Singh v Singh - [2025] NZHC 2994

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-1944

[2025] NZHC 2994

BETWEEN
CHERYL SINGH

Applicant

AND

SON SINGH and RAJESH JATTAN

Interested Parties

Hearing: On the papers

Counsel:

N W Woods for the applicant

K Anderson KC for the interested parties

Judgment:

9 October 2025

JUDGMENT OF BLANCHARD J

[Application for leave to appeal]

This judgment was delivered by me on 9 October 2025 at 4.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:
Rice Craig, Auckland Wynn Williams, Auckland

SINGH v SINGH [2025] NZHC 2994 [9 October 2025]

[1] Mr Singh and Mr Jattan seek leave to appeal against the decision in my judgment dated 16 July 2025 to dismiss their application for a Beddoe order to fund their defence of a judicial review application brought by Ms Singh relating to the Calvary Indian Assembly of God, a church in East Tamaki (the Church).1 They need leave under s 56 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 because they made their application for the Beddoe order by way of an interlocutory application. Their application is opposed by Ms Singh.

[2] In the same judgment, I dealt with a Beddoe application by Ms Singh. She brought her application to fund her claim in the judicial review application. I made an order in her favour.2 Mr Singh and Mr Jattan have appealed that aspect of my judgment as well. They do not require leave to bring that appeal because Ms Singh’s application was made by originating application.

Decision to dismiss Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s application

[3] The two applications for Beddoe orders were listed before me in the Judicial Review list on 21 May 2025. I recorded in my minute on that date that:3

Some submissions have already been filed in relation to the Beddoe
applications, but further and/or updating submissions are required.

[4] Accordingly, I directed the parties to file any submissions in support of their applications. I said that, upon such material being filed, the Court would resolve the applications on the papers.4

[5] Ms Singh filed a further memorandum and affidavit in support of her application. In contrast, however, nothing further was filed by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan. In view of this, I concluded that their application could not proceed and dismissed their application.5

1      Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 1952.
2 At [25].
3      Singh v Singh HC Auckland CIV-2024-404-1289, 21 May 2025 (Minute of Blanchard J) at [4].
4 At [6].
5      Singh v Singh, above n 1, at [22]–[23].

Leave criteria

[6] Section 56 of the Senior Courts Act provides a “filtering mechanism” to ensure that unmeritorious appeals of interlocutory orders, or appeals of interlocutory orders of no great significance to the parties or more generally, do not unnecessarily delay proceedings.6 A “high threshold” applies. Applicants must raise an arguable error of law or fact that is of general or public importance, or…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Singh v Singh

Details

AGLC: Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 2994
Case: [2025] NZHC 2994
Decision Date: 9 October 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Singh and Mr Jattan applied for leave to appeal the decision of Blanchard J to dismiss their application for a Beddoe order to fund their defence in a judicial review application brought by Ms Singh. The dismissal was pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016, as the application for the Beddoe order was made by interlocutory application. The appeal against the dismissal was opposed by Ms Singh. Additionally, Mr Singh and Mr Jattan appealed the granting of Ms Singh's Beddoe application, which was made by originating application, and thus did not require leave to appeal.

The legal issues before the court were whether Mr Singh and Mr Jattan had identified an arguable error of law or fact in the dismissal of their application for a Beddoe order and whether it was in the interests of justice to hear their appeal together with the appeal against the order made in favour of Ms Singh. The court also considered the criteria for leave to appeal, including whether the error of law or fact was of general or public importance or of sufficient importance to the applicant.

Blanchard J found that Mr Singh and Mr Jattan had not identified an arguable error in the dismissal of their application. The court had not overlooked the submissions filed by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan in August and September 2024, which were referred to in the court's minute of 21 May 2025. Those submissions contained background information relevant to their Beddoe application but did not make substantive submissions in support of the application. The court had directed the parties to file further and/or updating submissions, which Mr Singh and Mr Jattan failed to do. As a result, the application could not proceed, and the dismissal was upheld. Blanchard J also declined the application for leave to appeal.

The application for leave to appeal was declined.

Orders