Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 31 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 40

File number: NSD 784 of 2020
Judgment of: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 29 January 2021 
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of decision to refuse application for an act of grace payment under s 65(1) of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) – where act of grace payment sought for the purpose of satisfying legal fees incurred in litigation relating to alleged conduct by a member of the Parliament of Australia – where previous litigation discontinued before trial by the applicant due to purported financial pressure – where the Member of Parliament was granted an act of grace payment in relation to his legal fees – whether there was an error by the delegate of the Minister in failing to assess the claim in support of the act of grace application that the applicant was a whistle-blower, alternatively that this claim was not assessed to the requisite level of detail – whether the delegate’s finding that there was no basis for an argument that the previous act of grace payment to a litigant had an influence over the litigation was irrational – whether the delegate failed to have regard to relevant evidence that the proceeding was not highly politicised – whether there was any error in the delegation rendering the decision-making power of the delegate void – held: the delegate did not fail to assess the whistle-blower claims made by the applicant and was not required to give further or better consideration to these claims – the delegate’s finding that the act of grace payment made to the Member of Parliament did not influence the litigation was not irrational and was not outside of the exercise of their jurisdiction – there was no failure to deal with evidence relating to the claims that the proceeding was highly politicised – the applicant’s construction of the delegation power was not sensible or pragmatic and the conduct of the delegate in this case was clearly contemplated by the delegation’s authorising Act – application dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 16)

Fair Work Act2009 (Cth)

Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33

Secretary of the Department of Finance (Cth), Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Finance Secretary to Finance Officials) Delegation 2020 (No 1) (22 January 2020) sch 1A pt 11

Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) ss 65(1), 107, 109

Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (Cth) s 24

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1411; 209 FCR 65

Ashby v Slipper (No 3) [2015] FCAFC 9; 317 ALR 623

Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15; 219 FCR 322

Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd v GPT Re Ltd [2007] NSWCA 171; 153 LGERA 450

Croker v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FCA 40
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Mr. Ashby, a former parliamentary employee, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Finance to deny his application for an act of grace payment under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). Mr. Ashby sought the payment to cover legal fees incurred from litigation he had brought against a Member of Parliament and the Commonwealth. The court was required to determine whether there were any errors in the delegate's assessment of Mr. Ashby's claims that he was a whistleblower or that his claims were not evaluated with sufficient detail, whether the delegate's conclusion that an act of grace payment to the Member of Parliament did not influence Mr. Ashby's litigation was irrational, and if the delegate failed to consider relevant evidence that the proceedings were not highly politicised. The court also considered whether there was any error in the delegation rendering the decision-making power of the delegate void.

The court found that the delegate did not fail to assess Mr. Ashby's claims that he was a whistleblower, nor was the delegate required to give further or better consideration to these claims. The court held that the delegate's finding that the act of grace payment made to the Member of Parliament did not influence the litigation was not irrational and was within the exercise of their jurisdiction. The court further found that there was no failure to deal with evidence relating to the claims that the proceedings were highly politicised. The applicant's interpretation of the delegation power was not sensible or pragmatic, and the conduct of the delegate in this case was clearly contemplated by the delegation's authorising Act.

The court dismissed the application with costs. The claims made by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application, insofar as they were reflected in grounds 1, 3, and 4 of the amended statement of grounds of judicial review, were dismissed. The question of costs of and incidental to the above claims and grounds was reserved. The parties were directed to confer and within 14 days, or such longer time as may be allowed, email the associate to Justice Bromwich agreed or competing draft procedural orders for the hearing and determination of the remaining parts of the applicant's case. In the event that there were any outstanding procedural issues which required an in-court adjudication, the balance of the applicant's case was to be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be fixed in February 2021 in consultation with the parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The claims made by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application dated 17 July 2020, insofar as they are reflected in grounds 1, 3 and 4 of the amended statement of grounds of judicial review dated 7 October 2020, be dismissed.

2. The question of costs of and incidental to the above claims and grounds be reserved.

3. The parties confer and within 14 days, or such longer time as may be allowed, email the associate to Justice Bromwich agreed or competing draft procedural orders for the hearing and determination of the remaining parts of the applicant’s case, being:

(a) any part of the claims made by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application dated 17 July 2020, to the extent they remain in ground 2 of the amended statement of grounds of judicial review dated 7 October 2020; and

(b) the claims made by paragraph 3 of the originating application dated 17 July 2020.

4. In the event that there are any outstanding procedural issues which require an in court adjudication, the balance of the applicant’s case as set out in order 3 above be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be fixed in February 2021 in consultation with the parties.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Most of the judicial review aspect was heard separately and first, by reference to grounds 1, 3 and 4 in the Amended Statement of Grounds of Judicial Review. This judgment is only concerned with those three grounds. Ground 2 is not part of this aspect of Mr Ashby’s case and therefore not a part of this judgment. Nor are the claims made in paragraph 3 of the originating application, based upon the Fair Work Act, addressed in this judgment.Background In the period between 22 December 2011 and 23 October 2012, Mr Ashby was employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth) (MOP(S) Act) to work for the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr Peter Slipper MP. On 20 April 2012, Mr Ashby brought a proceeding in this Court against Mr Slipper and against the Commonwealth. He alleged sexual harassment and misuse of parliamentary entitlement by Mr Slipper, and sought relief under the Fair Work Act and at common law. The history of that proceeding is summarised in a document that he furnished in support of his act of grace payment application. Aspects of the following, insofar as they are not disputed by the respondents, are drawn from that document, and also from the text of judgments referred to. Mr Slipper and the Commonwealth each filed interlocutory applications, respectively on 8 June 2012 and 13 June 2012, seeking summary dismissal or a permanent stay of the proceeding brought by Mr Ashby. Those applications were heard together, commencing on 23 July 2012: see Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1411; 209 FCR 65. On 4 October 2012, a deed of settlement was executed by Mr Ashby and the Commonwealth, in accordance with a without prejudice offer made by the Commonwealth. That deed resolved Mr Ashby’s claim against the Commonwealth and provided for certain mutual releases. The Commonwealth in turn agreed to pay Mr Ashby $50,000; to implement an improved education program for staff employed under the MOP(S) Act concerning the process by which issues of bullying and harassment could be brought to its attention and remedied; and to offer specific training for Members of the House of Representatives and Senators in relation to issues of sexual harassment. The deed did not contain any admissions. On 12 December 2012, the interlocutory application maintained by Mr Slipper was granted and Mr Ashby’s proceeding was summarily dismissed as an abuse of process. On 27 February 2014, an appeal by Mr Ashby succeeded by majority: Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15; 219 FCR 322. At [115] of that judgment, the majority made an observation about Mr Ashby’s apparent motivation in bringing the proceeding, being a goal of the prevention of future harm. The Full Court there noted that the pursuit of stopping a perceived harm through channels other than the seeking of legal advice did not render the litigation as meaningless or a sham. However, in a subsequent unanimous judgment, the same Full Court made it clear that this was only a qualitative assessment of the material advanced in support of the summary dismissal, not a positive finding in Mr Ashby’s favour about his reasons for bringing the proceeding, which was neither appropriate nor possible without a full factual hearing: Ashby v Slipper (No 3) [2015] FCAFC 9; 317 ALR 623 at [46]-[47].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In June 2014, Mr Ashby withdrew the action against Mr Slipper before a trial could take place. By then, Mr Ashby had incurred substantial legal costs, described in the supporting documentation to his act of grace application as “millions of dollars for legal fees and disbursements”. These costs were owed to his lawyers at the time of his act of grace payment application and I understand that they remain outstanding.Act of grace payment application, decision and reasons Mr Ashby’s act of grace payment application was made in October 2018. In that application, Mr Ashby, through his lawyers, sought the payment of $4,537,000. The basis of the act of grace payment application was to redress an asserted injustice in relation to the proceeding that he had brought against Mr Slipper and the Commonwealth. After a lengthy process of competing submissions to the delegate by Mr Ashby and by the Minister’s Department, on 8 May 2020 a delegate of the Minister decided not to authorise an act of grace payment. Reasons were subsequently sought and were provided on 19 June 2020. In this proceeding, Mr Ashby submits that the two main reasons advanced to the delegate in support of his act of grace payment application were:(1)the fact that he was a whistle-blower and had sought to achieve a desirable public objective in the exposure and prevention of sexual harassment and misuse of parliamentary entitlements by a senior Commonwealth office-holder; and(2)the inequitable treatment in making an act of grace payment in favour of Mr Slipper, who already had greater resources and was the alleged wrongdoer. On 19 October 2020, Mr Ashby sought an internal review of the delegate’s decision. The respondents rely upon that application having been made as being relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant relief on the judicial review aspect of this proceeding. The delegate advised by letter dated 8 May 2020 and addressed to the solicitors for Mr Ashby that he had decided, under s 65(1) of the PGPA Act, “not to authorise an act of grace payment in this instance”. That decision was made by the delegate, who agreed with a recommendation contained in a memorandum addressed to him and also dated 8 May 2020. A notation on that memorandum indicated that there may have been additional reasons to those in the memorandum if a statement of reasons was sought by Mr Ashby. By a letter dated 29 May 2020, Mr Ashby’s solicitors requested reasons under s 13 of the ADJR Act. By a further letter dated 19 June 2020, the delegate furnished written reasons. Those reasons stated that in making the decision, the delegate had regard to the full contents of the Department’s file, including the request and competing submissions (a total of seven documents), and also had regard to the guidance contained in a document titled “Resource Management Guide No. 401, Requests for discretionary financial assistance under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that no vitiating error has been established, and this ground must therefore fail.Ground 3 – irrationality and constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction The essence of the submissions on this ground are that:(1)the delegate’s finding that the act of grace payment approval in favour of Mr Slipper did not influence the proceedings brought by Mr Ashby was irrational, so as to constitute a decision beyond jurisdiction, an improper exercise of power, or an error of law, such that it would give rise to relief under s 5(1)(c), (e) or (f) of the ADJR Act; and(2)in the course of finding that the proceedings brought by Mr Ashby did not become highly political, the delegate failed to deal with relevant evidence, amounting to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, an improper exercise of power or an error of law, so as give rise to relief under s 5(1)(e) or (f) of the ADJR Act. The first aspect of this ground relies upon the delegate’s reasoning that it was necessary to examine any special circumstances which may make it appropriate to approve an act of grace payment: Resource Management Guide No. 401 [9]. This was stated to include whether an act of a non-corporate Commonwealth entity had caused an unintended and inequitable result in Mr Ashby’s circumstances, which was outside the parameters of events for which he was responsible or had the capacity to adequately control: Resource Management Guide No. 401 [10]. Mr Ashby expressly takes no issue with such criteria being applied by the delegate. However, he submits that it was irrational for the delegate to find, as set out in the conclusion of the delegate’s reasons reproduced at [28] above, that there was no clear basis for the suggestion that providing an act of grace approval to Mr Slipper influenced the manner in which the litigation was undertaken in the period between when it was commenced and when an act of grace payment was made in favour of Mr Slipper in July 2013. It should be noted that Mr Ashby’s appeal to the Full Court was heard in May 2013, prior to the act of grace payment decision in favour of Mr Slipper; that the Full Court’s decision was reserved until 27 February 2014; and that Mr Ashby abandoned his case against Mr Slipper several months later in June 2014. Mr Ashby’s submissions construe the delegate’s reasons as though they extend to the period after the act of grace approval in favour of Mr Slipper took place. The reasons did not say that there was no basis for an argument that the act of grace payment would have influenced the course of the litigation after the act of grace payment was made, and they expressly refer to the relevant period being the period before the payment was made. Read literally, there was nothing irrational in this impugned aspect of the delegate’s reasons, as Mr Ashby’s submissions tacitly accept by attempting to have them apply to the period beyond that to which the delegate was expressly referring. Even if the delegate’s reasons were not so confined, the Full Court hearing of Mr Ashby’s matter occurred in May 2013, so the relevant period which Mr Ashby says was logically influenced by the act of grace payment made to Mr Slipper was mostly consumed by the period during which the Full Court decision was reserved. Mr Ashby does not identify how there was any meaningful opportunity for any party to the matter to exert any asserted influence over the litigation while awaiting the decision of the Full Court. It would not have been irrational, and indeed would have been reasonably open for the delegate to reach a conclusion on the evidence that there was no reasonable basis for an argument that such an influence over the litigation existed. Instead, as already noted, the delegate stopped short of that, and found no clear basis for the argument that providing an act of grace approval to Mr Slipper had influenced the manner in which the litigation was undertaken. I can see no error in the delegate not being satisfied that there was enough to establish the existence of the influence that was asserted to exist, as apparently being self-evident rather than shown to exist.