Ahmed v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 46 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ahmed v Harbour Radio Pty Limited [2009] FCA 1113

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether Federal claims based upon s 60 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) should be struck out – whether Federal claims colourable – whether proceedings should be dismissed or transferred to a State court – pleaded s 60 case should be struck out – leave to re-plead not sought and not granted – only common law claims remained – s 60 claims not colourable – proceedings transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales

TRADE PRACTICES – whether the undue harassment or coercion referred to in s 60 of the Trade Practices Act is confined to harassment or coercion of a consumer – whether the harassment or coercion can be of a person who is not a consumer provided that there is a sufficient connection between that conduct and the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer or the payment for goods or services by a consumer – meaning of the expression “in connection with” in s 60 of the Trade Practices Act discussed – pleaded case based upon several talkback radio broadcasts failed to address the necessary connection between the alleged contravening conduct and the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer – pleaded case struck out 

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 60, 82 and 86A

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Capalaba Pty Ltd [2004] ATPR 41‑976 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Davis [2003] FCA 1227 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2003] FCA 1225 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 926 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia (2001) 114 FCR 472 applied
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McCaskey (2000) 104 FCR 8 applied
Bourke v State Bank of New South Wales (1988) 22 FCR 378 applied
Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1987) 18 FCR 212
Cook v PasmincoLtd (2000) 99 FCR 548 cited
Dorotea Pty Ltd v Vancleve Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 629, (1987) ATPR 40-807 applied
Elna Australia Pty Ltd v International Computers (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) (1987) 16 FCR 410 applied
Stalyce Holdings (Aust) Pty Ltd v Cetec Pty Ltd [2002] ATPR 41-866 cited
Worchild v Queensland Television Ltd [2005] FCA 1792 applied

KIM ANNE AHMED v HARBOUR RADIO PTY LIMITED ACN 010 853 317

NSD 1368 of 2008

FOSTER J
1 OCTOBER 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1368 of 2008

BETWEEN:

KIM ANNE AHMED
Applicant

AND:

HARBOUR RADIO PTY LIMITED ACN 010 853 317
Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 OCTOBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The whole of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Statement of Claim filed on 2 September 2008 and the words “Breaches of Section…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ahmed v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ahmed v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd involved the applicant seeking to resolve her dispute with the respondent, Harbour Radio Pty Ltd, in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issues in the case were the pleading of common law causes of action and the application of section 60 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The applicant alleged harassment and coercion under section 60, as well as common law claims for negligence, nuisance, and defamation. The respondent sought to have the section 60 claims struck out, arguing they were colourable and not viable.

The court considered the arguments presented by both parties regarding the pleading of the common law causes of action. It declined to determine the respondent's strike-out application in respect of the balance of the Statement of Claim. The court found that the section 60 claims were not colourable but decided to strike them out due to the particulars provided not being adequate. The court also transferred the proceedings to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for further consideration of the pleadings. The court ruled that the applicant should pay the respondent's costs of the motion and that other costs incurred would be determined at the final hearing in the Supreme Court.

The reasoning of the court was that the applicant's section 60 claims, while not colourable, were not adequately pleaded. The court emphasized that the applicant's lawyers had not responded to the respondent's earlier offer to settle, leading to the current proceedings. The court concluded that the respondent had substantially succeeded in its applications, and therefore, the applicant should pay the costs of the motion. The court also noted that the circumstances did not warrant an indemnity costs order, instead ordering costs on a party/party basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The whole of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Statement of Claim filed on 2 September 2008 and the words “Breaches of Section 60 TPA” in the heading to the Particulars on page 3 of the said Statement of Claim be struck out.

2. Pursuant to s 86A(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

3. The Notice of Motion filed by the respondent on 9 October 2008 otherwise be dismissed.

4. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the said Notice of Motion.

5. The parties’ costs otherwise incurred to date be costs in the proceedings.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FOSTER J
The parties should confer with a view to resolving their differences in respect of the pleading of the common law causes of action. In the event that no sensible resolution is reached, it will be open to either party to make an appropriate application to the Supreme Court in respect of the pleading of those causes of action. I wish to make it quite clear that I have not determined the respondent’s current strike out application in respect of the balance of the Statement of Claim and that my decision not to do so cannot operate prejudicially to the respondent should it wish to make a similar application to the Supreme Court in respect of the pleading of those causes of action. Similarly, nothing I have said should affect any entitlement which the applicant may have to seek leave from the Supreme Court to amend her pleading in such manner as she may be advised. CONCLUSIONS For all of the above reasons, I propose to strike out the applicant’s s 60 claims, to transfer the whole of the proceedings to the Supreme Court of New South Wales and to make no other orders save an appropriate order as to costs. The several applications made by the respondent were, to some extent, made in the alternative. They were advanced in a sensible and logical order. Although I have rejected the respondent’s contention that the s 60 claims were colourable and declined to deal with the last group of strike-out applications made by the respondent in respect of the common law pleadings, the respondent has substantially succeeded in the applications which have been determined by these Reasons for Judgment. In a letter dated 26 September 2008 from the respondent’s lawyers to the lawyers for the applicant, the respondent foreshadowed at least some of the arguments which it ultimately advanced in the present applications. They contended in that letter that the s 60 claims were unarguable. They asserted that those claims had been included only for the purpose of attempting to attract the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. They offered to bear their own costs should the applicant discontinue the present proceedings promptly. The applicant’s lawyers did not respond to that letter and the present applications were then made. Given the substantial success achieved by the respondent, I think that the appropriate order for costs is that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the hearing of the respondent’s Notice of Motion filed on 9 October 2008. I will make an order in those terms. The parties’ costs otherwise incurred to date should abide the final determination of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respondent seeks its costs on an indemnity basis. I do not think that the circumstances of the present case justify an order for costs on an indemnity basis. The respondent has not had complete success. In particular, it has not succeeded in its contention that the s 60 claims were colourable. The debate before me was not caused by manifestly unreasonable conduct on the part of the applicant or her lawyers. I think that the costs should be paid on the party/party basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FOSTER J

It is apparent from the particulars of the alleged breaches of s 60 of the Act provided in the Statement of Claim that 17 broadcasts made by Mr Hadley in the period from September 2007 to May 2008 are relied upon in support of the applicant’s s 60 case and in support of all of the claims which she makes in tort except for the defamation claim. The defamation claim is confined to what was said by Mr Hadley during his on air conversation with the victim’s father on 21 May 2008. No particulars have been provided of the substance of what was said during any of the 15 broadcasts which took place in late 2007. CONSIDERATION AND DECISIONThe Case Based on Section 60 of the Act Section 60 of the Act is in the following terms:60 Harassment and coercionA corporation shall not use physical force or undue harassment or coercion in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a consumer or the payment for goods or services by a consumer. There are some important differences between the s 60 case put in the applicant’s Written Submissions and that which has been pleaded in the Statement of Claim. In his Written Submissions, Counsel for the applicant explained her s 60 case in the following way: (a)The lease between GPT, as lessor, and the applicant and her husband, as lessees, gave to the applicant certain rights, benefits, privileges and facilities in respect of the leased property;(b)Those rights, benefits, privileges and facilities are services within the meaning of the Act; (c)The services were provided, granted or conferred in trade and commerce; (d)The applicant is a consumer of the services provided by GPT under the lease; (e)The customers of the Seafood Lovers business are indirect consumers in respect of the services provided by GPT and direct consumers in respect of the goods sold by the applicant;(f)The respondent directly unduly harassed and/or coerced the applicant’s customers into not dealing with the applicant; (g)The respondent unduly harassed and coerced GPT in connection with the supply of services to the applicant under the lease and in the supply of services or goods to the applicant’s customers, being those who purchased the products sold from the Seafood Lovers business; and(h)The harassment and coercion applied to GPT led it to terminate the applicant’s lease and the harassment and coercion applied to the applicant’s retail customers caused them to boycott the Seafood Lovers business. In the submissions which I have summarised in [24] above, the applicant put forward a case of harassment and coercion of GPT and of the retail customers of the Seafood Lovers business. Counsel for the applicant did not articulate a case based upon harassment and/or coercion of the applicant herself in the Written Submissions filed on behalf of the applicant. The Statement of Claim, on the other hand, contains allegations that the respondent: (a)Unduly harassed the applicant and her business; and(b)Unduly harassed and coerced GPT to terminate the lease which it had granted to the applicant and her husband. The pleaded case based upon harassment of the applicant was relied upon by Counsel for the applicant in his oral submissions. He also relied upon the other ways in which he had put the case in his Written Submissions.