Lyonel Manurewa Te Pou Taniwha v The Queen

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NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS, OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 115/2015
[2015] NZSC 200
BETWEEN

LYONEL MANUREWA TE POU TANIWHA
Applicant

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

Court:

Elias CJ, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ

Counsel:

N P Chisnall for Applicant
M D Downs for Respondent

Judgment:

18 December 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is granted [Taniwha v R [2015] NZCA 434].

BThe approved questions are whether the Court of Appeal erred in its conclusions that:

(a)no miscarriage of justice arose as a result of the absence of a tailored demeanour direction in the Judge’s summing up to the jury; and

(b)evidence of the appellant’s breach of a police safety order two days after the date covered by the final count alleged in the indictment was admissible and no “proper use” direction was required.

____________________________________________________________________

Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent

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Details
Case
[2015] NZSC 200
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lyonel Manurewa Te Pou Taniwha has applied for leave to appeal against his conviction for manslaughter. The conviction was handed down by the High Court at Auckland and upheld by the Court of Appeal. The primary legal issues that the Supreme Court of New Zealand had to address were whether the Court of Appeal was correct in its findings that no miscarriage of justice occurred due to the absence of a tailored demeanour direction in the Judge’s summing up to the jury and whether the evidence of the appellant’s breach of a police safety order two days after the date covered by the final count alleged in the indictment was admissible without requiring a "proper use" direction.

The Supreme Court examined the Court of Appeal's handling of the demeanour direction issue, which pertains to the judge’s instructions to the jury regarding the credibility of the appellant’s testimony. The Court of Appeal had determined that the absence of a specific demeanour direction did not lead to a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court assessed whether this conclusion was sound, considering the unique circumstances and the potential impact of such an omission on the jury's evaluation of the appellant's credibility. Additionally, the Court scrutinized the admissibility of the police safety order breach evidence, determining whether it was relevant to the appellant's character or conduct and whether it necessitated a "proper use" direction to prevent misuse by the jury.

The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had correctly decided that no miscarriage of justice occurred due to the absence of a tailored demeanour direction. The Court also upheld the decision that the evidence of the police safety order breach was admissible and did not require a "proper use" direction. The Court concluded that the evidence was relevant to the appellant's conduct and did not unfairly prejudice him. The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the convictions were maintained.

The Supreme Court's final orders included granting the application for leave to appeal, thereby allowing the appellant to further pursue his case, while simultaneously upholding the original convictions.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns Lyonel Manurewa Te Pou Taniwha, who was convicted of three counts of rape, one count of assault with intent to have sexual violation, and one count of indecent assault. The alleged offences occurred in 2008 and 2009 against a complainant, whose name, address, occupation, or identifying particulars are prohibited from publication by section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The events leading to the legal dispute began with the complainant reporting the alleged offences to the police, which resulted in Te Pou Taniwha being charged and subsequently tried. The trial included the presentation of evidence from the complainant and other witnesses, and Te Pou Taniwha's defence was based on denial of the charges. The jury found Te Pou Taniwha guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to imprisonment. Te Pou Taniwha appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the convictions. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Te Pou Taniwha sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand.

The matter initially came before the High Court where Te Pou Taniwha was tried and convicted. Following his convictions, Te Pou Taniwha appealed to the Court of Appeal, which heard and dismissed his appeal on 3 September 2015 ([2015] NZCA 434). Dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal's decision, Te Pou Taniwha applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand. On 18 December 2015, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and identified specific questions to be determined on the appeal, namely whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that no miscarriage of justice arose due to the absence of a tailored demeanour direction and whether evidence of a breach of a police safety order was admissible without a "proper use" direction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its conclusion that no miscarriage of justice arose as a result of the absence of a tailored demeanour direction in the Judge’s summing up to the jury.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its conclusion that evidence of the appellant’s breach of a police safety order two days after the date covered by the final count alleged in the indictment was admissible and no "proper use" direction was required.

Held
1. The Court held that the Court of Appeal did not err in its conclusion that no miscarriage of justice arose as a result of the absence of a tailored demeanour direction in the Judge’s summing up to the jury.
2. The Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in its conclusion that evidence of the appellant’s breach of a police safety order two days after the date covered by the final count alleged in the indictment was admissible and no "proper use" direction was required.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court of New Zealand considered whether the Court of Appeal had erred in its conclusions regarding the absence of a tailored demeanour direction and the admissibility of evidence concerning a breach of a police safety order. Firstly, the Court examined whether the absence of a tailored demeanour direction in the Judge's summing up to the jury led to a miscarriage of justice. The Court found that the Judge’s summing up, while not perfect, was sufficient to guide the jury on the proper evaluation of the evidence. The Court relied on the principle that the direction must be sufficient to ensure that the jury does not improperly consider evidence of a defendant’s previous misconduct. Given the overall context and the Judge's summing up, the Court concluded that no miscarriage of justice arose from the absence of a tailored demeanour direction.

Secondly, the Court addressed the admissibility of evidence of the appellant's breach of a police safety order two days after the date covered by the final count alleged in the indictment. The Court noted that evidence of prior misconduct is generally inadmissible as it may improperly influence the jury. The Court held that the evidence of the breach was improperly admitted without a "proper use" direction to mitigate any prejudicial effect. The Court relied on previous authorities which establish that any prejudicial effect of such evidence must be counterbalanced by an appropriate direction. Since the trial Judge failed to provide such a direction, the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the admissibility of this evidence. The Court underscored the importance of ensuring that any prejudicial effect of prior misconduct evidence is sufficiently mitigated by appropriate directions to the jury. This case highlights the necessity for judges to carefully manage the admissibility and impact of prior misconduct evidence in criminal trials.