IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2025-404-000695
[2025] NZHC 1817
BETWEEN
RYAN BARKER
Appellant
AND
ALICE BARKER
Respondent
Hearing:
5 June 2025
Appearances:
V Crawshaw KC and S Wilson for the Appellant
JWA Johnson (VMR), A G Needham and A Brown (VMR) for the Respondent
Judgment:
4 July 2025
JUDGMENT OF HARVEY J
This judgment is delivered by me on 4 July 2025 at 10AM pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
………………………………
Deputy Registrar
Solicitors: Treadwell Gordon, Whanganui (A Brown)
Counsel:
Vivienne Crawshaw KC, Auckland JWA Johnson, Barrister, Auckland A G Needham, Barrister, Auckland
BARKER v BARKER [2025] NZHC 1817 [4 July 2025]
Introduction1
[1] On 3 March 2025, the Family Court held that Ryan Barker’s 3.5 million ordinary shares in [Company] are relationship property and ordered the immediate transfer of half of those shares to his former wife, Alice Barker.2 Mr Barker’s appeal of that decision to this Court will be heard on 1 October 2025. The appellant will submit that the Family Court Judge erred in law by:
(a)failing to consider provisions of [Company’s] constitution which restrict or prohibit the transfer of shares;
(b)failing to take into account the fact that the share transfer would place the appellant in breach of his duty to act in [Company’s] best interests;
(c)holding that the share transfer would achieve a just division of relationship property under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) and, in doing so, failing to properly consider:
(i) the prejudice to the appellant and [Company] arising from a 12.85 per cent shareholding being transferred to a third party with no ties to the business, no relevant expertise and whose commercial intent is not aligned with that of [Company] nor the existing shareholders; and
(ii) how a just division of relationship property could be achieved in a manner which protects the appellant’s future interest in [Company];
(d)failing to craft orders which would minimise conflict in the distribution of relationship property and avoid unnecessary harm to the appellant’s future interest in [Company]; and
(e)failing to take account of the appellant’s post-separation contributions (both past and future) to the value of his shareholding in [Company].
1 Pseudonyms are used for the parties in this judgment.
2 [Barker] v [Barker] [2025] NZFC 1815 [Decision under appeal].
The strike-out application
[2] The respondent has applied to strike out the appeal claiming that it does not disclose any reasonably arguable grounds and that it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. Mr Johnson submitted that the respondent is entitled to finality of litigation but that the appellant is attempting to relitigate issues already settled by the Family Court. Counsel contended that allowing the appeal to proceed would be contrary to the purposes and principles of the PRA, including the just, inexpensive, simple and speedy resolution of relationship property disputes.3
[3] The appellant opposes the strike-out application. Ms Crawshaw KC argued the application seeks…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Barker v Barker [2025] NZHC 1817
Case
[2025] NZHC 1817
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In Barker v Barker, the appellant, Ryan Barker, appealed a Family Court decision that ordered the immediate transfer of half of his 3.5 million ordinary shares in [Company] to his former wife, Alice Barker. The appeal was heard on 5 June 2025 and the judgment was delivered on 4 July 2025 by Harvey J. The central issue before the Court was whether the appeal disclosed reasonably arguable grounds and whether it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The respondent argued that the appeal was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and sought to strike it out. The appellant opposed the strike-out application, arguing that it was premature and that the grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable.
The Court found that the appeal was not frivolous or vexatious, and that it was not an abuse of process. Although there was a change in the appellant’s position between the Family Court and the High Court, the Court found that this was not sufficient to amount to an abuse of process. The Court also found that the appeal was not clearly untenable and that it was reasonably arguable that the Family Court had failed to take into account certain considerations when making its decision. These included the restrictions in the company’s constitution, the potential prejudice to the company’s ability to preserve its capital and attract further investment, and the appellant’s post-separation contributions to the value of his shareholding. The Court held that these issues should be argued in full at the substantive hearing.
The Court granted the respondent’s application for leave to cross-appeal out of time, allowing her to challenge two findings of the Family Court regarding the valuation of the shares. The Court partially granted the application to strike out the appeal, striking out the second ground of appeal. The final orders of the Court were that the second ground of appeal be struck out and that the respondent be granted leave to cross-appeal out of time.