AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  AGL Sales (Qld) P/L v Dawson Sales P/L & Ors
[2009] QCA 262
PARTIES:  AGL SALES (QUEENSLAND) PTY LIMITED
ACN 121 177 740
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
DAWSON SALES PTY LTD
ACN 087 886 913
(first defendant/first appellant)
ANGLO COAL (DAWSON) LIMITED
ACN 100 155 342
(second defendant/second appellant)
MITSUI MOURA INVESTMENT PTY LTD
ACN 088 091 356
(third defendant/third appellant)
FILE NO/S:  Appeal No 2520 of 2009 Appeal No 4390 of 2009 SC No 10731 of 2007
DIVISION:  Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:  General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  4 September 2009
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  5 August 2009; 6 August 2009
JUDGES:  Muir, Fraser and Chesterman JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the orders made
ORDERS: 
1.  Appeal dismissed with costs.
2.  Appeal against the costs orders is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS: CONTRACT LAW – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – where agreement between appellants and respondent whereby appellants to provide specified quantities of coal seam gas to the respondent – where appellants were unable to provide the specified quantity due to the productivity of some wells being lower than expected – where the appellants consequently attempted to reduce the amount it was required to provide under clause 14 of the agreement – whether the situation relied upon by the appellants falls within the definition of a ‘Force Majeure Event’ in Schedule 1 – whether a valid curtailment notice was given under clause 14.1 of the agreement – whether the appellants failed to discharge their onus of proof under clause 14.8 of the agreement

PROCEDURE – COSTS – DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE – OTHER CASES – FAILURE IN PORTION OF A CASE – where respondent was awarded costs at trial – where appellants were given leave by trial judge under s 253 Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) to appeal the costs order – where appellants argue that respondent was unsuccessful at trial in relation to a large portion of its argument and should only receive part of its costs – whether respondent acted reasonably in the way it framed its case regarding the interpretation of the relevant agreement – whether respondent acted reasonably in not applying for summary judgment – whether the respondent should only have been awarded a portion of its costs at trial

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), s 253

Andre & Cie. S.A. v ETS. Michel Blanc & Fils [1977]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 166, distinguished
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian
Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99; [1973]
HCA 36, cited
BHP Coal Pty Ltd and Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG
and Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64, considered
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft Schaft m.B.H. v Vanden Avenne
Izegem P.V.B.A. [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109, considered
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 33,
applied
Di Carlo v Dubois & Ors [2004] QSC 041, applied

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Details
Case
[2009] QCA 262
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the appeal of AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd, the appellants contested the primary judge's finding that they failed to prove the average quantity of gas unable to be delivered under Clause 14.8 of the Agreement. The appellants contended that in the event of a Force Majeure Event, the respondent should be exempt from liability for the entire shortfall in supply, rather than just the shortfall attributable to the Force Majeure Event. The primary judge's interpretation, however, was upheld as it aligned better with the contractual intent and avoided illogical outcomes.

The court was tasked with interpreting the meaning of "Force Majeure Event" as defined in the Gas Supply Agreement, specifically focusing on paragraph (h) which refers to "unpredicted, sudden and material deterioration in the productivity of more than one well." The court had to decide whether this definition could encompass the exhaustion of gas reserves as well as mechanical failures, and whether the term "failure" had a specialised meaning within the gas industry. Additionally, the court needed to determine the proper construction of the "Force Majeure Event" definition and whether it was necessary for the general requirements to be met if any of the specific events listed in paragraph (h) were to qualify as such an event.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeal and agreed with the primary judge's interpretation of Clause 14.8. The court found that the appellants' interpretation would lead to absurd results, such as allowing the respondent to reduce the minimum daily quantity by a large percentage even if the initial shortfall was due to non-Force Majeure causes. The court also agreed with the primary judge's conclusion that the general requirements in the definition of "Force Majeure Event" must be satisfied for any event listed in paragraph (h) to qualify. The appeal against the costs orders was also dismissed.

ORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed with costs.
2. Appeal against the costs orders is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

2.

Appeal against the costs orders is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants challenged the primary judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to prove "the average quantity of Gas unable to be delivered" within the meaning of Clause 14.8 of the Agreement. The appellants argued at first instance and on appeal that where a Force Majeure Event occurred, Dawson was relieved of any liability for the entire shortfall in its supply rather than, as the primary judge held, the shortfall constituted by the gas which could not be delivered because of the Force Majeure Event. The construction favoured by the appellants could not conceivably accord with the contractual intention of the parties: it would be capable of producing bizarre results quite unconnected with the conventional operation of a Force Majeure provision. If, for example, Dawson had consistently been supplying only one-half of the gas required to be supplied under the contract prior to a Force Majeure Event which reduced the quantity able to be supplied by Dawson by a further one-tenth of the contracted volume, Dawson may be entitled under Clause 14.8 to reduce the MDQ by 60 per cent. That would be so even if Dawson's inability to deliver the one-half was caused by matters which did not attract the operation of the Force Majeure provisions. The primary judge's conclusion in this respect was plainly right. Conclusion For the above reasons, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I also agree that, for the reasons given by Fraser JA, Dawson's appeal against the costs orders should be dismissed. FRASER JA: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Muir JA and Chesterman JA concerning the substantive appeal (CA 2520 of 2009). I gratefully accept and will not repeat their Honours’ expositions of the factual background, material contractual provisions, and issues at trial and in the appeal. I agree with Muir JA’s reasons for the conclusion that the substantive appeal should be dismissed with costs. I also agree with Chesterman JA’s conclusion that a further ground on which this appeal should be dismissed is that, on the proper construction of the Gas Supply Agreement, the general requirements in the introductory words of the definition of “Force Majeure Event” must be satisfied if any of the things described in paragraph (h) of that definition is to qualify as such an event. (The appellants accepted that their appeal must fail if that construction were adopted.) My principal reasons for preferring that construction are that it is the natural and literal meaning of the contractual text and it makes commercial sense (a topic upon which Chesterman JA has elaborated), but I also record my specific agreement with paragraphs 72-76 and 81-89 of Chesterman JA’s reasons. The substantive appeal was brought by the defendants against a judgment in favour of the plaintiff after a 20 day trial.[13] The trial judge subsequently heard argument about costs and on 7 April 2009 ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceedings, including any reserved costs to be assessed.[14] On the same day, the trial judge granted an application by the defendants for leave to appeal against that costs order pursuant to s 253 of the Supreme Court Act (Qld) 1995. What follows are my reasons for concluding that this costs appeal should be dismissed. [13] AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] QSC 8. [14] AGL Sales (Qld) P/L v Dawson Sales P/L & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 75.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is also useful to repeat the following passage from the reasons dealing with the factual background to the Agreement and matters giving rise to the present dispute[2]: "When the Agreement was made in 2003, Dawson was extracting gas from a parcel of land within the Moura mining lease called Hillview. But wells have a limited life, at least because there is only so much gas which can be extracted from any one location. And having regard to the increasing MDQ during the life of the Agreement, Dawson well knew that it would have to drill wells beyond Hillview in order to meet its commitments. The land called Ridgedale is alongside Hillview. Dawson commenced exploratory work on Ridgedale at the end of 2004. The first of the production wells on Ridgedale was drilled by 13 June 2005 and began to produce gas from December 2005. Dawson attempted to drill 15 production wells in Ridgedale. Two of them, being the wells numbered RG (Ridgedale) 3 and RG 13, did not produce any gas. … five of them produced some gas but their production had ceased by the time of the Curtailment Notice in July 2007. The other wells were still producing then, although in each case the production had been less than Dawson had expected. So each of these 15 wells was either never productive or was less productive than Dawson had forecast. In each case the problem is said to have been the difficult and unforeseen geological conditions which were encountered." [2] AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Limited v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] QSC 8 at [30] - [31]. Consideration of paragraph (h) in the definition of Force Majeure Event It is convenient to set out the relevant parts of Clause 14 of the Agreement and the definition of "Force Majeure Event". Clause 14 of the Agreement relevantly provided: The term 'Force Majeure Event' is defined in Schedule 1 of the Agreement as follows: " 'Force Majeure Event' means any event or circumstance, or combination of events or circumstances, not within the control of a Party, and which by the exercise of Good Engineering and Operating Practice, and seeking in good faith to comply with its contractual and other obligations by the expenditure of reasonable sums of money and the application of proven technology widely known to and generally available for use by persons in the gas industry, that Party is not able to prevent or (for the time being) overcome, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: Paragraph (h) is not without obscurity. It is not clear why the words "unpredicted, sudden and material deterioration" qualify "productivity of more than one well" and not "failure of wells, equipment or plant breakdown."[3] Nor is the meaning of "failure" and "full or partial interruption" immediately obvious. Take "failure of wells". The words, in their everyday meaning, are capable of encompassing the exhaustion of winnable gas in the wells as well as the breakdown or collapse of the structure of wells or their otherwise becoming inoperable. It is not suggested that "failure" has a particular meaning in the relevant industry. [3] A construction accepted by the parties.