Singh v Singh
[2025] NZHC 1516
•11 June 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2024-404-000752
[2025] NZHC 1516
UNDER Part 19 of the High Court Rules 2016 IN THE MATTER
of the Calvary Indian Assembly of God
BETWEEN
SON SINGH
First Applicant
RAJESH JATTAN
Second Applicant
AND
CHERYL SINGH
First Respondent
CARROL PRASAD
Second Respondent
URMILA NARAYAN
Third Respondent
On the papers Counsel:
Applicants self-represented N W Woods for Respondents
Judgment:
11 June 2025
JUDGMENT OF VAN BOHEMEN J
[on costs]
Solicitors:
This judgment was delivered by me on 11 June 2025 at 11 am pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
……………………………..
Rice Craig, Auckland
Copy to Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan
SINGH v SINGH [2025] NZHC 1516 [11 June 2025]
[1] This judgment decides an application for costs following a judgment given in a proceeding concerning a dispute over the membership of the Trust Board and the Church Board of the Calvary Indian Assembly of God (Calvary, sometimes referred to as the Assembly or the Church).
[2] In a judgment dated 3 March 2025, I dismissed the originating application by Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan (the Applicants) for orders under ss 112, 114 and 133 of the Trusts Act 2019 directing that:1
(a)all current trustees on the Trust Board and all current members of the Church Board retire; and
(b)a special meeting of members of Calvary be called to elect five new Trustees/Board members.
[3] In the judgment, I accepted that the Trustees/Board members were at an impasse and that, absent outside intervention or a major change of attitude on the part of the Trustees/Board members, that impasse was not likely to resolved.2 I also accepted that the impasse was to the detriment of Calvary and its operation as a charitable trust and as a church.3 However, I concluded I should not make the orders sought by the Applicants for the reasons set out in the judgment.4 These included that the actions of the Applicants were the reason for the impasse and that I was not persuaded that the orders sought by the Applicants would cure the impasse.5 I also noted that there was on foot another proceeding (namely the Respondents’ application for judicial review) in which similar orders are sought and which was more appropriate for considering whether such orders should be made.6
[4]I held that the Applicants were liable for the Respondents’ costs, subject to a
Beddoe order made by Campbell J on 6 September 2024, and recorded that I
1 Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 364 [Originating application judgment].
2 At [71].
3 At [71].
4 At [72].
5 At [80]–[82].
6 At [84].
considered costs to be payable on 2B basis.7 However, I gave leave to the parties to file memoranda in accordance with a timetable set out in the judgment.
[5] In the event, the parties were not able to agree, and memoranda were filed. The substantive memorandum filed by the Applicants, who are now self-represented, was filed considerably later than directed.
Costs and orders sought by Respondents
[6] In a memorandum dated 24 March 2025 from their counsel, Mr Woods, the Respondents seek:
(a)costs in the sum of $36,567 calculated on a 2B basis (the Scale Costs), and disbursements of $286, with interest on these sums to run from the date of this costs judgment to the date of payment;
(b)an order that Mr Ray Cox, who was appointed to administer Calvary’s affairs on an interim basis,8 be directed to pay the reasonable costs and expenses of Mr Andrew Gilchrist, who has acted as independent chair of the Board since 22 March 2023,9 relating to this proceeding and the administration of Calvary; and
(c)an order that Mr Cox be directed to pay the difference between the Respondents’ actual costs of $64,750 (comprising a fee of $55,000, GST of $8,250, and an office charge of $1,500), and the Scale Costs, being the sum of $28,183.10
[7]Attached to Mr Woods’ memorandum are two annexes:
(a)Annex A: a breakdown of the calculation of the Scale Costs by reference to the steps in sch 3 to the High Court Rules 2016.
7 At [89]–[90]; and Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2559 [First Beddoe order judgment] at [45].
8 Singh v Singh HC Auckland CIV-2024-404-752, 13 May 2024 (Minute of Brewer J).
9 Originating Application Judgment, above n 1, at [37].
10 It appears from Annex 2 to Mr Woods’ memorandum that the plaintiffs may have intended to claim
$64,975 to include $225 for GST on the office charge.
(b)Annex B: being a copy of Rice Craig’s invoice dated 24 March 2025 for a fee of $55,000 plus GST of $8,250 as well as the office charge of
$1,500 and GST of $225, resulting in a total sum of $64,975.00.
[8] The calculation of Scale Costs includes steps taken by the Respondents in seeking consolidation of the Applicant’s originating application with the Respondents’ judicial review application.11 It also includes steps taken by the Respondents in opposing the Applicants’ application to strike out an affidavit filed by Mr Gilchrist in the originating application proceeding.12
[9] However, the calculations in the two annexes do not refer to or take into consideration an order made by Campbell J on 25 October 2024 in accordance with the First Beddoe order judgment and directing Mr Cox to pay Ms Cheryl Singh (the First Respondent) the sum of $25,000 for costs incurred in defending the Applicant’s originating application.13
[10]In that minute, Campbell J also directed Mr Cox:14
(a)to pay other costs incurred by the Respondents in relation to their application for the Beddoe order;
(b)to pay the Applicants the sum of $25,000 in accordance with a Beddoe order he made in relation to their costs in bringing the originating application;15 and
(c)to pay the Applicants’ costs in opposing the Respondents’ application for Beddoe orders and in bringing their own Beddoe application.
[11] I note that, while Campbell J’s minute and the two Beddoe order judgments were made in the context of the Respondents’ judicial review application, it is plain
11 Singh v Singh HC Auckland CIV-2024-404-752, 8 July 2024 [Minute of Becroft J].
12 Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2685 [Judgment of Tahana J].
13 Singh v Singh HC Auckland CIV-2024-404-1944, 25 October 2024 [Minute of Campbell J], at [4].
14 At [8]–[10].
15 Singh v Singh [2024] NZHC 2736 [Second Beddoe order judgment].
that his orders also applied to costs incurred by the Respondents and the Applicants in relation to the originating application.
Memorandum from Applicants on costs
[12] In a memorandum dated 6 May 2025, the Applicants submit that no order should be made against them with respect to the Respondents’ costs on the application to strike out Mr Gilchrist’s affidavit because Tahana J ordered that some paragraphs in the affidavit should be redacted. They also submit that no orders should be made regarding the payment of Mr Gilchrist’s costs in relation to the proceeding because those costs were not relevant to the current proceeding and because Mr Gilchrist made no application for costs.
[13] More generally, the Applicants submit that the Respondents should not be awarded costs in excess of the indemnity of $25,000 which Campbell J ordered because any award in excess of that amount would affect the Trust’s funds.
[14] The Applicants attach to their memorandum a letter dated 18 March 2025 from Mr Woods, in which the Respondents proposed, on a without prejudice basis, that costs be resolved for a lesser amount than that now sought as part of a proposed resolution of this proceeding, the judicial review application and the impasse in Calvary.
Analysis
[15] In this proceeding, the Respondents successfully opposed the orders sought in the Applicants’ originating application. Accordingly, they were the successful parties and are entitled to costs in the normal way, irrespective of any offer made to accept a lesser amount in the context of a settlement offer that was not accepted by the Applicants.
[16] However, the Respondents are only entitled to costs in relation to this proceeding and on matters on which they were the successful party. They are also not entitled to double recovery of their costs. There is also a question as to whether I have jurisdiction to make some of the other orders sought by the Respondents.
Costs relating to consolidation of proceedings and opposing strike out of affidavit
[17] I note that, in dismissing the Respondents’ application to consolidate the Applicants’ originating application with the Respondents’ judicial review application, Becroft J made no order as to costs.16 Becroft J’s assessment that the decision of the originating application would effectively resolve concerns in the judicial review application did not prove correct. However, I do not consider that entitles the Respondents to costs on their application for consolidation, especially when their application for judicial review was filed after the originating application had been set down by consent for hearing on 26 September 2024. Given the late filing of the judicial review application and the application for consolidation, I consider the costs relating to consolidation of the two proceedings should lie where they fall and should be removed from the Respondent’s calculations.
[18] On the other hand, I accept that the Respondents can properly claim their costs in defending the Applicant’s application to strike out Mr Gilchrist’s affidavit, in which the Respondents were largely successful and on which costs were reserved.17
[19] Based on the calculations in Annex A to Mr Woods’ memorandum, it appears that the Scale Costs should be reduced by 2.35 days or $5,616.50 to exclude steps relating to the application for consolidation. This results in an adjusted total for scale costs of $30,950.50.
[20] I have considered whether to reduce further this adjusted total by $950.50 to ensure that total recovery under this judgment and Campbell J’s minute of 25 October 2024 does not exceed actual costs incurred by the Respondents. However, given the office charge of $1,500 plus GST, I have decided to make no further deduction. I see no case, however, for ordering payment of any greater sum, whether by the Applicants or the Trust through Mr Cox.
16 Minute of Beecroft J, above n 11.
17 Judgment of Tahana J, above n 12, at [21].
Costs incurred by Mr Gilchrist
[21] While Mr Gilchrist was not a party to the originating application proceeding, his affidavit was filed in accordance with directions made by Becroft J.18 Moreover, Mr Gilchrist’s evidence of what had transpired between the parties was important to my decision. For these reasons, I am satisfied it is appropriate to direct Mr Cox to pay the reasonable costs incurred by Mr Gilchrist relating to the proceeding.
[22] However, I do not consider I have jurisdiction to order payment of Mr Gilchrist’s costs and expenses relating to the administration of Calvary. I record, however, that I do not doubt that those costs and expenses were genuinely incurred and should be paid by Calvary. However, they were not costs incurred in this proceeding.
Orders
[23]Accordingly, I make the following orders.
[24]First, I order the Applicants, jointly, to pay the Respondents’ costs of
$30,950.50 plus disbursements of $286.00. Interest under the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016 shall run on those amounts from the date of this judgment to the date of payment. Given my findings that the actions of the Applicants were the reason for the impasse in Calvary, and Campbell J’s orders for payment of some of the Applicants’ costs in this proceeding in accordance with the second Beddoe order judgment,19 the costs ordered in this judgment should be met personally by the Applicants and not by the Trust or the Church Board.
[25] Secondly, I direct Mr Ray Cox, the independent accountant for the Church, to pay the reasonable costs incurred by Mr Gilchrist relating to this proceeding.
G J van Bohemen J
18 Minute of Becroft J, above n 11, at [38].
19 Minute of Campbell J, above n 13, at [9].