FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Croker v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2011] FCA 1188
Citation: Croker v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2011] FCA 1188 Parties: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION File number(s): NSD 1184 of 2011 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 17 October 2011 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review of administrative decision – decision to refuse act of grace payment – whether error of law in construing "special circumstances" – whether decision made in “bad faith” – application dismissed Legislation: Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33 Cases cited: Croker v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1136 distinguished
Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981 followedDate of hearing: 17 October 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 34 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Gouliaditis of Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1184 of 2011
BETWEEN: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 OCTOBER 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1184 of 2011
BETWEEN: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE:
17 OCTOBER 2011
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application, filed on 19 July 2011, to review the decision of the respondent denying to the applicant, Mr Croker, a payment under s 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ("the FMA Act”) "for the difference between the cancellation date of [Mr Croker's] first statutory entitlement (Disability Support Pension) and the grant date of [Mr Croker's] second statutory entitlement".
In essence, there is a period of some 23 months between the date from which the Disability Support Pension ("DSP") paid to Mr Croker was cancelled, 6 June 2006, and the date with effect from which Mr Croker was again paid DSP by a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT), 29 April 2008.
Mr Croker invokes the Court’s jurisdiction under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.
Written submissions were filed on 13 September by Mr Croker and by the respondent on 20 September, and those written submissions and the oral submissions made this morning enable me to deal with the matter today.
The application identifies the date of the decision as 22 June 2011, that being the date of the statement of reasons. In fact 3 May 2011 was the date of the decision to deny the application for a payment under s 33 of the FMA Act but nothing turns on that and I will treat the application as one for judicial review of…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 1188
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's interpretation of "special circumstances" in the context of the FMA Act was erroneous and whether there was evidence of bad faith in the decision-making process. The Court examined previous judicial interpretations of "special circumstances" in other contexts and concluded that the Minister's understanding of the term was neither too narrow nor legally incorrect. The Court also rejected the argument of bad faith, finding no evidence to support the applicant's claims of maladministration and defective legislation.
The Court found that the Minister had appropriately exercised his discretion in denying the act of grace payment. The interpretation of "special circumstances" was deemed to be within the broad discretion granted by the FMA Act, and the Court was not in a position to substitute its own view for that of the Minister. Furthermore, the allegations of bad faith were unsupported by the evidence presented. As a result, the Court dismissed the application for judicial review.
The Court ordered that the application for judicial review be dismissed. The orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Croker also gave particulars in his Outline of Submissions of bad faith which he said arose. Those particulars were – and as repeated in oral submissions this morning – as follows (again correcting transcription and other errors where possible):(i) That the Respondent failed to acknowledge that there was defective and/ or maladministration which manifested the loss of the applicant’s statutory entitlement and the decision 9/6/2009 of the SSAT that restored the applicant’s statutory entitlement was on legislative requirements that substantially raise the bar for the qualification for the entitlement and backdated it to the 28/4/008, approximately 1 month after the Federal Court of Australia effectively locked out the applicant from continuing to appeal the first cancellation of the applicant’s statutory entitlement by requiring security for costs;(ii)That the Respondent failed to come to the matter with clean hands and to acknowledge pertinent criticism expressed in the undertaking of Croker v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1136 and in particular at paragraph 23 :-. . . (iii)That the Respondent failed to acknowledge defective legislation that prevented the applicant from receiving the statutory entitlement the applicant was always intended to receive;(iv) That the Respondent failed to acknowledge misdirections that provided wrong, misleading or wholly inadequate advice, and in particular those decisions of the Federal Court of Australia and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that failed to restore the statutory entitlement; and(iv)The Respondent failed to approach the material facts of the application and in particular the fact that the cancellation and subsequent re-grant of the entitlement left a time line gap which has no reasonable grounds to be established in a conceptual view.Consideration Mr Croker is a bankrupt but the respondent takes no issue as to the competency of the proceeding, given the nature of the relief sought. In Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981, Weinberg J considered s 33 of the FMA Act. In that case, in the letter of denial, the respondent wrote:"My power to approve act of grace payments under the FMA Act is only exercised where it is considered that the application of Commonwealth legislation has produced unintended, anomalous, or inequitable results, or where, because of its direct role in a particular situation the Commonwealth considers that it has a moral responsibility to redress the circumstances of the individual concerned." The applicant in that case submitted that the respondent had erred in law by adopting an unduly narrow interpretation of the term "special circumstances" in s 33(1) of the FMA Act. The Court rejected that submission. Weinberg J said, at [28] and following :The expression "special circumstances" has been the subject of extensive judicial consideration. However, there does not appear to have been any occasion on which that expression has been considered in the context of s 33(1) of the FMA Act.In Wu v Attorney General (1997) 79 FCR 303 at 307, Burchett J dealt with an interlocutory motion for the grant of bail in which the meaning of the expression "special circumstances" arose for determination. His Honour referred to Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187, a case involving an application to extend time in which to file a notice of appeal, in which the Full Court discussed a number of decisions concerning the terms "special circumstances", and "special reasons", terms which were treated as having essentially the same meaning. The Court said that "special reasons":"...is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served."Burchett J went on to say:"The same principle was applied to the expression "special circumstances", in relation to an application for release from an implied undertaking, in Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 576 at 578-579, where it was pointed out that the word "special" derives almost all of its meaning from its context. See also Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217; Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 125 at 132-133..."The statutory context in which the term "special circumstances" arises in the present case is one in which the Minister is given a discretion to authorise the making of act of grace payments where such payments "would not otherwise be authorised by law or required to meet a legal liability". There are any number of circumstances which may give rise to a claim for a payment of this type. It is impossible to anticipate the situations in which such payments may be warranted. The discretion vested in the Minister is obviously broad.The respondent said in the letter of denial that the power to approve act of grace payments under the FMA Act was only to be exercised where it was considered that the application of Commonwealth legislation had produced unintended, anomalous, or inequitable results, or where because of its direct role in a particular situation the Commonwealth considered that it had a moral responsibility to redress the circumstances of the individual concerned. . . There is nothing in the formulation of "special circumstances" adopted by the respondent which strikes me as being too narrow, or otherwise erroneous in law.. . . The legislature has entrusted the power to make act of grace payments to the Minister. Such payments are not based upon any legal entitlement but are made in response to moral obligations assumed by the Commonwealth as a result of the actions of its employees or instrumentalities. The power to make such payments is, by its very nature, one which is particularly suited to be exercised by the Minister. The role of the Court is to ensure that the Minister exercises that power lawfully. Provided he does so, his decision cannot be impugned.