Singh v Singh

[2025] NZHC 1952

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-1944

[2025] NZHC 1952

BETWEEN

CHERYL SINGH

Applicant

AND

SON SINGH and RAJESH JATTAN

Interested Parties

Hearing:

On the papers

Counsel:

N W Woods for the applicant

A Nand for the interested parties
N W Taefi KC as counsel assisting the Court

Judgment:

16 July 2025

JUDGMENT OF BLANCHARD J

This judgment was delivered by me on 16 July 2025 at 11.30 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Rice Craig, Auckland

Patel Nand Legal Barristers and Solicitors, Auckland Shortland Chambers, Auckland

SINGH v SINGH and JATTAN [2025] NZHC 1952 [16 July 2025]

[1]    This proceeding  concerns  the Calvary  Indian Assembly  of God, a church  in East Tāmaki (the Church). The Church has been established as a charitable trust (the Trust).  The Trust has a board (the Board) which holds assets on trust for     the Church.

[2]The parties are Board members of the Church and trustees of the Trust.

[3]In 2024, the parties brought three proceedings relating to the Trust:

(a)Mr Singh and Mr Jattan brought an originating application seeking orders under the Trusts Act 2019 (in CIV-2024-404-752). This application was opposed by Ms Singh, Carrol Prasad and Urmila Narayan.

(b)Ms Singh brought a judicial review application  against  Mr  Singh, Mr Jattan and the Board (in CIV-2024-404-1289).

(c)Finally,  Ms  Singh  brought  this  proceeding  in  which  she  sought  a Beddoe order to fund her opposition to the originating application and her claim in the judicial review application. In response, Mr Singh and Mr Jattan sought a Beddoe order to fund the originating application and their defence of the judicial review application.

[4]    On 6 and 20 September 2024, Campbell J issued two judgments in this proceeding.1 In these judgments, he granted Beddoe orders in favour of both sides for the originating application. He ordered that each side could receive up to $25,000 from the Trust to fund their positions in the originating application. But he adjourned the Beddoe applications  insofar as they relate to the judicial review application.     He considered that the applications relating to the judicial review application should be dealt with after the originating application was determined.

1      Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2559; and Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2736.

[5]    On 3 March 2025, van Bohemen J issued a judgment in relation to the originating application in which he declined to grant the orders sought.2

[6]    The background to this dispute is set out in the two judgments of Campbell J and van Bohemen J and I will not repeat it.

[7]    On 19 May 2025, counsel for Ms Singh filed a memorandum requesting that the Court now resolve her Beddoe application in relation to the judicial review application. On the same date, counsel for Mr Singh and Mr Jattan filed a memorandum indicating that they too would like their application relating to the judicial review application to be resolved.

[8]    Accordingly, on 21 May 2025, I made directions allowing the parties to file any further material in relation to their applications. Upon such material being filed, the Court would resolve the applications on the papers.

[9]    In accordance with these directions, on 11 June 2025, Ms Singh filed a further memorandum and affidavit in support of her application. However, nothing further was filed by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan.

Ms Singh’s application

[10]   Rule 19.4A(1)(b)(iii) of the High Court Rules 2016 requires an applicant for a Beddoe order to obtain an opinion from an appropriately qualified lawyer as to the prospects of success of the proceeding and whether the proceeding is in the best interests of the trust.

[11]   Ms Singh’s affidavit of 9 August 2024 attaches the opinion of a barrister, Alex McDonald, dated 1 August 2024. Mr McDonald’s conclusions are that the three causes of action in the judicial review application appear to have “more than reasonable prospects of success” and it “appears inarguable that the three causes of action brought by Ms Singh are in the best interests” of the Trust.

2      Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 364.

[12]   Nura Taefi KC  provided  submissions  as  counsel  assisting  dated  2  and  18 September 2024. These were relied upon by Campbell J in writing his judgments. The first of these submissions discusses the strength of the judicial review application. Overall, she views the application positively. Her comments also suggest that she does not disagree that the application is in the best interests of Trust.

[13]   Ms Singh’s 11 June 2025 affidavit exhibits an estimate of costs for bringing the judicial review application that she obtained  from her solicitors.  The estimate   is that the costs and disbursements in the proceeding will total $114,250 (including GST). It assumes the case will proceed as a “straightforward Judicial Review Application”, there will be no interlocutory applications, only “modest accommodation for witness briefing” is required, Mr Singh and Mr Jattan will “vigorously oppose the Orders”, and a three-day hearing will be required.

[14]   Ms Singh seeks an order that it is proper for her to continue with her judicial review application at the Trust’s expense to the extent such expense is reasonably incurred, but to a maximum of $114,250. She says that, in the absence of this order, she will not be able to afford to continue with the judicial review application.

[15]   Ms Singh’s affidavit also attaches a draft amended statement of claim. The amendments take into account the matters in van Bohemen J’s judgment. She intends filing the amended pleading if and when the Beddoe order she seeks is made.

[16]   The relevant legal principles are set out in Campbell J’s first judgment at [23] to [28], and I will not repeat them.

[17]   I accept that the proceeding is in the interests of the Trust. The judgment of van Bohemen J did not resolve the matters in dispute. The Board and Trust remain at an impasse.  The parties, and the factions they represent,  have not  been able to  reach  a resolution of the matters in dispute. It is obviously in the interests of the Trust for the impasse to be resolved, and Ms Singh’s judicial review application seems to be the only available avenue to achieve that outcome.

[18]   I have  referenced  Mr  McDonald’s and Ms Taefi’s  views on the prospects  of success of the judicial review application. Although these views were provided prior to van Bohemen J’s judgment, there does not appear to be anything in that judgment that might cause them to downgrade their assessments. In fact, the opposite may well be the case.

[19]   There is no reason to think that Ms Singh is acting out of self-interest. Nor that she has acted in any  way  improperly or unreasonably.  There is  no  criticism  of  Ms Singh in the judgment of van Bohemen J, whereas he is highly critical of Mr Singh and Mr Jattan. He considers it is “blindingly obvious” that they are responsible for the impasse.3

[20]The final matter I must consider is the estimate Ms Singh has obtained.

$114,250 is a large sum of money. It is around double the amount of the scale costs to which Ms Singh would be entitled on the basis that a three-day hearing is required. But I accept the figure as a cap on the fees that Ms Singh can reasonably incur.

[21]   For these reasons, I conclude that I should make the Beddoe order sought by Ms Singh.

Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s application

[22]   As I have said, Mr Singh and Mr Jattan did not file anything further in support of their application.  This may be because they no longer have legal representation.   I see that van Bohemen J’s judgment of 11 June 2025 dealing with costs  in relation to the originating application indicates that they are now self-represented.4

[23]   As  they  did  not  file  anything  further,  their  application  cannot  proceed.  I therefore dismiss their application.

3      Singh v Singh, above n 2, at [80].

4      Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 1516.

Costs

[24]   Ms Singh is entitled to be indemnified from the assets of the Trust for her reasonable costs of bringing the present application.

Result

[25]   I grant Ms Singh’s application. I order that it is proper for her to continue with her judicial review application at the Trust’s  expense to the extent such expense     is reasonably incurred, but to a maximum of $114,250.

[26]I dismiss Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s application.

[27]   I order that Ms Singh is entitled to be indemnified from the assets of the Trust for her reasonable costs of bringing her application.

Blanchard J