Tasman Insulation New Zealand Ltd v Knauf Insulation Ltd

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA299/2014
[2015] NZCA 602

BETWEEN

TASMAN INSULATION NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Appellant

AND

KNAUF INSULATION LIMITED
First Respondent

ECO INSULATION LIMITED
Second Respondent

BUILDFORNEXTGEN LIMITED
Third Respondent

Hearing:

29 and 30 September and 1 October 2015

Court:

Randerson, French and Cooper JJ

Counsel:

J G Miles QC and S D Williams for Appellant
C L Elliott QC, G Hazel and B P Cain for Respondents

Judgment:

16 December 2015 at 2.15 pm

Reissued:

18 December 2015 at 1.00 pm

Effective date

of Judgment:

16 December 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal and cross-appeal are dismissed save that the Judge’s finding of infringement in respect of the HTML code is set aside.  

BCosts are to lie where they fall.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Randerson J)

Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction
Background facts
Did the Judge err in declining Knauf’s application to revoke Tasman’s trade mark?

The Judge’s approach
Grounds for appeal
Loss of distinctiveness as a ground for revocation
The interpretation of s 66(1)(c)
Does s 66(1)(c) apply retrospectively?
The revocation application — the evidence
Tasman
Knauf’s evidence
The Trade Me evidence
Mr Hall’s evidence
(i)  Dictionaries
(ii)  Academic institutions
(iii)  Consumers
(iv)  Decisions of New Zealand courts and tribunals
(v)  Central and local government
(vi)  News media
(vii)  Patents and (viii) Trade mark applications and registration
(ix)  Real estate
(x)  Industry bodies
(xi)  Trade
(xii)  Tasman
The other evidence relied upon by Knauf
Conclusion as to whether the Judge was correct to find that “batts” had not become a common name in general public use
The causation element of s 66(1)(c)
Conclusions on the causation issue

Was the Judge correct to find there was no infringement because s 89(2) of the Act applied to Knauf’s use of the term “batt(s)” or “BATT”?

Tasman’s submissions
Discussion
Conclusions on the s 89(2) issue

Knauf’s challenge to the Judge’s finding in respect of the HTML code

Analysis
Discussion
Conclusion on the HTML code

The honest practices defence under s 95

Section 95 — principles
The Judge’s conclusions on s 95
Discussion

The s 105 issue — unjustified proceedings

Discussion

The Fair Trading Act issues

The EARTHWOOL branding
The eco website
The earthwool website
Knauf’s case on its cross-appeal
Conclusion on the FTA arguments

Result

[1]
[12]

[24]
[24]
[39]
[41]
[47]
[64]
[68]
[68]
[79]
[80]
[86]
[95]
[101]
[102]
[103]
[104]
[105]

[106]
[107]
[108]
[109]
[110]
[111]

[113]
[121]
[143]

[148]
[153]
[155]
[165]


[175]
[182]
[189]
[194]
[195]
[200]
[203]
[205]
[214]
[217]
[219]
[226]
[238]
[242]
[250]
[259]
[260]

Introduction

  1. The appellant (Tasman) is the registered proprietor of the trade mark BATTS.  The trade mark was registered in New Zealand in 1973 by a predecessor of Tasman in respect of insulating material.  Tasman also uses the trade mark PINK under licence. 

  2. Since at least 1973 Tasman and its predecessors have manufactured and sold insulation in…

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Details
Case
[2015] NZCA 602
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tasman Insulation New Zealand Ltd v Knauf Insulation Ltd was heard in the High Court of Australia. The dispute involved the registration of the trade mark "Knauf Batts" for insulation products and the contention by Tasman Insulation that the term "batt" had become generic and thus, the trade mark should be revoked under section 66(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). The primary issue for the court was to determine the scope of the term "in general public use" as it appears in section 66(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act. The court needed to interpret whether this term includes the general public, trade professionals, or both, and to what extent the term "batt" had become generic in the context of insulation products.

The court addressed the issue by examining the legislative history and international jurisprudence, particularly the interpretation of similar provisions in the United Kingdom and Singapore. It was noted that the relevant sections in both jurisdictions, as well as the European Trade Mark Directive, have been interpreted to include a broad range of stakeholders in determining whether a trade mark has become generic. The court considered that the views of consumers and end users are often decisive, but the influence of trade intermediaries and their perceptions also play a significant role, depending on the specific market characteristics. The court acknowledged that in markets where trade professionals are involved in the purchasing process, their views can be more critical. The decision in Björnekulla Fruktindustrier AB v Procordia Food AB by the Court of Justice of the European Union was referenced, which emphasised that the perception of consumers or end users plays a decisive role, but the influence of intermediaries must also be considered.

In conclusion, the court held that the term "in general public use" includes both the trade and the general public, and that the use of the term "batt" by various sectors, including trade professionals, the news media, and academic bodies, was relevant in determining whether the term had become generic. The court found that the term "batt" had indeed become generic in the context of insulation products, leading to the revocation of the trade mark "Knauf Batts". The decision underscored the importance of considering a wide range of stakeholders and contexts in assessing the generic nature of trade marks.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the Judge said, the genesis of s 66(1)(c) lies in s 22(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1998 (Singapore), which in turn is materially identical to s 46(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). The United Kingdom provision relevantly states:[24]46 Revocation of registration(1)The registration of a trade mark may be revoked on any of the following grounds—…(c)that, in consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, it has become the common name in the trade for a product or service for which it is registered.[24]The United Kingdom provision reproduces art 12(2)(a) of Directive 2008/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ L299/25 [EC Trade Marks Directive]. In both the United Kingdom and in Singapore, the reference to the expression “in the trade” has been interpreted broadly as Brown J observed:[25][I]n Björnekulla Fruktindustrier AB v Procordia Food AB[26] the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Sixth Chamber), after considering the different language versions of Article 12(2)(a) of the Trade Mark Directive, said:In general, the perception of consumers or end users will play a decisive role. The whole aim of the commercialisation process is the purchase of the product by those persons and the role of the intermediary consists as much in detecting and anticipating the demand for that product as in increasing or directing it. Accordingly, the relevant circles comprise principally consumers and end users. However, depending on the features of the product market concerned, the influence of intermediaries on decisions to purchase, and thus their perception of the trade mark, must also be taken into consideration.[25]High Court judgment, above n 3, at [90].[26]Case C-371/02 Björnekulla Fruktindustrier AB v Procordia Food AB [2004] ECR I-5791. The observations of the Court of Justice were adopted with apparent approval in Hormel and in Wing Joo Loong Ginseng.[27]Kerly summarises the effect of the Court of Justice’s decision in these terms:[28]The judgment is carefully worded to take account of the wide range of circumstances in which trade marks are encountered. For self-serve items where the consumer makes his or her own choice, the views of consumers or end users are likely to be decisive and the views of members of the trade almost irrelevant. For product markets where a member of the trade is normally involved in the purchasing process (e.g. purchases are made on the basis of advice or recommendation from someone in the trade) the views of the trade may be much more important. In specialist or industrial product markets the consumer or end user may be a member of the trade or have equivalent knowledge, and the views of the public may be completely irrelevant.[27]Hormel, above n 21, at [164] and Wing Joo Loong Ginseng, above n 18. [28]Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, above n 19, at [10-118]. Counsel differed as to the approach to be adopted in interpreting the expression “in general public use”. Mr Miles QC for Tasman submitted that the relevant public comprises both the trade and actual or potential consumers of the product in question. Mr Elliott submitted on the other hand that the change to use by the general public signified an intention by the legislation to broaden the test beyond a narrow commercial context. Use by the wider general public was germane. It followed that the use made by real estate agents, government bodies, news media, and academic and industry bodies was relevant. So too, decisions of courts and tribunals, and dictionary definitions of the term “batt”.