Winkelmann CJ, Glazebrook, Ellen France, Williams and Kós JJ
Counsel:
D M Salmon KC, D A C Bullock, N R Coates and N T Sussman for Appellant D R Kalderimis, N K Swan and T A T K Dewes for First Respondent S J P Ladd and T M J Shiels for Second Respondent B G Williams and J P Papps for Third Respondent D T Broadmore and C T Ottow for Fourth Respondent T D Smith and A M Lampitt for Fifth Respondent A J Horne and J S Hofer for Sixth Respondent R J Gordon and A S Dawson-Swale for Seventh Respondent J S Cooper KC, J D Every-Palmer KC and J P Cundy for Lawyers for Climate Action NZ Incorporated as Intervener M K Mahuika and H K Irwin-Easthope for Te Hunga Rōia Māori o Aotearoa | The Māori Law Society as Intervener A S Butler, R A Kirkness and H Z Yang for Human Rights Commission | Te Kāhui Tika Tangata as Intervener
Alleged consequences of the release of GHGs into the atmosphere
[52]
Tikanga pleading
[59]
First cause of action: public nuisance
[62]
Second cause of action: negligence
[66]
Third cause of action: proposed climate system damage tort
[71]
Strike out
[73]
General principles
[74]
Our approach
[83]
Are common law actions over GHG emissions excluded by statute?
[86]
Submissions
[90]
Our assessment
[92]
Is the public nuisance claim bound to fail?
[102]
Evolution and elements of the tort
[103]
High Court and Court of Appeal
[114]
Submissions
[122]
(a) For Mr Smith
[123]
(b) For the respondents
[131]
(c) For the interveners
[140]
Our assessment
[143]
(a) The “first question”: actionable public rights tenably pleaded
[144]
(b) The “second question”: independent illegality not required
[146]
(c) The “third question”: special damage rule requires reconsideration
[148]
(d) The “fourth question”: sufficient connection, or causation
[153]
Concluding observations
[172]
What about the remaining causes of action?
[174]
Can tikanga inform the formulation of tort claims?
[177]
Submissions
[179]
Our assessment
[182]
Conclusion
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of Smith v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd, the High Court of New Zealand addressed a dispute concerning the impact of tikanga, or traditional Māori law, on modern legal proceedings. The plaintiff, Mr Smith, sought to bring a claim on behalf of the land, water, and sea, asserting his role as a kaitiaki, or guardian, of these elements. He alleged that Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd, and other respondents, had caused significant harm through their actions, which he claimed infringed upon his rights as kaitiaki. The case centred on whether Mr Smith's claim, grounded in tikanga, could be recognised and pursued under New Zealand's common law system.
The central legal issue before the court was whether the traditional Māori concept of tikanga could be integrated into a common law proceeding and, if so, to what extent. The court had to consider whether tikanga principles could be applied to determine the scope and nature of Mr Smith's claims, particularly in the context of public nuisance and potential environmental harm. This involved examining the extent to which tikanga could inform the court's understanding of loss and the appropriate remedies in such cases.
The court determined that tikanga, as the original law of New Zealand, must be acknowledged and considered in modern legal disputes, especially when traditional rights and responsibilities are at stake. The judges held that the trial court must engage with tikanga principles to properly assess Mr Smith's claims, recognising the unique relationship between the plaintiff and the natural elements he seeks to protect. The court found that the traditional concepts of loss under tikanga, which may not align with conventional physical or economic harm, needed to be addressed. However, the court did not delve into the specifics of the evidence or the ultimate merits of the claim, as those were matters for the trial court to determine. Instead, the focus was on the necessity of considering tikanga in the proceedings.
The appeal was allowed, reinstating Mr Smith's claim. The court concluded that the traditional Māori concepts and the role of kaitiaki could not be ignored in the context of this case. The decision underscored the importance of integrating tikanga with the common law to ensure that the rights and responsibilities recognised by Māori culture are appropriately reflected in legal proceedings. The court did not order costs, recognising the public interest nature of the case and its broader implications.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
In the 1866 case of Reynolds v Tuangau, there was a dispute over title to a pounamu boulder weighing “considerably more than a ton”.[253] Mr Reynolds said that he had found it in a West Coast river. He broke the boulder up and had it removed in 16 bags by horse and boat to the mouth of the Taramakau river. The bags were seized by the police at the direction of the local mining warden who considered the pounamu belonged to one Simon Tuangau. [253]“James Reynolds v Simon Tuangau” West Coast Times (New Zealand, 8 August 1866) at 2–3. It was common in the 19th century for newspapers to report court proceedings in detail. A summary of this case is provided in Reynold v Tuangau SC Wellington, 7 August 1866 available at >Mr Reynolds sued Mr Tuangau in the Hokitika Supreme Court in trover, detinue and conversion, seeking return of the pounamu. Mr Tuangau contended the pounamu was his according to tikanga as he had worked the boulder and had left his mark on it to render it tapu (restricted) to him alone. Counsel for Mr Reynolds argued that evidence of tikanga was inadmissible “on English territory”. Gresson J nonetheless admitted independent evidence about tikanga rendering objects tapu to their owner in this way. He directed the jury that this tikanga had been proved for the purpose of their consideration of the case.[254] While the first jury was unable to reach a verdict, a second returned a “special verdict”, finding that Mr Tuangau was the “first discoverer” of the pounamu, had worked it, and had not abandoned it by the time Mr Reynolds claimed it. Mr Reynolds’ claim was summarily dismissed by a five‑judge appellate bench (which included Gresson J).[255] [254]“The Supreme Court” West Coast Times (New Zealand, 11 August 1866) at 5.[255]See “Court of Appeal” Daily Southern Cross (New Zealand, 9 November 1866) at 6. Better known is the 1910 case of Baldick v Jackson.[256] In that case Stout CJ dismissed an appeal by Mr Baldick and others, who were whalers, against a judgment in the Magistrate’s Court in Blenheim in favour of the plaintiff, Mr Jackson, also a whaler. Mr Jackson had filed a plaint note in conversion. He claimed that Mr Baldick and company had converted the carcass of a right whale belonging to him, valued at £200. In response, the appellants argued that a 14th‑century statute affirmed that the King owned all whales, meaning Mr Jackson could not establish a proprietary interest in the whale sufficient to maintain an action in conversion.[257] Stout CJ held that this statute did not apply to the circumstances of the colony of New Zealand because “Maoris … were accustomed to engage in whaling” and such activity was protected by Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi.[258] Judgment was entered for Mr Jackson. [256]Baldick v Jackson (1910) 30 NZLR 343 (SC).[257]It is unclear whether the statute was enacted in 1322: Statute of the King’s Prerogative (Eng) 15 Edw II c 2; or 1324: Statute of the King’s Prerogative (Eng) 17 Edw II c 2. But in any event, s 13 provided that “the King shall have” shipwrecks, sturgeons and whales taken in the sea.[258]Baldick, above n 256, at 344–345. The other ground of appeal, that Mr Jackson had abandoned the whale, also failed.In more recent times, the common law has re‑engaged with tikanga. For example, in 2003, a five‑judge bench in the Court of Appeal affirmed that Māori land rights (including in the foreshore and seabed) derived from tikanga were cognisable at common law.[259] Citing extensive authority, the Court found that this had been the position since the common law’s arrival in 1840. And in Takamore v Clarke,[260] Trans‑TasmanResources Ltd v Taranaki‑Whanganui Conservation Board[261] and Ellis v R (Continuance)[262] this Court considered the relationship between tikanga and the common law as it operates outside the sphere of customary title.[263]To summarise the essential conclusions reached, tikanga was the first law of New Zealand, and it will continue to influence New Zealand’s distinctive common law as appropriate according to the case and to the extent appropriate in the case.[264] The respondents do not challenge these propositions. As noted, their argument is not with the relationship between tikanga and the common law, but with its practical utility in the circumstances of this case.[259]Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA).[260]Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116, [2013] 2 NZLR 733.[261]Trans‑Tasman Resources Ltd v Taranaki‑Whanganui Conservation Board [2021] NZSC 127, [2021] 1 NZLR 801.[262]Ellis v R (Continuance) [2022] NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239.[263]Customary title is also known as “native title” in Australia and “aboriginal title” in Canada.[264]The past and present interface of tikanga and the common law was recently discussed in: Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission He Poutama (NZLC SP24, 2023).So, to return to the starting point, whatever the cause of action, the trial court will need to grapple with the fact that Mr Smith purports to bring proceedings not merely as an alleged proprietor who has suffered loss, but as a kaitiaki acting on behalf of the whenua, wai and moana—distinct entities in their own right.[265] And it must consider some tikanga conceptions of loss that are neither physical nor economic. In other words, addressing and assessing matters of tikanga simply cannot be avoided. [265]We note that a proprietary interest in the affected land is not an element of public nuisance: see Kit Barker and others The Law of Torts in Australia (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2012) at 219–220.The analytical methodology outlined in Ellis (Continuance) will assist the court in this respect,[266] but more neither can nor need be said at this early stage since all we have are factual assertions that must be accepted for strike out purposes. Mr Smith’s ultimate prospects at trial will depend, in part, on the quality of the evidence, including that in relation to tikanga.Conclusion[266]See Ellis (Continuance), above n 262, at [121]–[125] per Glazebrook J, [181] per Winkelmann CJ and [261]–[273] per Williams J.For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the appellant’s claim is reinstated.Mr Smith is represented on a pro bono basis and does not seek costs. Whatever the outcome, he sought that costs lie where they fall in this Court, as they have done in the Courts below, because the proceeding is brought on a public interest basis and has wider implications beyond the case at hand. We agree. ResultThe appeal is allowed.The appellant’s claim is reinstated.There is no order as to costs.Solicitors: LeeSalmonLong, Auckland for AppellantChapman Tripp, Wellington for First, Third and Fifth RespondentsBell Gully, Auckland for Second RespondentBuddle Findlay, Auckland for Fourth RespondentMinterEllisonRuddWatts, Auckland for Sixth RespondentMinterEllisonRuddWatts, Wellington for Seventh RespondentJ P Cundy, Auckland for Lawyers for Climate Action NZ Incorporated as IntervenerKāhui Legal, Wellington and Whāia Legal, Wellington for Te Hunga Rōia Māori o Aotearoa | The Māori Law Society as IntervenerJ S Hancock, Auckland for Human Rights Commission | Te Kāhui Tika Tangata as Intervener