Woolley v Marlborough District Council
[2025] NZCA 589
•7 November 2025 at 11 am
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
CA749/2024
[2025] NZCA 589
BETWEEN PHILIP JOHN WOOLLEY Appellant AND MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT COUNCIL Respondent
| Hearing: | 21 July 2025 |
| Court: | Mallon, Powell and Cull JJ |
| Counsel: | P A Morten and M A Robertson for Appellant |
| N Ravaji and A C Harpur for Respondent |
Table of contents
Para No.
| Introduction | [1] |
| Background | [3] |
| Judge’s findings | [5] |
| Relevant discovery rules | [9] |
| Fresh evidence | [14] |
| Issues | [16] |
| Overview | [17] |
| Issue One: searches of the Council’s database | [19] |
| Background | [19] |
| Judge’s decision | [20] |
| Parties’ submissions | [26] |
| Discussion | [29] |
| Conclusion | [37] |
| Issue Two: files from Radich Law | [38] |
| Background | [38] |
| Judge’s decision | [43] |
| Discussion | [46] |
| Conclusion | [50] |
| Issue Three: documents held by engineering consultant | [51] |
| Background | [51] |
| Judge’s decision | [52] |
| Parties’ submissions | [55] |
| Conclusion | [57] |
| Issue Four: Four categories of metadata | [58] |
| Location of the soil sample | [61] |
| Interference and conspiracy allegations | [64] |
| 1. | Site visit notes and farm inspection reports | [71] |
| 2. | Soil sample test results | [81] |
| 3. | Abatement notices | [89] |
| 4. | Public notification decision | [94] |
| Conclusion | [100] |
| Overview summary | [101] |
| Result | [103] |
| Introduction |
This appeal concerns the scope of discovery in proceedings claiming damages
for tortious interference in contractual relations (two causes of action), intention to
injure by unlawful means (unlawful means conspiracy), negligence and breach of
statutory duty.
Mr Woolley appeals two separate judgments of Associate Judge Paulsen. We
refer to them as the Main Judgment[1] and the Metadata Judgment.[2] Mr Woolley
[1] Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2023] NZHC 3840 [Main Judgment].
[2] Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2024] NZHC 1647 [Metadata Judgment].
contends that the Judge erred in finding that the Marlborough District Council (the
Council) has complied with its discovery obligations under the High Court Rules
2016 (HCR). The Council opposes the appeal.
Background
The factual background was summarised in the Main Judgment, which we
gratefully adopt:[3]
[3] Main Judgment, above n 1. We note that Mr Woolley says the first sentence of [11] is incorrect,
[10] In 2010, Mr Woolley was granted resource consent for a dairy
operation at Glenmae. The resource consent contained a condition requiring
a certificate from the designing engineer of the effluent system to confirm it
was installed and functioned according to the approval. No effluent was to be
discharged until the certificate was received by the Council.
[11] In 2012, Mr Woolley designed and built two effluent ponds himself.
An engineer did not certify the ponds. In June 2013, the Council applied to
the Environment Court for an enforcement order which was granted on 4 April
2014. Mr Woolley was ordered to cease operating the milking sheds on
Glenmae until the effluent disposal system had been certified. The engineer’s
certificate was to be provided to the Council and the Environment Court by
6 June 2014. On 9 June 2014, the Environment Court refused an application
by Mr Woolley for an extension of time to comply with the enforcement order.
In July 2014, Mr Woolley and his contract milker started milking cows using
the milking shed on the property in breach of the enforcement order.
[12] Mr Woolley was contracted to Fonterra for the supply of milk from
Glenmae. He says Fonterra, under pressure from the Council, refused to
collect his milk. In addition, his contract milker terminated its contract
milking agreement in mid-September 2014 on the ground that Mr Woolley’s
actions prevented milking.
[13] On 5 September 2014, Opus International Consultants Ltd (Opus)
certified compliance with the enforcement order, but the Council refused to
accept the certificate and receivers and managers were appointed over
Mr Woolley’s assets on 24 November 2014.
[14] On 27 November 2014, the Council filed charges against Mr Woolley
in the District Court for breaches of the enforcement order. On 24 July 2015,
Judge Smith convicted Mr Woolley of breaching the enforcement order,[4] and
[4] Marlborough District Council v Woolley [2015] NZDC 13811. At [23] Judge Smith held that
on 14 August 2015 Mr Woolley was sentenced.[5]
[5] Marlborough District Council v Woolley [2015] NZDC 16110.
[15] In 2018, Mr Woolley commenced proceedings against Fonterra,
alleging it was in breach of its supply contract by refusing to collect milk from
Glenmae.[6] His claim was dismissed in the High Court,[7] and an appeal to the
[6] Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2021] NZHC 2690.
[7] Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd, above, n 6. Contrary to the conclusion of the
Court of Appeal was also dismissed.[8]
[8] Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2023] NZCA 266, [2023] 3 NZLR 405.
Mr Woolley then commenced proceedings against the Council, seeking
damages under five causes of action. In the course of these proceedings, Mr Woolley
believed the Council was not complying with its discovery obligations. He applied to
the High Court for orders. The Main Judgment, which determined that application,
sets out these events:[9]
[9] Main Judgment, above n 1 (some footnotes omitted). We have omitted discussion of the issues
[1] … [Mr Woolley] is seeking damages from the Marlborough District
Council (the Council) in respect of events that occurred between 2014 and
2015. There are five causes of action in the statement of claim, namely:
(a) tortious interference by the Council with Mr Woolley’s supply contract with Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd (Fonterra);
(b) tortious interference with Mr Woolley’s milking contract with the CN and DV Perrott Partnership;
(c) wrongful combination to injure Mr Woolley by multiple means; (d) negligence; and (e) breach of statutory duty. [2] Associate Judge Johnston directed the parties to provide standard
discovery. The Council’s affidavit of documents was filed in December 2020.
… On 28 February 2022, an amended affidavit of documents was filed.
[3] Mr Woolley is not satisfied the Council has complied with its
discovery obligations. In December 2022, he made an application for orders
setting aside claims to privilege and particular discovery, which the Council
opposed. That application came before me on 22 May 2023, but was
adjourned part heard. The hearing resumed on 30 October 2023. In between
times, Mr Woolley filed an amended application, the Council filed an
amended notice of opposition along with several further affidavits, and
Mr Woolley applied for leave to cross-examine Council witnesses, which I
declined.[10]
[10] Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2023] NZHC 2995.
[4] In his amended application, Mr Woolley is seeking the following
orders: …
(c) that the Council provide further and better discovery in respect of categories of documents identified in pt 2 and pt 3
of sch A to his amended application (the pt 2 and pt 3
documents);
…
[6] The Council’s stance is that it has gone to considerable lengths to
respond to challenges to its discovery by Mr Woolley, … and it has complied
with its discovery obligations.
…
[8] In respect to the pt 2 and pt 3 documents, the issues are:
(a) whether the Council has undertaken a sufficient search to locate documents within the scope of the discovery order; and
(b) if not, whether further discovery ought to be ordered.
Judge’s findings
The Judge declined Mr Woolley’s application for further and better discovery
as sought at [4(c)] of the Main Judgment above, and made three findings, which
Mr Woolley submits are wrong:
(a) the keyword and other searches undertaken by the Council of its document systems satisfied its discovery obligations under pt 8 of the
HCR (Issue One);
(b) the searches of the files held by the Council’s solicitors (Radich Law) met its obligations under pt 8 of the HCR and the discovery order
(Issue Two); and
(c) the Council met its discovery obligations in respect of Mr Thomas, an engineering consultant engaged by the Council, by providing a copy of
the August 2014 report he prepared for use in an Environment Court
proceeding in August 2014, but none of his notes (Issue Three).
During the hearing of that application, Mr Woolley’s counsel raised the issue
of disclosure of metadata of documents held in the Council’s electronic databases. The
Judge made directions for Mr Woolley to request such metadata and if any disputes
arose as to whether it had to be disclosed, the matter was to be referred back to the
Judge.[11]
[11] Main Judgment, above n 1, at [113].
Mr Woolley subsequently requested metadata in respect of several categories
of documents which the Council did not supply. Mr Woolley applied for an order that
metadata in the Council’s database relating to 42 records in eight categories be
disclosed. The Judge dismissed the application and held that the Council was not
required to disclose the sought iterations of documents and metadata.[12] Mr Woolley
[12] Metadata Judgment, above n 2.
also says this finding was wrong (Issue Four).
The Judge granted leave to appeal the Main Judgment and Metadata Judgment
on 23 October 2024.[13]
[13] Woolley v Marlborough District Council [2024] NZHC 3081 [Leave Judgment].
Relevant discovery rules
Rule 8.7 of the HCR provides that standard discovery requires each party to
disclose documents that are or have been in that party’s control and that are:
(a) documents on which the party relies; (b) documents that adversely affect that party’s own case; (c) documents that adversely affect another party’s case; or (d) documents that support another party’s case.
Rule 8.14 provides that a party must make a reasonable search for documents
within the scope of the discovery order. What amounts to a reasonable search depends
on the circumstances, including the following factors:[14]
[14] High Court Rules 2016, r 8.14(2).
(a) the nature and complexity of the proceeding; (b) the number of documents involved; (c) the ease and cost of retrieving a document; (d) the significance of any document likely to be found; and (e) the need for discovery to be proportionate to the subject matter of the proceeding.
Under r 8.19, a party may apply for further discovery if it believes another
party has not discovered documents that should have been discovered. The rule
provides:
8.19 Order for particular discovery against party after proceeding commenced If at any stage of the proceeding it appears to a Judge, from evidence or from the nature or circumstances of the case or from any document filed in the proceeding, that there are grounds for believing that a party has not discovered 1 or more documents or a group of documents that should have been discovered, the Judge may order that party—
(a) to file an affidavit stating— (i) whether the documents are or have been in the party’s
control; and
(ii) if they have been but are no longer in the party’s
control, the party’s best knowledge and belief as to
when the documents ceased to be in the party’s
control and who now has control of them; and
(b) to serve the affidavit on the other party or parties; and (c) if the documents are in the person’s control, to make those documents available for inspection, in accordance with
rule 8.27, to the other party or parties.
The four-stage approach in Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion
(New Zealand) Ltd is followed:[15]
[15] Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd [2015] NZHC 2760, [2018] NZAR
(a) Are the documents sought relevant and, if so, how important will they be?
(b) Are there grounds for belief that the documents sought exist? This will often be a matter of inference. How strong is that evidence?
(c) Is discovery proportionate, assessing proportionality in accordance with Part 1 of the Discovery Checklist in the High Court Rules?
(d) Weighing and balancing these matters, in the Court’s discretion applying r 8.19, is an order appropriate?
When determining whether there are grounds to believe that a party has not
discovered documents that should have been disclosed, the court has regard to affidavit
evidence, pleadings, and the circumstances of the case.[16] We are also mindful of the
[16] Thode v Turners and Growers Horticulture Ltd [2018] NZHC 890, [2018] NZAR 592 at [15].
principle enunciated by this Court in Juken New Zealand Ltd v Red Stag Timber Ltd:[17]
[17] Juken New Zealand Ltd v Red Stag Timber Ltd [2022] NZCA 184 at [10] (footnote omitted), citing
… appeal courts will exercise particular restraint in respect of appeals from
case management decisions, including those relating to discovery. This is
because the judge assigned to manage a complex proceeding such as this gains
a familiarity with the case and is best placed to make case management
decisions to enable its efficient and just disposition. An appeal court does not
share this advantage.
Fresh evidence
Shortly before the hearing, the respondent sought leave to admit the affidavits
of Glenn Thomas and Peter Radich on the grounds that this evidence is fresh and
outlines recent steps taken by Mr Thomas and Radich Law to search for records
relating to Mr Woolley’s farm, Glenmae, and other documents relevant to the issues
in the High Court proceedings.[18]
[18] Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, r 45.
[15] Although Mr Woolley opposes leave, we consider that the affidavit evidence by both deponents was highly relevant to two of the issues for determination in this appeal and, because the deponents provide updating information on disclosure of
documents, the evidence is fresh and cogent, and it is in the interests of justice that
leave be granted.[19] We grant leave accordingly.
[19] Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd (Further Evidence) (No 1) [2006] NZSC 59,
Issues
The four issues for determination on appeal are:
(1) whether the Council has complied with its discovery obligations; (2) whether searches of files held by the Council’s solicitors met its discovery obligations;
(3) whether the Council’s searches for records held by a third party, its engineering consultant, met its discovery obligations; (4) whether an order for particular discovery should be made in respect of the metadata in four categories of documents stored in the Council’s document management system.
Overview
Before addressing each of the four issues, we make the following brief
observations which we think underpin this appeal. We acknowledge from the outset
that this proceeding and its history is complex and covers a significant period of time,
in which there have been other proceedings and appeals arising. We also appreciate
the careful and thorough way the Judge has approached the discovery applications in
each of his decisions and are mindful of the need for restraint in case management
decisions.
However, we respectfully conclude that there have been two oversights in the
way the Judge addressed Mr Woolley’s application for better and further discovery.
The first concerns the tortious interference and conspiracy claims in relation to some of the categories of documents. The second is the deference the Judge paid to the
previous litigation findings. We address these matters further under Issues One and
Four.
Issue One: searches of the Council’s database
Background
The Judge summarised the searches made of the Council’s database in the
Main Judgment. We adopt his summary:[20]
[20] Main Judgment, above n 1.
[66] Kathleen McIlveney made an affidavit dated 3 August 2023. She was
previously the Council’s in-house counsel and is familiar with the
requirements of standard discovery. From 2008 to 2010 the Council digitised
its hardcopy files into a database previously called TRIM, now called CM
(HPE Content Manager). Hardcopy files were destroyed. The Council’s
records management policy requires all staff to capture all records of their
work into CM. Records from Glenmae are stored in CM under the property
number, including resource consents (including monitoring), building
consents, compliance, legal and other services. In addition, the Council’s
email archive service (AfterMail) captures all emails in and out of the Council
going back to 2005.
[67] Ms McIlveney says following the making of the standard discovery
order she provided the Council’s discoverable documents to its external
solicitors. To do so, she identified the property file for Glenmae and also did
keyword searches in CM and AfterMail using keywords “Woolley” and
“Glenmae”. She also requested files from the Council’s external lawyers,
Radich Law, and the Crown Solicitor’s office in Nelson (who acted in the
prosecution against Mr Woolley). Ms McIlveney inspected the files and
copied any documents which the Council did not already have. After the
initial list of documents was filed in November 2020, she was informed that
some documents had not been uploaded to the external document processor
and a further list was completed in February 2022.
[68] Shelley Lines was a senior environmental protection officer with the
Council from 2018 to 2023 and has also sworn an affidavit dated 3 August
2023. In response to queries raised by Mr Woolley she did further searches in
CM and AfterMail, going back to 2005 in respect to four categories of
documents. In respect to three of those categories she used keyword searches
selected for the subject matter of the query.
…
[70] There was also a further affidavit of Ms McIlveney of 9 October 2023,
in response to Mr Woolley’s application that she be cross-examined. In it she
addresses several matters, including her experience in the use of CM and
AfterMail, the extent to which proper searches were undertaken in the Council’s electronic databases, the Council’s record management policy, and
whether there was a likelihood of Council staff creating and retaining
documents outside of CM contrary to the Council’s record management
policy.
Judge’s decision
The Judge observed that district councils can be expected to have expertise in
record management and retrieval because they are required under statute to properly
maintain their records. They often have to provide disclosure in Court proceedings
and in response to public information requests.[21] The Judge noted that the Council’s
[21] At [75].
2013 records management policy stated that its hardcopy documents were being
digitised and that, “[a]ll other records must be captured within the TRIM electronic
management system”. There was a clear requirement that employees “[c]apture and
maintain records, regardless of their format, into organisation-wide electronic or hard
copy records management systems”.[22]
[22] At [76].
The Judge considered that as the events involved in Mr Woolley’s claim
occurred a decade ago, it was unlikely that any documents which were not saved in
TRIM/CM (Content Manager) would still exist, and it was even less likely that those
documents would be sufficiently relevant or important to warrant further searches of
hardcopy files. The Judge concluded that it was reasonable for the Council to rely on
its Content Manager and AfterMail systems in the way it has done.[23]
[23] At [77].
In relation to the keyword search items, the Judge concluded that “Woolley”
and “Glenmae” were broad and would capture most relevant documents. If not, he
observed that keyword searches were not the only document location method used by
the Council.[24] He found that the two Council employees (Ms McIlveney and
[24] At [80].
Ms Lines) were sufficiently familiar and experienced in the use of the Council’s
document management systems and the issues arising in this litigation to make the
searches on the Council’s behalf. IT assistance was not required.[25]
[25] At [81]–[82].
The Judge made the following conclusory findings:
[84] Standing back and looking at the matter as a whole, I am satisfied the Council did undertake a reasonable search to locate documents it was required
to disclose under the discovery order.
[85] The Council had established and robust records management systems. There were policies in place for the use of those systems. The Court can have
a high degree of assurance that documents in the Council’s control relevant to
the matters in issue were maintained and could be located in the CM and
AfterMail databases.
[86] Searches were undertaken, including by the use of appropriate keywords, by staff familiar with the use of the databases and the issues in this
proceeding.
…
[88] The Council has responded to specific queries raised by Mr Woolley’s lawyers in relation to discovery and made further searches.
Lastly, the Judge noted that the Council made disclosures in other proceedings
taken against Mr Woolley, including the related civil proceeding Mr Woolley brought
against Fonterra.[26] Given this, the Judge said it is highly unlikely that requiring the
[26] Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd, above, n 6.
Council to undertake further searches will reveal any documents that are of
significance.[27]
[27] Main Judgment, above n 1, at [89].
In his leave to appeal decision, the Judge did not accept that this issue gave rise
to an arguable ground of appeal or that it was of sufficient importance to justify
granting leave to appeal. The Judge noted Mr Woolley’s challenge that some
discovered documents did not contain the searched keywords, and repeated that other
document location methods were utilised, including searches using other keywords in
response to queries from Mr Woolley’s solicitors.[28]
[28] Leave Judgment, above n 13, at [15]–[17].
Parties’ submissions
Mr Morten, for Mr Woolley, contends the use of just two search terms was
insufficient, as they would only return documents containing those exact keywords.
He submits documents containing misspellings of the terms (such as “Glen Mae” or “Wooley”), or not containing either term, would not have been captured. He says the
farm is referred to in other documents in a variety of ways, including “Hillesden
Farm”, “Wairau Valley Farm”, its address and its deposited plan number. Further, only
electronically text-searchable documents are captured, which would exclude, for
example, handwritten documents.
The Council says Ms McIlveney carried out a full review of the dedicated file
for the Glenmae property as part of her search for documents to discover. In response
to specific inquiries from Mr Woolley, Ms Lines undertook further targeted searches
using several other keywords/phrases, which did not identify any additional
documents.
The Council says Mr Woolley’s request for additional searches, using no less
than 60 search terms, is disproportionate and extremely unlikely to result in the
discovery of any additional relevant documents. The Council relies on the Judge’s
conclusion that the facts that form the basis of this proceeding have already been
scrutinised at length in other proceedings. While the causes of action may have been
different, the Council says the underlying events were the same.
Discussion
The Judge’s conclusion that the facts that form the basis of this proceeding
have already been scrutinised at length in other proceedings has, in our view, led to
error. Relying on that finding, the Council has also submitted that the underlying
events were the same, meaning that no further discovery should be ordered. We are
unable to accept that submission. Findings in previous proceedings do not bind a
Court in determining these proceedings, particularly given the pleadings in this
proceeding involving conspiracy and related claims.
We do not accept that because relevant events had occurred over a decade
earlier, it was unlikely that any documents not saved to the database would still exist.
Even if the documents are no longer in existence, we accept Mr Morten’s submission
that the Council should provide evidence of the inquiries it made about these
documents.
In the hearing before us, Mr Robertson, in support of Mr Woolley’s argument
that relevant documents have not been discovered, produced a 2014 email exhibit from
Mr Congdon, Ms Lines’ manager. The email referred to the Opus report which was
subject to a court-scheduled teleconference call in respect of the Fonterra proceedings.
This was a relevant document which was not included in the Council’s affidavit of
documents and was missed by the two-word search and other searches of the Council’s
documents.
In addition, in support of Mr Woolley’s claim of incomplete discovery, an
affidavit from Mr Woolley’s solicitor[29] annexed four examples of relevant documents
[29] Affidavit of D J Clark, dated 12 February 2024.
from Radich Law and the Council, which were not discovered by the Council.
We consider the Council’s searches were insufficient to capture relevant
documents with other iterations and misspellings of “Woolley” or “Glenmae” or
references to the other farms owned by Mr Woolley. As the appellants submit,
discovered documents record different property folder numbers from the Glenmae
property folder, which is the only property folder Ms McIlveney says she “browsed”.
Discovered documents also feature different TRIM references. Ms McIlveney accepts
that relevant documents may have been misfiled. We find it difficult therefore, to
accept the contention that all relevant documents would have been captured by the
Council’s search methods. If, as Mr Morten submits, there is an overlap between
actions taken by the Council in respect of the Awarua farm (another farm of
Mr Woolley’s) that affect what occurred on Glenmae, those documents have not been
discovered.
It was open to the Judge to find that the Council, with its established robust
record management systems, used a search method which was reasonable. However,
it is not the method which is at issue, but rather the search request into the Council’s
record management system. We accept the appellant’s submission that the search
terms used by the Council of “Woolley” and “Glenmae” are unduly restrictive, given
the way in which Mr Woolley and his farm are referred to by a number of other
descriptors within the Council documents already discovered. Documents which have been located but not discovered by the Council demonstrate that the other search
methods employed by the Council were inadequate and did not remedy this deficiency.
We deal then with the Council’s objection that using no less than 60 proposed
search terms suggested by the appellant is disproportionate. The Council submits that
it is, in any event, extremely unlikely to result in any additional relevant documents.
We accept that, even if searches are to be undertaken with the appellant’s proposed
word types, the identified documents would need to be individually considered for
duplication, relevance and privilege.
We have been given limited detail of how Content Manager operates.
However, the first stage of identifying documents under the search terms provided by
the appellant should be undertaken. The documents returned by the proposed search
terms will give the parties a better idea of how many documents are duplicates of
documents already discovered and whether a less onerous revised list of search terms
is appropriate.
Conclusion
We uphold Mr Woolley’s appeal in respect of this issue. We therefore
respectfully disagree with the Judge that the Council has complied with its discovery
obligations. We make specific orders for discovery at the end of this judgment.
Issue Two: files from Radich Law
Background
[38] Radich Law has acted for the Council for years, including in the
Environment Court enforcement proceedings against Mr Woolley in 2013–2014. The
Council requested documents from Radich Law to fulfil its discovery obligations in
the present proceeding.
Mr Radich says he understood that the Council had searched Radich Law’s
hard copy files, copied documents relevant to Mr Woolley’s claim and provided those
documents to Mr Woolley as part of its discovery obligations. He then says that he did not search Radich Law’s electronic and email files because he was not asked to by
the Council.
Mr Radich has sworn an affidavit outlining the steps taken by him to review
the firm’s files, including his responses to specific queries by Mr Woolley’s solicitors.
In his affidavit, Mr Radich says the Council took physical possession of all of
Radich Law’s hard copy files relating to Glenmae in 2020, and later returned those
files to Radich Law.
Ms McIlveney for the Council deposed that when the Council asked for
Radich Law’s files, it was presented only with the hard copy files. In its submissions,
the Council says it understood at the time that Radich Law held files only in hard copy.
This year, Radich Law has engaged its external ICT support providers to search
all of the firm’s electronic systems with the key words: Glenmae, Woolley,
Wairau Valley and Awarua. Mr Radich has now provided the records that the external
support providers identified to the Council, to enable the solicitors acting for the
Council in these proceedings to assess whether they are relevant to Mr Woolley’s
claim. There has been no affidavit of documents filed in respect of this search.
Judge’s decision
In finding that he was satisfied the Council undertook a reasonable search to
locate documents for disclosure, the Judge traversed the background, and found that
the Council “requested and disclosed the records of external solicitors who held
relevant documents”.[30]
[30] Main Judgment, above n 1, at [87].
This was addressed in items 1, 2 and 4 of the Part 2 requests schedule attached
to the Main Judgment as an appendix.[31] In the final column, the Judge found that there
[31] Main Judgment, above n 1.
was no reason to believe the Council has not discovered any relevant documents in its
control, and observed that Mr Radich had responded to this in his affidavit.
[45] In his leave judgment, the Judge said it appeared relevant email
correspondence that should have been located by a search of Radich Law’s electronic
files was not discovered. The Judge further accepted that Mr Radich’s affidavit
referred to hard copy files only and did not confirm that the searches undertaken
extended to electronic and email files. The Judge said Mr Woolley is entitled to expect
confirmation that Radich Law searched all its electronic databases for relevant
documents and, if not, to have such searches undertaken. He concluded that this gave
rise to an arguable ground of appeal.[32] He further noted that this matter could be
quickly and inexpensively remedied by the Council of its own volition.[33]
Discussion
[32] Leave Judgment, above n 13, at [20].
[33] At [36].
It is common ground that while Radich Law’s hardcopy files were searched, it
did not extend to electronic and email files. We note Mr Morten’s submission that in
letters between the Council and Mr Woolley, Mr Woolley refers to emails from Ms and
Mr Radich to Fonterra and Mr Woolley’s sharemilker’s solicitors, that were not caught
by the search process undertaken by Ms Lines and Ms McIlveney.
We consider the evidence on this issue is contradictory and unsatisfactory. On
the one hand, Mr Radich says the Council asked only for his hard copy files, which he
provided. On the other, the Council asked for Radich Law’s files and was presented
only with the hard copy files.
Mr Radich is an experienced solicitor and can be taken to know the
requirements and obligations of discovery under the HCR. It was incumbent on
Mr Radich to make a search of all of the firm’s electronic and email correspondence
in relation to Mr Woolley and the disputes at issue in this proceeding, including
relevant documents from the previous related proceedings.
While the Council has reviewed the records that were retrieved from
Mr Radich’s office, it is not in a position to assert that there are no additional
discoverable documents. The documents held by Mr Radich are in the Council’s power or control and Mr Radich can be expected to assist the Council in making them
available.
Conclusion
We allow this ground of appeal. We consider the Judge was in error in not
directing that Mr Radich should comply with the discovery obligations under pt 8 of
the HCR. The electronic documents are discoverable and the Council must provide
Mr Woolley with a further affidavit of documents accordingly.
Issue Three: documents held by engineering consultant
Background
Mr Thomas, of Independent Project Consultants Ltd, was an expert engaged
by the Council to investigate the construction and operation of the effluent ponds at
Glenmae in 2014. Mr Thomas prepared a report of his investigations and provided
affidavit evidence to the Environment Court in 2014. Mr Woolley sought discovery
of documents held by Independent Project Consultants Ltd or Mr Thomas relating to
this investigation for the period April to November 2014 including site visit notes.
Judge’s decision
In item 12 of the Part 3 requests schedule attached to the Main Judgment as an
appendix, the Judge did not accept a submission that the Council was obliged to
disclose all “factual material” collected and relied upon by Mr Thomas.[34] He
considered such material would remain the property of Mr Thomas and was not under
the control of the Council. In arriving at that conclusion, he relied upon
Guttenbeil v Tower Insurance Ltd and other decisions that referred to and applied it.[35]
[34] Main Judgment, above n 1.
[35] Guttenbeil v Tower Insurance Ltd [2012] NZHC 2106 at [25] and [28]–[29] .
In the leave decision, the Judge observed that the terms of engagement between
Independent Project Consultants Ltd and the Council state that ownership of the
collected data and factual information lies with the Council, as Mr Woolley noted. The
Judge concluded that it must be arguable that Mr Thomas or Independent Project Consultants Ltd have documents (such as notes taken on Mr Thomas’ site visits to
Mr Woolley’s farm) that are under the control of the Council and may be relevant to
the matters in issue. The Judge concluded that this ground of appeal is arguable.[36]
[36] Leave Judgment, above n 13, at [23]–[25].
As with the previous ground, the Judge said this matter could be quickly and
inexpensively remedied by the Council of its own volition.[37]
Parties’ submissions
[37] At [36].
For Mr Woolley, counsel submits that Mr Thomas’ documents are relevant to
the compliance of Glenmae’s effluent system with the Environment Court’s
enforcement order and Ms Lines’ assertion that the Hills Laboratory soil sample was
taken from pond two. It is a matter of concern for the appellant that the Council has
not discovered any notes that record from where the sample was taken. We discuss
the origin of the sample and its significance to the proceedings further under
Issue Four.
The Council advises that it has since contacted Mr Thomas, who searched his
records for any documents relating to Glenmae and affirmed in an affidavit that such
records, dating back to 2014, no longer exist. The Council submits that, given the
passage of time, the Council genuinely believed that it was not required to discover
records held by Mr Thomas. The Council notes that it was only in the application for
leave to appeal that Mr Woolley referred to Mr Thomas’ 2014 terms of engagement.
Conclusion
Given that Mr Thomas has sworn an affidavit detailing his search for his
records and confirming that they no longer exist, it is unnecessary for Mr Thomas to
file a further affidavit.
Issue Four: Four categories of metadata
Mr Woolley seeks an order for particular discovery under r 8.19 of the HCR of
the audit logs and iterations of documents in relation to four classes of documents,
being:
(a) site visit notes and farm inspection reports that Ms Lines drafted following her visits to Glenmae;
(b) an email commissioned and sent to Ms Lines by Hills Laboratory and the attached soil sample report;
(c) the Council decision dated 2 July 2014 which required public notification of Mr Woolley’s application to amend his resource consent
so that pond two could be synthetically lined; and
(d) the abatement notices that the respondent served on Mr Woolley in 2014 that prevented him from discharging effluent and prevented him
from taking stock through an underpass.
Mr Woolley says the metadata of these documents is particularly relevant to
his conspiracy claim that the Council exercised its regulatory powers in an unlawful
manner with the intention of preventing Mr Woolley from operating his dairy farm.
Before addressing the four categories of metadata, it is relevant to canvas a
factual issue and the appellant’s pleadings, both of which have relevance to the issue
of metadata discovery.
Location of the soil sample
One of the contested facts is the location of a soil sample taken from one of
Mr Woolley’s effluent ponds. Mr Woolley’s farm contained two ponds (pond one and
pond two). On 13 August 2014, Ms Lines and her superior, Mr Congdon, undertook
a site visit at Glenmae with Mr Thomas. They took a soil sample. Ms Lines’ evidence was that the soil was taken from excavation materials on the north side of pond two.
The sample was tested for its clay content.
Mr Woolley asserts that the soil sample was taken from pond one. If that were
the case, Mr Woolley says the test results of that sample would demonstrate that there
was no basis for the Council to refuse the certification of the effluent ponds (on the
basis of pond one’s clay lining), which was required under the enforcement order
issued by the Environment Court before Mr Woolley could operate the milking sheds.
Fonterra suspended milk collection from Mr Woolley on the basis of his
non-compliance with the enforcement order.[38]
[38] See [3] above; Woolley v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd [2021] NZHC 2690 (especially at
The second matter relates to the nature of the proceedings.
Interference and conspiracy allegations
The Judge quite rightly had regard to the complexity of the proceeding and also
had regard to the pleadings, which we have recorded at [4] above. The pleadings
allege two causes of action of tortious interference by the Council with Mr Woolley’s
supply and milking contract and a further cause of action, a claim that the Council
conspired to injure Mr Woolley by unlawful means (in addition to causes of action
alleging negligence and a breach of statutory duty).
The Judge correctly noted in the Main Judgment that the author of a document,
when it was created and/or what changes were made to it in the course of its creation
become pertinent in the context of a trial where the persons involved in the conspiracy,
namely the combination, must be named and their role identified.[39] However, in his
Metadata Judgment, the Judge did not apply this approach.
[39] Main Judgment, above n 1, at [78].
In order to succeed in his claims of interference with contractual relations,
Mr Woolley must establish the following four ingredients: [40]
[40] OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at [39]–[44]; Diver v Loktronic Industries Ltd
(a) there must be a legally enforceable contract in existence; (b) the Council must have engaged in conduct which induced a breach of the contract;
(c) the Council must have known that their conduct would induce the breach; and
(d) the Council’s conduct inducing the breach must have caused loss or damage.
In relation to the claim of conspiracy to injure by unlawful means, Mr Woolley
is required to prove the following four elements: [41]
[41] Wagner v Gill [2014] NZCA 336, [2015] 3 NZLR 157 at [49]–[50].
(a) the existence of a combination (two or more people); (b) the combination undertaking an unlawful action (unlawful means); (c) an intention to injure the claimant; and (d) actual damage caused to the complainant.
Similarly, in relation to the claims of tortious interference, the pleadings also
have to be particularised. Discovery in respect of those causes of action must be
assessed, particularly where there are grounds for believing that there are one or more
documents or a group of documents, that could have been discovered but have not.
We agree with Mr Morten’s submission that the real issue in this appeal is
whether the documents sought by Mr Woolley by way of particular discovery are
relevant to the pleadings.
We now address each of the four categories of metadata sought.
1. Site visit notes and farm inspection reports
Background
Ms Lines prepared site visit and compliance inspection reports relating to
Mr Woolley’s property over a period of years. In the High Court, Mr Woolley
identified 26 such reports relating to the period 3 May 2011 to 16 March 2015 and
sought metadata showing when the reports were drafted, edited and read and by whom.
He said metadata may also show that content in the reports was edited.[42] He argues
there was reason to believe that the records were not accurate, and that the integrity of
the site visit reports is relevant.
Judge’s decision
[42] Metadata Judgment, above n 2, at [32].
The Judge observed that standard discovery does not generally require a party
to disclose documents that are merely background. The Judge considered there were
only three instances in which it had been explained how metadata was relevant, other
than as part of the background narrative.[43]
[43] At [33], citing Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Mr Woolley focussed on two site visit reports dated 31 July 2014 (in relation
to a site visit on 30 July) prepared by Ms Lines and Mr Congdon. He says there is a
discrepancy between these reports, in that one describes material examined as “a clay
loamy soil with gravel stones and some bigger rocks” and the other as “a mixture of
stones and dirt”, and that this calls into question the accuracy of Council records of visits to Mr Woolley’s property.[44] Mr Woolley further asserted that Ms Lines gave
evidence in other proceedings that she alone drafted the reports.[45]
[44] This is relevant in part because one of Ms Lines’ site visit reports records that a soil sample was
[45] At [34]–[36].
The Judge considered it was arguable whether there was a discrepancy between
the reports, and said the suggestion that Mr Congdon’s report was altered made no
sense when it might be considered supportive of Mr Woolley’s case to the extent it
referred to “clay loamy soil”.[46] The Judge said the argument that the discrepancy
called into question the accuracy of Council records of visits to Glenmae more
generally, so that metadata in respect to all of them should be disclosed, was simply
untenable, and could not be justified even on a train of inquiry approach.[47]
[46] At [35].
[47] At [36].
The third instance was a report dated 13 August 2014, in which Ms Lines
recorded that a soil sample was taken but not where it had been taken from.
Mr Woolley said the place the soil sample was taken from will be in issue. The Judge
held there was no reason to believe the file note had been altered, so the reason for
requesting metadata falls away. The Judge also noted that Mr Woolley has previously
accepted that the sample was not taken from pond one and was therefore seeking
metadata to advance an argument that is contrary to his evidence in other
proceedings.[48]
[48] At [37].
In the leave application, Mr Woolley again argued that there was evidence site
visit notes had been altered on various dates in the weeks and months following their
creation. He said there were five site visit notes between July and August 2014, which
might contain information relevant to matters at issue. The Judge referenced the
13 August 2014 report as an example, and Mr Woolley’s argument that the pond from
which the soil sample was taken would be an issue at trial and that earlier iterations of
the notes might contain that information. The Judge concluded that, to the extent he
dismissed Mr Woolley’s application for metadata concerning those five site visit notes
and any earlier iterations of those documents, there was an arguable issue on appeal.[49]
[49] Leave Judgment, above n 13, at [26]–[29].
Mr Morten submits the Judge was wrong to limit his finding to just five of the
reports. He says there is basis to believe that the 26 site visit reports from July to
August 2014 might contain information relevant to matters in issue. There are
discrepancies in the 31 July 2014 reports of Ms Lines and Mr Congdon, which calls
into question the accuracy of the Council’s records of site visit to Glenmae. Further,
it is submitted that Ms Lines was not qualified to make the findings that the ponds
were not clay lined. He cites the Environment Court’s recording of Ms Lines’
admission that the Council does not have expertise in this area.[50]
[50] Marlborough District Council v Woolley, above n 38, at [35] and [48].
The Council says any differences in the 31 July 2014 reports are because the
two documents were prepared by two separate authors, and it is expected that the
language of the notes would differ. The Council says Mr Woolley is making
allegations of dishonesty and conspiracy, which should only be made with an
appropriate evidential foundation to support a prima facie case.[51] The Council further
submits that the site visit notes are of marginal relevance only, as, at the time, the
Council was monitoring Mr Woolley’s compliance with the Environment Court
enforcement orders.
Discussion
[51] Relying on Ng v Harkness Law Ltd [2014] NZHC 850 at [44].
We reject the Council’s submission that the site visit reports are of marginal
relevance only. As the Judge found, Mr Congdon’s report might be considered
supportive of Mr Woolley’s case to the extent it referred to “clay loamy soil”.[52] The
differing description in Ms Lines’ report could therefore be relevant.
[52] Metadata Judgment, above n 2, at [35].
The metadata sought in respect of the five reports on which the Judge found
there was an arguable case should now be discovered. This is not a fishing exercise,
as the Council submits, but is warranted on the pleadings of conspiracy, which we
discuss further below.
2. Soil sample test results
Background
The soil sample results showed that the pond assessed was clay-lined.
Mr Woolley submits the sample was taken from pond one, and that therefore the
results showed that pond one was clay-lined and the Council had no basis to refuse the
certification of the ponds.[53] Mr Woolley submits the reports were suppressed as they
was not disclosed to Mr Woolley, his engineering consultants or the Council’s
independent consultant, and the Council failed to take any remedial action or
correction of its position as to the clay lining of pond one. The parties agree that
Ms Lines received the results on 4 September 2014.
Judge’s decision
[53] See above at [61]–[62].
The Judge observed in his Metadata Judgment that Mr Woolley had conceded
in other proceedings that the sample was not taken from pond one, and that it has been
held that the report results have no relevance to its clay content.[54] This reference was
to Isac J’s conclusion in Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd.[55] The Judge
decided that this evidence and the prior findings of Isac J strongly suggest that the
requested metadata will not produce meaningful probative evidence.[56]
[54] Metadata Judgment, above n 2, at [30].
[55] Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd, above n 6, at [511].
[56] Metadata Judgment, above n 2, at [31].
With regard to Mr Woolley’s assertion that the report was suppressed, the Judge
found that the soil sample reports were received by Ms Lines on or around
4 September 2014, as the parties accepted. Ms Lines had given evidence in other
proceedings that she provided the reports to Mr Congdon, which the Judge understood
was not in dispute.[57] The Judge concluded that, given the dates of the reports, they
could not shed any light on Mr Woolley’s allegation that the Council had from April
to September 2014 falsely asserted that the pond did not have a clay lining. The Judge
held that whether the content of the reports was suppressed will not be assisted by metadata showing when the reports were filed or who within the Council viewed
them.[58]
Parties’ submissions
[57] At [27].
[58] At [29].
Mr Woolley makes the same assertions as he did in the High Court on appeal.
He submits the sample was taken from pond one, noting that Ms Lines’ site notes do
not record where the sample was taken from, and that Mr Thomas, the consultant who
directed Ms Lines to have the sample he took analysed, said the sample was taken
from pond one. With regard to suppression, Mr Morten argues metadata will show
who knew about the test results and, with that knowledge, did not provide the results
to the consultants or Mr Woolley.
The Council submits the evidence regarding this report has been scrutinised by
the High Court in the Fonterra proceedings, where the Court found that the results
were not relevant to pond one.[59] The Council again notes that the issue with pond one
was that it had not been certified by a suitably qualified engineer as required by the
resource consent, as confirmed by Mr Woolley’s breach of the related enforcement
orders. These findings however are not binding in this proceeding.[60]
Discussion
[59] Woolley v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd, above n 6.
[60] Evidence Act 2006, s 50.
We are unable to uphold the Judge’s findings on the soil sample test results.
First, we disagree with the Judge’s finding that the reports cannot shed any light on
Mr Woolley’s allegation, that the Council had from April to September 2014 falsely
asserted that the pond did not have a clay lining. This was not an accurate description
of Mr Woolley’s position. In his statement of claim, Mr Woolley claims that the
Council made the noted false assertions from April to September 2014, “and then …
on learning that a clay lining existed, when laboratory reports were received on
4 September 2014, suppress[ed] that information and fil[ed] it without other or
remedial action or correction of position”.[61] We consider the metadata relating to the
reports is relevant, given the specificity of the pleadings.
[61] Emphasis added.
Second, disclosure of the metadata of the reports may well show whether they
were suppressed by the Council. We acknowledge that this will only be relevant, if it
can be proved that the soil sample was taken from pond one. If the sample was taken
from pond one, it is difficult to see how its suppression would have injured
Mr Woolley. However, disclosure of the metadata is likely to resolve this issue.
Third, the Judge deferred to Isac J’s findings in Mr Woolley’s proceedings
against Fonterra. While potentially persuasive, these are not binding on the
High Court determining these decisions. More relevantly, claims of conspiracy were
not made in the other proceedings.
3. Abatement notices
Background
Abatement notices were issued against Mr Woolley on 2 July 2014 preventing
Mr Woolley from discharging effluent to land, and in August 2014 preventing
Mr Woolley walking stock through an underpass to other areas of his farm.
Mr Woolley says the abatement notices exacerbated issues on the farm.
Mr Woolley seeks metadata showing who was responsible for and involved in
the decision making leading to the issuing of the abatement notices to him and his
sharemilker.
Judge’s decision
In the High Court, Mr Woolley had said the metadata would show when the
notices were drafted or edited and by whom. The Judge considered there was no
pleading in the statement of claim that put the creation of the abatement notices in
issue, and thus that the disclosure of the metadata would not produce evidence that is
meaningful or probative.[62]
[62] Metadata Judgment, above n 2, at [26].
While the Council submits that the metadata is not probative to any issues in
the proceedings, Ms Lines was instructed to issue the abatement notices by
Radich Law. We accept Mr Morten’s submission that the metadata is relevant to the
issue of which person in the alleged “wrongful combination” instructed or made the
decision to issue those abatement notices to prevent Mr Woolley from discharging
effluent from the ponds. It is relevant to the pleading that the Council and other
persons combined to exercise their regulatory powers in an unlawful manner, with the
intention of injuring Mr Woolley and is therefore, discoverable.
As this is a similar issue to the next category, we discuss it further below.
4. Public notification decision
Background
On 2 July 2014, the Council determined that Mr Woolley’s application to vary
his resource consent so that pond one could be synthetically lined should be publicly
notified. Mr Woolley says the effect of this was that pond one could not be relined
before the start of the milking season for supply.
Mr Morten says that, on the face of the document, the Council’s resource
management officers made the decision. However, he submits Ms Lines,
Ms McIlveney and Ms Radich were also involved in the decision. Mr Morten says the
metadata will show who had input into and agreed to the reasons for the decision.
Judge’s decision
In the Metadata Judgment, the Judge observed that the Council officers who
made the decision of public notification are identified on the decision, have signed it
and provided reasons for the decision. The Judge held that he did not consider
metadata that may show that other persons were involved in the creation of the record
or viewed it would assist the Court.[63]
[63] At [44]–[45].
We consider that, in reaching his decisions on the above issues in the Metadata
Judgment, the Judge has overlooked the ingredients of the tortious interference and
conspiracy by unlawful means causes of action in this proceeding. For example, the
Judge did not consider the request for disclosure of the metadata of the abatement
notices was an arguable issue on appeal;[64] we consider this conclusion overlooked the
pleading of conspiracy.
[64] Leave Judgment, above n 13.
After hearing from counsel as to the proposed use of the metadata to identify
which of the Council officers were involved in the specific factual circumstances as
pleaded, we consider it is both relevant and necessary for the metadata to be
discovered. We accept Mr Morten’s submission that, in order to prosecute this claim,
he must particularise who comprise the conspirators (the combination of persons) and
the factual matters alleged in relation to them.
It is not disputed that Council staff members are involved in the alleged
“wrongful combination”. However, it will be necessary for Mr Woolley to
particularise the identity of the persons comprising the “combination” and what
actions they each, or together, took, if his causes of action in conspiracy and tortious
interference are to succeed.
Conclusion
We therefore uphold this fourth ground of appeal. It appears to us that the
Judge overlooked the requirements on Mr Woolley to particularise and prove the
elements of conspiracy. We are satisfied this is not a fishing expedition and is not
disproportionate. We therefore find that the Council is to discover the metadata in
respect of the five site reports on which the Judge found there was an arguable case
and the metadata for the other three categories.
Overview summary
In reaching our conclusions, we have been mindful of the four steps set out in
Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd and the need for restraint in case management
decisions.[65] We are also mindful that there is considerable background which has led
[65] Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (New Zealand) Ltd, above n 15.
to the claims made by Mr Woolley, that those claims are serious, and there are high
hurdles Mr Woolley must overcome if he is to succeed.
[102] However, standing back we are satisfied it is appropriate to require further
discovery here. Discovery to date has been piecemeal and at times unduly narrow.
This has led to Mr Woolley’s concerns that more is required. The further discovery is
directed at relevant matters and we are not able to say that they are unlikely to be
important. Nor is the further discovery unduly onerous and disproportionate. We
conclude therefore that it is appropriate to make orders for further discovery.
Result
The application to adduce further evidence is granted.
The appeal is allowed.
We make the following orders for further and particular discovery:
(a) (i) The Council is to provide an initial printout list of documents from its Content Manager and AfterMail systems, using the
search terms provided by Mr Woolley’s counsel.
(ii) Counsel should confer and agree in the first instance on whether
there are obvious duplications and irrelevant documents, which
could result in a revised list of proposed search terms.
(iii) If counsel are not able to agree, we direct that the matter be
placed before the Associate Judge for directions on specified
search terms and the timetabling of discovery of the documents
identified.
(b) The Council is to file and serve a further affidavit of documents of the relevant documents held by Radich Law.
(c) The Council is to discover the metadata in the five reports on which the Judge found there was an arguable case, and the metadata for the other
three categories.
The High Court costs orders on the Main Judgment and Metadata Judgment
are set aside.
The respondent must pay the appellant costs for a standard appeal on a band A
basis and usual disbursements. Costs in the High Court are to be determined by that
Court in light of this judgment.
Solicitors:
Wisheart Macnab & Partners, Blenheim for Appellant
Rice Speir, Auckland for Respondent
| Judgment: | 7 November 2025 at 11 am |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
| A | The application to adduce further evidence is granted. |
| B | The appeal is allowed. |
| C | The respondent is to make further and particular discovery in terms set out |
| at [105] of this judgment. | |
| D | The High Court costs orders on the Main Judgment and Metadata Judgment |
| are set aside. | |
| E | The respondent must pay the appellant costs for a standard appeal on a |
| band A basis and usual disbursements. Costs in the High Court are to be | |
| determined by that Court in light of this judgment. |
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Cull J)
WOOLLEY v MARLBOROUGH DISTRICT COUNCIL [2025] NZCA 589 [7 November 2025]
as a contractor built the second effluent pond.
Opus’s certificate of 5 September 2014 satisfied the requirements of the enforcement order; but
see n 7.
Environment Court, Isac J held at [380] that Mr Woolley remained in breach of the enforcement
order and his resource consent after 5 September 2014.
not relevant to this appeal.
600 at [14]; and Lighter Quay Residents’ Society Inc v Waterfront Properties (2009) Ltd [2017]
NZHC 818 at [16].
Houghton v Saunders [2019] NZCA 506 at [50]; and James Hardie New Zealand Ltd v White
[2020] NZCA 142, (2020) 25 PRNZ 691 at [55].
[2007] 2 NZLR 1.
[502]–[511]); and Marlborough District Council v Woolley [2014] NZEnvC 79.
[2012] NZCA 131; and Intellihub Ltd v Genesis Energy Ltd [2020] NZHC 1135 at [11]. The Court
in Diver notes that there are some differences between the OBG formulation of the tort’s elements
and that of the Court of Appeal in Jiao v Barge CA236/05, 19 July 2006, which pre-dated OBG:
at [31].
Reuters) at [HR8.7.01].
taken from pond two.
0
19
0