Pioneer Credit Solutions Pty Ltd v Hyett

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Pioneer Credit Solutions Pty Ltd v Hyett [2021] QDC 11

PARTIES:

PIONEER CREDIT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD

ACN 136062970

(applicant)

v

DANIELLE HYETT

(respondent)

FILE NO:

1467/20

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Noosa Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

04 February 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

10 December 2020

JUDGE:

Muir DCJ

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to appeal filed 22 May 2020 is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES – APPEAL – LEAVE TO TAKE A STEP IN THE PROCEEDING – where the applicant claimed monies owing under assignment of the respondent’s debt together with interest and costs - where there was a greater than two year delay during which no action was taken in the proceedings - where the appellant sought leave in the Magistrates Court under r 389 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to take a step in the proceedings– where the appellant submits that the magistrate failed to give proper consideration to the strength of the applicant’s case – where the appellant submits that the magistrate failed to give proper consideration to whether the delay in proceedings impacted on the prospects of a fair trial – where the appellant submits that the magistrate failed to give proper consideration to whether directions could ensure a timely trial – where the appeal is dismissed

LEGISLATION:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r222, r280, r 389, r786(8).

CASES:

AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262
Artahs Pty Ltd v Galls Stanfield & Smith (a firm) [2013] 2 Qd R 202
Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASCA 131
Di Iorio v Wagener [2016] QCA 97
Ferrari Estate Holdings Pty Ltd v Cooktown Earthmoving & Quarrying Pty Ltd & Anor [2016] QCA 266
Francis v Todd [2011] WASC 185
Horne v Commissioner of Main Roads [1991] 2 Qd R 38
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-506
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
KGK Constructions Pty Ltd v East Coast Earthmoving Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 13
Strahan v Brennan [2014] WASC 190
Tran v Claydon [2003] WASCA 318; (2003) 40 MVR 506
Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Limited [2000] QCA 178

COUNSEL:

A F Messina & J I Sproule for the applicant
S W Trewavas for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Sphere Legal for the applicant
Aitken Whyte for the respondent

Introduction      

  1. The applicant Pioneer Credit Solutions Pty Ltd seeks leave to appeal a decision made by a magistrate on 20 March 2020, to make orders: refusing its application for leave to take a step in the proceeding under r 389 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules1999 (Qld); and granting the respondent Danielle Hyett’s cross application to dismiss the proceeding under UCPR r 280.

  2. The proceeding concerns an alleged debt incurred by the respondent on her credit card with the Bank of Western Australia Limited between December 2012 and…

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Details
Case
[2021] QDC 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pioneer Credit Solutions Pty Ltd sought to recover monies owed under an assignment of a debt from Hyett, the respondent. The matter was heard in the Magistrates Court, where the court was required to determine whether Pioneer Credit Solutions could proceed with its claim, given the significant delay in the proceedings. The primary legal issue was whether the delay in taking steps in the proceedings constituted a breach of the rules and if it would result in unfairness or prejudice to the respondent. The court had to weigh the delay against the prospects of success and other relevant factors.

The court examined the length and nature of the delay, the applicant's prospects of success, and the extent to which the delay had prejudiced the respondent. The magistrate found that the delay was significant, with over six years passing since the cause of action arose, and much of the relevant evidence had been lost due to the passage of time. The court also considered that the delay was largely attributable to the applicant, although it noted that the respondent had not acted with undue haste either. The magistrate concluded that the delay had resulted in prejudice to the respondent, making it extremely difficult for her to defend the claim effectively. As a result, the magistrate dismissed the applicant's application for leave to take a step in the proceedings and granted the respondent's application to dismiss the case for want of prosecution.

The court held that the delay had a substantial impact on the respondent's ability to mount an effective defence, and the prejudice outweighed any potential prospects of success the applicant might have had. The court found that the magistrate's decision was reasonable and did not contain any errors that would warrant an appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the orders made by the magistrate were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal filed 22 May 2020 is dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

On appeal the applicant must identify an error of the kind identified in House v The King.[8] It follows that this court must be satisfied that the magistrate: acted on wrong principal; allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect his determination; mistook the facts; or did not take into account some material consideration. Error in one or more of these categories may be inferred even where it is not explicit on the face of the reasoning but where the decision appears to be unreasonable or plainly unjust. [8] (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-506. Relevant background The relevant background to the applications below as elicited from the material before the magistrate is relatively uncontroversial. The applicant commenced proceedings against the respondent by filing a claim and statement of claim on 3 February 2017. The claim does not seek a specific amount but claims monies owing under assignment from the Bank of Western Australia together with interest and costs. The statement of claim seeks the sum of $36,601.67 as the principal sum owing pursuant to the Contract [the Contract being defined in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim as the credit card agreement bearing original account number 5229803651065691 between the respondent and the Bank of Western Australia] together with interest under the Contract at the rate of 17.99% per annum on this sum from 5 February 2014. The applicant also pleads that on 5 February 2014, by way of assignment, it obtained the benefit of the Contract and that the applicant notified the respondent of this assignment in writing on 10 February 2014. On 22 May 2017 the respondent’s solicitors requested the applicant’s solicitors provide further and better particulars of the statement of claim together with copies of the Contract, assignment, notification and demands and correspondence referred to in the statement of claim (under UCPR r 222). On 23 May 2017 the respondent filed a defence. The defence does not admit the Contract but at the hearing below it was uncontroversial that the respondent entered into a written contract to obtain a credit card with the Bank of Western Australia on 20 March 2008 and that she received and used the card she was issued over the next few years. The defence also contained non admissions about the fact of the assignment and the notice of the assignment and denied that the sum of $36,601.67 (or any amount) was owing by the respondent to the Bank of Western Australia as at 5 February 2014 because any amounts owing by her to the Bank of Western Australia had been “paid in full”.[9] [9] Defence at [4]. The respondent’s evidence was she spoke to a representative of “BankWest” in September 2012 about closing her account and she returned the credit card by post to BankWest shortly afterwards; and that in November 2012 she received her last statement which showed that she had overpaid her account by 4 cents. At the time of service of the defence on 2 June 2017, the respondent’s solicitors followed up on their earlier request for particulars and documents requesting provision of this information “without delay.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The magistrate then then determined that the delay had resulted in prejudice to the respondent leading to an inability to ensure a fair trial as follows:[32]“Well, because of the fact that these events took place in 2012 and 2013 and 2014, some evidence has been lost. The defendant became aware of these proceedings, of course, when served with them in early 2017. And yes, it is said that she could have taken steps then to secure evidence in support of her case, which is that she is not the person responsible for incurring the debts on that particular account. But she had sought further particulars from the plaintiff and, it seems, sought documents from the plaintiff, which documents did not come until January 2020.She, through a lawyer, has tried to access records of the bank of some closed-circuit television recordings of the – some of the retail outlets at which the credit card was used. But the reasonable enquiries there have not declared that there is anything still in existence. Opinions from employees – say, from Bunnings – was it unlikely that they would have security camera footage from 2013. A statement from Coles is it generally does not keep – its general policy is it does not keep CCTV footage of inside stores for over six years. That is a general statement, not specific, of course, as pointed out by the plaintiff.The fact is that it would be extremely hard at this late juncture for the defendant to raise the defence that she wishes to raise, that it is – was not her that incurred these debits to this account. The plaintiff says, well, she received statements of the account subsequent to the time that she says that she informed the bank that she was closing the account and that she cut up her card. The – that is denied by her – that is, the fact that she received those things. It is a strange case in that someone has made payments on that account in payment of the debts incurred on the account.Why I say it is strange is that, well, if it was a fraudulent transaction on the account, one would not expect there to be payments made in reduction of the debt on the account. And well over 40 years, now, in the criminal courts, I find that that would be incredibly peculiar for a fraudulent holder of a credit card to make a payment in reduction of the account. But the plaintiff does not even have access to the relevant accounts from the ANZ as to payments – which account from ANZ was making those payments to this particular credit card subsequent to the time that the defendant says that she stopped the account. It would, of course, be compelling if the plaintiff had those records. But for some reason, they do not have those records.And that is an example of the fact that the delay in this particular matter has or could lead to a fair trial being – well, not occurring. I think the delay is too long. I think the prejudice is so much to the defendant that it outweighs the other matters and the delay is not at her feet in the main. It is more at the feet of the plaintiff and its lawyers. And the onus on satisfying the court that the action should be allowed to proceed is, of course, on the applicant as per Justice Chesterman in Lillyville Proprietary Limited v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society [1999] QSC 372 at paragraph 2. For those reasons, then, the plaintiff’s application for an order allowing for the taking of the new step in the proceeding is dismissed. The defendant’s application to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution is granted. I will hear the parties as to costs.” [emphasis added].[32] Transcript Magistrates Decision 5, ll 40 – 45.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant must show that there was a good reason for excepting the proceeding from the general prohibition in UCPR r 389[19] and that the continuation of the proceeding would not involve injustice or unfairness to the respondent by reason of delay.[20] But the discretion under UCPR r 389 is not to be fettered by rigid rules. It should take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case (including the consideration that ordinary members of the community are entitled to get on with their lives and plan their affairs without having the continuing threat of litigation and its consequences hanging over them) together with the above non-exhaustive factors identified in Tyler as set out in paragraph 32 above.[21][19] Tyler at [5].[20] Tyler at [5].[21] Tyler at [2].The decision below The hearing below (at which both parties were legally represented by counsel), took approximately two and a half hours.[22] During the hearing, Ms Pagan (who appeared by telephone) was cross examined by counsel for the respondent. The magistrate had the benefit of considered written and oral submissions from both counsel and a few hours later he delivered a reasonably detailed ex tempore decision making the orders.[23] [22] Between 9.50a.m. and 12.21p.m.[23] The substance of the transcript of the magistrate’s decision is five pages. As part of his reasoning, the magistrate set out the relevant background to the application.[24] This summary is not challenged on appeal. The magistrate also correctly identified the relevant legal principles and he addressed each of the relevant Tyler factors in turn.[25][24] Transcript Magistrates Decision T 2 to T 3 (l 22). [25] With reference and the order set out by Atkinson J at [2] in Tyler– and as set out in paragraph 32 of these Reasons. In doing so, the magistrate firstly identified that over six years had transpired since the cause of action arose [on 5 February 2014] and that the proceeding had been commenced within time [on 3 February 2012]. He found this delay to be considerable and that it “does play a part in my considerations here.” [26][26] Transcript Magistrates Decision 4, ll 15 – 21. The magistrate then turned to the applicant’s prospects of success; and in doing so he found that “the plaintiff does have some prospects of success, though not overwhelming. And I do not know whether one could class them in that the plaintiff has reasonable prosects.”[27] He then observed that:“The problem is, a lot of the documents have either been lost or destroyed. Not for any nefarious reasons but just in the general course of business because the matter is so old.”[28] [27] Transcript Magistrates Decision 4, ll 30 – 35.[28] Transcript Magistrates Decision 4, ll 27 – 28. After noting that there had been no disobedience to court orders or directions, the magistrate turned to examine whether the litigation had been characterised by periods of delay. The magistrate found that there had been delay on both sides but he found “more of which is attributable to the plaintiff.” [29][29] Transcript Magistrates Decision 5, l 4. The Magistrate characterised the delay between May 2017 and March 2018 of some 10 months in the applicant’s favour as a period “when the plaintiff was negotiating, as responsible plaintiffs do, without rushing forward, of course”.[29] Transcript Magistrates Decision 4, ll 30 – 35.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In evaluating the magistrate's decision, the court first considered whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to properly consider the strength of the applicant’s case. The magistrate noted that while the applicant had some prospects of success, these prospects were not overwhelming. The court acknowledged the magistrate's observation that many documents had been lost or destroyed due to the age of the matter, which impacted the applicant's ability to present a robust case. However, the court found that the magistrate appropriately considered the applicant's prospects of success, noting that while the prospects were not overwhelming, they were not negligible either.

Next, the court assessed whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to properly consider whether the delay in proceedings impacted on the prospects of a fair trial. The magistrate identified that the considerable delay, over six years since the cause of action arose, had led to the loss of evidence. This evidence loss was not due to any nefarious reasons but was a consequence of the general course of business. The magistrate concluded that it would be extremely difficult for the respondent to raise her defence effectively due to the lost evidence. The court held that the magistrate correctly considered the impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a fair defence, emphasizing the importance of timely litigation and the potential prejudice caused by significant delays.

The court then examined whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to properly consider whether directions could ensure a timely trial. The magistrate acknowledged that there had been delays on both sides but found that more of the delay was attributable to the applicant. Despite this, the magistrate concluded that the delay did not necessarily warrant allowing the proceedings to continue, given the significant prejudice to the respondent. The court found that the magistrate adequately addressed the issue of potential directions to ensure a timely trial, though it ultimately decided that the delay's impact on the respondent's ability to defend herself outweighed the applicant's prospects of success.

The court further considered whether the magistrate’s consideration of the delay was unreasonable or plainly unjust, warranting an inference of error. The magistrate found the delay to be considerable and noted that the respondent had suffered prejudice due to the lost evidence. The court concluded that the magistrate's reasoning appeared fair and balanced, taking into account the significant impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a defence. The magistrate's decision did not appear unreasonable or plainly unjust, and thus no inference of error was warranted.

Finally, the court evaluated whether the magistrate correctly applied the relevant legal principles in exercising the discretion under UCPR r 389. The magistrate identified and correctly applied the relevant factors set out in Tyler, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the applicant's prospects of success, and the potential prejudice to the respondent. The court found that the magistrate's application of these principles was appropriate and that the decision was not fettered by rigid rules but was instead based on a comprehensive consideration of all relevant circumstances. The court held that the magistrate correctly exercised the discretion under UCPR r 389, and the decision to dismiss the applicant's application for leave to take a step in the proceedings was justified.