Croker v Minister for Finance and Deregulation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Croker v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2011] FCA 1188

Citation: Croker v Minister for Finance and Deregulation [2011] FCA 1188
Parties: CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER v MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
File number(s): NSD 1184 of 2011
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 17 October 2011
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for judicial review of administrative decision – decision to refuse act of grace payment – whether error of law in construing "special circumstances" – whether decision made in “bad faith” – application dismissed
Legislation: Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) s 33
Cases cited: Croker v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1136 distinguished
Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981 followed
Date of hearing: 17 October 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 34
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Gouliaditis of Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1184 of 2011

BETWEEN:

CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 OCTOBER 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1184 of 2011

BETWEEN:

CLAYTON ROBERT CROKER
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FINANCE AND DEREGULATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE:

17 OCTOBER 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application, filed on 19 July 2011, to review the decision of the respondent denying to the applicant, Mr Croker, a payment under s 33 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) ("the FMA Act”) "for the difference between the cancellation date of [Mr Croker's] first statutory entitlement (Disability Support Pension) and the grant date of [Mr Croker's] second statutory entitlement".

  2. In essence, there is a period of some 23 months between the date from which the Disability Support Pension ("DSP") paid to Mr Croker was cancelled, 6 June 2006, and the date with effect from which Mr Croker was again paid DSP by a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT), 29 April 2008.

  3. Mr Croker invokes the Court’s jurisdiction under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.

  4. Written submissions were filed on 13 September by Mr Croker and by the respondent on 20 September, and those written submissions and the oral submissions made this morning enable me to deal with the matter today. 

  5. The application identifies the date of the decision as 22 June 2011, that being the date of the statement of reasons.  In fact 3 May 2011 was the date of the decision to deny the application for a payment under s 33 of the FMA Act but nothing turns on that and I will treat the application as one for judicial review of…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1188
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Mr Croker sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Finance and Deregulation, represented by Centrelink, to refuse an application for an act of grace payment. The applicant argued that the decision to deny the payment was an error of law, as the Minister had construed the term "special circumstances" too narrowly, and that the decision was made in bad faith due to maladministration and defective legislation. The primary focus of the case was whether the Minister had correctly exercised his discretion under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) in denying the act of grace payment.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's interpretation of "special circumstances" in the context of the FMA Act was erroneous and whether there was evidence of bad faith in the decision-making process. The Court examined previous judicial interpretations of "special circumstances" in other contexts and concluded that the Minister's understanding of the term was neither too narrow nor legally incorrect. The Court also rejected the argument of bad faith, finding no evidence to support the applicant's claims of maladministration and defective legislation.

The Court found that the Minister had appropriately exercised his discretion in denying the act of grace payment. The interpretation of "special circumstances" was deemed to be within the broad discretion granted by the FMA Act, and the Court was not in a position to substitute its own view for that of the Minister. Furthermore, the allegations of bad faith were unsupported by the evidence presented. As a result, the Court dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Court ordered that the application for judicial review be dismissed. The orders were entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Also annexed to Mr Croker's first affidavit is a letter from the Assistant Secretary dated 22 June 2011 in answer to Mr Croker's e-mail of 25 May 2011 requesting a statement of reasons under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 and enclosing such a statement of reasons.The decision-making Section 33(1) of the FMA Act, so far as is relevant, is in the following terms:(1)If the Finance Minister considers it appropriate to do so because of special circumstances, he or she may authorise the making of any of the following payments to a person (even though the payment or payments would not otherwise be authorised by law or required to meet a legal liability):(a)one or more payments of an amount or amounts specified in the authorisation (or worked out in accordance with the authorisation);(b)periodical payments of an amount specified in the authorisation (or worked out in accordance with the authorisation), during a period specified in the authorisation (or worked out in accordance with the authorisation). The respondent made the following findings of fact:(i) On 24 April 1994, Mr Croker was granted DSP. He continued to receive DSP for twelve years until on 6 September 2005, after a periodic review of his DSP, it was determined that he was no longer eligible and he was notified that the DSP would be cancelled.(ii) After the decision to cancel his DSP on 6 September 2005, Mr Croker continued to receive DSP pending the outcome of his appeal against the decision. On 2 December 2005, the ARO [the Authorised Review Officer] affirmed the decision to cancel Mr Croker's DSP as he was not eligible on medical grounds.(iii)On 4 January 2006, Mr Croker applied to the SSAT for a review of the decision to cancel his DSP and on 28 April 2006, the SSAT affirmed the decision to cancel Mr Croker's DSP on the basis that he was not eligible on medical grounds.(iv)On 15 May 2006, Mr Croker applied to the AAT for a review of the decision and a stay of the SSAT decision. On 19 May 2006, Centrelink wrote to Mr Croker and advised him that in accordance with the decision of the SSAT his DSP would be cancelled from 6 June 2006.(v) On 13 June 2006, the AAT refused the request to stay and Mr Croker appealed the decision to the FC [Federal Court] which dismissed the application on 27 October 2006.(vi)On 13 April 2007, the AAT affirmed the SSAT decision to cancel Mr Croker's DSP. Mr Croker appealed to the FC for review of the AAT decision and this application was dismissed on 30 October 2007, as no legal error was found in the decision of the AAT.(vii)Mr Croker appealed to the full FC and on 6 March 2008, the application was stayed until Mr Croker could provide security for costs. As Mr Croker was unable to do this, this matter remains stayed.(viii) Mr Croker was granted NSA [Newstart Allowance] with effect from 6 June 2006, and continued to receive NSA until he was granted DSP with effect from 29 April 2008.(ix)NSA is a payment designed to assist recipients to return to work and includes a number of activities to enhance recipients' employment prospects. As part of the requirements for receiving this payment, Mr Croker was required to undertake activities such as job searching and attending a third party organisation for assistance with job search activities. Mr Croker makes various claims against Centrelink officers related to the requirements of meeting the NSA activity agreement.(x) On 29 April 2008, Mr Croker contacted Centrelink regarding a new claim for DSP and on 7 May 2008 he submitted a claim. On 3 November 2008 Centrelink rejected Mr Croker’s claim. On 7 January 2009, an ARO affirmed the decision.(xi)On 16 January 2009, Mr Croker appealed to the SSAT for review of the decision to decline his DSP application and on 1 June 2009, the SSAT set aside Centrelink's decision and granted Mr Croker DSP with effect from 29 April 2008. It was not considered that Mr Croker’s condition had changed in any significant manner from the previous cancellation of his DSP and the determination of the SSAT resulted from the subjective nature of the impairment tables that are used in determining medical eligibility for DSP.(xii) Between 21 April 2010 and 6 April 2011, Mr Croker unsuccessfully appealed the start date of the second grant of DSP with Centrelink, an ARO, the SSAT, and the AAT.(xiii)Centrelink advised that Mr Croker’s DSP is due for review and that it may be reviewed at any time but is unlikely to be reviewed before July 2011.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Croker also gave particulars in his Outline of Submissions of bad faith which he said arose. Those particulars were – and as repeated in oral submissions this morning – as follows (again correcting transcription and other errors where possible):(i) That the Respondent failed to acknowledge that there was defective and/ or maladministration which manifested the loss of the applicant’s statutory entitlement and the decision 9/6/2009 of the SSAT that restored the applicant’s statutory entitlement was on legislative requirements that substantially raise the bar for the qualification for the entitlement and backdated it to the 28/4/008, approximately 1 month after the Federal Court of Australia effectively locked out the applicant from continuing to appeal the first cancellation of the applicant’s statutory entitlement by requiring security for costs;(ii)That the Respondent failed to come to the matter with clean hands and to acknowledge pertinent criticism expressed in the undertaking of Croker v Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs [2010] FCA 1136 and in particular at paragraph 23 :-. . . (iii)That the Respondent failed to acknowledge defective legislation that prevented the applicant from receiving the statutory entitlement the applicant was always intended to receive;(iv) That the Respondent failed to acknowledge misdirections that provided wrong, misleading or wholly inadequate advice, and in particular those decisions of the Federal Court of Australia and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that failed to restore the statutory entitlement; and(iv)The Respondent failed to approach the material facts of the application and in particular the fact that the cancellation and subsequent re-grant of the entitlement left a time line gap which has no reasonable grounds to be established in a conceptual view.Consideration Mr Croker is a bankrupt but the respondent takes no issue as to the competency of the proceeding, given the nature of the relief sought. In Toomer v Slipper [2001] FCA 981, Weinberg J considered s 33 of the FMA Act. In that case, in the letter of denial, the respondent wrote:"My power to approve act of grace payments under the FMA Act is only exercised where it is considered that the application of Commonwealth legislation has produced unintended, anomalous, or inequitable results, or where, because of its direct role in a particular situation the Commonwealth considers that it has a moral responsibility to redress the circumstances of the individual concerned." The applicant in that case submitted that the respondent had erred in law by adopting an unduly narrow interpretation of the term "special circumstances" in s 33(1) of the FMA Act. The Court rejected that submission. Weinberg J said, at [28] and following :The expression "special circumstances" has been the subject of extensive judicial consideration. However, there does not appear to have been any occasion on which that expression has been considered in the context of s 33(1) of the FMA Act.In Wu v Attorney General (1997) 79 FCR 303 at 307, Burchett J dealt with an interlocutory motion for the grant of bail in which the meaning of the expression "special circumstances" arose for determination. His Honour referred to Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187, a case involving an application to extend time in which to file a notice of appeal, in which the Full Court discussed a number of decisions concerning the terms "special circumstances", and "special reasons", terms which were treated as having essentially the same meaning. The Court said that "special reasons":"...is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served."Burchett J went on to say:"The same principle was applied to the expression "special circumstances", in relation to an application for release from an implied undertaking, in Holpitt Pty Ltd v Varimu Pty Ltd (1991) 29 FCR 576 at 578-579, where it was pointed out that the word "special" derives almost all of its meaning from its context. See also Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217; Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 125 at 132-133..."The statutory context in which the term "special circumstances" arises in the present case is one in which the Minister is given a discretion to authorise the making of act of grace payments where such payments "would not otherwise be authorised by law or required to meet a legal liability". There are any number of circumstances which may give rise to a claim for a payment of this type. It is impossible to anticipate the situations in which such payments may be warranted. The discretion vested in the Minister is obviously broad.The respondent said in the letter of denial that the power to approve act of grace payments under the FMA Act was only to be exercised where it was considered that the application of Commonwealth legislation had produced unintended, anomalous, or inequitable results, or where because of its direct role in a particular situation the Commonwealth considered that it had a moral responsibility to redress the circumstances of the individual concerned. . . There is nothing in the formulation of "special circumstances" adopted by the respondent which strikes me as being too narrow, or otherwise erroneous in law.. . . The legislature has entrusted the power to make act of grace payments to the Minister. Such payments are not based upon any legal entitlement but are made in response to moral obligations assumed by the Commonwealth as a result of the actions of its employees or instrumentalities. The power to make such payments is, by its very nature, one which is particularly suited to be exercised by the Minister. The role of the Court is to ensure that the Minister exercises that power lawfully. Provided he does so, his decision cannot be impugned.