk he poses to the safety of the community;
·there is also a clear need for the respondent to be monitored in the community so that his risk of sexual offending can be monitored and if there is a decline in his mental health, or he resumes alcohol use, measures can be taken to address these issues to prevent him from posing a risk to the safety of the community.
As to the question of appreciable risk, the applicant emphasises that notwithstanding the concluding recommendation (or non-recommendation) in his Post-Treatment Report, Mr Norton’s assessment was that the applicant posed a high risk of sexual re-offending if not supervised and had outstanding treatment needs. He had observed that the respondent’s lack of transparency made it difficult to assess whether, despite his assessed risk, he may have ‘moved on his dynamic risk factors’. The applicant submitted that notwithstanding the respondent’s engagement in individual treatment, the respondent still had some way to go.
In the applicant’s submission, a further period of supervision would allow the respondent to engage in therapy to reduce his victim blaming and aggressive nature.
The respondent’s counsel emphasised that:
·whilst the respondent had a relationship breakdown with one of his community corrections officers, he had otherwise reacted positively to his release from custody and had endeavoured to secure employment;
·the reporting obligation breaches, whilst serious and concerning (as recognised by the sentencing magistrate), did not involve nefarious conduct which suggested an increased risk of sexual offending. He has not committed a sexual offence in the several years during which he has been in the community and subject to supervision;
·the opinion expressed by the Parole Board was based on limited interactions with the respondent;
·the respondent had been assessed in 2020 at Owenia House as having an ‘average risk of sexual offending’ (VRS-SO);
·Dr Raeside’s evidence at an earlier hearing had been that the SBC program would not change the static risk factors for the respondent, and Dr Raeside had acknowledged in his evidence that the respondent did not have a long history of sexual offending and was not on the ‘more serious side of the scale like many people that come before the courts’;
·Dr Raeside had also acknowledged that if the respondent was gainfully employed, content, happy and feeling that everything was going well in his life, his risk to the community would be decreased;
·the respondent attended his 22 individual treatment sessions punctually;
·the respondent has returned a large number of negative urinalysis results and breath tests, indicating he has addressed one of his criminogenic factors;
·during the period of home detention, the respondent had been compliant with all pass out requests;
·the ESO Progress Report had not recommended or supported a further extended supervision order.
The respondent’s counsel submitted that it is appropriate to allow the respondent an opportunity to re-establish himself financially in the community without the obligations and limitations imposed by an interim order, and thereby to demonstrate that a further extended supervision order would lack utility and be an unjustifiable interference with his liberty.
The respondent also emphasised that even without an interim supervision order in place, he will still be subject to ANCOR reporting obligations.
By way of reply submissions, the applicant submitted that the lack of sexual offending in the recent past needed to be viewed in the context that the respondent had been subject to supervision. That is true but it reflects a recurring conundrum that arises when a person is not given an opportunity to demonstrate compliant behaviour on an unsupervised basis.
Consideration
The respondent’s circumstances are difficult and unfortunate. On the one hand, there is much that may be able to be said against the imposition of a third extended supervision order in due course. The respondent has remained abstinent from alcohol and has participated in significant individual counselling. He has not committed any sexual offending in the period he has been under supervision. It is also arguable that fewer restrictions may assist the respondent in pursuing employment and social re-integration, which will be important for his further rehabilitation.
However, focusing upon whether, on the basis required by s 9(1), there is an appreciable risk of offending absent supervision such as would justify the imposition of an extended supervision order, the material before me suggests an affirmative answer.
Dr Nambiar’s opinion was that the May 2017 offending, committed whilst the respondent was subject to a suspended sentence bond in relation to possession of child exploitation material, represented a worrying escalation. That seems self-evidently true. Those who have assessed the respondent have expressed a concern about the respondent’s tendency to externalise blame and decline to face up to the sexual misconduct by disclaiming a clear memory due to alcohol use. It is difficult to be confident, in those circumstances, that abstinence from alcohol is truly indicative of a reduction in criminogenic factors. Mr Norton’s opinion was that the respondent’s lack of transparency makes it difficult to know whether he has made more progress than his most recent risk assessment suggests.
The respondent’s conduct in March 2023, November 2023 and March 2024, whilst not involving sexual misconduct, involved non-compliant and maladaptive behaviour of a kind that remains troubling given the respondent’s demonstrated reluctance to be open and transparent about the circumstances of his earlier sexual offending.
I consider that the requirements for the imposition of an interim supervision order are satisfied. On the basis required by s 9(1), the material supporting the application discloses a risk of re-offending and therefore a risk to the safety of the community that is perceptible and non-speculative and which would justify a further extended supervision order in the relevant sense.
That is not to say that an extended supervision order is inevitable. The s 7(3) report that has been ordered will, in my view, be important in ascertaining whether the respondent has made more progress in reducing his dynamic risk factors than those who have assessed the respondent have felt able to assess. Further evidence and argument will elucidate whether the respondent’s ongoing treatment needs demand a further period of supervision or whether, on the contrary, given his particular personality, his prospects of avoiding re-offending would be the same, or perhaps even enhanced, if unsupervised.
Whilst I have considered whether, in the exercise of discretion, I should decline to make an interim supervision order, I have decided that the order should be made. I do no think that an interim order would so impede the respondent’s prospects of demonstrating a reduced risk that it outweighs the risk to community safety that would be entailed by ceasing supervision at this stage, although I recognise that the continuing ANCOR reporting obligations provide a level of risk mitigation in their own right. The respondent’s relatively recent failure to comply with those obligations decreases the confidence that might otherwise be taken from that regime.
It will be a matter for the judge tasked with deciding whether an extended supervision order should be imposed to assess whether continuing interference with the respondent’s liberty is justified having regard to the ongoing risk that he poses and in light of the paramount consideration in s 7(5), but it may be hoped that the respondent will take what steps he can take in the intervening period to pursue the strategies recommended by Mr Norton (and set out earlier in these reasons), so that any progress he may have made (or may make) will be manifest when the time comes for it to be assessed.
I will hear the parties as to the precise terms of the interim supervision order to be imposed. I make clear, however, that it will not include electronic monitoring. The reasons given by Bampton J for removing that condition remain persuasive. He has been compliant with his conditions in the intervening period.