DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Pioneer Credit Solutions Pty Ltd v Hyett [2021] QDC 11
PARTIES:
PIONEER CREDIT SOLUTIONS PTY LTD
ACN 136062970
(applicant)
v
DANIELLE HYETT
(respondent)
FILE NO:
1467/20
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Noosa Magistrates Court
DELIVERED ON:
04 February 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 December 2020
JUDGE:
Muir DCJ
ORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal filed 22 May 2020 is dismissed
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES – APPEAL – LEAVE TO TAKE A STEP IN THE PROCEEDING – where the applicant claimed monies owing under assignment of the respondent’s debt together with interest and costs - where there was a greater than two year delay during which no action was taken in the proceedings - where the appellant sought leave in the Magistrates Court under r 389 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) to take a step in the proceedings– where the appellant submits that the magistrate failed to give proper consideration to the strength of the applicant’s case – where the appellant submits that the magistrate failed to give proper consideration to whether the delay in proceedings impacted on the prospects of a fair trial – where the appellant submits that the magistrate failed to give proper consideration to whether directions could ensure a timely trial – where the appeal is dismissed
LEGISLATION:
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r222, r280, r 389, r786(8).
CASES:
AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262
Artahs Pty Ltd v Galls Stanfield & Smith (a firm) [2013] 2 Qd R 202
Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASCA 131
Di Iorio v Wagener [2016] QCA 97
Ferrari Estate Holdings Pty Ltd v Cooktown Earthmoving & Quarrying Pty Ltd & Anor [2016] QCA 266
Francis v Todd [2011] WASC 185
Horne v Commissioner of Main Roads [1991] 2 Qd R 38
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-506
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
KGK Constructions Pty Ltd v East Coast Earthmoving Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 13
Strahan v Brennan [2014] WASC 190
Tran v Claydon [2003] WASCA 318; (2003) 40 MVR 506
Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Limited [2000] QCA 178COUNSEL: A F Messina & J I Sproule for the applicant
S W Trewavas for the respondentSOLICITORS: Sphere Legal for the applicant
Aitken Whyte for the respondent
Introduction
The applicant Pioneer Credit Solutions Pty Ltd seeks leave to appeal a decision made by a magistrate on 20 March 2020, to make orders: refusing its application for leave to take a step in the proceeding under r 389 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules1999 (Qld); and granting the respondent Danielle Hyett’s cross application to dismiss the proceeding under UCPR r 280.
The proceeding concerns an alleged debt incurred by the respondent on her credit card with the Bank of Western Australia Limited between December 2012 and…
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- Case
- [2021] QDC 11
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the length and nature of the delay, the applicant's prospects of success, and the extent to which the delay had prejudiced the respondent. The magistrate found that the delay was significant, with over six years passing since the cause of action arose, and much of the relevant evidence had been lost due to the passage of time. The court also considered that the delay was largely attributable to the applicant, although it noted that the respondent had not acted with undue haste either. The magistrate concluded that the delay had resulted in prejudice to the respondent, making it extremely difficult for her to defend the claim effectively. As a result, the magistrate dismissed the applicant's application for leave to take a step in the proceedings and granted the respondent's application to dismiss the case for want of prosecution.
The court held that the delay had a substantial impact on the respondent's ability to mount an effective defence, and the prejudice outweighed any potential prospects of success the applicant might have had. The court found that the magistrate's decision was reasonable and did not contain any errors that would warrant an appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the orders made by the magistrate were upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal filed 22 May 2020 is dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In evaluating the magistrate's decision, the court first considered whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to properly consider the strength of the applicant’s case. The magistrate noted that while the applicant had some prospects of success, these prospects were not overwhelming. The court acknowledged the magistrate's observation that many documents had been lost or destroyed due to the age of the matter, which impacted the applicant's ability to present a robust case. However, the court found that the magistrate appropriately considered the applicant's prospects of success, noting that while the prospects were not overwhelming, they were not negligible either.
Next, the court assessed whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to properly consider whether the delay in proceedings impacted on the prospects of a fair trial. The magistrate identified that the considerable delay, over six years since the cause of action arose, had led to the loss of evidence. This evidence loss was not due to any nefarious reasons but was a consequence of the general course of business. The magistrate concluded that it would be extremely difficult for the respondent to raise her defence effectively due to the lost evidence. The court held that the magistrate correctly considered the impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a fair defence, emphasizing the importance of timely litigation and the potential prejudice caused by significant delays.
The court then examined whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to properly consider whether directions could ensure a timely trial. The magistrate acknowledged that there had been delays on both sides but found that more of the delay was attributable to the applicant. Despite this, the magistrate concluded that the delay did not necessarily warrant allowing the proceedings to continue, given the significant prejudice to the respondent. The court found that the magistrate adequately addressed the issue of potential directions to ensure a timely trial, though it ultimately decided that the delay's impact on the respondent's ability to defend herself outweighed the applicant's prospects of success.
The court further considered whether the magistrate’s consideration of the delay was unreasonable or plainly unjust, warranting an inference of error. The magistrate found the delay to be considerable and noted that the respondent had suffered prejudice due to the lost evidence. The court concluded that the magistrate's reasoning appeared fair and balanced, taking into account the significant impact of the delay on the respondent's ability to present a defence. The magistrate's decision did not appear unreasonable or plainly unjust, and thus no inference of error was warranted.
Finally, the court evaluated whether the magistrate correctly applied the relevant legal principles in exercising the discretion under UCPR r 389. The magistrate identified and correctly applied the relevant factors set out in Tyler, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the applicant's prospects of success, and the potential prejudice to the respondent. The court found that the magistrate's application of these principles was appropriate and that the decision was not fettered by rigid rules but was instead based on a comprehensive consideration of all relevant circumstances. The court held that the magistrate correctly exercised the discretion under UCPR r 389, and the decision to dismiss the applicant's application for leave to take a step in the proceedings was justified.