Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee

Link copied
Case Copied 76 min read

For a Court ready (fee required) version please follow this link

NOTE: HIGH COURT ORDER SUPPRESSING PUBLICATION OF THE NAME AND IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE APPELLANT INCLUDING DETAILS OF HIS PRACTICE AND ITS LOCATION REMAINS IN FORCE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 22/2007
[2008] NZSC 55

BETWEENZ


Appellant

ANDDENTAL COMPLAINTS ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE


Respondent

Hearing:13 November 2007

Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Anderson JJ

Counsel:A H Waalkens QC and A L Credin for Appellant


B M Stanaway and A M Toohey for Respondent

Judgment:25 July 2008 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is allowed to the extent that the allegation of professional misconduct in 1987 is not to form part of the charge heard by the Tribunal.

BIn all other respects the appeal is dismissed.

CThe appellant is to pay costs to the respondent of $10,000, together with reasonable disbursements to be fixed if necessary by the Registrar.

Table of Contents  Para No

Elias CJ  [1]
Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ  [75]
Anderson J  [142]

ELIAS CJ

[1]       The appeal concerns the intersection between criminal prosecution and professional disciplinary action taken under statutory authority.  It raises the question whether it may amount to an abuse of the statutory disciplinary power to charge a dentist with indecent assault, despite his previous acquittal in criminal proceedings in respect of three incidents which are the subject of the disciplinary charges and despite the fact that the fourth claim has not been the subject of criminal proceedings at all.  A related but subsidiary question arises as to the standard of proof to be applied by a disciplinary body.  These questions are not adequately addressed simply by labelling proceedings as “civil”, a classification which is not accurately applied to statutory disciplinary proceedings and which is not in any event determinative of either abuse of power or the appropriate standard of proof.  Nor is it adequate to say that a principal purpose of professional disciplinary processes is maintenance of standards, in protection of the public, rather than the punishment of criminal conduct.  Criminal law, too, aims to protect the public through enforcing minimum standards of behaviour.[1] 

[1]See R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 AC 787 at para [17] per Lord Steyn.

[2]       What constitutes abuse of power requires “a broad, merits-based judgment” in context.[2]  I have come to the conclusion that in the present case those charges of professional misconduct which are based entirely on the indecent assaults can fairly be determined only by criminal process.  In my view it was an abuse of the power to bring disciplinary charges for the Complaints Assessment Committee constituted under the provisions of the Dental Act 1988 to refer claims of indecent assault for determination by the Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal.  I reach that conclusion, for reasons more fully developed at paras [56] to [74], because of four principal and overlapping considerations.  They are:

·     determination of culpability for a crime is not in general appropriately undertaken in our legal system “by a method…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] NZSC 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of New Zealand was asked to determine whether the Dental Complaints Assessment Committee (the Committee) abused its statutory power by bringing professional disciplinary charges against a dentist (the dentist) for indecent assault. The dentist had previously been acquitted of the criminal charges relating to the same conduct. The Court found that it was an abuse of power for the Committee to bring charges for conduct which was the same as that for which the dentist had been acquitted in criminal proceedings. The Court found that this was because it was not appropriate to undertake the determination of culpability for a crime by a method which denies the offender the protection of the criminal law. The Court also found that it was an abuse of power for the Committee to bring charges for conduct which constituted a crime because it was not in the public interest for administrative processes to determine criminal culpability. The Court held that the criminal standard of proof should apply to disciplinary proceedings where serious allegations are made, including where the allegations also amount to a crime. The Court found that the Committee did not abuse its power by bringing charges for conduct which had not been the subject of criminal proceedings. The Court found that the disciplinary process was materially different to the criminal process and that it was not an abuse of power to bring charges for conduct which had been acquitted in criminal proceedings because the scope of the disciplinary inquiry was wider than that of the criminal proceeding. The Court also found that it was not an abuse of power to include allegations of indecent assault in the disciplinary charges because the allegations were relevant to the wider aspects of the dentist's conduct which the Committee was entitled to consider.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established