Singh v Singh - [2025] NZHC 1952

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-1944

[2025] NZHC 1952

BETWEEN
CHERYL SINGH

Applicant

AND

SON SINGH and RAJESH JATTAN

Interested Parties

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

N W Woods for the applicant

A Nand for the interested parties
N W Taefi KC as counsel assisting the Court

Judgment:

16 July 2025

JUDGMENT OF BLANCHARD J

This judgment was delivered by me on 16 July 2025 at 11.30 am pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:
Rice Craig, Auckland
Patel Nand Legal Barristers and Solicitors, Auckland Shortland Chambers, Auckland

SINGH v SINGH and JATTAN [2025] NZHC 1952 [16 July 2025]

[1] This proceeding concerns the Calvary Indian Assembly of God, a church in East Tāmaki (the Church). The Church has been established as a charitable trust (the Trust). The Trust has a board (the Board) which holds assets on trust for the Church.

[2]The parties are Board members of the Church and trustees of the Trust.

[3]In 2024, the parties brought three proceedings relating to the Trust:

(a)Mr Singh and Mr Jattan brought an originating application seeking orders under the Trusts Act 2019 (in CIV-2024-404-752). This application was opposed by Ms Singh, Carrol Prasad and Urmila Narayan.

(b)Ms Singh brought a judicial review application against Mr Singh, Mr Jattan and the Board (in CIV-2024-404-1289).

(c)Finally, Ms Singh brought this proceeding in which she sought a Beddoe order to fund her opposition to the originating application and her claim in the judicial review application. In response, Mr Singh and Mr Jattan sought a Beddoe order to fund the originating application and their defence of the judicial review application.

[4] On 6 and 20 September 2024, Campbell J issued two judgments in this proceeding.1 In these judgments, he granted Beddoe orders in favour of both sides for the originating application. He ordered that each side could receive up to $25,000 from the Trust to fund their positions in the originating application. But he adjourned the Beddoe applications insofar as they relate to the judicial review application. He considered that the applications relating to the judicial review application should be dealt with after the originating application was determined.

1 Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2559; and Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2736.

[5] On 3 March 2025, van Bohemen J issued a judgment in relation to the originating application in which he declined to grant the orders sought.2

[6] The background to this dispute is set out in the two judgments of Campbell J and van Bohemen J and I will not repeat it.

[7] On 19 May 2025, counsel for Ms Singh filed a memorandum requesting that the Court now resolve her Beddoe application in relation to the judicial review application. On the same date, counsel for Mr Singh and Mr Jattan filed a memorandum indicating that they too would like their application relating to the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Singh v Singh

Details

AGLC: Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 1952
Case: [2025] NZHC 1952
Decision Date: 16 July 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of New Zealand in Auckland was tasked with resolving a dispute among trustees and board members of the Calvary Indian Assembly of God church, which operates as a charitable trust. The central figure in the dispute is Cheryl Singh, who sought funding from the trust to proceed with a judicial review application against her co-trustees, Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan, and the church's board. Simultaneously, Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan sought their own funding to defend against Cheryl Singh's judicial review application and to pursue their own originating application under the Trusts Act 2019. The court had to determine whether Cheryl Singh's request for funding to pursue her judicial review application was justified, considering the trust's interests and the prospects of success of her application.

The primary legal issue was whether Cheryl Singh's judicial review application was in the best interests of the trust and whether she had reasonable prospects of success. The court also needed to assess whether Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan's application for funding to defend against Cheryl Singh's judicial review application and to pursue their originating application should proceed. The court examined the opinions of legal experts, the potential costs involved, and the broader context of the trust's ongoing disputes. The court's decision hinged on whether Cheryl Singh's judicial review application offered a viable path to resolving the impasse within the trust and if the requested funding was reasonable.

In its judgment, the court concluded that Cheryl Singh's judicial review application was in the best interests of the trust, as it seemed to be the only way to resolve the ongoing impasse among the trustees. The court accepted the opinion of legal experts that the application had reasonable prospects of success, especially in light of the critical remarks made about Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan in a previous judgment. The court also found that Cheryl Singh was acting in the interests of the trust and not out of self-interest. Although the requested funding of $114,250 was significant, the court considered it reasonable given the estimated costs of the judicial review application. Conversely, Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan's application was dismissed as they did not provide any further evidence in support of their request for funding.

The court granted Cheryl Singh's application for a Beddoe order, allowing her to proceed with her judicial review application at the trust's expense, up to a maximum of $114,250. The court dismissed Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan's application for funding. Additionally, the court ordered that Cheryl Singh would be indemnified by the trust for her reasonable costs of bringing her application.

Orders