Taniwha v R

Case [2016] NZSC 123


NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 115/2015
[2016] NZSC 123
BETWEEN

LYONEL MANUREWA TE POU TANIWHA
Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

Hearing:

7 June 2016

Court:

Elias CJ, William Young, Glazebrook, Arnold and OʼRegan JJ

Counsel:

N P Chisnall and M F Laracy for Appellant
M D Downs and F G Biggs for Respondent

Judgment:

8 September 2016

Reissued:

12 September 2016

Effective date

of Judgment:

8 September 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS
(Given by Arnold J)

Table of Contents

Para
Introduction [1]
Background [2]
  The towel incident [5]
  Police safety order incident [12]
The issues [17]
Demeanour [18]
The Judge’s instructions to the jury [21]
Evaluation [26]
Police safety order [59]
Decision [68]

Introduction

  1. In New Zealand, as in other jurisdictions from the common law tradition, criminal trials are conducted orally, in open court.  The principle of orality, enshrined in s 83 of the Evidence Act 2006, recognises the fundamental importance of transparency in the administration of justice through the courts.  The principle also rests upon the assumption that a fact-finder, whether a judge sitting alone or a jury, is likely to benefit from seeing and hearing witnesses give their evidence.  There is, however, research which indicates that a person’s demeanour when giving evidence in court generally provides little or no assistance to a fact-finder charged with determining whether or not the witness is telling the truth.[1]  A witness who presents as confident, articulate and honest may be mistaken or dishonest; a witness who presents as diffident, hesitant or awkward may be telling the truth and their evidence may be accurate.  Not only can appearances be deceptive, but fact-finders may over‑estimate their ability to recognise those who are truthful from those who are not, by, for example, relying on unreliable behaviours such as fidgeting or looking away.[2]  In this appeal, the Court is asked to consider how a judge instructing a jury in a criminal trial should deal with the question of demeanour.

Background

[1]See, for example, Aldert Vrij Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities (2nd ed, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester (Eng), 2008).

[2]See, for example, Eiten Elaad “Effects of Feedback on the Overestimated Capacity to Detect Lies and the Underestimated Ability to Tell Lies” (2003) 17 Appl Cognit Psychol 349.

  1. The appellant, Mr Taniwha, was convicted following a jury trial before Judge O’Driscoll of six of 12 counts involving physical and sexual violence against the complainant, with whom he was in a relationship for a few months.  The Crown alleged that soon after the relationship began, Mr Taniwha began to act in a possessive and controlling way towards the complainant and later became abusive and violent towards her.  Ultimately the police became involved, which led to the charges.  Mr Taniwha denied the charges.  While acknowledging that there were arguments and fights during their relationship, he said that…

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Details
AGLC
Taniwha v R [2016] NZSC 123
Case
[2016] NZSC 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Taniwha v R involved a criminal trial in the New Zealand court system. The defendant, Taniwha, was on trial for a criminal offence and the case centred around the admissibility and evaluation of certain evidence presented during the trial. The court had to determine whether the evidence provided by the witnesses was reliable and credible, particularly in light of the fact that the witnesses were not present in the courtroom. The court also had to consider the implications of the principle of orality in criminal proceedings and how it affects the assessment of witness credibility.

The legal issues that the court had to decide in this case were whether the trial judge had correctly directed the jury on the assessment of witness credibility and whether the evidence provided by the witnesses was admissible and reliable. The court had to consider the factors that the jury should take into account when assessing the credibility of a witness, particularly in cases where the witnesses were not present in the courtroom. The court also had to consider the implications of the principle of orality in criminal proceedings and how it affects the assessment of witness credibility.

The court's reasoning in this case was that the trial judge had not correctly directed the jury on the assessment of witness credibility. The court held that the jury should be advised of two points: firstly, that the assessment of the credibility and reliability of a witness should be broadly based and take into account the evidence as a whole and other relevant factors; and secondly, that while demeanour could properly be taken into account, it was best not considered in isolation but should be considered as one factor in a broader assessment. The court held that the trial judge had not given the appropriate direction to the jury on these points, and that this was a significant error that could have affected the outcome of the trial.

The court's outcome in this case was that the conviction of the defendant, Taniwha, was quashed and a retrial ordered. The court held that the error in the trial judge's direction to the jury on the assessment of witness credibility was significant enough to affect the outcome of the trial, and that a retrial was necessary to ensure a fair trial for the defendant. The court also held that the principle of orality in criminal proceedings was an important one, and that the fact-finder should be given the opportunity to assess first-hand the credibility and veracity of the witness giving evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As we noted at the outset, criminal trials in New Zealand are conducted by way of oral evidence given before a fact-finder (whether a judge sitting alone or a jury). This is reflected in the Evidence Act, s 83(1)(a) of which provides:83 Ordinary way of giving evidence(1) The ordinary way for a witness to give evidence is,―(a)in a criminal or civil proceeding, orally in a courtroom in the presence of―(i)the Judge or, if there is a jury, the Judge and jury; and(ii)the parties to the proceeding and their counsel; and(iii)any member of the public who wishes to be present, unless excluded by order of the Judge; As s 83(1)(a) indicates, the oral tradition is linked to the requirement that the administration of justice through the courts be conducted by way of an open, public process. The requirement for an open, public court process is seen as vital to the preservation of public confidence in the courts, to the extent that the common law recognised only very narrow exceptions to it.[26] More relevantly, however, the principle of orality also reflects an assumption that a fact-finder is likely to benefit from seeing and hearing a witness give evidence in person. In their 2013 review of the Evidence Act, the Law Commission expressed the view that:[27]… the principle of orality in criminal proceedings is an important one; it allows a defendant to fully test a witness’s evidence by cross-examining them on it and provides the fact-finder with the opportunity to assess first‑hand the credibility and veracity of the witness giving evidence. In E (CA799/2012) v R the Court of Appeal concluded that in cases where demeanour might be relevant, a warning about the risks of relying on demeanour when assessing credibility was not inevitably required, but, when a warning was required, it should be tailored to the circumstances of the particular case. To adopt a universal rule would, the Court said:[28]… tend to deprive juries of the accepted benefits of seeing and hearing the witnesses; it would risk juries interpreting the Judge’s direction as an invitation to disbelieve the witness or to place little weight on his or her evidence; and it would restrict the ability of the trial judge to tailor a direction appropriate to the circumstances of the case.[28]E (CA799/2012) v R, above n 8, at [41]. The Court went on to say, however, that the jury should be advised of two points.[29] The first was that the assessment of the credibility and reliability of a witness should be broadly based and take into account the evidence as a whole and other relevant factors. The second was that, while demeanour could properly be taken into account, it was best not considered in isolation but should be considered as one factor in a broader assessment.[29]At [43]. In relation to the factors potentially relevant to that broader assessment, the Court identified:[30](a)The consistency of the witness’s evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred. (b) The internal consistency of the evidence of the witness. (c) Consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions. (d) The credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation. …(e)The inherent plausibility of the evidence of the witness (does it make sense?) and(f)Where appropriate, consistency with any contemporaneous documentary evidence.[30]At [44]–[45] (footnotes omitted).

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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