Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCAFC 77

Appeal from:

Application for extension of time and leave to appeal from: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 40

Application for leave to appeal from: Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2021] FCA 830

File numbers: NSD 799 of 2021
NSD 806 of 2021
Judgment of: KATZMANN, ABRAHAM AND GOODMAN JJ
Date of judgment: 12 May 2022
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – where s 65(1) of the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 1913 (Cth) (PGPA Act) permits the Finance Minister on behalf of the Commonwealth to authorise acts of grace payments if the Minister considers it appropriate to do so because of special circumstances — where appellant applied under the PGPA Act for an act of grace payment of more than $4.5 million to compensate him for legal costs he incurred in prosecuting an application for relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) for adverse action allegedly taken against him by the then Speaker of the House of Representatives for whom he had previously worked and the Commonwealth of Australia who was his then employer – where appellant discontinued the proceeding before trial and entered into a deed of release with the Commonwealth in which he agreed to release the Commonwealth from “all his claims against it” in consideration of the Commonwealth paying him $50,000 in settlement of those claims – where delegate considered there were no special circumstances and decided not to authorise an act of grace payment and appellant applied for judicial review of delegate’s decision – whether primary judge erred in dismissing judicial review application and upholding the Commonwealth’s application for summary judgment – where instrument of delegation gave delegate the power to consider all applications for act of grace payments but not the power to authorise applications in excess of $50,000, whether delegate lacked jurisdiction to refuse the act of grace payment

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time and leave to appeal from judgment on judicial review application and for leave to appeal from judgment on FW Act application, whether leave to appeal required and whether it should be granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where the Commonwealth applied for summary dismissal of the adverse action claim, whether primary judge erred by finding that the claim enjoyed no reasonable prospects of success

INDUSTRIAL LAW – where delegate took into account the choices made by the appellant, which primary judge assumed for the purpose of the summary dismissal application could otherwise constitute adverse action within the meaning of s 340 of the FW Act and where s 342(3)(a) provides that “adverse action” does not include action that is “authorised by or under … [a] law of the Commonwealth”, whether primary judge erred by finding that s 65 of the PGPA Act was a law of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s 342(3)(a) and the decision of the delegate was authorised by or under the PGPA

Legislation:

Administrative…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 77
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ashby v Commonwealth of Australia involved an application by the appellant for a judicial review of the decision by a delegate of the Minister for Finance to deny a request for an act of grace payment of over $4.5 million under the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). The appellant sought compensation for legal costs incurred in a Fair Work Act claim against the then Speaker of the House of Representatives and his former employer, the Commonwealth. The appellant had discontinued the Fair Work Act proceeding and settled his claims for $50,000. The primary judge dismissed the judicial review application and upheld the Commonwealth's application for summary judgment, leading to the appellant's appeal. The appellant also sought an extension of time and leave to appeal from the primary judge's judgments.

The legal issues in this case included whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the judicial review application, whether the delegate lacked jurisdiction to refuse the act of grace payment, and whether the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant's Fair Work Act claim enjoyed no reasonable prospects of success. Additionally, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act was a law of the Commonwealth within the meaning of the Fair Work Act, and whether the delegate's decision was authorised by or under the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act.

The court found that the primary judge's construction of the instrument of delegation was both impractical and improbable, as it would require the Minister or Secretary to consider all act of grace applications over $100,000 irrespective of merit. Instead, the court held that the plain words of the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act contemplated two separate steps: first, considering whether it is appropriate to make the payment and if not to refuse to do so, and second, if satisfied that payment is appropriate, deciding whether to authorise the payment. Both steps did not need to be performed by the same delegate, and it was apparent that the second step could only be carried out by someone with authorisation to approve payments over $100,000. The court also found that the primary judge was correct in summarily dismissing the appellant's Fair Work Act claim, as the delegate's decision was authorised by or under the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act.

The court granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal with costs. The court found that the primary judge's judgments were attended by significant doubt and that the appeal from the second judgment involved an important question as to the scope of the exception in section 342(3) of the Fair Work Act. The court held that the primary judge's construction of the instrument of delegation was both impractical and improbable, and that the plain words of the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act contemplated two separate steps in the act of grace payment process. The court also found that the primary judge was correct in summarily dismissing the appellant's Fair Work Act claim, as the delegate's decision was authorised by or under the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour found that this construction of the FM-FS Delegation was both impractical and improbable as it would mean that the Minister or Secretary would have to consider all act of grace applications over $100,000 irrespective of merit (at [45]). Rather, his Honour held that the plain words of s 65(1) of the PGPA Act contemplated two separate steps: first, considering whether it is appropriate to make the payment and if not to refuse to do so, and second, if satisfied that payment is appropriate, deciding whether to authorise the payment (at [47]). Both steps did not need to be performed by the same delegate and it was apparent that the second step could only be carried out by someone with authorisation to approve payments over $100,000 (at [50]).The application for summary judgment The Commonwealth and the Minister (the respondents) applied for summary judgment of Mr Ashby’s remaining matter, namely that the delegate’s refusal decision amounted to “adverse action” under the FW Act. The application rested on the terms of s 342(3)(a) of that Act which provides that “adverse action” does not include action that is authorised by or under the FW Act or any other law of the Commonwealth. For the purpose of the respondents’ application only, the primary judge assumed in Mr Ashby’s favour that the delegate’s conduct constituted “adverse action” within the meaning of s 342(1) of the FW Act.The second judgment The primary judge agreed with the respondents’ submission that s 65(1) of the PGPA Act conferred a broad discretionary power on the Minister to make or not make an act of grace payment without any express or implied limitation on what could be taken into account (at [29]–[30]). His Honour noted that the delegate had refused Mr Ashby’s application because he was not satisfied that there were any special circumstances justifying the payment, particularly because Mr Ashby elected not to pursue alternative, less costly options rather than commencing court proceedings, some of which could be characterised as “workplace rights” (at [30]). His Honour was therefore satisfied that s 65(1) gave express legal authority to take the impugned action of refusing the act of grace payment application and there was no proper reason to read down the discretion (at [31]). Thus, his Honour was satisfied that the delegate’s decision was authorised by law and was covered by the exception in s 342(3). His Honour therefore concluded that Mr Ashby had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the balance of his proceeding and summarily dismissed the application (at [32]).The application for extension of time and leave to appeal Mr Ashby applied for an extension of time and leave to appeal from the first judgment, and for leave to appeal from the second judgment. He did not concede that either an extension or leave to appeal were required, but applied out of an abundance of caution. He contended that a “substantial injustice” would be caused if leave were not granted and that both judgments of the primary judge were attended by significant doubt to justify the grant of leave. In addition, he argued that the appeal from the second judgment involved “an important question” as to the scope of the exception in s 342(3) of the FW Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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