FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 40
File number: NSD 784 of 2020 Judgment of: BROMWICH J Date of judgment: 29 January 2021 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for review of decision to refuse application for an act of grace payment under s 65(1) of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) – where act of grace payment sought for the purpose of satisfying legal fees incurred in litigation relating to alleged conduct by a member of the Parliament of Australia – where previous litigation discontinued before trial by the applicant due to purported financial pressure – where the Member of Parliament was granted an act of grace payment in relation to his legal fees – whether there was an error by the delegate of the Minister in failing to assess the claim in support of the act of grace application that the applicant was a whistle-blower, alternatively that this claim was not assessed to the requisite level of detail – whether the delegate’s finding that there was no basis for an argument that the previous act of grace payment to a litigant had an influence over the litigation was irrational – whether the delegate failed to have regard to relevant evidence that the proceeding was not highly politicised – whether there was any error in the delegation rendering the decision-making power of the delegate void – held: the delegate did not fail to assess the whistle-blower claims made by the applicant and was not required to give further or better consideration to these claims – the delegate’s finding that the act of grace payment made to the Member of Parliament did not influence the litigation was not irrational and was not outside of the exercise of their jurisdiction – there was no failure to deal with evidence relating to the claims that the proceeding was highly politicised – the applicant’s construction of the delegation power was not sensible or pragmatic and the conduct of the delegate in this case was clearly contemplated by the delegation’s authorising Act – application dismissed with costs Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 16)
Fair Work Act2009 (Cth)
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33
Secretary of the Department of Finance (Cth), Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Finance Secretary to Finance Officials) Delegation 2020 (No 1) (22 January 2020) sch 1A pt 11
Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) ss 65(1), 107, 109
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (Cth) s 24
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Cases cited: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 4) [2012] FCA 1411; 209 FCR 65
Ashby v Slipper (No 3) [2015] FCAFC 9; 317 ALR 623
Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15; 219 FCR 322
Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd v GPT Re Ltd [2007] NSWCA 171; 153 LGERA 450
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 40
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the delegate did not fail to assess Mr. Ashby's claims that he was a whistleblower, nor was the delegate required to give further or better consideration to these claims. The court held that the delegate's finding that the act of grace payment made to the Member of Parliament did not influence the litigation was not irrational and was within the exercise of their jurisdiction. The court further found that there was no failure to deal with evidence relating to the claims that the proceedings were highly politicised. The applicant's interpretation of the delegation power was not sensible or pragmatic, and the conduct of the delegate in this case was clearly contemplated by the delegation's authorising Act.
The court dismissed the application with costs. The claims made by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application, insofar as they were reflected in grounds 1, 3, and 4 of the amended statement of grounds of judicial review, were dismissed. The question of costs of and incidental to the above claims and grounds was reserved. The parties were directed to confer and within 14 days, or such longer time as may be allowed, email the associate to Justice Bromwich agreed or competing draft procedural orders for the hearing and determination of the remaining parts of the applicant's case. In the event that there were any outstanding procedural issues which required an in-court adjudication, the balance of the applicant's case was to be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be fixed in February 2021 in consultation with the parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The claims made by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application dated 17 July 2020, insofar as they are reflected in grounds 1, 3 and 4 of the amended statement of grounds of judicial review dated 7 October 2020, be dismissed.
2. The question of costs of and incidental to the above claims and grounds be reserved.
3. The parties confer and within 14 days, or such longer time as may be allowed, email the associate to Justice Bromwich agreed or competing draft procedural orders for the hearing and determination of the remaining parts of the applicant’s case, being:
(a) any part of the claims made by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the originating application dated 17 July 2020, to the extent they remain in ground 2 of the amended statement of grounds of judicial review dated 7 October 2020; and
(b) the claims made by paragraph 3 of the originating application dated 17 July 2020.
4. In the event that there are any outstanding procedural issues which require an in court adjudication, the balance of the applicant’s case as set out in order 3 above be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be fixed in February 2021 in consultation with the parties.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows that no vitiating error has been established, and this ground must therefore fail.Ground 3 – irrationality and constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction The essence of the submissions on this ground are that:(1)the delegate’s finding that the act of grace payment approval in favour of Mr Slipper did not influence the proceedings brought by Mr Ashby was irrational, so as to constitute a decision beyond jurisdiction, an improper exercise of power, or an error of law, such that it would give rise to relief under s 5(1)(c), (e) or (f) of the ADJR Act; and(2)in the course of finding that the proceedings brought by Mr Ashby did not become highly political, the delegate failed to deal with relevant evidence, amounting to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, an improper exercise of power or an error of law, so as give rise to relief under s 5(1)(e) or (f) of the ADJR Act. The first aspect of this ground relies upon the delegate’s reasoning that it was necessary to examine any special circumstances which may make it appropriate to approve an act of grace payment: Resource Management Guide No. 401 [9]. This was stated to include whether an act of a non-corporate Commonwealth entity had caused an unintended and inequitable result in Mr Ashby’s circumstances, which was outside the parameters of events for which he was responsible or had the capacity to adequately control: Resource Management Guide No. 401 [10]. Mr Ashby expressly takes no issue with such criteria being applied by the delegate. However, he submits that it was irrational for the delegate to find, as set out in the conclusion of the delegate’s reasons reproduced at [28] above, that there was no clear basis for the suggestion that providing an act of grace approval to Mr Slipper influenced the manner in which the litigation was undertaken in the period between when it was commenced and when an act of grace payment was made in favour of Mr Slipper in July 2013. It should be noted that Mr Ashby’s appeal to the Full Court was heard in May 2013, prior to the act of grace payment decision in favour of Mr Slipper; that the Full Court’s decision was reserved until 27 February 2014; and that Mr Ashby abandoned his case against Mr Slipper several months later in June 2014. Mr Ashby’s submissions construe the delegate’s reasons as though they extend to the period after the act of grace approval in favour of Mr Slipper took place. The reasons did not say that there was no basis for an argument that the act of grace payment would have influenced the course of the litigation after the act of grace payment was made, and they expressly refer to the relevant period being the period before the payment was made. Read literally, there was nothing irrational in this impugned aspect of the delegate’s reasons, as Mr Ashby’s submissions tacitly accept by attempting to have them apply to the period beyond that to which the delegate was expressly referring. Even if the delegate’s reasons were not so confined, the Full Court hearing of Mr Ashby’s matter occurred in May 2013, so the relevant period which Mr Ashby says was logically influenced by the act of grace payment made to Mr Slipper was mostly consumed by the period during which the Full Court decision was reserved. Mr Ashby does not identify how there was any meaningful opportunity for any party to the matter to exert any asserted influence over the litigation while awaiting the decision of the Full Court. It would not have been irrational, and indeed would have been reasonably open for the delegate to reach a conclusion on the evidence that there was no reasonable basis for an argument that such an influence over the litigation existed. Instead, as already noted, the delegate stopped short of that, and found no clear basis for the argument that providing an act of grace approval to Mr Slipper had influenced the manner in which the litigation was undertaken. I can see no error in the delegate not being satisfied that there was enough to establish the existence of the influence that was asserted to exist, as apparently being self-evident rather than shown to exist.