Fisk v Chief of the Defence Force (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Fisk v Chief of the Defence Force (No 2) [2017] FCA 1490

File number: NSD 1159 of 2016
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 8 December 2017
Catchwords: DEFENCE AND WAR – whether termination notice issued to officer, Australian Defence Force, under reg 85(2), Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) is invalid by reason of invalid delegation - principles relevant to conditions of an instrument of delegation
Legislation:

Acts and Instruments (Framework Reform) Act 2015 (Cth)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 46

Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) ss 8, 10, 46

Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth) s 5

Defence Force Regulations 1952 (Cth)

Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth) regs 85, 119

Defence Regulation 2016 (Cth)

Legislation (Exemptions and Other Matters) Regulation 2015 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum to the Acts and Instruments (Framework Reform) Bill 2014

Cases cited:

Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427

Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221 CLR 309

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153

Master Education Services Pty Limited v Ketchell [2008] HCA 38; (2008) 236 CLR 101

Noble v Commonwealth (1943) 17 ALJ 184

One.Tel Limited v Australian Communications Authority (2000) 110 FCR 125

Owendale Pty Limited v Anthony (1966) 117 CLR 539

Parks Holdings Pty Ltd (t/as Gladston Chemicals) v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2004] FCA 820; (2004) 81 ALD 365

Parks Holdings Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2001] AATA 562

Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for ACT Revenue (1994) 119 FLR 38

Re Reference Under Section 11 of Ombudsman Act 1976 for an Advisory Opinion; ex parte Director-General of Social Services (1979) 2 ALD 86

Date of hearing: 30 September 2016, 19 October 2016
Date of last submissions: 8 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 43
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr RC Gration
Solicitor for the Applicant: K&L Gates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr D Robertson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1159 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SHAUN MICHAEL FISK

Applicant

AND:

CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCE

Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.Costs are reserved.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3.In the event that orders as to costs are not agreed:

(a)on or before 4pm on Friday 15 December 2017 the legal representatives for the parties are to advise the associate to Justice Perry of a proposed timetable, agreed if possible, for the filing of short written submissions on the issue of costs; and

(b)the issue of costs will be determined on the papers.

4.The parties are to liaise with respect to the orders otherwise necessary to give effect to these reasons and in particular paragraph [4]. The parties are to provide a draft minute of consent orders, if agreed, or alternatively the orders that each party requests be made, to the…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1490
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Fisk v Chief of the Defence Force (No 2) was before the Federal Court of Australia. The applicant, an officer of the Australian Defence Force, challenged the validity of a termination notice issued under regulation 85(2) of the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth). The applicant contended that the termination notice was invalid because it was issued pursuant to an invalid delegation by the Governor-General. The court was tasked with determining whether the delegation was valid and, if not, whether the termination notice issued under it was invalid.

The central legal issue was whether the delegation made by the Governor-General under section 119 of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) was valid. The applicant argued that the delegation was invalid as it purported to confer power on the Chief of the Defence Force to delegate the power to issue termination notices to officers, which exceeded the scope of the power permitted by regulation 119. The court needed to examine the principles relevant to the conditions of an instrument of delegation, including whether the delegation complied with the requirements set out in section 119 of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth).

The court held that the delegation was valid and, therefore, the termination notice issued under it was not invalid. The court found that the delegation complied with the conditions set out in section 119 of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), which allowed for the delegation of the power to issue termination notices to officers. The court also noted that if the delegation had been construed as intended to confer power in excess of that permitted by regulation 119, it could have been read down by section 46(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act or at common law. The application was dismissed, and costs were reserved.

In summary, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the applicant's challenge to the validity of the termination notice issued under regulation 85(2) of the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth). The court held that the delegation made by the Governor-General was valid and, therefore, the termination notice issued under it was not invalid. The applicant's application was dismissed, and costs were reserved pending further consideration by the parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. Costs are reserved.

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

3. In the event that orders as to costs are not agreed:

(a) on or before 4pm on Friday 15 December 2017 the legal representatives for the parties are to advise the associate to Justice Perry of a proposed timetable, agreed if possible, for the filing of short written submissions on the issue of costs; and

(b) the issue of costs will be determined on the papers.

4. The parties are to liaise with respect to the orders otherwise necessary to give effect to these reasons and in particular paragraph [4]. The parties are to provide a draft minute of consent orders, if agreed, or alternatively the orders that each party requests be made, to the Associate to Justice Perry by 4pm on 15 December 2017.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a challenge to a termination notice issued to an officer in the Australian Defence Force under regulation 85(2) of the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth). The Chief of the Defence Force decided on the officer's Request for Operational Grievance (ROG), leading to the officer filing an application to challenge the validity of the termination notice. The applicant sought to re-open and further amend his originating application to raise a new issue, which was ultimately refused. The primary focus of the case was on whether the termination notice was invalid due to an invalid delegation, specifically concerning the conditions of the instrument of delegation.

The matter came before the Federal Court in an application challenging the validity of a termination notice issued to an officer in the Australian Defence Force. The applicant had previously sought to re-open and amend his originating application to include a new issue, which was refused by the court in a separate decision. The court considered the validity of the delegation under which the termination notice was issued, specifically examining whether the delegation was invalid due to conditions that exceeded the authority granted under regulation 119 of the Defence (Personnel) Regulations 2002 (Cth).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, I note that following the decision by the Chief of Defence Force on the applicant’s ROG, the Court was requested to defer delivery of judgment. Following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the matter, the applicant applied to re-open and further amend his originating application to raise a new issue. For reasons separately published in Fisk v Chief of Defence Force [2017] FCA 1489, that application was refused. 2. EVIDENCE The respondent relied upon the following affidavits which were read without objection: (1)paragraphs 1 to 6 of the affidavit of COL Michael Edward Garraway affirmed 19 July 2016, including Annexures 1, 2 and 3;(2)paragraphs 1 to 6 of the affidavit of COL Garraway affirmed 16 September 2016, including the Annexures thereto; and(3)paragraphs 1 to 11 of the affidavit of COL Garraway affirmed 28 September 2016, including Annexures thereto. No evidence was ultimately led by applicant save for the Formal Instrument of Delegation given by the Governor-General dated 12 December 2013 (Exhibit A1) (the delegation). 3. THE POWER TO TERMINATE AN OFFICER’S SERVICE UNDER REGULATION 85, PERSONNEL REGULATIONS While the Personnel Regulations and the Defence Force Regulations were repealed with effect from 1 October 2016 by the Defence Regulation 2016 (Cth), reg 85 of the Defence Regulation 2016 provides that the Personnel Regulations and the Defence Force Regulations “continue to apply in relation to an application made, or a process begun, under those regulations before their repeal”. Under Reg 85(1) of the Personnel Regulations, the service in the Defence Force of an officer may be terminated in accordance with reg 85 for any of the reasons specified in subreg (aa)-(g), including that:(d) the Chief of the officer’s Service is satisfied that the retention of the officer is not in the interest of:(i) the Defence Force; or(ii) the Chief’s Service; Sub-regulation 85(2) conferring power on the Governor-General to give the officer a termination notice is in the following terms:(2) The Governor-General may give the officer a termination notice:(a) stating that it is proposed to terminate the officer’s service in the Defence Force; and(b) stating the reason for terminating the service; and(c) setting out particulars of the facts and circumstances relating to the reason for terminating the service that is sufficient to allow the officer to prepare a statement of reasons why the service should not be terminated; and(d) inviting the officer to give the Governor-General a written statement of reasons why the server should not be terminated; and(e) specifying a period of at least 28 days after the date of the notice as the period in which the officer may give the statement of reasons. As such, in line with the requirements of procedural fairness, sub-reg 85(2) provides a means by which an officer is notified of the proposal to terminate her or his service in the Defence Force, is advised of the reasons why that is proposed, and is afforded an opportunity to be heard on why her or his service should not be terminated by a statement of reasons. When no statement of reasons is given by the officer within the specified period and the Governor-General considers that there has not been any change in circumstances since the termination notice was given, sub-reg 85(3) requires the Governor-General to terminate the officer’s service in the Defence Force. On the other hand, where a statement of reasons is given by the officer, the Governor-General must terminate the officer’s service in the Defence Force only if, having considered the officer’s statement, the Governor-General considers that the reason for terminating the officer’s services has been established and there has been no change in circumstances: sub-reg 85(4).

Decision

Reasons for decision

In circumstances where these issues were not the subject of argument, it would not be appropriate for me to endeavour to resolve them. Nor, for the reasons already given, do I consider that it is necessary to read down the delegation in reliance upon s 46(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act. However, as the respondent pointed out, in any event s 46 of the Acts Interpretation Act “is essentially a statutory invocation of the common law principles of severance and reading down which the court would still apply to the construction of the delegation even if it considered that s 46 did not apply to construction of the delegation”: see for example, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153 at 180 (Isaacs J). As such, if the delegation were construed as intended to confer power in excess of that permitted by reg 119, it suffices to say that the delegation could be read down by s 46(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act or alternatively at common law. 6. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the application is dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs. Subject to considering any objection by the parties, the issue of costs should be determined on the papers. On the issue of costs, I note that the costs of the second day of hearing on 19 October 2016 were reserved by consent. I also note that, while the second respondent’s agreement (without admission) to the continuation of the interim injunction made by Wigney J on 18 July 2016 rendered the hearing of the application for final injunctive relief pending the final outcome of the ROG process otiose, that agreement was given only on the second day of the hearing after the parties had filed detailed written submissions addressing the claim for final injunctive relief.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the termination notice issued under regulation 85(2) was invalid due to an invalid delegation. The court noted that the delegation in question was given by the Governor-General under the authority of section 119 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and was subject to the conditions outlined in that section. The court found that the delegation met the statutory requirements and did not exceed the powers permitted by regulation 119. The court further determined that the delegation was validly made and did not suffer from any defect that would render the termination notice invalid. The court held that the termination notice was not invalid by reason of an invalid delegation.

In addressing the principles relevant to the conditions of an instrument of delegation, the court highlighted that the delegation must comply with the statutory requirements and common law principles. The court noted that section 46(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act could be invoked to read down or sever any invalid parts of the delegation. The court found that the delegation was valid and did not need to be read down or severed. The court emphasised that the delegation must be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to its purpose and does not exceed the powers permitted by the enabling statute. The court concluded that the principles relevant to the conditions of an instrument of delegation include adherence to statutory requirements, compliance with common law principles, and the ability to read down or sever invalid parts of the delegation. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a valid delegation made under section 119 of the Acts Interpretation Act is not invalid merely because it confers power in excess of that permitted by regulation 119, and such delegation can be read down or severed if necessary.