Woolley v Marlborough District Council

[2024] NZHC 3081

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND BLENHEIM REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WAIHARAKEKE ROHE

CIV-2020-406-015

[2024] NZHC 3081

BETWEEN

PHILIP JOHN WOOLLEY

Plaintiff

AND

MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT COUNCIL

Defendant

Hearing:	3 September 2024
Appearances:	P A Morten and M Robertson for Plaintiff A C Harpur and N Ravaji for Defendant
Judgment:	23 October 2024

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN

This judgment was delivered by me on 23 October 2024 at 3.00 pm pursuant to rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

WOOLLEY v MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT COUNCIL [2024] NZHC 3081 [23 October 2024]

[1]    For many years the plaintiff, Mr Woolley, has been engaged in litigation with the Marlborough District Council (the Council) in the Environment Court, the District Court, and the High Court about events that occurred between 2014 and 2015 in relation to his then dairy farm at Glenmae. There have also been related proceedings between Mr Woolley and Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd (Fonterra) in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal.1

[2]    In this proceeding Mr Woolley is seeking damages from the Council, alleging tortious interference with the supply contract between him and Fonterra, tortious interference with his milking contract with the CN and CV Perrott Partnership, a “wrongful combination” by unlawful means, negligence and breach of statutory duty. In summary, Mr Woolley considers that officers of the Council exercised its regulatory powers in an unlawful manner with the intention of bringing about the closure of his dairying operations and were successful in doing so.

[3]    The parties were ordered  to  provide  standard  discovery.  As  a  result  of Mr Woolley’s dissatisfaction with the discovery provided by the Council he made several applications.

[4]    In a judgment of 21 December 2023 (the main judgment) I determined applications by Mr Woolley for orders:2

(a)setting aside the Council’s claims to privilege or confidentiality in    38 documents;

(b)declaring that litigation privilege claimed by the Council in respect to documents prepared for a prosecution taken against him in the Environment Court had expired;

(c)that the Council provide further and better discovery in 23 categories of documents;

1      Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2021] NZHC 2690; and Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2023] NZCA 266, [2023] 3 NZLR 405.

2      Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2023] NZHC 3840, (2023) 26 PRNZ 437 [main judgment].

(d)that Mr Woolley be granted access to the Council’s computer systems to ensure compliance with its discovery obligations;

(e)that an unless order be made in Mr Woolley’s favour; and

(f)that Mr Woolley be granted leave to cross-examine certain Council officers on the hearing of his application.

[5]    I dismissed all of Mr Woolley’s applications, except to the limited extent that I disallowed some of the Council’s claims to privilege in a small number of documents.

[6]    During the hearing of that application Mr Woolley’s counsel raised the issue of disclosure of metadata of documents held in the Council’s electronic databases. I made directions for Mr Woolley to request such metadata and for any disputes about whether it had to be disclosed by the Council to be referred back to the Court.

[7]    Mr Woolley did subsequently request metadata in respect of several categories of documents which the Council did not supply. In a judgment dated 21 June 2024 I dealt with applications by Mr Woolley for the disclosure of metadata relating to 42 documents in eight categories.3 I dismissed that application.

[8]    Mr Woolley seeks leave to appeal from the main and metadata judgments to the Court of Appeal under s 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 (the Act). He has supported his application for leave to appeal with two affidavits of his solicitor, David Julian Clark, which address his understanding of the functionality of the Council’s record management systems and other evidence to support Mr Woolley’s contention that the Council has not complied with its discovery obligations and that there were errors of fact and law in my judgments.

[9]    The Council opposes the application for leave to appeal and says the Court should disregard the affidavits of Mr Clark. It says it is highly irregular that a partner in the firm acting for Mr Woolley would make such affidavits,4 and that the evidence

3      Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2024] NZHC 1647 [metadata judgment].

4      Although not referred to by counsel, I note r 13.5.2 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008.

is not fresh, credible or cogent. It says that should leave to appeal be granted it will oppose the admission of any further evidence. The Council also asks the Court to fix costs on Mr Woolley’s discovery applications in its favour.

[10]This judgment deals with:

(a)Mr Woolley’s application for leave to appeal; and

(b)costs on Mr Woolley’s discovery applications.

Legal principles

[11]   Section 56 of the Act governs the position in relation to appeals from decisions of the High Court made on interlocutory applications.5 Section 56 does not set out the legal test to be applied;6 this has been formulated by case law.

[12]   The Court of Appeal has confirmed that “[t]here is no doubt that s 56(3) was intended to reduce the volume of appeals to this Court from interlocutory decisions in the High Court”.7

[13]   A high threshold exists for the granting of leave under the Act.8 The High Court in Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan succinctly outlined the purpose of s 56 of the Act as:9

[13]      The requirement for leave to appeal should serve as a “filtering mechanism”, to ensure that unmeritorious appeals of interlocutory orders, or appeals of interlocutory orders of no great significance  to either the parties or more generally, do not unnecessarily delay the proceedings in which the orders were made.

[14]      Ultimately … the court hearing an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order will need to stand back and assess, in a pragmatic and realistic way, whether the interests of justice are served by granting leave to appeal.

5      Jessica  Gorman  and  others  (ed)  McGechan  on  Procedure  (online  ed,  Thomson  Reuters)  at [SC56.01].

6      Li v Chief Executive, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2018] NZHC 1171, [2018] NZAR 1134 at [9].

7      Ngai Te Hapu Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2018] NZCA 291 at [15].

8      Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand [2020] NZCA 122 at [6(a)] and [16].

9      Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan [2017] NZHC 1679.

(emphasis added)

[14]      The relevant considerations in determining an application for leave to appeal have been consistently held to be:10

(a)the applicant must identify an arguable error of fact or law;

(b)the alleged error should be of general importance warranting determination, or otherwise be of sufficient importance to the applicant to outweigh the lack of general or precedential value;

(c)the circumstances must warrant incurring further delay; and

(d)the ultimate question is whether the interests of justice are served by granting leave.

The proposed grounds of appeal

The main judgment

[15]      Fundamentally, Mr Woolley says I was wrong to find that the Council undertook sufficient searches to locate documents within the scope of the discovery order. His counsel’s submissions helpfully focused on three matters.

[16]      The first matter relates to the searches undertaken by the Council of its own electronic databases, referred to in my judgment as Content Manager and AfterMail, which Mr Woolley considers were not adequate. Mr Woolley considers that searches using the keywords “Glenmae” and “Woolley” were too limited. It is said that the use of other keyword search terms should have been undertaken.

[17]      I do not accept that this gives rise to an arguable ground of appeal or is of sufficient importance to justify granting leave to appeal. I was satisfied that keyword searches using “Glenmae” and “Woolley” were likely to capture most relevant

10 Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan, above n 9, at [9], referring to A v Minister of Internal Affairs [2017] NZHC 887 at [10]–[12]. Affirmed in Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand, above n 7, at [6]; and more recently in Ding v James [2021] NZCA 578 at [18].

documents. While Mr Woolley challenges that conclusion by referring to some discovered documents that did not contain those terms, the Council did not confine itself to keyword searches but also utilised other document location methods. Further, in response to queries from Mr Woolley’s solicitors the Council undertook further searches, which included using other keywords. Ultimately the assessment of what amounts to a reasonable search is highly case specific. In my assessment, given the legislative framework for the maintenance of Council records, the nature of the Council’s record management systems, and the totality of the document location methods used by the Council to search its databases, the steps taken were sufficient.

[18]      The next matter raised concerns the searches undertaken of Radich Law’s files. Radich Law acted for the Council in respect to matters concerning Mr Woolley. The evidence was that the Council had requested documents from the firm for discovery. Mr Peter Radich has sworn an affidavit on behalf of Radich Law of steps taken to review the firm’s files, including in response to specific queries by Mr Woolley’s solicitors. For the Council, one of its officers, Ms McIlveney, says she reviewed the Radich Law documents and copied and included in discovery documents the Council did not have.

[19]      Mr Woolley argues I was wrong to accept that the searches of Radich Law’s files were adequate. His counsel identifies emails that it is said ought to have been revealed by a proper search which have not been discovered (although Mr Woolley has these documents via other means) and says there is no evidence that a search of Radich Law’s electronic files, and particularly electronic email folders, was undertaken as part of the process Mr Radich described. The Council says it is not required to explain to the exhaustive level of detail required by Mr Woolley what searches were undertaken.

[20]      It appears email correspondence relevant to matters in issue that should have been located by a search of Radich Law’s electronic files was not discovered. It is notable also that Mr Radich says the firm’s files (by which I understand he means hardcopy files) had been taken out of its possession by the Council and later returned “having been worked over and having been dismantled and reassembled”. He does not say that the searches undertaken extended to electronic and email files. I consider

Mr Woolley is entitled to expect confirmation that Radich Law searched all its electronic databases for relevant documents, and if not to have such searches undertaken. Accordingly, this gives rise to an arguable ground of appeal.

[21]      The next matter concerns documents in the possession of Glenn Thomas of Independent Project Consultants (IPC). Mr Thomas was engaged by the Council as an expert and visited Mr Woolley’s farm. He prepared a report and gave evidence for the Council in proceedings before the Environment Court. Mr Woolley sought discovery of documents held by IPC/Mr Thomas relating to issues arising for the period April 2014 to November 2014 including site visit notes.

[22]      In the main judgment I did not accept a submission that the Council was obliged to disclose all “factual material” collected and relied upon by Mr Thomas. I considered such material would remain the property of Mr Thomas and was not under the control of the Council. In arriving at that conclusion I relied upon Guttenbeil v Tower Insurance Ltd and other decisions that referred to and applied it.11

[23]      Mr Woolley’s counsel says my conclusion was wrong and refers me to the terms of engagement between IPC and the Council, which states that ownership of data and factual information collected lies with the Council.

[24]      For its part, the Council argues that beyond Mr Thomas’s report and affidavit he made in the Environment Court proceedings no further discovery is required. It argues that I was correct to rely upon the authorities I referred to in my judgment. Further, it argues that in referring to IPC’s terms of engagement Mr Woolley conflates ownership of copyright in records produced during the engagement with control over those records for disclosure purposes.

[25]      The terms of engagement state that copyright of drawings, specifications and other documents prepared by it is retained by IPC. However, it also states “[t]he ownership of data and factual information collected by the Consultant and paid for by the Client shall, after payment by the Client, lie with the Client”. It must therefore be arguable that, irrespective of which party owns copyright in documents produced in

11     Guttenbeil v Tower Insurance Ltd [2012] NZHC 2106 at [25], [28]–[29].

the course of the engagement, Mr Thomas or IPC has documents (including possibly notes taken on his site visits to Mr Woolley’s farm) that may be relevant to the matters in issue which are under the Council’s control. This proposed ground of appeal is therefore arguable in my view.

The metadata judgment

[26]      I dismissed Mr Woolley’s application for metadata on the basis the metadata sought was not sufficiently relevant to any matter in issue, would not produce evidence of meaningful probative value or, in some respects, did not exist.

[27]      In submissions in support of the application for leave to appeal Mr Woolley’s counsel focused on site visit notes prepared by Council officers following inspections of Mr Woolley’s farm. Mr Clark says there is evidence site visit notes have been altered on various dates in the weeks or months following their creation. Specifically, there are site visit notes for July to August 2014 where it is said iterations of the site visit notes might contain information relevant to matters in issue.

[28]      By way of example, there is reference to site visit notes of 13 August 2014 which recorded that a soil sample was taken from Mr Woolley’s farm but not where it was taken from. Mr Woolley maintains that the location from which the soil sample was taken will be an issue at trial and that earlier iterations of the site visit notes may contain that information.

[29]      To the extent that I dismissed Mr Woolley’s application for metadata concerning those five site visit notes and any earlier iterations of those documents, I accept there is an arguable issue on appeal.

Should leave to appeal be granted?

[30]      It does not follow that Mr Woolley should be granted leave to appeal. No issues of general or public importance arise. The Council argues the proposed appeal does not raise any issues of sufficient importance as between these parties either because the facts of this case have been traversed at length in several other proceedings and further discovery is unlikely to produce any material evidence.

[31]      The Council also argues that the events in issue occurred over a decade ago and there have been lengthy delays in getting to trial. It says the delays have been contributed to by Mr Woolley raising other related applications which had no merit but put the Council to extraordinary cost.

[32]      Underlying the Council’s concern is a belief that Mr Woolley will never be satisfied that the Council’s discovery is adequate and that further disclosure will be used as a springboard for yet more requests.

[33]      The Council considers that the granting of leave to appeal will inevitably unnecessarily prolong this proceeding, which is contrary to the interests of justice. It says the objective of the High Court Rules 2016 (the Rules) to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of a proceeding will be best served by refusing leave to appeal.

[34]      There is force in the Council’s submissions. This case has been before the Court for too long. It was filed in 2020 and the parties have been embroiled in disputes over discovery for seemingly most of that time. It should be set down for hearing as soon as possible. That said, it appears to me that there is no reason why the case could not be timetabled toward trial now, notwithstanding any appeal, given the length of time before the case could be heard.

[35]      It is also the case Mr Woolley has obtained disclosure in other proceedings that were concerned with the same events and further disclosure may not produce any documents of importance. On the other hand, the possibility of further documents of importance coming to light cannot be excluded. It is also the case that any appeal can be considered more effectively now than in the context of an appeal on the substantive decision, should the case proceed to trial.

[36]      On balance then I have decided to grant Mr Woolley leave to appeal but make the following further comments. All the matters I have identified as arguable errors in the earlier judgments could be quickly and inexpensively remedied by the Council of its own volition, by agreement between counsel, or by further Court order under r 8.19 of the Rules. I have contemplated making orders under r 8.19 but have decided against

that course as I understand there was resistance to it from the Council, and because the making of such orders might not be accepted by either party as a final resolution of discovery issues. That is not to say I would not be open to a further application should it be thought that would provide a more direct route to resolution of the discovery issues.

Costs

Background

[37]I must determine costs in relation to:

(a)Mr Woolley’s unsuccessful application to cross-examine Ms Lines and Ms McIlveney;

(b)the main judgment; and

(c)the metadata judgment.

[38]      To understand the position in relation to costs some background is required as to how Mr Woolley’s discovery applications progressed.

[39]      The Council’s first affidavit of documents was filed on 20 November 2020. Its second affidavit was filed on 28 February 2022, following protracted correspondence between the parties and further discovery being provided by the Council.

[40]      Mr Woolley’s application for further discovery was filed in December 2022. It came on for hearing before me on 22 May 2023, but the hearing was not completed and was adjourned part heard.

[41]      I issued a minute of 23 May 2023, and noted that at that stage there were little more than bare assertions by the Council that it had undertaken adequate searches/enquiries to comply with its discovery obligations. I directed its counsel to take instructions with a view to providing further evidence. I said:

[3]        I discussed with counsel steps that could be usefully taken to at least narrow the issues. Specifically, the following matters were identified:

(a)It is not clear whether there is agreement that the documents in respect of which a challenge is made to the defendant’s claim to litigation privilege should be provided to me for inspection. It would be useful if counsel could confirm their instructions and confer in respect of that matter to see if there is a common position.

(b)Ms Harpur is to take instructions with a view to providing full details of all the searches/inquiries that were taken or made by the defendant in compliance with its discovery obligations. To date there are little more than bare assertions that adequate searches have been completed. This information should be provided to the plaintiff’s counsel in the expectation that it may provide clarity around what (if any) further searches may be undertaken for documents the plaintiff considers have not been disclosed.

(c)Insofar as the defendant submits it has in fact produced documents in the categories in pt 2 and pt 3 of the plaintiff’s application, these documents should be specifically identified in the defendant’s affidavit of documents by reference to Document IDs.

[4]        Counsel are to confer and advise by memorandum as soon as possible whether they will be in a position to resume the hearing on Friday.

[42]      On 30 May 2023 the Council filed a memorandum indicating steps were being taken to comply with the directions.

[43]      On 25 July 2023 Mr Woolley filed an amended application. He sought additional discretionary relief by way of an unless order against the Council.

[44]      On 3 August 2023 the Council filed affidavits by Ms McIlveney, Ms Lines and an unsworn statement by Mr Radich purporting to respond to my direction at [3(b)] of my minute, and amended its notice of opposition in response to Mr Woolley’s application for an unless order.

[45]      The hearing was to resume on 7 August 2023, but in response to further discovery provided by the Council Mr Woolley sought an adjournment so he could review the documents provided. I granted the adjournment by consent on 7 August 2023. A telephone conference was scheduled for 13 September 2023.

[46]      In a memorandum dated 11 September 2023 Mr Woolley’s counsel noted that if the Court was going to accept the further affidavits filed for the Council he would wish to cross-examine Ms Lines and Ms McIlveney on their affidavits.

[47]      On 14 September 2023 I made directions for Mr Woolley to make an application to cross-examine Ms Lines and Ms McIlveney. Mr Woolley filed his application to cross-examine on 21 September 2023. The Council filed its notice of opposition on 6 October 2023, along with further affidavits by Mr Radich (2 October 2023) and Ms McIlveney (9 October 2023). I dealt with the matter on the papers and issued a results judgment dismissing Mr Woolley’s  application  to  cross-examine Ms Lines and Ms McIlveney on 26 October 2023.12

[48]      The hearing of Mr Woolley’s now amended application resumed and was completed on 30 October 2023. I issued the main judgment on 21 December 2023.

[49]      In accordance with directions made in the main judgment, Mr Woolley’s counsel made requests of the Council for the disclosure of metadata which the Council refused to provide. Mr Woolley referred the matter back to me to determine. I heard that application on 11 June 2023 and issued the metadata judgment on 21 June 2023.13

Costs principles

[50]      Costs are awarded at the discretion of the Court.14 The party who fails on an interlocutory application should pay costs.15 Success or failure is better assessed by a realistic appraisal of the end result rather than focusing on which party initiated a particular step and whether it was successful.16

12     Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2023] NZHC 2995.

13     Woolley v Marlborough District Council, above n 3.

14     High Court Rules, r 14.1.

15     Rule 14.2(1)(a).

16     Packing In Ltd (in liq) v Chilcott (2003) 16 PRNZ 869 (CA) at [6] where each party had similar success.

[51]      Under r 14.8, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, costs must be fixed when an interlocutory application is determined and become payable when they are fixed.17

[52]      Rule 14.7(f)(iv) gives the Court discretion to refuse or reduce the costs otherwise payable, including where there has been a failure without reasonable justification to comply with an order of the Court for discovery. Rule 14.7(g) allows the Court to refuse or reduce costs if “some other reason” exists that justifies it doing so.

[53]In assessing the Council’s claims for costs I have followed these steps:

(a)Which party was successful overall on the application?

(b)What is the appropriate costs category? In this regard I understand it is agreed the applications are category 2 for costs purposes.

(c)What steps were taken and what time allocations are objectively appropriate for each step?

(d)Are there circumstances that require a departure from scale costs?

(e)What disbursements are recoverable?

Mr Woolley’s application to cross-examine

[54]      The Council was successful in opposing Mr Woolley’s application and is entitled to costs.

[55]      The Council has submitted a schedule of steps for which costs are claimed. It seeks costs on a scale B basis for all steps taken which is appropriate.

17 In Chapman v Badon Ltd [2010] NZCA 613, (2010) 20 PRNZ 83 at [12] the Court of Appeal observed that costs should be dealt with at the time applications are determined, not held over until the substantive application is known. That reflects the fact that the merits of particular applications and the merits of substantive proceedings are different matters.

[56]      Mr Woolley disputes claims made by the Council in respect to step 13 for appearance at a case management conference on 13 September 2023 and step 28 for obtaining judgment without an appearance.

[57]      In relation to the case management appearance, Mr Woolley argues this related to timetabling for the resumed hearing and not the application to cross-examine. In fact, the conference dealt with both matters. I will allow 50 per cent of this claim which I consider a fair apportionment.

[58]      I agree with Mr Woolley that the Council cannot claim in respect to step 28 when the application was determined on the papers, and I disallow this claim.

[59]      In my view there are no other reasons to depart from scale costs in respect to this application. The Council is awarded costs of $5,377.50 and disbursements of

$110, a total of $5,487.50.

The main judgment

[60]      The Council seeks  costs  on  the  basis  that  it  was  the  successful  party.  Mr Woolley argues that costs should be reserved or lie where they fall. In the main judgment I expressed the view that it may be appropriate to reserve costs. However, having the benefit of counsel’s submissions I consider that costs should be determined now, there being no special reason why costs should not be fixed at this stage.18

[61]      In my view the Council was overall the successful party on Mr Woolley’s discovery applications under the main judgment. As is set out in the main judgment, much of the argument advanced by Mr Woolley concerned issues of law upon which he was unsuccessful and has not sought to appeal. Further, his applications for an unless order and access to the Council’s database were similarly unsuccessful and those decisions have not been challenged either. For the avoidance of doubt, my conclusion that the Council was the successful party would be the same despite any of the arguable errors in the judgment I have earlier identified.

18     High Court Rules, r 14.8.

[62]      The Council has submitted a schedule of the steps for which costs are claimed. It seeks costs on scale B basis for steps taken, which is appropriate. I agree with the Council’s schedule of the steps taken, with the following exceptions. I disallow the claim in relation to step 11 for the filing of memoranda for the case management hearings for the reasons identified by Mr Woolley’s counsel. I also disallow the claim for step 30, which I agree with Mr Woolley’s counsel does not apply to interlocutory applications.

[63]      Mr Woolley argues there should be a departure from scale costs. He says that his application was necessary because it was only as a result of bringing it, and months after the first day of the hearing of his application, that the Council belatedly filed evidence of what steps it had taken to search for documents it was required to discover. Mr Woolley’s contention is that it was only when he received Ms McIlveney’s affidavit of 9 October 2023 that he had any detail about the Council’s use of Content Manager. Notably, this is in the context of the discovery order having been made by Associate Judge Johnston on 15 September 2020 and the Council’s first affidavit of documents having been filed on 20 November 2020.

[64]      Mr Woolley also says that as a result of his application the Council produced further documents that it ought to have previously discovered and the Council ultimately had several of its claims to litigation privilege disallowed. Mr Woolley argues these factors engage both rr 14.7(f) and 14.7(g) of the Rules.

[65]      I agree that the Council’s costs should be reduced. My concern about the lack of evidence from the Council of the searches it had undertaken to locate discoverable documents is reflected in my minute of 23 May 2023. It was only shortly before the resumed hearing that the Council filed affidavits and provided detail of the searches undertaken. Had that evidence been filed earlier I consider Mr Woolley’s application would have been fully argued at the first hearing.

[66]      On this basis it is relatively easy to identify the particular steps in respect to which the Council’s failure to provide its evidence earlier contributed to increased costs. In my view, the Council is not entitled to claim costs twice in respect to step 23

for filing oppositions to Mr Woolley’s applications, for step 26 for appearances of counsel at two hearings or step 32 for preparation for the two hearings.

[67]      In respect to this application, the Council is awarded costs of $12,189 and disbursements of $220, a total of $12,409.

The metadata judgment

[68]      The Council was successful in opposing Mr Woolley’s application for metadata and is entitled to costs.

[69]      The Council has submitted a schedule of steps for which costs are claimed. It seeks costs on a scale B basis for each step taken, which is appropriate.

[70]      However, I disallow the claim for step 23 for filing an opposition to interlocutory application as no such opposition was filed. I also disallow in part the claim for step 26 for a full day of hearing as the hearing lasted half a day.

[71]In respect to this application, the Council is awarded costs of $5,497.

Result

[72]Mr Woolley is granted leave to appeal the main and metadata judgments.

[73]      In  relation  to  costs  on  Mr  Woolley’s  application  for  leave  to  appeal, Mr Woolley has been successful and would ordinarily be entitled to costs. If counsel cannot agree they may file memoranda.

[74]      The Council is awarded costs on Mr Woolley’s application to cross-examine, the main judgment and the metadata judgment in the amounts set out in paragraphs [59], [67] and [71].

[75]      As noted above, I consider the case should be timetabled to trial regardless of whether or not Mr Woolley pursues his appeal. The Registrar should set the case down for a telephone case management conference with an Associate Judge. Counsel are to

confer and at least three days prior to the teleconference file a preferably joint memorandum of proposed timetable directions.

O G Paulsen Associate Judge

Solicitors:

Wisheart McNab & Partners, Blenheim Rice Speir, Auckland