Singh v Singh

Case [2025] NZHC 364


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2024-404-000752

[2025] NZHC 364

UNDER Part 19 of the High Court Rules 2016

IN THE MATTER

of the Calvary Indian Assembly of God

BETWEEN

SON SINGH

First Applicant

RAJESH JATTAN

Second Applicant

AND

CHERYL SINGH

First Respondent

CARROL PRASAD

Second Respondent

URMILA NARAYAN

Third Respondent

Hearing: 26 September 2024

Counsel:

P J Napier and J Y Leenoh for Applicants N W Woods and for Respondents

Judgment:

3 March 2025


JUDGMENT OF VAN BOHEMEN J


This judgment was delivered by me on 3 March 2025 at 3 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

……………………………..

Solicitors:

K3 Legal, Auckland Rice Craig, Auckland

SINGH v SINGH [2025] NZHC 364 [3 March 2025]

[1]    This application concerns the Calvary Indian Assembly of God (Calvary, sometimes referred to as the Assembly or the Church). Calvary has been established as a charitable trust (the Trust). The Trust has a board of trustees (the Trust Board), who hold assets on trust for Calvary under a trust deed. The assets include a church at Nikau Road, Ōtāhuhu for services for the members of Calvary. Under separate rules providing for Calvary to be an incorporated society, it also has a board, which is responsible for its management and organisation (the Church Board).

[2]    In the period under consideration, all members of the Trust Board were also members of the Church Board and, with one exception,  all  members  of  the  Church Board were also members of the Trust Board. Despite the slight mismatch in memberships, in practice, the two Boards were treated as one and the same. I note that the same applied to equivalent bodies considered by the Court of Appeal in Time v Fagalilo, another decision involving an Assembly of God church.1

[3]    However, because the two Boards are subject to different rules, I consider it important to maintain the distinction between the two sets of memberships. In this judgment, I use the terms “Trustees” to refer to members of the Trust Board and “Board members” to refer to members of the Church Board.

The application

[4]    Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan (the Applicants), who were elected as Trustees and Board members in July 2022, apply  under  ss  112,  114  and  133  of  the  Trusts Act 2019 for orders directing that:

(a)all current Trustees and Board members retire; and

(b)a special meeting of members of Calvary is called to elect five new Trustees/Board members.

[5]    The application proposes eligibility criteria for persons who could be nominated for election as Trustees/Board members and for Calvary members entitled


1      Time v Fagalilo [2011] NZCA 402 at [24].

to vote in the elections. The proposed criteria are based on completion of membership forms, attendance at Church services and the payment of tithes.

[6]    The Applicants say the orders are needed because there is an irreconcilable division between the current Trustees/Board members. The division has resulted…

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Singh v Singh [2025] NZHC 364
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[2025] NZHC 364
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The application by Son Singh and Rajesh Jattan under ss 112, 114 and 133 of the Trusts Act 2019 for orders directing the retirement of all current Trustees and Board members of the Calvary Indian Assembly of God (Calvary) and the election of new Trustees and Board members was dismissed. The Applicants sought the orders on the basis of an impasse between the Trustees and Board members that had paralysed Calvary and led to the exclusion of the Respondents from Calvary and from the decision-making processes of the Trust/Church Board. The Court held that the Court of Appeal had held in Time v Fagalilo that the Court’s power to appoint new trustees under s 51 of the Trustee Act 1956 did not extend to requiring election of a church board governed by separate rules. The Court was also not satisfied that the current impasse was sufficient grounds for Court intervention because it was clear that the impasse was the result of the actions of the Applicants. The Court also held that the orders sought by the Applicants would not cure the impasse and might even make it worse. The Court was also not satisfied that it had an adequate basis for determining the eligibility criteria for the election of new Trustees and Board members.

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