Singh v Singh
[2025] NZHC 2994
•9 October 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2024-404-1944
[2025] NZHC 2994
BETWEEN CHERYL SINGH
Applicant
AND
SON SINGH and RAJESH JATTAN
Interested Parties
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
N W Woods for the applicant
K Anderson KC for the interested parties
Judgment:
9 October 2025
JUDGMENT OF BLANCHARD J
[Application for leave to appeal]
This judgment was delivered by me on 9 October 2025 at 4.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Rice Craig, Auckland Wynn Williams, Auckland
SINGH v SINGH [2025] NZHC 2994 [9 October 2025]
[1] Mr Singh and Mr Jattan seek leave to appeal against the decision in my judgment dated 16 July 2025 to dismiss their application for a Beddoe order to fund their defence of a judicial review application brought by Ms Singh relating to the Calvary Indian Assembly of God, a church in East Tamaki (the Church).1 They need leave under s 56 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 because they made their application for the Beddoe order by way of an interlocutory application. Their application is opposed by Ms Singh.
[2] In the same judgment, I dealt with a Beddoe application by Ms Singh. She brought her application to fund her claim in the judicial review application. I made an order in her favour.2 Mr Singh and Mr Jattan have appealed that aspect of my judgment as well. They do not require leave to bring that appeal because Ms Singh’s application was made by originating application.
Decision to dismiss Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s application
[3] The two applications for Beddoe orders were listed before me in the Judicial Review list on 21 May 2025. I recorded in my minute on that date that:3
Some submissions have already been filed in relation to the Beddoe
applications, but further and/or updating submissions are required.
[4] Accordingly, I directed the parties to file any submissions in support of their applications. I said that, upon such material being filed, the Court would resolve the applications on the papers.4
[5] Ms Singh filed a further memorandum and affidavit in support of her application. In contrast, however, nothing further was filed by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan. In view of this, I concluded that their application could not proceed and dismissed their application.5
1 Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 1952.
2 At [25].
3 Singh v Singh HC Auckland CIV-2024-404-1289, 21 May 2025 (Minute of Blanchard J) at [4].
4 At [6].
5 Singh v Singh, above n 1, at [22]–[23].
Leave criteria
[6] Section 56 of the Senior Courts Act provides a “filtering mechanism” to ensure that unmeritorious appeals of interlocutory orders, or appeals of interlocutory orders of no great significance to the parties or more generally, do not unnecessarily delay proceedings.6 A “high threshold” applies. Applicants must raise an arguable error of law or fact that is of general or public importance, or one that is otherwise of sufficient importance to the applicant to outweigh the lack of general or precedential value. The significance or implications of such an error, either for the particular case or for the applicant, or as a matter of precedent, must warrant the further delay and cost of the appeal.7
Basis for application for leave
[7] Mr Singh and Mr Jattan say I erred because, in dismissing their Beddoe application on the basis that they did not file anything further following my direction on 21 May 2025, I overlooked submissions they had filed in August and September 2024.
[8]Mr Singh and Mr Jattan also say:
(a)They have appealed as of right the other part of my decision dealing with Ms Singh’s application. It is in the interests of justice that both sides of the “Beddoe coin” issues are argued together on appeal.
(b)Ms Singh has made amendments to the statement of claim in the judicial review application that are significant, seeking relief that the Court is unlikely to be able to grant. It is in the interest of justice that Mr Singh and Mr Jattan have an opportunity to make submissions on appeal as to the implications of those amendments in the context of their Beddoe application.
6 Finewood Upholstery Ltd v Vaughan [2017] NZHC 1679 at [13].
7 Greendrake v District Court of New Zealand [2020] NZCA 122 at [6]; Ngai Te Hapu Inc v Bay of Plenty Regional Council [2018] NZCA 291 at [17]; and Wallace v Green [2022] NZHC 800 at [17].
(c)There is no question of unwarranted delay, given the parallel appeal against the order made in relation to Ms Singh’s application. As leave is not required for that appeal, it is currently before the Court of Appeal. If leave is granted, the two appeals will proceed together.
Decision
[9] Had Mr Singh and Mr Jattan been able to point to an arguable error in my decision, it is likely that I would have granted leave to appeal. Mr Singh and Mr Jattan only require leave in this case for the arbitrary reason that they brought their application by interlocutory application. Had they brought their application by way of an originating application, as is the usual practice, they would not require leave. However, it would not be right for me to grant leave because I do not consider that they have identified an arguable error.
[10] I did not overlook the August and September 2024 submissions. I had these submissions before me when I wrote the judgment. They (along with submissions that had been filed on behalf of Ms Singh) were what I was referring to as “some submissions” when I said in my 21 May 2025 minute that, “Some submissions have already been filed in relation to the Beddoe applications, but further and/or updating submissions are required.”8
[11] The August and September 2024 submissions do contain background information that is relevant to Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s Beddoe application, but they do no more than that. Neither set makes submissions in support of Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s application. Both sets of submissions relate to other applications.
[12] The August 2024 submissions are in opposition to Ms Singh’s Beddoe application, as well as to a different Beddoe application by Ms Singh relating to a different proceeding brought by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan seeking orders relating to the Church under the Trusts Act 2019. The September 2024 submissions are in support of a different Beddoe application by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan that relates to their proceeding under the Trusts Act.
8 Singh v Singh, above n 3, at [4].
[13] The Beddoe application by Mr Singh and Mr Jattan to which their application for leave to appeal relates is mentioned in the September 2024 submissions, but only in passing. All that is said about the application is that it should be adjourned to a Duty Judge list mention at a later date.
[14] The August and September 2024 submissions only contain background information that was relevant to Mr Singh and Mr Jattan’s application. They do not make submissions in support of the application. Mr Singh and Mr Jattan did not take up the opportunity given to them on 21 May 2025 to file further and/or updating submissions. There was no basis for the Court to consider or determine their application.
[15] Key information, as required by r 19.4A of the High Court Rules 2016, was missing, such as an estimate of the costs likely to be incurred if an order was granted in favour of Mr Singh and Mr Jattan.9 The procedural issues with the application were not just irregularities. Without any substantive submissions or supporting material, the objectives of the requirements in r 19.4A could not be met by other means.10 Accordingly, the application could not proceed and had to be dismissed.
[16] For these reasons, I cannot see any arguable error in my decision and, therefore, I decline the application for leave.
Result
[17]The application for leave is declined.
Blanchard J
9 High Court Rules 2016, r 19.4A(b)(ii); and Wallace v Green [2022] NZHC 512 at [46].
10 High Court Rules, r 1.5. Wallace v Green, above n 9, at [50]–[59]; and Singh v Singh
[2024] NZHC 2736 at [6]–[8].
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