Rangitonga v Parker

Case [2016] NZCA 166


For a Court ready (fee required) version please follow this link

NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 139 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1985.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA477/2015 [2016] NZCA 166

BETWEEN

NEIHANA JEREMY RANGITONGA

Appellant

AND

SHANNON LAING PARKER

Respondent

Hearing: 2 November 2015

Court:

Randerson, Lang and Clifford JJ

Counsel:

A F Rickard-Simms for Appellant

P J Davison QC and H D L Steele for Respondent

Judgment:

3 May 2016 at 11:00 am


JUDGMENT OF THE COURT



A        The application for leave to appeal is granted. B    The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Randerson J)

Introduction

[1]                  Mr Rangitonga’s application for leave to appeal raises questions as to the interpretation and application of s 47 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the CPA). Section 47 is expressed in different terms from its statutory predecessor, s 358 of the Crimes Act 1961. The new section provides:

RANGITONGA v PARKER [2016] NZCA 166 [3 May 2016]

47       Previous acquittal

If a plea of previous acquittal is entered in relation to a charge, the court must dismiss the charge under section 147 if the court is satisfied that the defendant has been acquitted of—

(a)the same offence as the offence currently charged, arising from the same facts; or

(b)any other offence arising from those facts.

[2]  In the High Court, Katz J identified the issue succinctly:1

… having been previously acquitted of rape, can Neihana Rangitonga now be charged with injuring the complainant with intent to injure her, arising out of events that occurred the same evening?

[3]  Katz J agreed with the  conclusion  reached  by  Judge  Ingram  in  the District Court.2 The injuring charge could still proceed despite the earlier acquittal  on the rape charge. In essence, Katz J considered the injuring charge did not arise  out of the same facts as the previous rape charge. Rather, she found the alleged rape and assault formed part of a series of events. While those events were closely linked in time and place, they arose out of different incidents, involving different facts which occurred sequentially.3

[4]                  In support of the appeal, Mr Rickard-Simms raised a number of issues but, in essence, the issue is whether the High Court Judge was correct in her conclusions as to the interpretation and application of s 47 of the CPA in the circumstances of the case.

[5]                  An unusual feature of the case is that the proposed injuring charge is brought by the respondent, Ms Parker, as a private prosecution. There is no procedural challenge in that respect.

[6]                  There being no opposition to Mr Rangitonga’s application for leave to appeal, we grant the application and proceed to consider the merits of the appeal.


1      Rangitonga v Parker [2015] NZHC 1772, [2016] 2 NZLR 73 at [1].

2      Parker v Rangitonga [2015] NZDC 7733.

3      Rangitonga v Parker, above n 1, at [97].

Background facts

[7]…

Continue reading Rangitonga v Parker

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Rangitonga v Parker [2016] NZCA 166
Case
[2016] NZCA 166
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Neihana Jeremy Rangitonga appeals against a decision of the High Court dismissing his plea of previous acquittal to a charge of injuring with intent brought by Shannon Laing Parker as a private prosecution. The appeal raises questions about the interpretation and application of s 47 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, which codifies the special pleas of previous acquittal and conviction. Mr Rangitonga had been acquitted of raping Ms Parker, but Ms Parker now seeks to prosecute him on a charge of injuring with intent arising from his admitted assault on her. The Court of Appeal agrees with the High Court that the injuring charge does not arise from the same facts as the rape charge, and accordingly dismisses the appeal. The Court of Appeal notes that the Crown withdrew the injuring charge prior to Mr Rangitonga's trial for rape, and suggests that in those circumstances the propriety of proceeding with a private prosecution on the injuring charge may be open to question.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.