R v Greig
[2025] NZHC 2145
•1 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2024-009-4424
[2025] NZHC 2145
THE KING V
ALEX ROBIN GREIG
Hearing: 1 August 2025 Appearances:
A M Harvey for Crown
K J Basire and J D Lucas for Defendant
Judgment:
1 August 2025
ORAL JUDGMENT OF OSBORNE J
Introduction
[1] Around midnight on Saturday 30 December 2023 there was a motor vehicle collision on Tunnel Road in Heathcote Valley, Christchurch. As a result of the collision, two victims were declared deceased at the scene and three others, together with the defendant, Alex Greig, were taken to Christchurch Public Hospital in critical conditions. The two deceased victims and one of the injured victims had been travelling south in a car. One of the other injured victims had also been travelling south but on a motorcycle close behind the others’ vehicle. The defendant and the other injured victim were travelling north when the car they were in collided with the other car.
R v GREIG [2025] NZHC 2145 [1 August 2025]
The finding of unfitness
[2] The defendant is charged with the manslaughter of two victims1 and with being a person in charge of a motor vehicle, causing injury to the other three victims, while having excess blood alcohol.2
[3] The defendant has been found unfit to stand trial pursuant to s 8A Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (CP(MIP) Act).3 The defendant was assessed by two health assessors for the fitness for trial hearing—Dr James Foulds and Dr Peter Dean, both consultant psychiatrists. They found the defendant has a diffuse axonal injury. Both experts confirmed they saw very little chance of substantial improvement in the defendant’s cognitive functioning based on the natural history of the injury of the kind he has experienced.4
The scope of the s 10(2) involvement hearing
The statutory provisions and the Court’s approach to the hearing
[4] The defendant’s involvement in what occurred now falls to be determined pursuant to s 10(2) of the CP(MIP) Act which relevantly provides:
10 Inquiry before trial into defendant’s involvement in the offence
…
(2) The court must decide whether the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the evidence against the
defendant is sufficient to establish that the defendant caused the act or omission that forms the basis of the offence with which the defendant is charged.
…
[5] In Rafferty v R, the Court of Appeal agreed with the conclusion expressed by Edwards J in R v Tongia that “the full force of the protections enshrined in our criminal
1 Manslaughter: Crimes Act 1961, ss 160(2)(a), 171 and 177 – maximum penalty life imprisonment.
2 Person in charge of motor vehicle causing injury: Land Transport Act 1998, s 61(1)(b) – maximum penalty five years’ imprisonment or $20,000 fine.
3 R v Greig [2025] NZHC 1064.
4 At [38], referring to the experts’ joint memorandum dated 16 April 2025.
justice system, and most importantly those found in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, should apply” to s 10 hearings.5
[6] In Tongia, Edwards J made reference to the s 10 inquiry being “akin to a trial”.6 In that context, her Honour identified the possible need for a distinction to be drawn between those whose “unfitness” is temporary and those whose “unfitness” is permanent:7
[47] It may be that a distinction can be drawn between those defendants who have a treatable condition, meaning their “unfitness” is temporary, and those defendants who have a condition that means their “unfitness’ is permanent. Less intensive scrutiny of the underlying facts at the involvement hearing stage will be appropriate in the former case. In those cases, a defendant is likely to be detained for a period of time to allow treatment to be undertaken, with the prospect remaining of the defendant being declared fit to stand trial at a future point in time. The involvement hearing does not operate as an alternative to trial in those cases, but as a filtering process to ensure there is sufficient evidence to justify treatment orders pending further trial.
[48] Different considerations apply when the defendant’s mental impairment is irreversible however, as appears to be the case with [the defendant]. In these situations, a defendant will remain permanently “unfit” and is unlikely to ever face trial. The involvement hearing is the only opportunity the defendant will have to contest the charge and put the Crown to proof and in that sense is very much an alternative to trial. I consider that the full force of the protections enshrined in our criminal justice system, and most importantly those found in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, should apply in those circumstances.
Establishing unlawfulness
[7] In Tongia, the central question to be considered by Edwards J related to whether the Court, at the defendant’s involvement hearing, had to consider not only whether the defendant caused the victims’ death and injury but also the evidence as to the lawfulness of the defendant’s actions including the evidence of self-defence. Edwards J concluded:
[51] … I consider the s 10(2) hearing involves more than just establishing that the defendant caused the acts or omissions. The unlawfulness of those acts or omissions must also be weighed in the balance. This flows from the scheme and purpose of the Act. Reversing the sequence of the stages of the inquiry also suggests that the involvement hearing is to be considered an
5 Rafferty v R [2024] NZCA 217 at [25], citing R v Tongia [2020] NZHC 2382, [2021] 2 NZLR 743 at [48].
6 R v Tongia, above n 5, at [45]–[46].
7 Footnotes omitted.
alternative to trial, rather than an addition to trial, at least for those defendants whose “unfitness” is irreversible.
[52] On this basis, I directed that the Crown had to disprove self-defence on the balance of probabilities.
[8] The conclusions reached by Edwards J in Tongia, relating specifically to the potential availability of the defence of self-defence, are likely to apply similarly, as Ms Basire has noted, where there is objective evidence which raises the issue of mistake or accident. That has been recognised by the House of Lords in R v Antoine.8 Objective evidence, of the nature referred to in Antoine, may involve independent eye- witness evidence, CCTV footage, cell site and scene of crime or expert forensic evidence.9 That said, the consideration of a defence based on mistake or accident, by its nature, may call for consideration in cases involving intentional crimes, such as murder. The offences with which Mr Greig is charged do not fall neatly into that category.
The standard of proof
[9] If the court is satisfied to the requisite standard that the evidence against the defendant is sufficient to establish he caused the act or omissions that form the basis of the offences respectively of manslaughter and, as the person in charge of a motor vehicle, causing injury, then there will be a disposition hearing under subpart (3) of the CP(MIP) Act to determine how to deal with the defendant.10
[10] The standard of proof here under s 10(2) is the balance of probabilities—I adopt a discussion of this requirement by Wylie J in R v Rafferty.11 In short:
(a)the court must be satisfied by the evidence the fact in issue is more likely (or more probable) than not;12 and
8 R v Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340 (HL) at 376–377, as cited in R v Tongia, above n 5, at [56].
9 R v Tongia, above n 5, at [57], citing R v Wells [2015] EWCA Crim 2, [2015] 1 WLR 2797 at [15].
10 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 23.
11 R v Rafferty [2022] NZHC 642 at [16]–[21].
12 Citing Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] NZSC 55, [2009] 1 NZLR 1 at [26] and [102]; and Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 (HCA) at 521–522.
(b)this standard of proof may be applied flexibly to accommodate serious allegations.13 This flexible approach is particularly appropriate where the charges involve the most serious allegations and consequences.14
Background
[11] The evidence for this hearing has come first from the written statements of seven witnesses, including two of the injured victims. Three police witnesses have also provided statements and have been available for cross-examination this morning. Additionally, the Crown has provided photographic and documentary exhibits, together with CCTV footage, which I have had the opportunity to fully review before this hearing.
[12] At approximately 11.57 pm on 30 December 2023, Patrick Anngow was driving his Chevrolet Bel Air south on Tunnel Road towards Lyttelton. In the vehicle with him were Andrew McFarlane and Babe Wihongi. The Chevrolet was unwarranted.
[13] Craig Wilson, a friend of the three, was travelling behind the Chevrolet on his Harley Davidson motorcycle.
[14] At the same time, the defendant was driving a 2006 Toyota Avensis, owned by Motu Monsall. Mr Monsall was in the passenger seat beside the defendant. The defendant was driving north on Tunnel Road (having a posted speed limit of 100 kmph). A witness, who had been travelling through the Lyttelton Tunnel and onto Tunnel Road, described the Toyota following close behind him through and out of the tunnel. The witness states he was travelling along Tunnel Road at about 105 kmph. Near the Port Hills Road off-ramp, he started to veer to the left to take the exit.
[15] At that point there was also a central traffic island that becomes a concrete barrier separating the two southbound lanes from the two northbound lanes. The defendant, moved to the wrong side of the barrier and then continued driving north on the wrong side of the carriageway. The evidence of Senior Constable Beaver
13 Citing Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee, above n 12, at [102].
14 R v Rafferty, above n 11, at [21].
indicates that there would have been a “Keep Left” sign at the barrier where the barrier begins that had apparently been broken off some time previously. He confirmed, by reference to photographs, the road was marked with white-painted arrows on the left side indicating to keep left as well as double yellow lines between the two sides of the carriageway.
[16] A vehicle driven by a second witness travelling south in the eastern-most lane narrowly avoided a collision with the defendant when the defendant had travelled approximately 200 metres on the wrong side.
[17] A short distance behind this witness’s vehicle, Patrick Anngow was driving in the Chevrolet, followed by Mr Wilson on his Harley Davidson. Both those vehicles were in the western-most lane. The defendant’s Toyota collided with Mr Anngow’s Chevrolet. The Chevrolet exploded and produced a large fireball. Mr Wilson was thrown from his motorcycle down the bank onto the eastern side of Tunnel Road.
[18] The force of the impact killed Mr Anngow and Ms Wihongi. Mr McFarlane was critically injured and was semi-conscious when found by those first at the scene. Mr Wilson received extensive injuries to his left leg.
[19] The Toyota driven by the defendant suffered extensive damage. Mr Monsall was trapped in the passenger seat and was cut out of the vehicle by Fire and Emergency New Zealand staff. The defendant was located conscious and mumbling on the ground near the open driver’s door. His cell phone was located, sometime afterwards, nearby.
[20] Approximately six hours after the crash, a blood sample was taken from the defendant which, upon analysis by ESR, identified:
(a)the defendant’s blood alcohol level was 109 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood; and
(b)the defendant’s blood drug results detected THC with a range value between 2.1 to 3.7. The tolerance legal limit is 1 and the high-risk level is 3.
[21] There is also evidence that the driver of the Chevrolet may have been impaired by alcohol and/or drugs. There is also evidence as to the Harley Davidson rider being drug-impaired and in following too close behind the Chevrolet.
[22] CCTV footage obtained by the police in relation to the movements of the Toyota and of Mr Monsall and the defendant during the course of 30 December 2023 clearly indicates the defendant had become the driver of the vehicle by the evening of 30 December 2023. The defendant’s location immediately after the collision, on the ground near the driver’s door, while Mr Monsall remained trapped in the passenger seat of the Toyota, indicates the defendant was the driver of the Toyota at the time of the collision.
Cross-examination of chief witnesses
Constable Cameron Brown
[23] Constable Cameron Brown, a constable on duty at Christchurch South Police Station on 30 December 2023, was despatched to the scene of the vehicle collision at
11.59 pm. He gives evidence particularly in relation to attending the vicinity of the collision and attending to those who had been in the collision.
[24] He identifies by reference to a photograph showing a person lying on the ground, which we know to be the defendant, near the driver’s door of the Toyota not able to move. He also refers to the male seated in the front passenger seat we know to be Mr Monsall and refers to the locating of the cell phone some time after the collision.
[25] Ms Basire asked questions of Constable Brown around the precise positioning of the person in the front passenger seat and referred him to the evidence of another witness as to Mr Monsall being slumped towards the driver’s side. Constable Brown did not perceive that on his view of the passenger. He identified where the cell phone and the keys were found to the right of the Toyota driver’s door.
Senior Constable Paul Beaver
[26] Senior Constable Paul Beaver is a member of the Canterbury Serious Crash Unit, New Zealand Police. He has numerous specialist qualifications in crash investigation, together with academic degrees. He has provided an extensive crash investigation report based on physical evidence and on witness interviews. He concluded the Toyota was travelling at an average speed between 120 kmph and 139 kmph prior to the crash while the Chevrolet was travelling at an average speed between 101 kmph and 118 kmph prior to the crash.
[27] He spoke to his conclusions as to the causative factors. He explained the limited visibility each of the drivers would have had of one another as they rounded what is a bend in the road, with vegetation affecting visibility. The Senior Constable confirmed in cross-examination that a “Keep Left” sign was sitting unseeable on the ground and appeared to have previously broken off by the condition he saw it in. He confirmed that the condition of the Chevrolet and, in particular, the degree to which it was rusted, would have contributed to the severity of the injuries sustained by the passengers. He also confirmed the lack of seat belts in a vehicle of that age, and the lack of restraint would have meant that the two Chevrolet passengers were able to be ejected from the vehicle following impact.
[28] The witness was questioned as to speed calculations and confirmed that the respective speeds reduced the ability of both drivers to react. He confirmed the closeness of the Harley Davidson to the Chevrolet would have also contributed to the collision and its consequences.
Detective Brett Goucher
[29] Detective Brett Goucher, assigned to the Canterbury Criminal Investigation Branch of New Zealand Police, was on the morning of 31 December 2023 assigned as the officer in charge of matters arising from the collision, which had been code-named “Operation Tunnel”. It was he who obtained CCTV footage and has produced a photo book together with the CCTV footage. He spoke to a number of witnesses. He did not speak with the defendant until 23 April 2024 as any meeting had to be delayed due to the defendant’s medical condition. The defendant on that occasion then stated
to Detective Goucher he had no memory of the crash or details relating to the Toyota or the other male in the Toyota.
[30] The witness also explained Mr Greig would have had a higher blood alcohol level at the time of the accident than when the sample was taken later at hospital. Expert calculations approximated Mr Grieg’s blood alcohol level at the time of the crash as being between 170 to 260 milligrams per 100 millilitres.
[31] Ms Basire had Detective Goucher confirm that he had not attended the scene of the collision at the time himself. He was aware the cell phone attributed to Mr Greig was taken from the scene only some time after the collision. He was asked to confirm he was satisfied the chain of custody in relation to Mr Greig’s blood sample assured us that the blood sample was indeed Mr Greig’s and he confirmed that. He confirmed it had been assumed in the course of the investigation that Mr Monsall was severely intoxicated at the time of the collision. He was cross-examined as to the still photographs taken from CCTV footage at 9.55 pm which he had identified by reference to a t-shirt as showing Mr Greig in the driver’s seat. He explained that when the original CCTV footage is seen it is clearer and he has no doubt that he has identified Mr Greig correctly as the driver in that image.
The elements of the offences
[32] To prove the charge of manslaughter, the Crown will be required to establish that:
(a)the defendant was driving the Toyota at the time of the collision;
(b)the defendant’s driving at the relevant time constituted a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person driving a motor vehicle;
(c)the defendant’s driving at the relevant time was likely to cause more than trivial harm to others in the vicinity; and
(d)the defendant’s driving was a substantial and operative, but not necessarily the only, cause of the deaths.
[33] To prove the charge of being a person in charge of a motor vehicle causing injury, the Crown will be required to prove that:
(a)the defendant was in charge of the Toyota at the relevant time;
(b)the defendant, in charge of or driving a motor vehicle, caused the injuries; and
(c)the proportion of alcohol in the defendant’s blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.
Standard of care applicable to persons under legal duties or performing unlawful acts.
[34] Relevantly to the charges of manslaughter in this case, s 150A(2) Crimes Act 1961 provides:
150AStandard of care applicable to persons under legal duties or performing unlawful acts
…
(2) For the purposes of this Part, a person is criminally responsible for omitting to discharge or perform a legal duty, or performing an unlawful act, to which this section applies only if, in the circumstances, the omission or unlawful act is a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies or who performs that unlawful act.
[35] In relation to the “major departure from the standard of care…” test in s 150A(2) there is a two-step process as identified by Toogood J in JF v Police:15
[39] ... The first step is to consider whether there has been a departure from the standard of care expected from a reasonable person. But this in itself is not sufficient and the second step is to consider whether such a departure was “major” by reference to community standards. In determining the second step, the seriousness of the appellant’s breach of duty and the circumstances in which the appellant was in when it occurred are highly relevant and, when looked at as a whole, the conduct must be so bad as to justifiably be considered criminal.
15 JF v Police [2013] NZHC 2729, (2013) 26 CLNZ 764 at [39] (footnotes omitted).
[36] The concept of “unlawful act” identified in s 150A(2) encompasses driving with excess blood or breath alcohol.
Discussion
[37] I preface my conclusion as to the events and causation that there were clearly contributing factors to the collisions which relate to matters other than Mr Greig’s driving as demonstrated through Ms Basire’s questioning of the officers. But the key question in this context is whether the defendant driving was a substantial and operative, but not necessarily the only, cause of the deaths.
[38] The available evidence, including the CCTV footage which I have reviewed, establishes the following on the balance of probabilities:
(a)The defendant had been drinking alcohol prior to the collision on 30 December 2023.
(b)The defendant, travelling northbound on Tunnel Road, at approximately 11.57 pm on Saturday, 30 December 2023, had crossed from the northbound lane to the southbound lane and had continued north in the southbound lane travelling against the traffic to the point of collision.
(c)The Toyota driven by the defendant on this length of the Tunnel Road had accelerated from approximately 105 kmph and was travelling at an average speed of 120 kmph to 139 kmph prior to the collision.
(d)The defendant drove the Toyota into collision with the Chevrolet driven by Mr Anngow.
(e)A collision also resulted from the initial collision between the Toyota and the Chevrolet causing the Harley Davidson ridden by Mr Wilson to collide with the Toyota.
(f)The blood sample taken from the defendant some 5.75 hours after the collision contained 109 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and THC within the range of 2.1 to 3.7.
[39] I am satisfied that neither the nature of the charges in this case nor the facts raise a relevant issue of accident.
[40] I am satisfied the defendant’s driving at the relevant time constituted a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person driving a motor vehicle and that the defendant’s driving was likely to cause more than trivial harm to others in the vicinity.
[41] I am satisfied the defendant, by causing the vehicle accident, caused the deaths of Mr Anngow and Ms Wihongi. I am also satisfied the defendant, as a person whose proportion of blood was 109 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood when he was in charge of a motor vehicle, caused bodily injury to Mr Monsall, Mr McFarlane, and Mr Wilson.
[42] Notwithstanding the gravity of these findings for the defendant, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities he was involved in the offences with which he is charged.
[43] In these circumstances, a possibility raised by Ms Basire that the Court might dismiss the manslaughter charges under s 147 Criminal Procedure Act and consider whether the commission of an included charge is established does not arise. I am satisfied the defendant was involved in the offences as charged.
Consequences
[44] It is now necessary to order inquiries to be made to determine the most suitable way of dealing with the defendant under ss 24 or 25 of the CP(MIP) Act.
[45] For the purpose of determining the most suitable method of dealing with the defendant, it would be helpful if a report or reports could be obtained from either
Dr Foulds or Dr Dean. The Registrar is directed to contact each of them to see if they can assist.
[46] With the assistance of submissions counsel now just made, I remand Mr Greig to his present bail address pursuant to s 23(2)(a) of the CP(MIP) Act. There is a condition added to his bail conditions that he attend all appointments as directed and requested in the period of the remand.
[47] The defendant is to be brought back before the court for a disposition hearing at the first available date that can be fixed in consultation with counsel. The CP(MIP) Act requires the inquiry to be completed as quickly as possible and, in any event, within 30 days after the date of this judgment.16 For that purpose, I will be remanding the defendant to 9.15 am on Friday, 29 August 2025. I add to my previous direction for the Registrar to obtain a further report or reports from either Dr Foulds or Dr Dean that the report is also to address any assessment under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.
Osborne J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch Josh Lucas, Barrister, Christchurch
16 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 23(4).
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