SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: AGL Sales (Qld) P/L v Dawson Sales P/L & Ors
[2009] QCA 262PARTIES: AGL SALES (QUEENSLAND) PTY LIMITED
ACN 121 177 740
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
DAWSON SALES PTY LTD
ACN 087 886 913
(first defendant/first appellant)
ANGLO COAL (DAWSON) LIMITED
ACN 100 155 342
(second defendant/second appellant)
MITSUI MOURA INVESTMENT PTY LTD
ACN 088 091 356
(third defendant/third appellant)FILE NO/S: Appeal No 2520 of 2009 Appeal No 4390 of 2009 SC No 10731 of 2007 DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal ORIGINATING
COURT:Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 4 September 2009 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 5 August 2009; 6 August 2009 JUDGES: Muir, Fraser and Chesterman JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed with costs. 2. Appeal against the costs orders is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: CONTRACT LAW – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – where agreement between appellants and respondent whereby appellants to provide specified quantities of coal seam gas to the respondent – where appellants were unable to provide the specified quantity due to the productivity of some wells being lower than expected – where the appellants consequently attempted to reduce the amount it was required to provide under clause 14 of the agreement – whether the situation relied upon by the appellants falls within the definition of a ‘Force Majeure Event’ in Schedule 1 – whether a valid curtailment notice was given under clause 14.1 of the agreement – whether the appellants failed to discharge their onus of proof under clause 14.8 of the agreement
PROCEDURE – COSTS – DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE – OTHER CASES – FAILURE IN PORTION OF A CASE – where respondent was awarded costs at trial – where appellants were given leave by trial judge under s 253 Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) to appeal the costs order – where appellants argue that respondent was unsuccessful at trial in relation to a large portion of its argument and should only receive part of its costs – whether respondent acted reasonably in the way it framed its case regarding the interpretation of the relevant agreement – whether respondent acted reasonably in not applying for summary judgment – whether the respondent should only have been awarded a portion of its costs at trial
Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), s 253
Andre & Cie. S.A. v ETS. Michel Blanc & Fils [1977]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 166, distinguished
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian
Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99; [1973]
HCA 36, cited
BHP Coal Pty Ltd and Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG
and Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64, considered
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft Schaft m.B.H. v Vanden Avenne
Izegem P.V.B.A. [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109, considered
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 33,
applied
Di Carlo v Dubois & Ors [2004] QSC 041, applied
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- Case
- [2009] QCA 262
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with interpreting the meaning of "Force Majeure Event" as defined in the Gas Supply Agreement, specifically focusing on paragraph (h) which refers to "unpredicted, sudden and material deterioration in the productivity of more than one well." The court had to decide whether this definition could encompass the exhaustion of gas reserves as well as mechanical failures, and whether the term "failure" had a specialised meaning within the gas industry. Additionally, the court needed to determine the proper construction of the "Force Majeure Event" definition and whether it was necessary for the general requirements to be met if any of the specific events listed in paragraph (h) were to qualify as such an event.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeal and agreed with the primary judge's interpretation of Clause 14.8. The court found that the appellants' interpretation would lead to absurd results, such as allowing the respondent to reduce the minimum daily quantity by a large percentage even if the initial shortfall was due to non-Force Majeure causes. The court also agreed with the primary judge's conclusion that the general requirements in the definition of "Force Majeure Event" must be satisfied for any event listed in paragraph (h) to qualify. The appeal against the costs orders was also dismissed.
ORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed with costs.
2. Appeal against the costs orders is dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
2.
Appeal against the costs orders is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is also useful to repeat the following passage from the reasons dealing with the factual background to the Agreement and matters giving rise to the present dispute[2]: "When the Agreement was made in 2003, Dawson was extracting gas from a parcel of land within the Moura mining lease called Hillview. But wells have a limited life, at least because there is only so much gas which can be extracted from any one location. And having regard to the increasing MDQ during the life of the Agreement, Dawson well knew that it would have to drill wells beyond Hillview in order to meet its commitments. The land called Ridgedale is alongside Hillview. Dawson commenced exploratory work on Ridgedale at the end of 2004. The first of the production wells on Ridgedale was drilled by 13 June 2005 and began to produce gas from December 2005. Dawson attempted to drill 15 production wells in Ridgedale. Two of them, being the wells numbered RG (Ridgedale) 3 and RG 13, did not produce any gas. … five of them produced some gas but their production had ceased by the time of the Curtailment Notice in July 2007. The other wells were still producing then, although in each case the production had been less than Dawson had expected. So each of these 15 wells was either never productive or was less productive than Dawson had forecast. In each case the problem is said to have been the difficult and unforeseen geological conditions which were encountered." [2] AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Limited v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] QSC 8 at [30] - [31]. Consideration of paragraph (h) in the definition of Force Majeure Event It is convenient to set out the relevant parts of Clause 14 of the Agreement and the definition of "Force Majeure Event". Clause 14 of the Agreement relevantly provided: The term 'Force Majeure Event' is defined in Schedule 1 of the Agreement as follows: " 'Force Majeure Event' means any event or circumstance, or combination of events or circumstances, not within the control of a Party, and which by the exercise of Good Engineering and Operating Practice, and seeking in good faith to comply with its contractual and other obligations by the expenditure of reasonable sums of money and the application of proven technology widely known to and generally available for use by persons in the gas industry, that Party is not able to prevent or (for the time being) overcome, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: Paragraph (h) is not without obscurity. It is not clear why the words "unpredicted, sudden and material deterioration" qualify "productivity of more than one well" and not "failure of wells, equipment or plant breakdown."[3] Nor is the meaning of "failure" and "full or partial interruption" immediately obvious. Take "failure of wells". The words, in their everyday meaning, are capable of encompassing the exhaustion of winnable gas in the wells as well as the breakdown or collapse of the structure of wells or their otherwise becoming inoperable. It is not suggested that "failure" has a particular meaning in the relevant industry. [3] A construction accepted by the parties.