R v Greig
[2025] NZHC 2889
•1 October 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2024-009-4424
[2025] NZHC 2889
THE KING v
ALEX ROBIN GREIG
Hearing: 1 October 2025 Counsel:
S J Mallett for Crown
K J Basire for Defendant
Judgment:
1 October 2025
ORAL JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J
[Disposition hearing]
Introduction
[1] Mr Alex Greig you face two charges of manslaughter1 and three charges of being a person in charge of a motor vehicle causing injury.2 On 6 May of this year, Eaton J in this Court found Mr Greig that you were unfit to stand trial.3 On 1 August of this year, Osborne J also concluded Mr Greig that you were involved in the offences as you were charged.4
1 Crimes Act 1961, s 171 and 177: maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
2 Land Transport Act 1998, s 61(1)(b): maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or a $20,000 fine.
3 R v Greig [2025] NZHC 1064.
4 R v Greig [2025] NZHC 2145.
R v GREIG [2025] NZHC 2889 [1 October 2025]
[2] The remaining matter for me to determine today is one of disposition. In other words how Mr Greig you should be dealt with under ss 24 and 25 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (CPMIP). To assist in this matter, a Health Assessment Report has been provided by Ms Kingi, a consultant clinical psychologist, and Dr McLeavey, a consultant psychiatrist.
[3] It is necessary for me first to traverse the difficult facts of this case and I now do so briefly.
The offending
[4] On 30 December 2023, Mr Greig you were driving on Tunnel Road heading towards Christchurch from Lyttelton. At the time, you were unlicenced with your learner’s licence having expired in May 2023. In the front passenger seat of the vehicle was Mr Monsall, who owned the vehicle and was unknown to you. Mr Greig you were driving over 100 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. Approximately 1.5 km after leaving the tunnel, prior to the Port Hills Road off-ramp, the motorist ahead of you indicated to take the exit. This section of the road has a speed limit of 100 km/h and has two lanes heading in both directions, with a centre barrier separating the lanes.
[5] Mr Greig you overtook the other motorist, and in doing so ended up on the wrong side of the centre barrier, driving north in the south bound lanes. You approached a slight bend in the road and narrowly missed an oncoming motorist. At approximately 11.57 pm your vehicle Mr Greig collided head-on with a Chevrolet motor car. A driver and two passengers were in the Chevrolet. The impact caused the Chevrolet to explode into a large fireball. After the impact, both cars spun sideways. While your vehicle Mr Greig was spinning, it was hit by a motorcyclist. At the time of the crash, your average speed Mr Greig was estimated at between 120–139 km/h, and the Chevrolet car at between 111–118 km/h.
[6] Two occupants of the Chevrolet were declared dead at the scene. The remaining occupant, the passenger in your vehicle Mr Greig, and the motorcyclist were all taken to hospital in a critical condition. A blood sample taken from you after the crash revealed the presence of THC and a blood alcohol level of 109 milligrams
of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood. You reported that you had no memory of the crash and could not remember anything after 25 December 2023.
[7] As a result of the injuries suffered in the car crash Mr Greig, you have a diffuse axonal injury to your brain. It is a serious traumatic brain injury which left you unable to comprehend your legal situation to retain information, or to instruct counsel. Your counsel Mr Greig reports that you have been working with the Laura Fergusson Brain Injury Trust since your release from hospital. Your health condition has deteriorated and you have suffered several tonic-clonic seizures since April 2025 which have worsened your cognitive functioning and physical health, and they have negatively impacted on your mental well-being.
The Health Assessor Report
[8] I turn now to the Health Assessor Report which was written by Ms Annmaree Kingi and co-signed by Dr Simone McLeavey.
[9] The report noted that a neuropsychological screening assessment on 27 May 2024 found that your recall ability Mr Greig fell into the second percentile after a 30- minute delay, and that your working memory and information processing speed were in the third and eighth percentile. An Addenbrookes Cognitive Exam administered on 21 October 2024, and re-administered on 1 November 2024 and March 2025 found that you Mr Greig had deficits across short-term memory, verbal fluency and spatial skills. Dr Foulds found the pattern of results were consistent with an individual who had mild to moderately advanced Alzheimer’s disease.
[10] The report also records discussions with your social worker Mr Greig, a Ms Carter. Ms Carter reported you found that all the Court-based appointments and appearances required considerable effort on your part that left you fatigued. You are also said to have significant sensory sensitivity to noise and light, as well as severe headaches, all of which cause profound fatigue. Slowed processing speed and memory are reported to remain major issues for you and you are said to be totally reliant on Ms Carter, your family, and taxis for transport. Mr Greig, your inability to independently leave the home has become a major barrier to you accessing alcohol or cannabis, with Ms Carter reporting that, to her knowledge, you have remained
substance free. In terms of your seizures, Ms Carter has reported they leave you exhausted afterward, making recovery difficult. With respect to the long-term outlook, Ms Carter did note that individuals with a similar severity of impairment have continued to demonstrate some slow improvement post-injury. However, she acknowledges Mr Greig that you are likely to have life-long neurological deficits, which may be compounded by later conditions which are associated with, or the consequences of, your current seizure disorder.
[11] Ms Kingi advises that, from the information available to her, it is likely Mr Greig that your premorbid intellectual functioning was low average to average range. Following your significant brain injury, your neuropsychological skills were tested and found to have profound deficits across memory, processing speed and language domains. Additionally, you continue to have significant issues associated with planning, initiation, sustained attention, low mood, and fatigue. Ms Kingi finds too that your fatigue has been further impacted by the onset of seizures. In her opinion Mr Greig, you are unlikely to experience substantial improvement across the neurological areas within the next 12 months. In terms of mental health, Ms Kingi advises that you continue to experience blunted affect (low mood) which is often underpinned by fatigue, but she says this is a normal response to loss of independence and is not uncommon in individuals with a traumatic brain injury. In her opinion, you do not fulfil the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability or any psychiatric condition, but you continue to meet the criteria for a major neurocognitive disorder due to a traumatic brain injury.
[12] In terms of her risk assessment, Ms Kingi says despite your physical and neurological impairments Mr Greig, there are no recorded moments of you having aggressive outbursts or threatening behaviour. She notes you do have a history of violent offending which includes burglary and domestic violence, but she says the risk factors associated with your violent offending were likely age and attitudes such as entitlement that supported the use of violence to deal with stressors in your relationships and substance abuse. Ms Kingi says your substance use was a primary causal factor in the crash. She advises that your injuries Mr Greig are likely to be life- long, with the possibility of some minor improvement continuing over the next year or so. However, she says it is unlikely that any improvement would be to the degree
that fitness to stand trial could be revisited. She notes Mr Greig that you are currently abstaining from substances use, with your complete reliance on external supports to access outings outside of the home, being a barrier to accessing alcohol. She also observes Mr Greig, that while you are socially isolated, you do have good family support and are engaged with rehabilitation services provided by the Laura Ferguson Trust and by ACC.
[13] Ms Kingi goes on to state Mr Greig that you do not present with any past or present history of mental illness that qualifies for a ‘mental disorder’ as defined under the Mental Health (Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. She notes that in the absence of a treatable mental disorder and any risk to yourself or to others Mr Greig, detainment in an inpatient psychiatric facility would not provide any rehabilitative benefit to you. She observes that your ongoing risk to the public has been mitigated by the severity of your brain and physical injuries from the crash. In her view, this is no indication that you would benefit from follow-up from outpatient specialist mental health services. Furthermore, in the absence of an intellectual disability, she says Mr Greig you would not fulfil the legal criteria under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003. Accordingly, in her view, disposition under ss 24(1) and (2) and 25(a) and (b) of CPMIP would not be available to you.
[14] On balance, with a consideration of the support systems in place for you Mr Greig, your ongoing engagement with services to continue your rehabilitation, your abstinence from alcohol and substances, and the likely low potential of general recidivism, Ms Kingi advises that you would be suitable for disposition under s 25(1)(d) of CPMIP. That is, release back into the community.
Legal principles
[15]Turning now to the legal principles.
[16]Section 24 of CPMIP provides as follows:
(1)When the court has sufficient information on the condition of a defendant found unfit to stand trial or acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court must—
(a)consider all the circumstances of the case; and
(b)consider the evidence of 1 or more health assessors as to whether the detention of the defendant in accordance with one of the orders specified in subsection (2) is necessary; and
(c)make one of the orders referred to in paragraph (b) if it is satisfied that the making of the order is necessary in the interests of the public or any person or class of person who may be affected by the court’s decision.
(2)The orders referred to in subsection (1) are that the defendant be detained—
(a)in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992; or
(b)in a secure facility as a special care recipient under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.
(3)Before the court makes an order specified in subsection (2)(a), the court must have received evidence under subsection (1)(b), about the defendant from at least 1 health assessor who is a psychiatrist.
[17] If the Court is not satisfied that an order under s 24(2) is necessary, then s 25(1) provides that the Court must deal with the defendant:
(a)by ordering that the defendant be treated as a patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992; or
(b)by ordering that the defendant be cared for as a care recipient under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003; or
(c)if the person is liable to be detained under a sentence of imprisonment, by deciding not to make an order; or
(d)by ordering the immediate release of the defendant.
[18] Before the Court can make an order under s 25(1)(a), the Court must be satisfied on the evidence of one or more health assessors that the defendant is mentally disordered.5 Similarly, the Court can only make an order under s 25(1)(b) if it is satisfied on the evidence of one or more health assessors that the defendant has an intellectual disability, has been assessed under the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, and is to receive care under a care programme completed under s 26 of that Act.6
5 CPMIP, s 25(2).
6 Section 25(3).
[19] In the exercise of its powers under s 25(1), the Court may take into account any undertaking given by, or on behalf of, the defendant that the defendant will undergo or continue to undergo a particular programme or course of treatment.7
[20] Additionally, s 27(1) of CPMIP provides that when a Court makes an order under s 25 in respect of a defendant who has been found unfit to stand trial, the Court may order that the proceedings in which that finding was made are stayed. While such a stay is in force, the defendant may not be charged again with an offence with which they were charged in those proceedings.8
Submission
[21]Turning now to the submissions I have received.
Submissions for you Mr Greig
[22] Ms Basire, for you Mr Greig, submits that an order under s 24 of CPMIP is clearly not appropriate, as you do not need to be detained for the protection of the public, you have no mental disorder that requires treatment, and you are not intellectually impaired. She says the risk of you committing further offending is minimal. Ms Basire also says an order under s 25(1)(a) or (b) is also unavailable for the same reasons. She notes Mr Greig that you are not subject to a term of imprisonment, and accordingly an order under s 25(1)(c) also does not apply. Accordingly, she says the only outcome realistically available to the Court is an order releasing you Mr Greig under s 25(1)(d). She submits that due to your injuries, your risk of reoffending, namely driving whilst impaired, is very low, and your care needs are said to be adequately met by your family and treating team.
[23] Ms Basire notes too that you cannot be disqualified from driving as you have not been convicted. However, she says the Court, the victims and their families may find solace in the fact that Waka Kotahi, the New Zealand Transport Agency, has the ability to revoke any driver’s licence you may have Mr Greig under s 82 of the Land Transport (Driver Licensing) Rules 1999 on the grounds that you are not a “fit and
7 Section 25(4).
8 Section 27(2).
proper person” to have a driver’s licence. She notes the health assessor’s comment also that in any event you Mr Greig are unlikely to be able to pass a driver’s licence test due to your impairment.
[24] Lastly, Ms Basire seeks a stay of proceedings under s 27 of CPMIP. She relies on the Court of Appeal decision in R v P,9 and says that given Mr Greig your offending here was serious, but it is unlikely you will ever be well enough to stand trial, a stay is the appropriate response. She submits that if you do become well enough, the Crown may make an application to lift the stay.
Submissions for the Crown
[25] In response, Mr Mallett, for the Crown, in his submissions acknowledges that the Health Assessor Report recommends here that an order for immediate release is appropriate. He says this reflects the absence of a treatable mental disorder and the lack of risk to self and others, which have been mitigated by the severity of your brain and physical injuries Mr Greig. Mr Mallett notes that you will require life-long support to continue to live as independently as you are able which support will be provided by ongoing input from your GP, the Laura Fergusson Trust and the ACC. Mr Mallett concludes that the Crown accepts the recommendation that an order under s 25(1)(d) may be appropriate, and says it appears to be the only order available to the Court on the material before it.
[26] In relation to the application to stay the proceeding, Mr Mallett notes the report writer has noted it is possible Mr Greig you will have “some minor improvement continuing over the next year or so” but that “it is unlikely that any improvement would be to the degree that fitness to stand trial could be revisited”. Mr Mallett maintains that the Crown does not wish to foreclose the possibility of the prosecution being recommenced, should issues pertaining to your fitness Mr Greig improve, however unlikely that might be. Mr Mallett says that if a stay were granted, it should be made clear that an application to lift the stay could be made at a future point in time, if required. He argues that a formal stay order however may be unnecessary, and refers to commentary in Adams which suggests there may be little difference between
9 R v P [2008] NZCA 469.
ordering a stay and not, given a stay can be lifted.10 He contends too that this is not a situation where the ability of Police to re-lay charges may interfere with any therapeutic or rehabilitative orders under ss 25(1)(a) or (b), since Mr Greig you are to be released immediately with no continuing oversight. Accordingly, he questions the practical utility of a stay in the circumstances here.
What order should be made?
[27] At the outset, I agree with both counsel before me that the only appropriate outcome available here is for the Court to make an order Mr Greig under s 25(1)(d) that you be released. The Health Assessor Report is clear that you do not qualify for orders under s 24(2)(a) and (b), nor under s 25(1)(a) and (b), as you do not have a mental disorder or an intellectual disability. Section 2 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act defines a mental disorder as “an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others, or seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or herself”. This evidently does not apply Mr Greig to your condition, with no indication you have an abnormal state of mind or delusions, and you are said only to have “low mood” which is not uncommon for those who have had a traumatic brain injury. Nor Mr Greig do you fulfil the legal criteria for intellectual disability under the requisite Act, as any intellectual deficits must have become apparent during the developmental period of the particular person,11 and your deficits Mr Greig arose from this car crash, which was well after you turned 18 years old.
[28] Additionally Mr Greig, given you have been found unfit to stand trial, you are not facing or subject to a sentence of imprisonment. That leaves the only available order as one for your immediate release. I acknowledge that your offending here Mr Greig was very serious indeed (with consequences that were catastrophic) and I do note the comments of Lang J that when the Court is confronted with such serious offending a “cautious approach” is required.12 However, the only realistic outcome
10 Matthew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CM27.02].
11 Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, s 7(1)(c).
12 R v Kalolo [2017] NZHC 518 at [10].
here is for your release Mr Greig. It is noted that, given your current condition, Mr Greig, you do not pose a risk to the public, being unable to easily access alcohol or other substances which appear to have previously been causative of your offending. Your needs Mr Greig also appear to be adequately tended to by your family, your GP, the Laura Fergusson Trust, and ACC. Accordingly, an order under s 25(1)(d) is to be made.
Should a stay of proceedings be granted?
[29] The one point of contention between the parties is whether a stay of proceedings should be ordered. Ms Basire has referred me to R v P, in which the Court of Appeal commented that:13
So long as the appellant lacks legal responsibility for his actions there can be no purpose in pursuing proceedings on which he is unfit to be tried. Parliament has recognised by s 27 of the CP(MIP) Act that the just response to such a situation may be to stay the proceedings so long as that condition lasts. While the possibility of improvement is no doubt remote, we accept the common contention of counsel that an order of stay rather than dismissal is appropriate.
[30]In contrast, Mr Mallett relies on the following commentary from Adams:
In Balemi v R [2014] NZCA 176 the Court of Appeal held that the fact that s 27 gives the Court a discretion not to stay the proceedings also indicates a contemplation by Parliament that a person found to be unfit to stand trial may be charged again later, should his or her mental health improve. This being the case, a curious situation results. If a person dealt with under s 25 of the CP(MIP) Act 2003, in respect of whom a stay order has not been made under s 27(1), is at risk of the proceedings being re-visited upon the improvement of their mental health, the question arises what is the purpose of the stay? If no stay of proceedings is ordered then the person is at risk of the proceedings being reactivated at any time. If a stay is ordered the position is no different because the stay may be lifted at any time and the person is then exposed to re-prosecution on the offences charged.
[31] However, in Balemi itself the Court noted that “the significance of a stay not being entered is that there will be no impediment to the charge or charges being re- laid in the event that the mental health of the defendant improves”.14 Accordingly, as I see the position, there is some utility here in a stay. It provides an assurance to you Mr Greig that, should your condition improve, the Crown cannot unilaterally
13 R v P, above n 9, at [44].
14 Balemi v R [2014] NZCA 176 at [19].
recommence criminal proceedings against you. Rather, the issue of fitness will need to be canvassed first to satisfy the Court that the stay should be lifted. I consider it appropriate to grant a stay in the circumstances here, particularly when Ms Kingi has concluded that it is unlikely Mr Greig that your condition will sufficiently improve to enable the question of your fitness to stand trial to be revisited.
Result
[32] In conclusion and for the reasons I have given, I now make an order under s 25(1)(d) of CPMIP Mr Greig that you be immediately released. I also make an order under s 27 of CPMIP that these criminal proceeding against you be stayed, noting that the Crown may apply in the future for the stay to be released in the unlikely event Mr Greig that your condition sufficiently improves.
Acknowledgement
[33] Finally and before concluding this hearing of the Court, I especially want to acknowledge the families and supporters of the victims here today, including Nicola and Gerard Anngow, Ms Best and Mr Anngow’s daughters, Ms Wihongi and Mr Wilson (himself a victim). Nothing that I can say in this Court will in any way lessen your loss.
[34] Ms Anngow and Mr Anngow—thank you for the statements you have read to the Court today. They are not formally victim impact statements because victim impact statements as such are only read on sentencing. They are not something that can influence the Court in coming to the decisions that the Court is obliged to make under the various mental health-related pieces of legislation. However, they are of importance for the community. For you and the family and friends of the victims sadly involved, it is important that you have had the opportunity to express your views.
[35] I hope that this opportunity to do that will have assisted you in some way in coming to terms with the sad loss of your loved one, and I acknowledge too that process will be a long and difficult one.
[36] Thank you counsel also for your helpful submissions. The Court will now adjourn.
Gendall J
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch
cc: K Basire, Barrister, Christchurch